This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`




1837
ARTES
VERITAS
SCIENTIA
LIBRARY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
TURRIS


D
73
.M
17
v.

THE

WORKS

OF

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence.

Newly TRANSLATED from the ORIGINALS;

ILLUSTRATED WITH

Notes, Anecdotes, Diſſertations, and the Life of MACHIAVEL,

Never before publiſhed:

And Several New PLANS in the ART of WAR.

By ELLIS FARNEWORTH, M.A.
Vicar of Roſthern in. Cheſhire.

Tranſlator of the LIFE of POPE SIXTUS V. and DAVILA's HISTORY of the CIVIL WARS of FRANCE.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

Printed for THOMAS DA[illegible] in Ruſſel-ſtreet, Covent-garden; THOMAS WALLER, in Fleet-Stree[illegible]. and J. DODSLEY, in Pall-Mall; JAMES FLETCHER, in St. Paul's Church-yard; Meſſ. BALFOUR and HAMILTON, at Edinburgh; and Mr. JAMES Ho[illegible] at Dublin.

MDC[illegible]

WORKS

OF

THOMAS MACKNIGHT

[redacted]

TO THE REVEREND

DOCTOR ADDENBROOKE,

DEAN of LICHFIELD.

SIR,

I Take the liberty of inſcribing this Volume of Machiavel's works to you, as the beſt friend I ever had, or expect to have. But at the ſame time that I indulge the dictates of Gratitude, and am proud of making a public acknowledgement of your favours, I freely confeſs, a little ſelf-intereſt and worldly policy have likewiſe ſome ſhare in prompting me to this Addreſs: for I am very certain your Name will be a ſufficient Recommendation to the World, and hope your Modeſty will not be offended

36472

at it; ſince it is not offered up as a fulſome Scrap of Adulation, (every body muſt know) but intended as a ſincere Declaration, how much I am, and really think myſelf,

SIR,

Your moſt obliged,

Humble Servant,

ELLIS FARNEWORTH.

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE

READER,

FROM

The French Tranſlation, concerning the enſuing Diſcourſes.

MACHIAVEL has been ſo generally decried, on account of the little regard he is ſuppoſed to have ſhewn to Religion and Morality in his writings, that a good man perhaps might think himſelf in ſome danger of being corrupted if he ſhould venture to read them. I confeſs I was long of that opinion myſelf, and therefore cannot well tell how to blame others for it. But after I had carefully peruſed them, and found ſufficient reaſon to alter my ſentiments in that matter; I thought many others might probably do the ſame, and that it would not be an unacceptable performance to ſeveral perſons of worth and candour, who do not underſtand Italian, if I ſhould furniſh them with the means of reading Machiavel's works, by tranſlating them into the vulgar tongue; that ſo they might have an opportunity not only of undeceiving, but even of profitting themſelves by the many admirable maxims and inſtructions they will find in them. For indeed it is impoſſible that any one, who maturely conſiders them, ſhould not be convinced of their excellence and utility, both in the management of State-affairs, and in the common tranſactions of life; in one or other of which every man has ſome concern, and conſequently will find his account in peruſing theſe writings. I might add, for my own juſtifi-

cation, that having duly examined the reaſons, which have given riſe to ſo unfavourable an opinion as hath been generally conceived of Machiavel, I find it has rather been owing to prejudice than any rational foundation: ſince he ſeems to have taken no greater liberties than ſeveral other Hiſtorians whoſe writings have never been objected to; and whilſt he is painting mankind in their true colours (which is a matter of great conſequence to know) neither recommends their vices, or enormities, or wicked maxims, as rules of conduct and practice for the imitation of others, in oppoſition to Virtue and Morality. On the contrary, it is very obſervable in the courſe of this work, which chiefly treats of the foundation and government of States, that the firſt Principles he lays down for thoſe purpoſes, are the fear of God, a love of unity and order, honeſt induſtry, a ſtrict regard to juſtice, good military diſcipline, temperance, and other rules for the prevention or ſuppreſſion of idleneſs and luxury.

If this be the caſe then, Machiavel's writings muſt be ſadly tortured in order to extract that poiſon, which is ſuppoſed to lurk in them. Let any one read them however without prepoſſeſſion, and interpret them fairly as he ought to do, by referring the ſeveral *traits* to their proper Characters, and applying the different Maxims to the Hypotheſes he lays down, and I am perſuaded he will ſoon diveſt himſelf of the prejudice he had conceived againſt him. But if, inſtead of that, he detaches ſome parts, and applies them again to others, where they neither are nor can be applicable, if he puts a bad conſtruction upon expreſſions which will naturally admit of a good one, if he makes it his buſineſs to carp only at the wicked examples that are quoted, the Author certainly is not worthy of cenſure, but he that abuſes him in ſuch a manner; and at this rate it might be reckoned dangerous to read any Hiſtorian; becauſe there are none in whoſe writings we may not find maxims both avowed and practiſed, that are at leaſt as exceptionable as thoſe imputed to our Author. A man muſt exclude himſelf from the world, if he would avoid meeting with bad examples, even amongſt people in *high places*, and who pique themſelves upon their devotion. Have we not ſeen authors, and thoſe of great name too, who have made no ſcruple of celebrating actions as *holy*, which another man of common ſenſe only would have deteſted as the moſt perfidious and inhuman? Have we not known Princes, otherwiſe great and illuſtrious, who have declared in their edicts, that they were reſolved to violate the privileges and immunities they had confirmed to their Subjects by the moſt ſolemn oaths and promiſes [*a*]? Nay, they have been ſo far from being aſhamed

[*a*] The French Tranſlator, Monſieur Tetard, who was a Proteſtant Refugee, may be ſuppoſed to allude here to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Lewis XIV. in the year 1685.

of

of ſuch an infamous manner of proceeding, that they have thought themſelves worthy of all praiſe, and reckoned it amongſt the moſt meritorious actions of their life. This aſtoniſhing depravation of the human heart is not indeed altogether a new thing, though it is in a manner peculiar to the latter ages of Chriſtianity, to give flaming and magnificent titles to a Prince who would have been abhorred in the primitive times. What muſt any one think, if we were here to recite the reaſons aſſigned for Canonizing Lewis IX. a Prince naturally inclined to be good, it muſt be confeſſed, but corrupted by the monks to ſuch a degree, as to perſecute the poor Albigenſes in the bloody and unmerciful manner he did? What ſhall we ſay of the ſplendid title of *Holy Office*, that is given to a Tribunal, the maxims and practice of which are ſufficient to inſpire any one with horror that only hears them related? It is certain that the very worſt things we meet with in Machiavel are far from being at ſuch variance with humanity and morality, as theſe *holy matters*, which ſo many weak people reverence, with a prejudice ten thouſand times more dangerous than what can ariſe from the tenets of the Florentine Politician.

But ſomebody perhaps may ſay, whence then proceeds this general prepoſſeſſion againſt an author, who, I maintain, has not tranſgreſſed the bounds of decency and moderation; whilſt many others that have exceeded them are looked upon with a favourable eye, and even young people are allowed to read Tacitus, who in point of morality very often ſtands in need of correction: whereas the *Holy Inquiſition* excommunicates all thoſe that read Machiavel? To which I anſwer, that in this caſe his Accuſers are his Judges: for he has touched upon the vices of Monks and other Prieſts in ſuch a manner, that it is no wonder if they do not love him. Every one knows that this ſort of people have the artifice to cover their own private intereſts under the veil of Religion, and fight their enemies with conſecrated arms. Machiavel therefore with them is a Heretic, an abandoned, profligate, dangerous fellow, for daring to preſent the world with ſuch a picture of the *Holy* Roman Church; which being founded only upon the prejudices of the multitude, will not ſuffer its Myſteries to be developed with impunity: it is making a cruel war upon it, thus to expoſe its interior, and ſtrip off the diſguiſe of its Prieſts. But if one was to ſtrike out all the paſſages in the writings of this great Politician which bear hard upon them; thoſe very people, who are now his bittereſt enemies, would then be the loudeſt in his praiſe. As the common Reader however is likely to be the moſt diſintereſted Judge, we ſhall leave the matter to his deciſion, without ſaying any thing further to bias his opinion in this cauſe. For the reſt, Machiavel indeed ſometimes lets himſelf looſe upon the Ultramontanes.

montanes. At the head of this work he treats the French and Germans as perfidious, rapacious Barbarians, &c. as if the Italians ſurpaſſed all other people in point of probity, generoſity, and humanity. But he may appear in ſome meaſure pardonable even in this reſpect, when we conſider the cruel treatment his country met with from thoſe nations. Few people love their Conquerors; and for that reaſon, we may ſuppoſe, he ſpeaks ſo harſhly of Charles VIII. whom other Hiſtorians mention with great honour, conſidering him as a young Prince. But to ſpeak truth, it ſeems as if the Italians, and particularly the Florentines, have no more reaſon than the Ultramontane Princes to boaſt of Sincerity, diſintereſtedneſs, or politeneſs in any of the quarrels they were ever engaged in with the latter. This, however, ought not to diſguſt any one, or deter him from reading ſo uſeful a work. Every Author has his faults; and Machiavel is not entirely exempt from them. The ſame may be ſaid of what he relates concerning the ancient Gauls and their neighbours: ſince neither Cæſar nor Tacitus repreſent thoſe Ultramontanes in ſo unfavourable a light as our Author has done.

THE

CONTENTS

OF THE

SECOND VOLUME.

POLITICAL Diſcourſes upon the firſt Decad of Livy, in three books.

The Art of War, in ſeven books.

The Marriage of Belphegor.

With his Poſthumous Works: conſiſting of a diſcourſe on the reformation of the Government of Florence; written by command of Pope Leo X. *And thirty-nine letters on matters of ſtate.*

MACHIAVEL's DEDICATION

OF HIS

POLITICAL DISCOURSES,

TO

ZANOBI BUONDELMONTE and COSIMO RUCELLAI.

IF the preſent I here ſend you, my dear friends, is not anſwerable to the obligations you have laid upon me, it is the beſt, however, I am able to offer you in my circumſtances; as it contains all the political knowledge I have collected from much reading, and long experience in the affairs of the world. Your uſual Candour, therefore, I am perſuaded, will not ſuffer you to expect more than I am able to give; though, perhaps, you will find juſt cauſe to be diſguſted at the poverty of my ſtyle, as well as at ſome errors of judgment, which I may probably be guilty of in the courſe of my reaſonings. Should that be the caſe, I cannot tell whether you will not be as blameable for urging me to undertake a taſk, which I ſhould otherwiſe never have attempted, as I ſhall be for not executing it in a better manner. Accept it, however, I beſeech you, like friends, who always conſider the good intention of the giver, rather than the value of the gift; and believe me, when I aſſure you, it gives me a particular ſatisfaction to reflect, that how much ſoever I may have erred in other points, I have acted with judgment in inſcribing theſe diſcourſes to you: for, as I am more obliged to you than any other perſons in the world, it ſhews ſome gratitude for the favours I have received at your hands.

It is true, I deviate in this from the cuſtom of moſt authors, who generally dedicate their works to ſome Prince, and, either out of ambition or avarice, baſely extol him to the ſkies for the practice of every virtue, when perhaps his vices deſerve the utmoſt deteſtation. But as I was determined to avoid all ſuſpicion of flattery, I have made choice of perſons to patronize my works, who, though not Princes in reality, yet highly deſerve to be ſo, for their numberleſs good qualities; not of ſuch as have it actually in their power to heap riches and honours upon me, but of thoſe that I know would not fail to do it, if they were as able as they were willing. For to judge rightly of things, we certainly ought to ſhew a greater degree of eſteem and regard for thoſe that have it in their will, than for others that only have it in their power to be liberal; and to reſpect ſuch as are worthy of a ſovereignty, more than thoſe that poſſeſs one without worth. Thus, Hiſtorians who praiſe Hiero the Syracuſan, though but a private man, ſeem to make little account of Perſes the Macedonian, notwithſtanding he was a Prince; becauſe Hiero wanted nothing but a crown to make him a King, and Perſes had no other qualification to entitle him to that dignity. Vouchſafe then, my dear Friends, to accept this work, (ſuch as it is) ſince I undertook it at your own requeſt; and if this part ſhall have the good fortune to meet with your approbation, I will proceed in it, according to my promiſe. Farewell.

THE

THE

AUTHOR's INTRODUCTION.

WHEN I conſider what veneration is ſhewn to Antiquity, how often it happens (to omit other inſtances) that an immenſe price is given by the curious for a fragment of an old ſtatue, either to adorn their cabinets, or to ſerve as a model for ſtatuaries to copy after in works of that kind; and what pains thoſe artiſts take to come up to their pattern: on the other hand, when I obſerve that the great and illuſtrious examples of ſeveral ancient Kingdoms and Republics which are recorded in Hiſtory, that the noble deeds of former Kings, Generals, Citizens, Legiſlators and others, who have conſecrated their labours to the ſervice and glory of their country, are now rather admired than imitated, and indeed, ſo far from being followed by any one, that almoſt every body is indifferent about them to ſuch a degree, that there ſeem to be hardly any traces left amongſt us of the virtue of the Ancients, I cannot help being both ſurprized and concerned at it; and ſo much the more, when I have taken notice, that in civil differences, as well as in the various maladies that are incident to mankind, we always have recourſe to ſuch deciſions and preſcriptions as have been handed down to us from our Anceſtors. For, in fact, the Civil Law is nothing more than a collection of determinations and decrees, that have been made by ancient Lawyers, which being now digeſted into due order and method, ſerve as precedents to direct our magiſtrates at this day in the diſtribution of juſtice. And what is the knowledge of Medicine, but the reſult of former experience delivered down from the Profeſſors of it in old times; and by which our Phyſicians at preſent regulate their practice? But in forming a Republic, in ſupporting a State, in governing a Kingdom, in diſciplining an Army, in conducting a War, in extending an Empire, there is now neither Prince,

nor Republic, nor General, nor eminent Citizen, that ſeems to pay the leaſt regard to the examples of Antiquity upon ſuch occaſions.——I cannot perſuade myſelf, however, that this proceeds ſo much from the effeminacy which the modern way of education has introduced into the world, or yet from the diſorder which an idle and luxurious manner of living has occaſioned in many ſtates and provinces in Chriſtendom in particular, as from a want of being ſufficiently converſant in Hiſtory, or at leaſt to an inattention to the precepts and examples it lays before us: to which it is owing, that few people underſtand them, fewer ſtill find any true reliſh or pleaſure in reading them, and of thoſe very few, perhaps here and there one indeed, may be delighted for a while, with the recital of the many ſtrange accidents and occurrences he meets with, but without any further thought or deſign of improving himſelf by them; out of an imagination that the great examples he there ſees, are not only difficult, but impoſſible to be equalled: as if the ſtars had changed their courſe, and not only the Elements, but even mankind themſelves, had loſt their priſtine vigour, and degenerated from what they were in former times.

Being deſirous, therefore, to undeceive thoſe that may poſſibly have fallen into this error, I thought the beſt method I could take for that purpoſe, would be to write ſuch a comment upon thoſe books of Livy's Roman Hiſtory, which have been ſpared us by the malevolence of time, as may beſt conduce to make them clearly underſtood, and moſt profitable to themſelves, when they have maturely compared the courſe of ancient and modern times and circumſtances; that ſo they may reap that advantage from theſe diſcourſes, which ought to be the true and only end of reading Hiſtory. And though indeed this is an arduous undertaking, yet with the aſſiſtance of thoſe that encouraged me to embark in it, I am not altogether without hope that I ſhall be able to acquit myſelf in ſuch a manner, as may, in ſome meaſure, anſwer the end propoſed.

THE

THE

CONTENTS

Of the First BOOK of

POLITICAL DISCOURSES.

THE Author's Dedication, Page ix
His Introduction, xii

Chap. I. *Concerning the Origin of Cities in general, and that of Rome in particular*, 1

Chap. II. *Concerning the different ſorts of Government, and eſpecially that of Rome*, 5

Chap. III. *To what accidents it was owing that Tribunes of the People were created at Rome; and how they contributed to make that Commonwealth more perfect*, 10

Chap. IV. *The diſſenſions betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians made the Roman Commonwealth more powerful and free*, 11

Chap. V. *Whether it is ſafer to truſt the guardianſhip of Liberty in the hands of the Nobility, or the Commonalty: and whether thoſe that only deſire to maintain what they have, or thoſe that want to uſurp more, are the moſt likely to excite commotions in a ſtate*, 14

Chap. VI. *Whether ſuch a form of Government could have been eſtabliſhed at Rome, as would have prevented animoſities betwixt the Senate and the People*, 18

Chap. VII. *How neceſſary it is for the preſervation of Liberty in a Commonwealth that any Criminal may be freely accuſed, with impunity to the Accuſer*, 23

Chap. VIII. *That Calumnies are as pernicious, as legal Accuſations are ſerviceable, to a Commonwealth*, 26

Chap.

Chap. IX. *That only one perſon ſhould be concerned, either in founding a new State, or making a thorough reform in an old one,* Page 30
Chap. X. *If thoſe that found States deſerve praiſe; others that introduce Tyranny, ought to be held in deteſtation,* 33
Chap. XI. *Concerning the Religion of the Romans,* 36
Chap. XII. *Of what importance it is for the preſervation of a State, to pay a due veneration to Religion; and how much the neglect of it, occaſioned by the Church of Rome, has contributed to the ruin of Italy,* 40
Chap. XIII. *How the Romans availed themſelves of Religion in reforming the State, in proſecuting their wars, and in compoſing tumults,* 44
Chap. XIV. *The Romans interpreted their Auſpices according to the neceſſity of the times, and wiſely pretended to conform to the Inſtitutions of their Religion, even when they were obliged to act counter to them: but if any one openly and raſhly deſpiſed them, he was always puniſhed for it,* 46
Chap. XV. *That the Samnites had recourſe to Religion, as the only Remedy when their affairs were become deſperate,* 48
Chap. XVI. *If a people accuſtomed to live under the dominion of a Prince, ſhould by any accident become entirely free, they will find it a very difficult matter to maintain their liberty,* 50
Chap. XVII. *If a corrupt people ſhould happen to recover their liberty, it is almoſt impoſſible they ſhould preſerve it,* 53
Chap. XVIII. *How Liberty may be ſupported in a corrupt State, where it has been once eſtabliſhed; and in what manner it may be introduced, if it was not eſtabliſhed there before,* 55
Chap. XIX. *When a good foundation is once laid, if a weak Prince ſhould ſucceed an able one, he may ſupport himſelf in the Government: but if one weak Prince ſhould ſucceed another, it is impoſſible to maintain any State,* 60
Chap. XX. *That if one martial Prince ſucceeds another, they may do very great things: and that as well-governed Republics muſt of neceſſity have virtuous men to conduct them, their conqueſts and acquiſitions will be proportionable to their virtue,* 62
Chap. XXI. *Thoſe Princes and Republics are highly to be blamed that have not troops of their own,* 63
Chap. XXII. *What is to be obſerved from the Combat betwixt the three Horatii of Rome, and the three Curiatii of Alba,* 65
Chap. XXIII. *That a State ought not to venture its all upon a part of its forces only: upon which account, it is often of great prejudice to defend paſſes,* 66

Chap. XXIV. *That well-governed Republics appoint proper rewards and punishments, according to the merits or demerits of their Citizens, and never balance one against the other,* Page 68

Chap. XXV. *Whoever would reform the Government in a free State, ought to retain the shadow at least of its ancient Customs and Institutions,* 69

Chap. XXVI. *That a new Prince must change every thing in a State which he has seized upon by force,* 70

Chap. XXVII. *That very few men can resolve to be either perfectly good, or totally bad,* 71

Chap. XXVIII. *Whence it came to pass that the Romans were not so ungrateful as the Athenians to their Citizens,* 73

Chap. XXIX. *Whether a Prince or a Commonwealth be generally the more ungrateful,* 75

Chap. XXX. *What means a Prince or a Commonwealth ought to take, in order to avoid the imputation of Ingratitude; and how a General or other Citizen must act to secure himself against the effects of it,* 80

Chap. XXXI. *That the Romans never punished their Generals with any extraordinary degree of Severity, when they had been faulty; not even when the Commonwealth had suffered, either through their ignorance or misbehaviour,* 83

Chap. XXXII. *That a Prince or Commonwealth ought not to defer their beneficence till it is extorted from them by necessity,* 85

Chap. XXXIII. *That when an evil or inconvenience is arrived at such a height, either at home or abroad, as to become dangerous, it is better for a State to temporize and give way to it, than to endeavour to remove it by violence,* 87

Chap. XXXIV. *That the Authority of a Dictator was always of service to the Roman commonwealth, instead of any prejudice: and that the power which is usurped by any Citizen, not that which is conferred by the free suffrages of the people, is pernicious to liberty,* 90

Chap. XXXV. *How it came to pass that the Creation of the Decemvirate was prejudicial to the liberties of Rome, though it was done by free and public suffrage,* 92

Chap. XXXVI. *That Citizens who have filled the highest posts in the State, ought not to be above serving in those of a lower degree,* 94

Chap. XXXVII. *What tumults and disorders were occasioned at Rome by the Agrarian Law; and how disgustful it is to make a new Law that looks backwards too far, in opposition to old Customs,* 95

Chap. XXXVIII. *That weak Republics are always irresolute, and take wrong measures: and if they come to any resolution, it is rather the effect of necessity than choice,* 98

Chap.

Chap. XXXIX. *That the ſame accidents often happen to different people,* Page 101

Chap. XL. *Concerning the creation of the Decemviri at Rome; what is moſt worthy of notice in it; and whether ſuch an Inſtitution may be of greater prejudice or advantage to a Commonwealth,* 102

Chap. XLI. *That it is impolitic in any man, who was humble and merciful before, to become arrogant and cruel on a ſudden, and without obſerving any gradation,* 107

Chap. XLII. *How prone Mankind are to corruption,* 108

Chap. XLIII. *That thoſe who fight out of a principle of honour, make the beſt and moſt faithful ſoldiers,* ibid.

Chap. XLIV. *That a multitude without a Head can do but little; and that they ſhould not threaten to make an ill uſe of power, before they have obtained it,* 110

Chap. XLV. *That it is a bad precedent to break a new Law, eſpecially in the Legiſlator himſelf: and that it is very dangerous for thoſe that govern States to multiply injuries, and repeat them every day,* 111

Chap. XLVI. *That men uſually riſe from one degree of ambition to another; endeavouring in the firſt place to ſecure themſelves from oppreſſion, and afterwards to oppreſs others,* 113

Chap. XLVII. *Though the People are ſometimes miſtaken in general points, yet they ſeldom or never err in particulars,* 114

Chap. XLVIII. *To prevent a mean or wicked man from being advanced to the Magiſtracy, care ſhould be taken to ſet a candidate of the nobleſt family, and moſt eminent merit, in competition with one of the baſeſt and vileſt of the People,* 118

Chap. XLIX. *If ſuch Cities as Rome, which were originally free, found it exceeding difficult to make laws ſufficiently effectual to ſecure their liberties; it is almoſt impoſſible for thoſe that have always been in a ſtate of ſervility and dependence, ever to become free,* 119

Chap. L. *That no one Magiſtrate or Council ſhould have it in their power to ſtop the courſe of public affairs in a Commonwealth,* 122

Chap. LI. *That a Prince or Republic ſhould ſeem to do that out of favour and liberality, which they are forced to do by neceſſity,* 123

Chap. LII. *The beſt, the ſafeſt, and leaſt offenſive way to repreſs the inſolence of a private perſon, who grows too powerful in a Commonwealth, is to be before-hand with him in the means he takes to advance himſelf,* 124

Chap. LIII. *That the People, deluded by a falſe appearance of advantage, often ſeek their own deſtruction: and that they are eaſily moved by magnificent hopes and promiſes.* 125

Chap. LIV. *How greatly the preſence of a grave man in authority contributes to appeaſe an enraged multitude,* 129

Chap.

Chap. LV. *How eaſy a matter it is to govern a State where the People are not corrupted; how hard to erect a Principality where there is an equality amongſt them; and that where there is no equality, a Commonwealth cannot be eſtabliſhed,* Page 130

Chap. LVI. *Before any great misfortune befals a State, it is generally either prognoſticated by ſome Portent, or foretold by ſome particular Perſon or other,* 134

Chap. LVII. *The Multitude united is ſtrong and formidable; but ſeparated it is weak and contemptible,* 144

Chap. LVIII. *That the Multitude are wiſer and more conſtant in general than a Prince,* 145

Chap. LIX. *Whether an Alliance made with a Prince or a Commonwealth is moſt to be confided in,* 151

Chap. LX. *That the Conſulſhip and all other Dignities in Rome were conferred without reſpect of age,* 153

The Contents of the Second Book of Political Diſcourſes.

THE Preface, 159

Chap. I. *Whether the grandeur of the Roman Empire may be aſcribed to the Virtue or good Fortune of that people,* 163

Chap. II. *With what Nations the Romans were engaged in their wars; and how obſtinately thoſe Nations defended their liberties againſt them,* 166

Chap. III. *That Rome made itſelf ſtrong and powerful by deſtroying the States round about it, and incorporating ſtrangers with its own Citizens,* 180

Chap. IV. *Concerning the three ways which Republics have taken to extend their Dominion,* 182

Chap. V. *That Deluges, Peſtilences, the change of Religion and Languages, and other accidents, in a manner extinguiſh the memory of many things,* 186

Chap. VI. *Concerning the conduct obſerved by the Romans in their Wars,* 189

Chap. VII. *What proportion of land the Romans gave to every inhabitant of their Colonies,* 191

Chap. VIII. *What are the reaſons that induce a people to abandon their own Country and force themſelves into that of others,* Page 191
Chap. IX. *What often gives riſe to a war betwixt different Powers,* 195
Chap. X. *That Money is not the Sinews of War, as it is commonly thought to be,* 197
Chap. XI. *That it is imprudent to enter into an alliance with a Prince, whoſe reputation is greater than his ſtrength.* 200
Chap. XII. *Whether, upon the expectation of a war, it is better to invade the Enemy, or to ſuſtain an Invaſion,* 201
Chap. XIII. *That men more frequently advance themſelves by guile and artifice than by force,* 205
Chap. XIV. *That people are often miſtaken, who think to work upon the proud and arrogant by moderation and courteſy,* 209
Chap. XV. *That weak States are generally doubtful in their reſolutions; and that ſlow determinations are always pernicious,* 210
Chap. XVI. *How much our Military Diſcipline in theſe times differs from that of the Ancients,* 213
Chap. XVII. *What account is to be made of Artillery at preſent: and whether the opinion which the Generality have conceived of it, is juſtly founded,* 216
Chap. XVIII. *Whether, in conformity to the authority of the Romans, and the example of ancient military diſcipline, one ought to make more account of Infantry than Cavalry,* 221
Chap. XIX. *That acquiſitions made by Republics which are ill governed, and contrary to the Model of the Romans, contribute to their ruin, inſtead of their exaltation,* 225
Chap. XX. *How dangerous it is for any Prince or Republic to employ either Auxiliary or Mercenary forces,* 229
Chap. XXI. *The firſt Pretor the Romans ever ſent abroad, was to Capua, four hundred years after they firſt began to make war,* 231
Chap. XXII. *That men often err in the judgment they form concerning things of great importance,* 233
Chap. XXIII. *That the Romans always avoided taking a middle courſe, when they had occaſion to paſs Judgment upon any of their Subjects,* 235
Chap. XXIV. *That Fortreſſes generally do a State more harm than good,* 239
Chap. XXV. *That it is imprudent to attack a people who are divided amongſt themſelves, in expectation of conquering them merely on that account,* 245
Chap. XXVI. *That contemptuous and reproachful language, inſtead of doing a man any good, only ſerves to provoke others, and make himſelf more hated,* 246

Chap.

Chap. XXVII. *That wiſe Princes and well-governed Republics ought to be contented with victory: ſince others that graſp at more, are often loſers by it,* Page 248

Chap. XXVIII. *That Princes and Republics ought to puniſh ſuch as have injured either a whole people, or any particular perſon,* 251

Chap. XXIX. *That Fortune throws a miſt before peoples eyes, when She would not have them obſtruct her deſigns,* 252

Chap. XXX. *Princes and Republics that are truly magnanimous and powerful, never make Leagues and Alliances by dint of money; their friendſhip and protection being courted by others on account of their valour, reputation, and Power,* 254

Chap. XXXI. *That it is dangerous to put confidence in Exiles,* 257

Chap. XXXII. *Concerning the ſeveral methods by which the Romans made themſelves maſters of Towns,* 259

Chap. XXXIII. *That the Romans, upon any Expedition, gave the Commanders of their armies free and diſcretionary Commiſſions,* 262

The Contents of the third Book of Political Diſcourſes.

Chap. I. *THAT no State or Religious Eſtabliſhment can ſubſiſt long, except it is frequently reduced to its firſt Principles,* 267

Chap. II. *That it is the part of a wiſe man to ſeem a fool upon occaſion,* 271

Chap. III. *That in order to preſerve Liberty when newly recovered, it is neceſſary to put ſuch men as the Sons of Brutus to death,* 273

Chap. IV. *That a Prince can never be ſafe in a State, whilſt thoſe are alive whom he has deprived of it,* 274

Chap. V. *How a King may loſe his Kingdom though it is hereditary,* 275

Chap. VI. *Of conſpiracies,* 277

Chap. VII. *How it comes to paſs that in changes of State from liberty to ſervitude, and from ſervitude to liberty, ſome are effected without violence or bloodſhed; and others are attended with both,* 296

Chap. VIII. *That whoever would change the form of a Government, ſhould duly conſider the manners and diſpoſition of the people,* 297

Chap. IX. *That in order to ſecure ſucceſs in great deſigns, a man muſt accommodate himſelf to the times,* 299

Chap. X. *That a General cannot avoid a battle, when the Enemy is reſolved to fight him upon any terms,* Page 302
Chap. XI. *Though a perſon who has many enemies to deal with at the ſame time, may be inferior to them all together; yet if he can ſuſtain their firſt ſhock, he commonly gets the better of them,* 306
Chap. XII. *A wiſe General ought to lay his own army under a neceſſity of fighting: but never to reduce an Enemy to ſuch circumſtances,* 308
Chap. XIII. *Whether a good General and a bad army, or a good army and a bad General, are moſt to be depended upon,* 311
Chap. XIV. *That new inventions and ſudden cries ſometimes have ſtrange effects in battle,* 313
Chap. XV. *That more than one Commander in chief over an army do more harm than good,* 315
Chap. XVI. *That men of eminent virtue and merit are employed in time of danger and diſtreſs: but in peaceable and proſperous times, men of the greateſt riches and alliances are preferred,* 317
Chap. XVII. *That a man who has been injured or diſguſted, ſhould not be truſted afterwards in any Office of authority or importance,* 319
Chap. XVIII. *That nothing ſhews the abilities of a General ſo much, as to penetrate into the deſigns of the Enemy,* 320
Chap. XIX. *Whether rigour, or clemency and gentle means, have a greater effect upon the multitude,* 322
Chap. XX. *That one inſtance of humanity and generoſity had a greater effect upon the Faliſci, than all the weight of the Roman arms,* 323
Chap. XXI. *How it came to paſs that Hannibal acquired as much glory in Italy, as Scipio did in Spain, but by quite different methods,* 324
Chap. XXII. *That Manlius Torquatus by his ſeverity, and Valerius Corvinus by his gentleneſs, acquired the ſame degree of Reputation,* 326
Chap. XXIII. *Upon what account Camillus was baniſhed from Rome,* 331
Chap. XXIV. *That the prolongation of Commiſſions was the ruin of the Roman liberties,* 332
Chap. XXV. *Concerning the poverty of Cincinnatus and ſeveral other Roman Citizens,* 333
Chap. XXVI. *That the ruin of ſome ſtates has been owing to women,* 336
Chap. XXVII. *What methods are to be taken in order to re-unite a divided State: and that they judge wrong who think that the beſt way to keep a City in Subjection, is to keep it divided,* 337
Chap. XXVIII. *That the Governors of a Republic ſhould keep a ſtrict eye upon the conduct of their ſubjects; becauſe under the diſguiſe of beneficence and humanity, they often aim at Tyranny,* 339
Chap. XXIX. *That the faults of the people are generally owing to the Prince,* 341

Chap.

Chap. XXX. *That a Citizen who would do any good in a Republic by dint of his own authority, muſt in the firſt place extinguiſh all envy: alſo what proviſions are to be made for the defence of a Town upon the approach of an enemy,* Page 343

Chap. XXXI. *That powerful Republics and truly great men retain their dignity and firmneſs in all viciſſitudes of fortune,* 346

Chap. XXXII. *What methods ſome people have taken to prevent a peace,* 349

Chap. XXXIII. *That it is of great ſervice in battle to inſpire ſoldiers with confidence, both in themſelves and their General,* 350

Chap. XXXIV. *What ſort of reputation, or character, or opinion it is, that firſt inclines the people to favour ſome particular Citizen: and whether a People, or a Prince, diſpoſes of their honours and employments with greater judgment and prudence,* 352

Chap. XXXV. *That it is dangerous to be the chief promoter and adviſer of an Enterprize: and that the more important the Enterprize is, the greater is the danger,* 356

Chap. XXXVI. *Why the French always have been, and ſtill are, accounted more than men at the firſt charge; and afterwards leſs than women,* 358

Chap. XXXVII. *Whether Skirmiſhes before a battle are neceſſary; and how the quality of a new enemy is to be diſcovered without them,* 360

Chap. XXXVIII. *How a General ought to be qualified to make his troops confide in him,* 362

Chap. XXXIX. *That a General ought to be well acquainted with the Country which is the Seat of war,* 364

Chap. XL. *That it is not accounted diſhonourable, but quite otherwiſe, to deceive an Enemy in time of war,* 366

Chap. XLI. *That all means are to be uſed, whether honourable or diſhonourable, to ſave one's Country,* 367

Chap. XLII. *That promiſes extorted by force are not binding,* 368

Chap. XLIII. *That the ſame diſpoſition is obſervable at all times in the natives of the ſame country,* 370

Chap. XLIV. *That things are ſometimes effected by bold and ſudden reſolutions, which could not have been done by ordinary means,* 372

Chap. XLV. *Whether it is a better way in battle to receive the enemy's firſt ſhock, and not to exert your Strength till they have in ſome meaſure ſpent their fury, or to attack them vigorouſly at firſt,* 374

Chap. XLVI. *How it comes to paſs that the ſame families in a Commonwealth, often retain the ſame manners and cuſtoms a long time,* 375

Chap.

ГІДА

POLITICAL

DISCOURSES

UPON THE FIRST DECAD OF

LIVY.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

Concerning the Origin of Cities in general, and that of Rome in particular.

WHOEVER examines the Origin of the City of Rome, in what manner, and by what laws it was governed, will find no great reaſon to wonder that it preſerved its virtue for ſo many ages, and that it afterwards acquired ſo vaſt a dominion. As I intended therefore to ſay ſomething of its Origin in the firſt place, I muſt premiſe that all Cities are founded either by natives of the Country where they are ſituated, or by foreigners. The firſt happens when the inhabitants, being diſperſed or ſeparated into little communities, cannot live in ſecurity: as no one of them of itſelf would be able to make a ſufficient defence, if it ſhould be aſſaulted by an enemy; nor would it have time in caſe of a ſudden attack to unite with others for that purpoſe. But ſuppoſing that could be effected, they muſt ſtill be obliged to abandon many of their habitations and poſſeſſions to the mercy of the Enemy: to avoid which dangers, they commonly agree at laſt either of their own accord, or by the advice of ſome perſon of the greateſt authority amongſt them, to unite and live to[illegible] in ſome one place

place choſen by general conſent, where they may mutually furniſh each other with the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life, and make better proviſion for their common ſafety. In this manner, Athens and Venice, amongſt many others, were founded at firſt; the former under the authority of Theſeus, and by people who before had been ſcattered and diſperſed at a diſtance from each other; the latter by ſuch as had fled into certain little Iſles at the extremity of the Adriatic, (to avoid the miſeries which were daily occaſioned in Italy, by the continual irruptions of Barbarians after the declenſion of the Roman Empire) where they lived together under no particular governor, though they agreed to obſerve certain laws which ſeemed abſolutely neceſſary for their future ſupport and eſtabliſhment. And in this they ſucceeded ſo well from the long repoſe they enjoyed in that ſituation, (being ſeparated from the continent, and not liable to be annoyed by an Enemy who had no ſhips to invade them) that from this ſmall beginning they at laſt arrived at that prodigious degree of power and grandeur in which we ſee the Venetians at preſent [*a*].

In the ſecond caſe, that is, when a City is founded by foreigners, it is done either by ſuch as are entirely free, or dependent on others; as by Colonies, for inſtance, which are ſent out by ſome Prince or Common-wealth, either to diſburden their own territories when they are too full of inhabitants, or to keep poſſeſſion at little or no expence of ſome Country they have newly conquered, (many of which ſort the Romans built in every part of their Empire) or perhaps by ſome Prince, not with any deſign to reſide there himſelf, but for his glory and reputation, as Alexandria was built by Alexander the Great. But theſe Cities, not being free in their Original, ſeldom attain to that degree of eminence as to become Capitals of Kingdoms or Empires. Of this kind was Florence, which (whether built by the Soldiers of Sylla, or perhaps by the inhabitants of the mountains about Fieſole [*b*], who, being encouraged by the long peace which the world enjoyed under the reign of Auguſtus, left their faſtneſſes, and came to live upon the banks of the Arno) was certainly founded under the Roman Empire, and therefore could never raiſe itſelf from ſuch a beginning to any greater height, than its Sovereign was pleas'd to allow of.

The founders of Cities may be ſaid to be free, when a people either quit their native country voluntarily, or are forced out of it by

[*a*] This was written when that Commonwealth was in the Zenith of its glory, and before it was humbled by the famous League of Cambray. It is now in very different circumſtances. See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book I.

[*b*] See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book II. at the beginning.

peſtilence,

peſtilence, famine, or war, to ſeek new habitations under the conduct of ſome Prince or other leaders of their own. And theſe muſt either inhabit ſuch Cities as they find ready built in the country they get poſſeſſion of, as Moſes did; or they muſt build new ones like Æneas. In the latter caſe, the Conductor of the undertaking has the greater opportunity of diſplaying his abilities; on which the future good or bad fortune of the City chiefly depends: and thoſe abilities are diſtinguiſhable principally in two points; firſt in the choice of a convenient ſituation, and next in making good laws. Now ſince ſome men betake themſelves to labour through mere neceſſity, and others only by choice, and it always happens that there is more virtue in thoſe countries where labour cannot poſſibly be diſpenſed with, than in others where there is more room for choice, it ſeems worthy of conſideration whether it is not the beſt way to build in a barren country; that ſo, when men are obliged to work hard and cannot afford to be idle, they may live more united; as the poverty of a country is ſeldom the occaſion of diſcord: in proof of which, we might alledge the concord of the Raguſans, as well as of the inhabitants of ſome other cities that have been built in ſuch ſituations, if it was neceſſary. And without doubt ſuch a choice would be both a very prudent and advantageous one, if men could be content with their own, and not covet the poſſeſſions of others. But ſince the depravity of human nature is ſuch, that it is impoſſible for any one to live in ſecurity, unleſs he fortifies himſelf with power, it is better to build in a fertile country, where plenty of all things will make the inhabitants increaſe, and enable them not only to defend themſelves againſt any attack, but to humble thoſe that ſhould dare to oppoſe their riſing fortune. As for the idleneſs which ſuch abundance may occaſion, it may be prevented by proper laws, according to the example of ſeveral wiſe Legiſlators, who having lived in ſuch pleaſant and fruitful countries as naturally incline men to be lazy and unfit for honeſt induſtry, have always obviated thoſe inconveniencies, which otherwiſe muſt have happened, by laying thoſe citizens who were deſigned for Soldiers, under a neceſſity of uſing hard labour and exerciſe: by which they made better proof than others, who had been bred up in rough and barren countries. Of this, the Kingdom of Egypt may ſerve for an example; which, though one of the moſt delightful countries in the World, availed itſelf however of wiſe laws and reſtrictions in ſuch a manner, that it produced many brave and excellent men, whoſe actions, if the memory of them had not been almoſt extinguiſhed by time, would have been more extolled than thoſe of Alexander the Great, and

ſeveral others which are ſtill held in ſo much admiration [c]. For whoever conſiders the Government of the Soldans, the diſcipline of the Mamalucs and the reſt of their Soldiery, before they were conquered by Selim the Grand Turk, will find many admirable regulations with regard to their forces; from whence it may eaſily be perceived how apprehenſive they were of their being enervated by that idleneſs to which the benignity of the climate muſt naturally have inclined them, if it had not been guarded againſt by the ſtricteſt injunctions of due exerciſe and labour.

I ſay therefore, it is the moſt prudent way to make choice of a fertile ſituation, provided proper care be taken to obviate the evils by ſalutary laws, which otherwiſe luxury and abundance may probably occaſion. When Alexander the Great intended to found a City to perpetuate his name, Dinocrates an Architect adviſed him to build it upon Mount Athos, which would not only be very ſtrong, but might be reduced into the ſhape of a man; a circumſtance that could not fail of being much admired, and muſt contribute greatly to his glory. But the King aſking him how the inhabitants were to be furniſhed with proviſions, he confeſſed he had not thought of that [d], at which Alexander could not help laughing very heartily, and leaving the mountain as it was, he built Alexandria, where he knew people would be glad to live on account of the richneſs of the Soil, as well as the advantages they might reap from the vicinity of the Sea and the river Nile.

If then we conſider the Origin of Rome, and admit it to have been founded by Æneas, it muſt be numbered amongſt thoſe cities that have been built by foreigners; but if the foundation of it is to be aſcribed to Romulus, it may be looked upon as built by the natives of the country in which it ſtands. In either caſe we ſhall find that it was free in the beginning and independent on any one. It will likewiſe appear (as we ſhall ſhew hereafter) that the inhabitants were laid under ſuch ſevere reſtrictions in ſeveral reſpects, by the laws which were made by Romulus, Numa, and others, that neither the fertility of the country, the conveniency of the Sea, the frequent and ſignal victories they gained, nor the greatneſs of their Empire, were able to corrupt them for many ages: on the contrary, they maintained their virtue with ſuch inflexible rigour, as there are few or no examples of in any other

[c] Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona
Multi, ſed omnes illacrymabiles
Urgentur, ignotique longâ
Nocte. Hor. Book III. Ode ix.

[d] Plutarch, in vit. Alexandri.

Common-

Common-wealth. And ſince the great exploits performed under that Government both at home and abroad, which are recorded by Livy, were conducted either by public or private Counſels, I ſhall begin my Diſcourſes with what ſeems moſt worthy of obſervation, at home and in public, not omitting the neceſſary circumſtances and conſequences, with which, the firſt book, or rather the firſt part of this work will conclude.

CHAP. II.

Concerning the different ſorts of Government, and eſpecially that of Rome.

OMITTING all mention at preſent of ſuch Cities as were dependent in the beginning, I ſhall ſpeak of thoſe only that were originally free, and conducted themſelves as they thought fit, either in a Republican or a Monarchical form of Government: and theſe, as their Principles and beginnings were different, had likewiſe different laws and conſtitutions. Some of them alſo had laws delivered to them by one perſon at the firſt, or at leaſt very ſoon after their foundation; as the Spartans received theirs immediately from Lycurgus: others had their laws given them at different times, according to the ſeveral accidents and exigencies that happened; which was the caſe of Rome. That State, therefore, may juſtly be deemed fortunate, which falls into the hands of a wiſe man, who makes ſuch laws at firſt, as want no amendment or new-modelling afterwards, but are ſufficient of themſelves to ſecure and protect thoſe that live under them; as it happened to the Spartans, whoſe laws were ſo excellent that they were inviolably obſerved for above eight hundred years, without occaſioning any murmurs or commotions of conſequence. On the other hand, that State muſt be in ſome meaſure unhappy, which, for want of prudence and foreſight in the Legiſlators at firſt, is reduced to the neceſſity of reforming and altering its laws upon ſudden emergencies: ſtill more unhappy when its laws are of ſuch a nature, that inſtead of conducing to promote the true ends of government, they have a quite different tendency; for in that caſe, there is hardly any poſſibility of reforming it. As to others which are eſtabliſhed upon good principles at firſt, and capable of improvement, if they are not altogether perfect, they may become more and more ſo in time by divers accidents and occurrences, though perhaps not without ſome dangerous ſhocks and concuſſions; for men are naturally averſe to any innovation or change in their cuſtoms and laws, except they are convinced there is an abſolute

neceſſity

neceſſity for it: and as this neceſſity muſt be occaſioned by ſome impending danger, the State may be ſubverted, before the remedy can have its effect. Of this we have ſufficient proofs in what has happened to the Republic of Florence, at various times, and upon different occaſions: particularly upon the commotions that happened at Arozzo and Prato; the former of which produced a new reformation in the State, and the latter great confuſion.

But as I propoſe to treat more particularly of the laws and conſtitution of the Roman Republic, and ſhew what accidents contributed to bring it to perfection, I muſt obſerve in the firſt place, that according to ſome authors, there are but three ſorts of government, *viz.* Monarchy or Principality, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy; and that thoſe who intend to erect a new State, muſt have recourſe to ſome one of theſe which he likes beſt. Others (and with more judgment, as many think) ſay there are Six ſorts; three of which are very bad, and the other three good in themſelves, but liable to be ſo corrupted that they may become the worſt. The three good ſorts have been juſt now mentioned; the other three proceed from theſe, and every one of them bears ſuch a reſemblance to that on which it reſpectively depends, that the tranſition from one to the other is ſhort and eaſy: for Monarchy often degenerates into Tyranny, Ariſtocracy into Oligarchy, and Democracy into licentious Anarchy and confuſion. So that whoever ſets up any one of the former three kinds of Government, may aſſure himſelf it will not be of any long duration; for no precaution will be ſufficient to prevent its falling into the other that is analogous to it, on account of the affinity which there ſeems to be in this caſe betwixt virtue and vice, perfection and imperfection.

This variety of Governments amongſt mankind, appears to have been the effect of chance: for in the beginning of the World, the inhabitants being few, for ſome time lived ſeparate from each other like beaſts; but afterwards as they multiplied, they began to unite for their mutual defence, and put themſelves under the protection of ſuch as were moſt eminent amongſt them for courage and ſtrength, whom they engaged to obey and to acknowledge as their chiefs [*e*]. Hence aroſe the diſtinction betwixt honeſt and diſhoneſt, juſt and unjuſt: for when any one injured his benefactor, it excited a ſort of fellow-feeling and

[*e*] Cum prorepſerunt primis animalia terris,
Mutum & turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter,
Pugnabant armis, quæ poſt fabricaverat uſus;
Donec verba, quibus voces ſenſuſque notarent,
Nominaque invenêre: dehinc abſtitere bello,
Oppida cœperunt munire, & ponere leges,
Ne quis fur eſſet, neu latro, neu quis adulter. Hor. Satir. lib I. iii.

indignation

indignation in others at his baſeneſs and ingratitude, as well as kindneſs and reſpect for thoſe that behaved otherwiſe: and as they conſidered they might ſome time or other perhaps be treated in the ſame manner themſelves, if proper meaſures were not taken to prevent it, they thought fit to make laws for the reward of good men, and the puniſhment of offenders. This firſt gave riſe to juſtice in the world [*f*]; and from this conſideration it came to paſs in proceſs of time, that in the election of a new Chief, they had not ſo much regard to courage and bodily ſtrength as to wiſdom and integrity. But afterwards, as this kind of government became hereditary by degrees inſtead of elective, the heirs of theſe Chieftains ſoon began to degenerate from the virtue of their Anceſtors, and to behave themſelves as if they thought the main duty of a Prince conſiſted in ſurpaſſing all other men in luxury, extravagance, effeminacy, and every ſort of voluptuouſneſs; by which in a while, they firſt grew odious to their Subjects, and then ſo afraid of themſelves, that they were forced to diſtreſs and cut off others for their own ſecurity, and at laſt to become downright Tyrants. This firſt occaſioned combinations and conſpiracies for the deſtruction of Princes; not amongſt the weak and puſillanimous, but amongſt ſuch as being more eminent than others for their generoſity, magnanimity, riches, and birth, could not endure any longer to ſubmit to theſe pitiful and oppreſſive Governors.

The multitude therefore, ſwayed by the authority of the Nobles, roſe in arms againſt their Prince, and being freed from his yoke, transferred their allegiance to their deliverers, who being thoroughly diſguſted at Monarchy, changed the form of Government, and took it into their own hands. After which they conducted both themſelves and the State, according to the laws they had made, preferring the common good to any particular advantage, and behaving in private as well as public affairs with aſſiduity and moderation, whilſt the remembrance of their paſt ſufferings continued freſh upon their minds. But this authority afterwards devolving upon their Sons, who had not ſeen theſe changes, nor experienced the miſeries of tyranny, they began to grow ſo diſſatisfied with that ſort of civil equality, that they caſt off all reſtraint, and giving themſelves up to rapine, ambition and luſt, ſoon changed the government again from Ariſtocracy into an Oligarchy. Their adminiſtration however becoming as inſupportable in a while as the tyranny of one had formerly been, the people naturally began to look out for ſome deliverer; and having fixed upon a leader, they put themſelves under his banners, and aboliſhed Oligarchy. But when they

[*f*] ——Utilitas juſti prope mater & æqui. Hor. Satir. lib. I. iii.

had

had done this, and came to reflect upon the oppreſſions they ſuſtained under a Tyrant, they reſolved never to be governed again by any one man; and therefore agreed to ſet up a popular Government, which was conſtituted in ſuch a manner, that the chief authority was not veſted either in a Prince or in a Junto of the Nobility. Now as all new eſtabliſhments are held in ſome degree of reverence and veneration at firſt, this form ſubſiſted for ſome time; though no longer than thoſe people lived who had been the founders of it: for after their death, their deſcendants degenerated into licentiouſneſs, and ſuch a contempt of all authority and diſtinction, that, every man living after his own caprice, there was nothing to be ſeen but confuſion and violence; ſo that either by the advice of ſome good and reſpectable man, or compelled by the abſolute neceſſity of providing a remedy for theſe diſorders and enormities, they at laſt determine once more to ſubmit to the dominion of one: from which State they fell again in time through the ſame gradations, and from the abovementioned cauſes into miſrule and licentiouſneſs. Such is the rotation to which all States are Subject; nevertheleſs they cannot often revert to the ſame kind of Government, becauſe it is not poſſible that any one ſhould be ſo long lived as to undergo many of theſe mutations; for it frequently happens that when a State is labouring under ſuch convulſions, and is deſtitute both of ſtrength and counſel, it falls a prey to ſome other neighbouring community or nation that is better governed; otherwiſe it might paſs through the ſeveral abovementioned revolutions again and again to infinity.

All theſe ſorts of government then, in my opinion, are infirm and inſecure; the three former from the uſual ſhortneſs of their duration, and the three latter from the malignity of their own principles. The wiſeſt Legiſlators therefore being aware of theſe defects, never eſtabliſhed any one of them in particular, but contrived another that partakes of them all, conſiſting of a Prince, Lords, and Commons, which they looked upon as more firm and ſtable, becauſe every one of theſe members would be a check upon the other: and of thoſe Legiſlators, Lycurgus certainly merits the higheſt praiſe, who conſtituted an eſtabliſhment of this kind at Sparta, which laſted above eight hundred years, to his own great honour as well as the tranquillity of the Citizens. Very different was the fate of the Government eſtabliſhed by Solon at Athens, which, being a ſimple Democracy only, was of ſo ſhort a continuance, that it gave way to the tyranny of Piſiſtratus before the death of the Legiſlator: and though indeed the heirs of that Tyrant were expelled about forty years after, and the Athenians not only recovered their liberty, but re-eſtabliſhed Solon's laws and plan of government,

government, yet they did not maintain it above a hundred years, notwithſtanding they made ſeveral new regulations to reſtrain the inſolence of the Nobles, and the licentiouſneſs of the Commons; the neceſſity of which Solon had not forſeen: ſo that for want of tempering his Democracy with a ſhare of Ariſtocracy and princely power, it was of ſhort duration in compariſon of the conſtitution of Sparta.

But to return to Rome. Though that City had not a Lycurgus to model its conſtitution at firſt, in ſuch a manner as might preſerve its liberty for a long courſe of time; yet ſo many were the accidents which happened in the conteſts betwixt the Patricians and the Plebeians, that chance effected what the Law-giver had not provided for. So that if it was not perfect at the beginning, it became ſo after a while; for though the firſt laws were deficient, yet they were neither incapable of amendment, nor repugnant to its future perfection: ſince not only Romulus but all the reſt of the Kings that ſucceeded him made ſeveral good alterations in them, and ſuch as were well calculated for the ſupport of liberty. But as it was their intention to found a Monarchy and not a Republic, when that City had ſhaken off the yoke of a Tyrant, there ſeemed to be many proviſions ſtill wanting for the further maintenance of its freedom. And notwithſtanding Tyranny was at laſt eradicated by the ways and means abovementioned, yet thoſe who had chiefly contributed to it, created two Conſuls to ſupply the place of Royalty; by which it came to paſs that the name alone, and not the authority of Princes, was extinguiſhed. So that the Supreme power being lodged only in the Conſuls and Senate, the Government conſiſted of no more than two of the three Eſtates which we have ſpoken of before, that is, of Royalty and Ariſtocracy. It remained therefore ſtill neceſſary to admit the people into ſome ſhare of the Government; and the Patricians growing ſo inſolent in time (as I ſhall ſhew hereafter) that the Plebeians could no longer endure it, the latter took arms, and obliged them to relinquiſh part of their authority, leſt they ſhould loſe the whole; on the other hand, the Conſuls and Senators ſtill retained ſo much power in the Common-wealth, as enabled them to ſupport their rank with dignity and honour. This ſtruggle gave birth to certain Officers called *Tribunes of the People*; after the creation of whom that State became more firm and compact, every one of the three degrees abovementioned having its proper ſhare in the Government; and ſo propitious was fortune to it, that although it was changed from a Monarchy into an Ariſtocracy, and afterwards into a Democracy, by the ſteps and for the reaſons already aſſigned, yet the Royal power was never entirely aboliſhed and given to the Patricians, nor that of the Patricians wholly to the Plebeians; on the contrary, the authority of the

three Eſtates being duly proportioned and mixed together, gave it the higheſt degree of perfection that any Common-wealth is capable of attaining to; and this was owing in a great meaſure, if not altogether, to the diſſenſions that happened betwixt the Patricians and the Plebeians, as ſhall be ſhewn more at large in the following Chapters.

CHAP. III.

To what accidents it was owing that the Tribunes of the People were created at Rome; and how they contributed to make that Common-wealth more perfect.

THOSE that have written upon Civil Government, lay it down as a firſt Principle, and all Hiſtorians demonſtrate the ſame, that whoever could found an eſtabliſhment, and make proper laws for the government of it, muſt preſuppoſe that all men are bad by nature [*g*], and that they will not fail to ſhew that natural depravity of their heart, whenever they have a fair and ſecure opportunity; and though it may poſſibly lie concealed for a while, on account of ſome ſecret reaſon which does not then appear to men of ſmall experience; yet Time, (which is therefore juſtly called *the Father of truth)* commonly brings it to light in the end. After the expulſion of the Tarquins at Rome, there ſeemed to be a perfect harmony betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians; the former having laid aſide their uſual arrogance, and aſſumed an appearance of familiarity and affability even towards the loweſt of the people. The reaſons of this were not diſcovered whilſt the Tarquins lived; for the Patricians being ſtill afraid of them, were likewiſe apprehenſive that if they ſhould oppreſs the people, they might be tempted to call in that family again; and this was the true cauſe of their ſeeming moderation. But as ſoon as the Tarquins were dead, and the Patricians delivered from thoſe apprehenſions, they began to vent their malice upon the Plebeians which they had ſo long concealed, and to treat them in the moſt inſolent and injurious manner, which may ſerve as a ſufficient proof of what I have juſt now ſaid, that men are never good but through neceſſity; on the contrary, when good and evil are left to their choice, and they can practiſe the latter with impunity, they will not fail to throw every thing into diſorder and confuſion.

[*g*] This ſeems a harſh ſuppoſition. But does not every Chriſtian almoſt daily juſtify the truth of it, by confeſſing it before God and the World; and are we not expreſsly told the ſame in ſeveral paſſages of the Holy Scriptures, and in all Syſtems of human Philoſophy.

Hence

Hence ariſes the common obſervation, that *hunger and poverty may make people induſtrious, but laws only can make them good:* for if men were ſo of themſelves, there would be no occaſion for laws, but as the caſe is far otherwiſe, they are abſolutely neceſſary.

After the Tarquins were dead therefore, who had been ſuch a check upon the Nobility, ſome other expedient ſeemed wanting that might have the ſame effect; ſo that after much confuſion and diſorder, and many dangerous conteſts betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians, certain Officers, called *Tribunes*, were created for the ſecurity of the latter: who, being veſted with ſuch privileges and authority as enabled them to become Arbiters betwixt thoſe two Eſtates, effectually curbed the inſolence of the former.

CHAP. IV.

The diſſenſions betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians made the Roman Common-wealth more powerful and free.

I Muſt here ſay ſomething of the conteſts that happened at Rome betwixt the death of the Tarquins and the creation of the Tribunes, and afterwards endeavour to refute the opinion of thoſe who aſſert, that the Roman Republic was ſo ſubject to tumult, ſedition and confuſion, that if its good fortune and military virtue had not over balanced theſe defects, it would have been much inferior to any other. It muſt be owned indeed, that both fortune and valour did not a little contribute to the aggrandizement of that Empire: but it ſeems to me as if theſe people did not conſider, that where there are good Soldiers there muſt be good order and diſcipline, which is likewiſe generally attended with good fortune.

But to deſcend to ſome other particulars relating to that City. I ſay thoſe that cavil at the diſſenſions betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians there, cavil at the very cauſes which in my opinion contributed moſt to its liberty; for whilſt they object to them as the ſources of tumult and confuſion, they do not conſider the good effects they produced; ſeeming either to forget, or never to have known, that in all Common-wealths, the views and diſpoſition of the Nobility and Commonalty muſt of neceſſity be very widely if not totally different: and that all the laws which are made in favour of liberty, have been owing to the differences betwixt them, as might eaſily be demonſtrated from what happened at Rome; for from the time of the Tarquins to that of the Gracchi, which was a period of above three hundred years, the conteſts

that aroſe there were very ſeldom attended with the baniſhment, and ſtill ſeldomer with the execution of any of the Citizens.

There is no reaſon then to look upon thoſe humours as noxious, nor that Republic as diſunited, in which during ſo long a ſpace, and ſo many ſtruggles, not above eight or ten people were ſent into Exile, very few put to death, and not many puniſhed with pecuniary fines on account of thoſe commotions; nor can it with any juſtice be called a diſordered or ill governed State, where there were ſo many examples of every kind of virtue; ſince good examples proceeded from good education, and good education from good laws, and thoſe laws from thoſe diſſenſions which many ſo inconſiderately condemn. For whoever will look into the conſequences of them, will find that they never occaſioned any baniſhment or other ſort of violence that was detrimental to the public good; but laws, on the contrary, that were highly conducive to the preſervation of their common liberties. If any one however ſhould object, that it muſt be a ſtrange and horrible ſight to ſee not only the Commonalty in an uproar againſt the Nobility, and the Nobility againſt the Commonalty, and both of them running through the ſtreets in a tumultuous manner; but tradeſmen ſhutting up their ſhops, and all ſorts of people flying by droves out of the City; a Spectacle, as they imagine, that muſt frighten any perſon that beheld, and even thoſe that read of it: I anſwer, that every State ought to have proper means in its hands to gratify the demands of the people, eſpecially thoſe States that are obliged to have recourſe to the Commonalty for their aſſiſtance upon any exigency: and as the Roman Republic was ſuch a one; whenever the people wanted to have a new law made, they either raiſed a tumult or refuſed to enliſt themſelves as Soldiers in time of war, till they had obtained ſome ſort of Satisfaction. And it ſeldom happens that the demands of a free people are either unreaſonable or prejudicial to liberty, as they commonly proceed either from actual oppreſſion, or the dread of it; but if that apprehenſion ſhould prove groundleſs, it is no difficult matter to diſabuſe them in a public conference, where they are always ready to liſten to any man of worth and authority that ſhall think fit to harangue them: for though the people may ſometimes be in an error, as Tully ſays, they are open to better information, and ſoon convinced, when a perſon of whoſe veracity and integrity they have a good opinion, undertakes to ſhew them their miſtake.

We ſhould not therefore be too forward in cenſuring the conſtitution of the Roman Republic; eſpecially when we conſider that the vaſt things which it accompliſhed muſt be owing to proportionable cauſes; and that if the diſſenſions that happened in it occaſioned the creation of Tribunes,

Tribunes, they were rather of advantage than otherwiſe: for they not only procured the people a ſhare in the adminiſtration of Government, but were the Guardians and Conſervators of the public liberty, as I ſhall ſhew in the next Chapter [*b*].

CHAP.

[*b*] "Monteſquieu hath often given it as his opinion, ſays the Author of *the Eſtimate* "*of the Manners and Principles of the times.* Vol. II. Sect. xii. That Factions are not "only natural but neceſſary to free Governments." This opinion, however, is in ſome ſenſe erroneous, becauſe too general. The Author borrow'd it with many other important obſervations in his book from Machiavel's diſcourſes upon Livy. But in juſtice to the Florentine, we muſt obſerve that *he* limits the obſervation to the times in which public Spirit was predominant: whereas the other extends it to later periods, when ſelfiſh ambition had quenched the love of one's country; and hence aroſe his error. As theſe two Authors, in the writer's opinion, poſſeſs the higheſt ſtation in the political ſcale, it may be worth while to give a comparative ſketch of their different characters. Machiavel, born and bred in tumultuous and profligate times, and occupied in the affairs of a diſtempered Republic, caught his firſt principles from what he *ſaw*. Monteſquieu, more happy in his birth and fortune, enjoying an early leiſure in a quiet and well regulated Monarchy, drew his firſt principles of Politics from what he *read*. Yet neither was the former given up to mere perſonal obſervation, nor the latter to mere ſtudy: in the progreſs of life, Machiavel applied himſelf to books, and Monteſquieu to men; yet, as was natural, their firſt habits prevailed, and gave to each his diſtinct and peculiar character. Hence, though both ſaw the internal and ſecret pangs of Government, (which, in my opinion, no writer but theſe two did ever fully comprehend or penetrate) yet they ſaw them by different lights, and through different mediums. Machiavel's leading guide was *Fact*; Monteſquieu's was *Philoſophy*. In conſequence of this, Simplicity forms the Character of one, Refinement that of the other. The Speculative Frenchman forms a fine ſyſtem; to the completion of which, he ſometimes tortures both Argument and Fact; the plain and downright Florentine builds on Facts, independent on all Syſtems. The polite and diſintereſted Sage is warm in the praiſe of *Honeſty*: the active and penetrating Secretary, above praiſe or cenſure, gives a bold and ſtriking picture of *the ways of men*. Hence, whilſt the firſt gains every heart by the force of moral Sympathy, the latter hath been unjuſtly deteſted, as the Enemy of Virtue and Mankind. Machiavel is negligent, yet pure and ſtrong, ſcorning the minuter graces of compoſition; Monteſquieu is elegant, yet nervous; and to the acuteneſs of the Philoſopher, often adds the fire of the Poet. Both were the friends of freedom and mankind; both ſuperior to the Genius of their time and country; both truly great: the Florentine ſevere and great; the Frenchman great and amiable.

Before we can determine therefore, whether the Factions that divide a free country be ſalutary or dangerous, it is neceſſary to know what is their foundation and object. If they ariſe from freedom of opinion and aim at the public welfare, they are ſalutary: but if their ſource be ſelfiſh intereſt of what kind ſoever, then they are dangerous and deſtructive. I cannot give a better comment on this truth, than in the words of Lord Bolingbroke: "As long, ſays he, as the Spirit of Liberty prevailed, a Roman ſacrificed his "own, and therefore no doubt, every other perſonal intereſt, to the intereſt of the Common-"wealth: when the latter (that is, the Spirit of Faction) ſucceeded, the intereſt of the "Common-wealth was conſidered no otherwiſe, than in ſubordination to that *particular* "intereſt which each perſon had eſpouſed. The principal men, inſtead of making their "grandeur and glory conſiſt, as they formerly had done, in that which the grandeur and "liberty of the Common-wealth reflected on them, conſidered themſelves now as "Individuals, not as Citizens; and each would ſhine with his own light. To this "purpoſe

CHAP. V.

Whether it is ſafer to truſt the guardianſhip of Liberty in the hands of the Nobility or the Commonalty: and whether thoſe that only deſire to maintain what they have, or thoſe that want to uſurp more, are the moſt likely to excite commotions in a State.

THE wiſeſt Legiſlators have always made it their principal care to provide a barrier or guardianſhip for the liberty of the States they have founded; and accordingly as that has been well or ill ſecured, the freedom of thoſe States has been of longer or ſhorter duration; and, as there muſt of neceſſity, be both Grandees and Commoners in every Republic, it has been a matter of doubt, in which of thoſe two orders, it would be moſt proper to veſt that charge. The Spartans formerly, and the Venetians more lately, committed it to the Nobility; but the Romans thought fit to lodge it in the hands of the Commonalty. Let us examine then, which of theſe Republics made the wiſer choice.

Now, if we weigh their reſpective motives for acting in this manner at firſt, we ſhall find that very powerful reaſons may be aſſigned on each ſide of the queſtion; but, if we conſider the duration of thoſe States, we muſt declare in favour of the former; as the liberties of Sparta and Venice were of longer continuance, than thoſe of

" purpoſe alone they employed the Commands they had of armies, the Government " of Provinces, and the influence they acquired over the *Tribes* (or different Claſſes " of people) at Rome, and over the Allies and Subjects of the Republic. Upon " principles of the ſame kind, inferior people attached themſelves to them; and that zeal " and induſtry, nay that courage and magnanimity, which had been formerly exerted " in the ſervice the Common-wealth, were exerted by the Spirit of Faction, for " Marius or Sylla, for Cæſar or Pompey."

So ſtands the caſe, with regard to the general foundations of Faction in moſt times and countries. But there is another ſource of Faction, of which we have had moſt fatal inſtances in our own Country, diſtinct both from that of public Spirit and private intereſt. I mean that of *erroneous conſcience*; when the *unalienable right* of governing is ſuppoſed to be inherent in any particular man, or race of men. This, though it hath not the nature, hath moſt of the conſequences of ſelfiſh Faction; and is attended with this additional evil, that as it is founded in Principle, it is more ſteady and reſolved. The civil wars which rent the Kingdom during the contentions betwixt the Houſes of York and Lancaſter were of this kind. Of this kind too, in a good meaſure, were the civil wars in which Charles the firſt periſhed: and of this kind altogether have been the conſequent Rebellions againſt eſtabliſhed Government. This diſtinction, however, muſt be remarked in favour of the free Spirit and ſenſe of the Lancaſtrians and Yorkiſts, beyond that of the Stuarts party; that theſe laſt pant for thraldom and chains; but amongſt the former, the ſame men who would have died for their reſpective Kings, would have died for the Laws and Liberty of their Country.

Rome.

Rome. To come to their ſeveral motives then; and, in the firſt place, to what may be urged in behalf of the Romans.—It may be ſaid, that the guardianſhip of Liberty ought always to be lodged in the hands of ſuch as are leaſt deſirous to encroach upon the rights of others; and that if we reflect upon the different views and appetites of Nobles and Commoners, we ſhall always find a luſt of power and dominion in the former; whilſt the latter ſeldom aſpire to any thing further than to defend themſelves from oppreſſion; and conſequently, as they have no ambition to rule, they muſt be truer friends to liberty than the Nobles; ſo that, when the people are entruſted with the conſervation of liberty, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, they will be moſt zealous in its ſupport; and that, as they do not deſire to violate it themſelves, they will take care to prevent others from ſo doing. On the other hand, the Advocates for the Spartan and Venetian eſtabliſhments may alledge, that two very good ends are anſwered, by committing the care of the public liberty to the Nobility: for, in the firſt place, it ſatiates the ambition of thoſe, who by that means, will have the chief authority in the Common-wealth, and leaves them no pretence to be diſcontented: and, in the next, by taking that power from the reſtleſs multitude, it deprives them of the opportunity of raiſing tumults and ſeditious commotions in the State, which often drive the Nobility to deſpair, and always are attended with the moſt pernicious conſequences. In confirmation of this, they produce the Republic of Rome itſelf for an example; where the Tribunes of the people having got the power into their hands, were not content with one Plebeian Conſul, but inſiſted that both of them ſhould be choſen out of that order; after which, they likewiſe ſeized upon the Cenſorſhip, the Prætorſhip, and all the other great offices in the Common-wealth. But not ſatisfied with this, they proceeded with the ſame degree of licentiouſneſs, to encourage certain bold and popular men, to thwart and inſult the nobility; which in time gave riſe to the domination of Marius, and at laſt proved the ruin of that Common-wealth.

It muſt be confeſſed, therefore, that after maturely conſidering both ſides of the queſtion, it ſtill ſeems a doubtful point, in what hands one ought to truſt the guardianſhip of Liberty; ſince it is no eaſy matter to determine, whether thoſe that only deſire to ſupport themſelves in the poſſeſſion of what they already have, or thoſe that want to uſurp more, are the moſt dangerous ſort of people in a Republic. But to come to ſome concluſion upon the whole; if the State in queſtion be deſigned to extend its dominion, and become a large Empire, as Rome did; the conduct of the Romans muſt be cloſely copied in every thing; but, if it is ſuch a one as deſires nothing more than to maintain its own, it will be ſufficient to imitate the example of the Spartans and Venetians,

Venetians, in ſuch a manner, and for ſuch reaſons, as ſhall be given in the next Chapter.

Let us now diſcuſs the other part of the queſtion, viz. whether thoſe that are afraid of loſing what they have, or thoſe that graſp at more, are the moſt dangerous ſort of people in a Common-wealth. Marcus Menenius being made Dictator, and Marcus Fulvius, General of the Horſe (both Plebeians) to quell a conſpiracy which had been formed at Capua, againſt the Romans, were likewiſe veſted with a power of inquiring into the conduct of ſuch citizens at home, as had been guilty of bribery, or any ſort of undue means, to obtain the Conſulſhip and other honours in the Government. But the Nobles apprehending this enquiry was chiefly levelled at them, gave out, that it was not the Nobility that had been guilty of ſuch practices, but the Commonalty, who having neither virtue nor birth to entitle them to honours, were obliged to have recourſe to thoſe mean artifices, of which they accuſed the Dictator in particular, with ſuch virulence, that after he had made a ſpeech in public, in which he complained of the aſperſions that had been thrown upon him by the Nobles, he laid down the Dictatorſhip, and ſubmitted to be tried by the people, as he was, and acquitted. But in the courſe of this trial, it was warmly debated, which of the two were the moſt dangerous perſons, thoſe that contented themſelves with defending what they had, or thoſe that wanted to uſurp more; as too obſtinate a manner of proceeding in either, might excite great diſturbances and commotions [*i*]. Such evils, however, are moſt frequently occaſioned

[*i*] "I look upon it as a peculiar happineſs, ſays an excellent Modern of this nation, "that were I to chuſe under what form of Government I would live, I ſhould moſt certainly give the preference to that which is eſtabliſhed in my own Country. In this "point, I think, I am determined by reaſon and conviction; but, if I ſhall be told, "that I am actuated by prejudice, I am ſure it is an honeſt prejudice; it is a prejudice "that ariſes from the love of my Country, and therefore ſuch a one as I will always in"dulge. That form of Government appears to me the moſt reaſonable, which is moſt "conformable to the quality that we find in human nature, provided it be conſiſtent "with public peace and tranquillity. This is what may properly be called *Liberty*, "which exempts one man from ſubjection to another, ſo far as the order and œconomy "of government will permit. Liberty ſhould reach every Individual of a People, as "they all ſhare one common nature: if it only ſpreads among particular branches, "there had better be none at all; ſince ſuch a Liberty only aggravates the misfortune of "thoſe that are deprived of it, by ſetting before them a diſagreeable ſubject of compa"riſon. This Liberty is beſt preſerved, where the Legiſlative Power is lodged in ſeve"ral Perſons, eſpecially if thoſe Perſons are of different ranks and intereſts; for where "they are of the ſame rank, and conſequently have an intereſt to manage peculiar to "that rank, it differs but little from a deſpotic Government in a ſingle Perſon. But the "greateſt ſecurity a People can have for their Liberty, is when the Legiſlative Power is "in the hands of Perſons ſo happily diſtinguiſhed, that by providing for the particular "intereſts of their ſeveral ranks, they are providing for the whole body of the People:

"or

occaſioned by thoſe that are in poſſeſſion; for the apprehenſion of loſing what they have got operates as ſtrongly in them, as the deſire of gaining more does in others; becauſe, men are apt to think they cannot ſecurely enjoy what they poſſeſs already, without adding ſtill more to it. Beſides, the more power they have, the more able they will be to raiſe tumults, and to bring about any change or alteration they deſire.

" or in other words, when there is no part of the People that has not a common intereſt " with at leaſt one part of the Legiſlators.

" If there be but one body of Legiſlators, it is no better than a Tyranny; if there are " only two, there will want a caſting voice, and one of them muſt at leaſt be ſwallowed, " up by diſputes and contentions that will naturally ariſe betwixt them. Four would " have the ſame inconvenience as two; and a greater number would ſtill cauſe more con- " fuſion. I could never read a paſſage in Polybius, and another in Cicero, to this pur- " poſe, without a ſecret pleaſure in applying it to the Engliſh Conſtitution, which it ſuits " much better than the Roman. Both theſe great authors give the pre-eminence to a " mixed Government, conſiſting of three branches, the Regal, the Noble, and the " Popular. They had doubtleſs in their thoughts the Conſtitution of the Roman Com- " mon-wealth, in which, the Conſul repreſented the King, the Senate the Nobles, and " the Tribunes the People. This diviſion of the three Powers in the Roman Conſtitu- " tion was by no means ſo diſtinct and natural, as it is in the Engliſh form of Govern- " ment. Amongſt ſeveral objections that might be made to it, I think the chief are " thoſe that affect the Conſular Power, which had only the ornaments, without the " force of the Regal authority. The Number had not a caſting voice in it; for which " reaſon, if one did not chance to be employed abroad, whilſt the other ſat at home, " public buſineſs was ſometimes at a ſtand, whilſt the Conſuls pulled two different ways " in it. Beſides, I do not find that the Conſuls ever had a negative voice in paſſing a " a Law, or Decree of the Senate; ſo that indeed they were rather the chief body of " the Nobility, or firſt Miniſters of the State, than a diſtinct branch of the Sovereignty; " in which none can be looked upon as a part, who are not a part of the Legiſlature. " Had the Conſuls been inveſted with the Regal authority to as great a degree as our " Monarchs, there would never have been any occaſion for a Dictatorſhip, which had " in it the Power of all the three Orders, and ended in the ſubverſion of the whole " Conſtitution.

" Such a Hiſtory as that of Suetonius, which gives us a Succeſſion of abſolute Princes, " is an unanſwerable argument againſt deſpotic power. Where the Prince is a man of " wiſdom and virtue, it is indeed happy for his people, that he is abſolute; but ſince, in " the common run of mankind, for one that is wiſe and good, you find ten of a contrary " character, it is very dangerous for a nation to ſtand to its chance, or to have its pub- " lic happineſs or miſery depend upon the virtues and vices of a ſingle perſon. Look " into the hiſtory I have mentioned, or into any ſeries of abſolute Princes, how many " tyrants you muſt read through, before you come to an Emperor that is ſupportable! " But this is not all; an honeſt private man, often grows cruel and abandoned, when " converted into an abſolute Prince. Give a man power of doing what he pleaſes with " impunity, you extinguiſh his fear, and conſequently overturn in him one of the great " pillars of Morality. This too we find confirmed by matter of fact; how many hopeful " heirs apparent to great Empires have become ſuch monſters of luſt and cruelty, as " are a reproach to human nature, when in poſſeſſion of them?

" Some tell us, we ought to make our Governments on earth like that in Heaven, " which, ſay they they, is altogether Monarchial and unlimited. Was man like his " Creator, in goodneſs and juſtice, who would not follow the great model? But where " goodneſs and juſtice are not eſſential to the Ruler, who would wiſh to put himſelf into " his hands, to be diſpoſed of according to his particular will and pleaſure?"

And, it may be added, that their inſolent and extravagant manner of living, inſpires thoſe that are excluded from the adminiſtration, with a ſort of envy, and a deſire of having their turn in it, either to plunder their adverſaries, or to get thoſe honours and emoluments into their own hands, which they ſee others make ſo bad a uſe of.

CHAP. VI.

Whether ſuch a form of Government could have been eſtabliſhed at Rome, as could have prevented animoſities betwixt the Senate and the People.

WE have already ſhewn what effects the conteſts betwixt the Senate and the People produced at Rome. Now as theſe ſtruggles continued till the time of the Gracchi, and then proved the bane of public liberty, it may be aſked, perhaps, whether that State might not have attained to ſuch a height of grandeur and authority as it did, under another form of government, which could have either prevented or exſtinguiſhed thoſe inteſtine diſcords? To ſolve this queſtion, we muſt examine the conſtitution of ſuch Republics as continued free for a long courſe of years, without any tumults and diſſenſions, to ſee what kind of Government they lived under; and then conſider whether the ſame could have been introduced at Rome; and ſince I have already mentioned thoſe of Sparta and Venice, let the former ſerve for an example in ancient, and the latter in modern times. Sparta was governed by a King, and a ſmall Senate: Venice does not give any different titles to thoſe that govern it; for all ſuch as are qualified to be admitted into the adminiſtration, are called by one common appellation, *Gentlemen* or *Nobles*, which indeed was rather owing to chance, than the prudence of their Law givers. For, as a great number of people were forced to retire into thoſe Iſles and Lagoons, where Venice now ſtands, (for the reaſons abovementioned) and the multitude at laſt encreaſed to ſuch a degree, that it became neceſſary to make ſome laws, in order to live peaceably and ſecurely together, they eſtabliſhed a form of government; and aſſembling frequently in council to make further proviſion for their common ſafety, when they thought they were numerous enough to ſubſiſt of themſelves, they ordained that nobody that ſhould come thereafter to live amongſt them, ſhould have any ſhare in the government. But their numbers ſtill increaſing, and many others coming afterwards to ſettle there, who therefore could not be admitted into the adminiſtration, they called thoſe that were already poſſeſſed of it, *Gentlemen* or *Nobles*, for their greater honour, and the reſt, only *Citizens*.

This

This form then, might both be eſtabliſhed at firſt, and afterwards ſupported without tumults or conteſts; for, when it was introduced, all the inhabitants being admitted to a ſhare in the Government without diſtinction, no body had any reaſon to complain; and thoſe that came to live there afterwards, finding the adminiſtration already fixed and ſettled, had neither cauſe nor means to diſturb it; for they could not pretend they were deprived of any privilege, nor had they power or weight ſufficient to raiſe diſſenſions, becauſe the government kept a ſtrict hand over them, and did not employ them in any charge that might give them ſo much authority. Beſides, after all, the number of new comers was not ſo great, as to exceed that of the firſt Settlers, or *Noble Venetians*; ſo that the latter had not only an opportunity of eſtabliſhing their government firmly at the beginning, but the power in their hands likewiſe, of keeping it united afterwards.

Sparta, as I ſaid before, being governed by a King, and a little Senate, was alſo enabled to ſupport itſelf a conſiderable time; for all foreigners being excluded, the number of inhabitants in that State was but ſmall, and thoſe living with great reputation, under the laws given by Lycurgus (the ſtrict obſervation of which prevented all cauſes of tumult and diſſenſion) continued a long while united; for though, by his laws, there was a diſtinction of rank and condition indeed eſtabliſhed, yet the revenues of the lands were almoſt equally divided amongſt them: ſo that one being very little, or perhaps, not at all richer than another, the people were the leſs diſſatisfied being kept at ſome diſtance by a few Nobles, who were in the adminiſtration; and not being oppreſſed by them, never thought of aſpiring to any higher degree of power. This was in ſome meaſure owing to the condition and circumſtances of their Kings, who, being elective, and ſurrounded by the Nobility, had no better expedient to ſupport their dignity, than by protecting the people from violence and injuſtice: by which, the latter being freed from all fear of oppreſſion, did not deſire any ſhare in the Government; and therefore, when there was no reaſon for envy or ſtrife with the Nobility, there could be nothing to diſturb their union. But the two principal cauſes of this long union, were the following: In the firſt place, the number of inhabitants in Sparta was ſo ſmall, that they might eaſily be governed by a few: and, in the next, as they admitted no foreigners into their Common-wealth, they were neither liable to be ſoon corrupted, nor to multiply in ſuch a manner as to become formidable to the few that governed them.

Theſe things being conſidered, it plainly appears, that if the Roman Law givers had intended to conſtitute a Republic, that ſhould continue in peace and unity, like thoſe abovementioned, they muſt have taken one of theſe two courſes; that is, they muſt either have acted like the

Venetians, in not employing the common people in their wars; or, like the Spartans, in admitting no foreigners into their State. But as they did both, it threw ſuch a degree of ſtrength into the hands of the Plebeians, that they had it in their power to raiſe tumults and ſeditions whenever they pleaſed. On the other hand, if this Republic had been leſs divided, it would not have been ſo ſtrong, nor could it ever have arrived at ſuch a pitch of grandeur as it did. So that if any method had been found to prevent the diſſenſions that happened in it, it muſt likewiſe have extinguiſhed the cauſes of its aggrandizement; for whoever will examine the courſe of human affairs, will ſoon ſee, that it is almoſt impoſſible to remedy one inconvenience without falling into another.

If then you ſuffer a people to encreaſe, and train them up to arms, in order to extend your Empire, you will not be able to govern them as you would do; and, if you keep them low and diſarmed, in order to render them more tractable, they will either make no conqueſts at all, or not be able to maintain them if they do, or become ſo daſtardly and effeminate, that you muſt of neceſſity fall a prey to the firſt Invader. In all ſuch undertakings, therefore, we ought to take that courſe, which after mature deliberation, ſeems to be ſubject to the feweſt and leaſt inconveniencies, and to look upon it as the beſt; for none are wholly exempt from difficulties and accidents. Rome, indeed, after the example of Sparta, might have choſen a prince to rule over it for his life, and have formed a little Senate; but it could not likewiſe have extended its Empire, without augmenting the number of its citizens; and, in that caſe, ſuch a King and ſuch a Senate would have contributed but little to its domeſtic peace and union. Whoſoever then intends to found a new Common-wealth, ſhould firſt conſider, whether he would have it extend its dominion, or be content with a narrow territory of its own: becauſe, in the firſt caſe, he ought to imitate the Romans, and make the beſt proviſion he can againſt diviſions, if it is not in his power intirely to prevent them; for, without a great number of men, and thoſe too well diſciplined in arms, no Republic can ever make any conqueſts, or, if it could, it would not be able to keep poſſeſſion of them. In the ſecond caſe, he ſhould follow the example of the Spartans and Venetians; but he muſt uſe all poſſible means to prevent new acquiſitions, becauſe conqueſts are generally deſtructive to ſuch feeble Common-wealths; and, indeed they proved ſo, both to Sparta and Venice: the former of which, having reduced almoſt all Greece, diſcovered its weakneſs upon a very ſlight occaſion. For, a rebellion happening at Thebes, at the inſtigation of Pelopidas, ſeveral other cities likewiſe revolted, and at laſt quite overturned the Lacedemonian Government. The Venetians alſo, after they had made themſelves maſters

maſters of the greater part of Italy, rather by artifice and dint of money, than arms, preſuming too much upon their ſtrength, loſt almoſt all, in one battle, that they had ever acquired before [*k*].

For my own part, I am of opinion, that if any one would found a Common-wealth, which ſhould ſubſiſt for a long time, it would be the beſt way to form its interior conſtitution after the model of Sparta; and to build the capital in a ſtrong and inacceſſible ſituation, like that of Venice: that ſo it might not be in the power of an enemy to cruſh it on a ſudden. Beſides which, care ſhould be taken, on the other hand, to hinder it from growing ſo great and powerful, as to become formidable to its neighbours; for the common motives that induce people to make war upon a State are, either the deſire of conquering it, or the fear of being conquered by it themſelves. But both thoſe cauſes are exſtinguiſhed by the precautions juſt now recommended: becauſe, if its natural ſituation makes it difficult to be aſſaulted (as I preſuppoſe) and it is pretty well provided for its defence, it will ſeldom or never happen, that any one will have the hardineſs to attempt it: and if it is content with its own territory, and every one ſees it has no ambitious views, others will have no occaſion to make war upon it for their own preſervation, eſpecially if its laws and conſtitution are ſuch as will not allow it to enlarge its dominion [*l*]. And, I verily believe, if things could be balanced in this manner, it would be far the beſt model of government, for any State that deſired to live in quiet and tranquillity. But, as the affairs of this world are perpetually fluctuating, and nothing continues long in the ſame condition, all States muſt of courſe grow either better or worſe in time [*m*]; neceſſity often forcing men to do ſuch things,

[*k*] In the year 1509, at Agnadel, near the river Adda.

[*l*] "This reaſoning (ſays the above cited Author of the *Eſtimate of the manners* " *and principles of the times*, Vol. II. Sect. ii.) is applied by Machiavel to Sparta and Ve" nice: I need not point out to the Reader, how much more applicable it is to Britain: " In ſome reſpects, perhaps, there is no time nor country delivered down to us in Story, " in which a wiſe man would ſo much have wiſhed to have lived, as in our own. If it be " aſked in what reſpects? Let us do juſtice to our age and country in every regard. A " political Conſtitution, ſuperior to all that Hiſtory hath recorded, or preſent times can " boaſt: a Religious Eſtabliſhment which breathes univerſal Charity and Toleration: " *a Separation from the Continent that naturally ſecures us from the calamities of Invaſion,* " *and the temptation of Conqueſt:* a Climate fertile in the ſubſtantial comforts of life: a " Spirit of liberty yet unconquered: a general Humanity and Sincerity beyond any na" tion upon Earth: an adminiſtration of juſtice that hath ſilenced envy. Theſe are " Bleſſings which every Engliſhman feels, and ought to acknowledge. Search through " all the moſt admired periods of the moſt admired Countries, the moſt flouriſhing æras " of Greece, Italy, or France; and tell me, if, in any of theſe, ſuch an Union can be " found? A volume might be written in proof and diſplay of this ſuperiority."

[*m*] To this purpoſe, Montaigne ſays very juſtly, Vol. III. Chap. ii. "Though the " features of the pictures I draw alter and vary, there is ſtill a likeneſs. The univerſe " is but one perpetual motion, in which all things are inceſſantly wheeled about; the " Rocks of Caucaſus, the Pyramids of Egypt, the Earth itſelf is ſo, both by a general motion,

things, as their reaſon diſapproves: ſo, when a State is founded that might continue firm and indiſſoluble for a long courſe of years, provided it did not attempt to extend its dominion, and it afterwards becomes abſolutely neceſſary to do ſo, its firſt principles and foundations being deſtroyed, it muſt ſoon fall to ruin. On the other hand, if fortune ſhould be ſo propitious to it, that it ſhould have no occaſion to engage in any war, the inhabitants would then degenerate into idleneſs, and from idleneſs into effeminacy and faction; which two evils together, or indeed either of them alone, would be ſufficient to cauſe its deſtruction. However, ſince it is hardly poſſible, I think, to balance things ſo exactly, or to obſerve ſo juſt a medium as I have been ſpeaking of above, it is the beſt way to have a particular regard in the conſtitution of a Republic to what ſeems moſt honourable; and to make ſuch proviſions, that if it ſhould ever become neceſſary to enlarge its empire, it may be able to keep poſſeſſion of what it ſhall acquire. Upon the whole, therefore, I ſhould chuſe to form a Common-wealth upon the Roman model, rather than upon that of the other States abovementioned (ſince it is impoſſible to obſerve a due medium betwixt them) and to bear with the diſſenſions that muſt ariſe betwixt the Senate and Plebeians, as an inconvenience altogether neceſſary in a people that would emulate the grandeur of the Romans; for, beſides the reaſons already aſſigned to ſhew the advantage of having Tribunes for the conſervation of the public liberties, it is eaſy to ſee the benefit that muſt accrue to a Common-wealth from the power thoſe officers had, amongſt other privileges, of freely impeaching ſuch as were thought culpable; of which I ſhall ſpeak more particularly in the next Chapter.

" motion, and a particular one of its own. Conſtancy itſelf is no other than a more lan-
" guid motion. I cannot be ſure of my object: 'tis always diſturb'd and ſtaggering by a
" a natural giddineſs. I take it at the point it is in at the inſtant when I conſider it. I
" do not paint its being, I paint its paſſage; not a paſſage from one century to another,
" or from one ſeven years to another ſeven; but from day to day, from minute to mi-
" nute. I muſt accommodate my Hiſtory to the time; I may ſoon change not only my
" fortune, but my intention alſo. It is a true colour of various and changeable accidents
" and of imaginations, that are wavering, and ſometimes contrary. Whether it be
" that I am not then the man I was, or that I lay hold on the ſubjects with other circum-
" ſtances and conſiderations; ſo it is, that perhaps I may plainly contradict myſelf; but,
" as Demades ſaid, I do not contradict the truth. Could my Soul once take ſure foot-
" ing, I would then ſpeak definitively and peremptorily: but, as it is, it is always learn-
" ing and making trial."

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

How neceſſary it is for the preſervation of Liberty in a Common-wealth, that any Criminal may be freely accuſed, with impunity to the Accuſer.

NOTHING can be of greater importance to the ſafety of a State, than a power lodged in the hands of thoſe that are appointed Guardians of its liberties, to accuſe ſuch perſons as violate the laws of their Country, either before the people, or the Magiſtrates, or ſome Council that takes cognizance of the like offences; for it produces two very ſalutary effects. In the firſt place, the Citizens, being awed by theſe accuſations, ſeldom dare to attempt any thing againſt the State: and if they do, they are preſently brought to puniſhment, without any reſpect of perſons [*n*]. In the next, a paſſage is opened for the evacuation of ſuch humours as are common in all great cities: for when theſe humours cannot diſcharge themſelves through a proper channel, they are apt to take ſome other courſe, that may be fatal to the Common-wealth [*o*]. It is of the utmoſt conſequence, therefore, to the welfare

[*n*] Of this we may ſee Tully's ſenſe in many parts of his works: let the following ſuffice. "Accuſatores multos eſſe in civitate utile eſt, ut metu contineatur audacia." *Pro. Sex. Roſc. Amer.* "Facile omnes patimur eſſe quamplurimos accuſatores, quod in-"nocens ſi accuſatus ſit, abſolvi poteſt; nocens niſi accuſatus fuerit, condemnari non "poteſt. Utilius eſt autem abſolvi innocentem, quam nocentem cauſam non dicere." *ibid.* "Nihil mali eſt, canes ibi quamplurimos eſſe ubi per-multi obſervandi, multaque "ſervanda ſunt." *ibid.*

[*o*] Machiavel might here have added another ſalutary effect from the abovementioned great authority, viz. the particular care of one's own conduct. "Omnes qui alterum, "nullis impulſi inimicitiis, nullâ privatim læſi injuriâ, nullo præmio adducti in judicium "Reipublicæ cauſâ vocant, providere debent, non ſolum quid oneris in præſentia tollant, "ſed etiam quantum in omnem vitæ negotii ſuſcipere conentur. Legem enim ſibi ipſi "dicunt innocentiæ, continentiæ, virtutumque omnium, qui ab altero rationem vitæ re-"poſcunt: atque eo magis, ſi id, ut ante dixi, faciunt nullâ re commoti aliâ, niſi utilitate "communi. Nam qui ſibi hoc ſumpſit ut corrigat mores aliorum, ac peccata reprehen-"dat, quis huic agnoſcat, ſi quâ in re ipſe ab religione officii declinârit? Quapropter "hoc magis ab omnibus ejuſmodi civis laudandus ac diligendus eſt, qui non ſolum reipu-"blicæ civem improbum removet, verum etiam ſeipſum ejuſmodi fore profitetur ac præ-"ſtat, ut ſibi non modo communi voluntate virtutis atque officii, ſed etiam, ut quâdam "magis neceſſariâ ratione rectè ſit honeſtèque vivendum.

"Furem aliquem, aut rapacem accuſâris? vitanda tibi ſemper erit omnis avaritiæ ſuſ-"picio: maleficum quempiam adduxeris aut crudelem? cavendum erit ſemper, ne quâ "in re aſperior aut inhumanior fuiſſe videare: corruptorem aut adulterum? providendum "diligenter, ne quod in vitâ veſtigium libidinis appareat. Omnia poſtremo, quæ vindi-"câris in altero, tibi ipſi vehementer fugienda ſunt. Etenim non modo accuſator, ſed "ne objurgator quidem ferendus eſt, qui quod in altero vitium reprehendit, in eo ipſo "deprehenditur."

welfare and repoſe of every Republic, that a legal proviſion be made, to give vent to theſe fermentaions: of which many proofs may be adduced, particularly the caſe of Coriolanus, as it is related by Livy. The Roman Nobility being exaſperated at the Plebeians, who they thought had gained too much authority by the creation of Tribunes, to fight their battles upon all occaſions; and the city, as it happened, labouring under ſuch a ſcarcity of proviſions, at the ſame time, that the Senate was forced to ſend to Sicily for corn; Coriolanus, who was a bitter enemy to the popular faction, ſuggeſted to the Nobility, that they had then a fair opportunity of humbling the Plebeians, and depriving them of the authority they had uſurped, to the great prejudice of the Nobles, by refuſing to let them have any ſhare of the corn that was to be imported. But this advice coming to the ears of the people, they were ſo enraged at Coriolanus, that they raiſed a tumult, and, falling upon him, as he came out of the Senate-houſe, would certainly have torn him to pieces, if the Tribunes had not interpoſed their authority, and cited him to anſwer the charge that was brought againſt him. From hence we may obſerve the utility or rather abſolute neceſſity of making proper laws in a Common-wealth, to diſſipate the choler and reſentment, ariſing from the hatred of the multitude to a ſingle perſon; which, if not diverted by ſome ſuch method, would take a different turn, and prove much more prejudicial to the State. And though, indeed, it may ſometimes happen, that a citizen may be unjuſtly puniſhed by the Magiſtrates, yet the Common-wealth would be but little, or not at all hurt by it; becauſe it is done neither by private violence, nor foreign aſſiſtance, which are the bane of liberty; but under the ſanction of laws, and by public authority, which, having their due bounds preſcribed them, cannot injure the Community.

To prove what I have aſſerted by examples, this of Coriolanus may ſerve for one of ancient date; and let any one conſider, what confuſion it muſt have occaſioned in the Roman government, if he had been killed in a tumultuary manner: for that would have been an act of private revenge; and violence of that kind always makes individuals afraid of each other; fear puts them upon providing for their defence, and in order to defend themſelves they muſt form parties; and parties at laſt turn to factions, which generally end in the ruin of a State; but, by the interpoſition of public authority, all theſe evils were prevented.

" deprehenditur." *In Verrem. orat.* VIII. *in init.*——" Monui illum, quem planè diligo, " ut cum alios accuſaſſet, cautius vlveret." *Epiſt. ad Attic.* Lib. VI. i. " Cognoſce ex " me quam multa eſſe oporteat in eo, qui alterum accuſat. Primum integritatem atque " innocentiam ſingularem. Nihil eſt enim quod minus ferendum ſit, quam rationem ab " altero vitæ repoſcere eum, qui non poſſit ſuæ reddere. Deinde accuſatorem ſermum " verumque eſſe oportet." *Divinat. contra Cæcil.*——See the Note concerning Informers, *Hiſt. Flor. lib.* II. towards the end.

As

As to modern inſtances of the bad conſequences of not providing the people with ſome legal means of venting their rage againſt any of their fellow-citizens, we have ſeen ſeveral in our own times, and one in particular at Florence, in the caſe of Franciſco Valori, who being a leading man there, was ſuſpected by many that knew his pride and ambition, of a deſign to ſeize upon the Government himſelf: and, as they had no other way to prevent it, but by ſetting up another faction againſt him; Valori, who had nothing to fear on his ſide, but ſome popular commotion, began to fortify himſelf with partizans and followers, to defend him in caſe of need. On the other hand, thoſe that oppoſed him being utterly unprovided with any lawful method of dealing with him, reſolved to have recourſe to arms; ſo that, though he might have eaſily been cut off in the ordinary way of juſtice, without hurting any one elſe, if their laws had been properly calculated for it, many other eminent citizens ſuffered as well as himſelf. I might likewiſe alledge what happened in the ſame City, with regard to Pietro Soderini; which was entirely owing to the want of due means, to call a powerful and ambitious citizen to account: becauſe eight Signiors only (and there were no more in that Republic) were not ſufficient for that purpoſe, which required a greater number of judges; as a few are liable either to be corrupted, or over-awed by a man in power. But had ſuch neceſſary proviſions been made, the citizens might either have accuſed him with ſecurity, if he deſerved it, and ſatiated their fury, without calling in a Spaniſh army to their aſſiſtance; or, if he did not deſerve it, they would not have dared to proceed againſt him in that manner, leſt he alſo ſhould have accuſed them in their turn: and thus that conteſt might have been ended, which cauſed ſo much tumult and diſorder.

We may conclude then, that when foreign aid is called into a Republic by any party, it is owing to a bad conſtitution, and that they have no legal way to purge off thoſe ill humours that are ſo natural to mankind; for which, the only remedy is to lodge legal accuſations againſt offenders before a number of Judges, and to make them reputable. This method was ſo well eſtabliſhed and obſerved at Rome, that in all the deſſenſions which happened betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians, neither the Senate, nor the People, nor any particular citizen ever thought of availing themſelves of foreign aſſiſtance: for as they had a remedy at home, they had no occaſion to ſeek for one abroad. And though the examples already cited may ſuffice to evince the truth and neceſſity of what I have laid down, I will yet produce another out of Livy, who tells us, that one Lucumo having debauched the Siſter of Aruns at Cluſium (one of the principal cities of Etruria at that time) Aruns not being able to revenge himſelf on ſo powerful a delinquent, had

had recourſe to the Gauls for aſſiſtance (who were then in poſſeſſion of that part of Italy now called Lombardy) and encouraged them to lay ſiege to Cluſium, by repreſenting to them what advantage they might reap themſelves from ſuch an expedition, at the ſame time that they procured him redreſs for the injury he had ſuſtained. Now if Aruns could have had juſtice done him at home, he would not have applied to foreigners for it.

But if legal accuſations are ſerviceable to a Republic, calumnies are no leſs dangerous and pernicious; as we ſhall endeavour to ſhew in the following Chapter.

CHAP. VIII.

That Calumnies are as pernicious, as legal Accuſations are ſerviceable to a Common-wealth.

THOUGH Furius Camillus was ſo highly revered for his valour in delivering his Country from the yoke of the Gauls, that no Roman Citizen of what rank ſoever he might be, thought it any diminution either to his dignity or reputation to give him the precedence: yet Manlius Capitolinus (ſo called, becauſe he ſaved the Capitol) who thought he had done as much for his Country as Camillus, and was in no wiſe inferior to him in military abilities, could not bear to ſee ſuch extraordinary honours conferred upon him. Full of envy therefore, and perceiving he could make no impreſſion upon the Senate, he applied to the people; amongſt whom he ſcattered various aſperſions and inſinuations to the prejudice of Camillus; particularly, that the ranſom money which was collected for the Gauls had not been appropriated to that uſe, but diſtributed amongſt ſome few Citizens; and that, if it could be recovered out of their hands, it would be of great advantage to the people, who might apply it either to leſſen the public taxes, or diſcharge their private debts. Theſe ſuggeſtions had ſuch an effect upon the people, that they began to form cabals, and at laſt to raiſe tumults in the City; which giving great offence to the Senators, who thought they might prove of dangerous conſequence, they appointed a Dictator to enquire into the matter, and to call Manlius to account for his behaviour. This Magiſtrate accordingly cited Manlius to appear immediately, and anſwer to the charge exhibited againſt him in a public aſſembly; whither the Dictator coming in the midſt of the Nobility, and Manlius ſurrounded by the Plebeians, the latter was deſired to declare in whoſe hands the money was, which he had ſpoken of; becauſe the Senators were as deſirous to be informed of that as the people.

But

But Manlius, inſtead of anſwering particularly to the queſtion, endeavoured to evade it, by ſaying, he had no occaſion to inform them of what they already ſo well knew themſelves; upon which, the Dictator ſent him directly to priſon.

From hence we may obſerve how deteſtable ſuch calumnies ought to be, not only in all free States, but in every civil Society; and how neceſſary it is to puniſh thoſe that are guilty of them, without partiality or reſpect of perſons. And certainly no method ſo effectual can be taken to prevent or ſuppreſs them, as to encourage legal accuſations as much as poſſible; ſince they are no leſs detrimental than ſuch accuſations are ſerviceable to a Common-wealth. For there is this difference betwixt them, that a Calumniator calls in no teſtimony or evidence to prove the truth of what he ſays; ſo that it is in any man's power to abuſe another; but an Accuſer muſt produce witneſſes and ſubſtantial proofs to ſupport his charge [*p*]. Accuſations are lodged before Magiſtrates, or Councils, or Aſſemblies of the people: but Calumnies are whiſpered about in holes and corners; and it always happens that Calumnies prevail moſt in thoſe States, where there are the feweſt accuſations, and the government is leaſt diſpoſed to encourage them.

A founder of a Republic therefore ought to make ſuch laws and proviſions, that any one citizen may ſecurely accuſe another, and to ſee that they are duly and ſtrictly obſerved: after which, he ſhould puniſh Calumniators with the utmoſt rigour; who indeed would have no reaſon to complain of it, when they had an opportunity of openly and ſafely accuſing thoſe whom they have baſely ſlandered in private. Where this is not duly attended to, great diſorders muſt always enſue; for Calumnies inſtead of making men better, only ſerve to irritate and provoke them; and when they are thus exaſperated, they naturally endeavour to revenge themſelves, as they will rather be apt to hate, than ſtand in any fear of thoſe that have aſperſed them. Excellent proviſions were made at Rome for this purpoſe, as we have ſaid before; and very poor ones, or in fact none at all, at Florence: accordingly the former Republic reaped great advantage from them, and the latter

[*p*] "Aliud eſt maledicere, aliud accuſare. Accuſatio crimen deſiderat, rem ut defi-
"niat, hominem ut notet, argumento probet, teſte confirment. Maledictio autem nihil
"habet propoſiti, præter contumeliam." *Cic. pro. M. Cælio. orat.* XIII. *in init.*
"Quid eſt enim minus, non dico Oratoris, ſed hominis, quam id objicere adverſario,
"quod ille ſi verbo negârit, longius progredi non poſſit qui objecerit?" *Philip.* II.
Add to theſe the words of Lactantius. "Turpe eſt hominem ingenioſum dicere id,
"quod ſi neges, probare non poſſit." Inſtit. *Divin.* lib. II. cap. xxviii. The Reader, if he pleaſes, may ſee two excellent diſcourſes upon this ſubject, in the 451ſt and 594th Numbers of the Spectator, and a Diſſertation upon defamatory Libels, by Mr. Bayle.

ſuffered much by that neglect. For whoever reads the Hiſtory of our Common-wealth will ſee how many aſperſions have been caſt at all times, upon thoſe that were employed in the management of its moſt important affairs; one being charged with embezzling the public money, another with being bribed by the enemy to loſe a battle, or raiſe a ſiege; and a third with being too ambitious; which occaſioned endleſs animoſities, diviſions, factions, and finally the ruin of that State. But if proper care had been taken at Florence to encourage legal accuſations againſt ſuch Citizens as were ſuppoſed to be guilty of any crime, and to puniſh Calumniators, all theſe evils might have been prevented; for thoſe Citizens, whether acquitted or condemned, would not have had it in their power to hurt the State, and fewer people would have been expoſed to Accuſations than Calumnies: becauſe, as I juſt now ſaid, it is a much eaſier thing to calumniate, than to maintain a juſt accuſation. It has likewiſe ſometimes happened, that an aſpiring Citizen has availed himſelf of calumnies, to gratify his ambitious views: for if he is oppoſed by any other perſon of weight and power in the State, he immediately aſperſes him, and puts himſelf at the head of the Plebeians, whom he confirms in the bad opinion of his adverſary, which he had inſtilled into them before; and thus ſecures their ſuffrages and intereſt to promote his own deſigns; of this ſeveral inſtances might be produced, but I ſhall content myſelf with one only.

When the Florentine army laid ſiege to Lucca, under the command of their Commiſſary Giovanni Guicciardini; whether it was owing to ill fortune or bad conduct, he could not make himſelf Maſter of that City. However it might be, he was charged with being corrupted by the Luccheſe; which calumny being induſtriouſly propagated by his enemies, enraged him to ſuch a degree, that it almoſt drove him to madneſs: and though he offered to put himſelf into the hands of a Magiſtrate till he ſhould be brought to a trial, yet he never could entirely wipe off the imputation, becauſe there were no laws in that Common-wealth to which he might have recourſe for his juſtification. Hence aroſe a mortal enmity betwixt Guicciardini's friends, (who conſiſted of the greater part of the Nobility) and thoſe that wanted to ſee a change of Government [q]; which animoſities, and others of the like nature daily increaſing, at laſt ended in the total deſtruction of the Republican Government there.

Manlius Capitolinus then being a Calumniator and not a fair Accuſer, the Romans have ſhewn us by their example, how ſuch people ought to be puniſhed: for they ſhould be made to bring a formal accuſation,

[q] See the Hiſtory of Florence. Book IV. towards the end.

inſtead

inſtead of ſpreading private calumnies; and rewarded, (at leaſt not puniſhed) in caſe they could make good their charge; if not, to be dealt with as Manlius was [r].

[r] Tenes or Temnes, who gave name to the Iſle of Tenedos, made a Law there, that a man ſhould always ſtand behind the Judge with an axe in his hand, ready to cut off the head of any perſon immediately, who ſhould be convicted of a falſity. *Ex Heraclide de politiis.* Others ſay he ordered an Executioner to ſtand with an axe lifted up behind the Accuſers, to put thoſe to death directly that ſhould be found guilty of falſe accuſations. *Suidas in voce* Τενδος ανθρωπος. This puts one in mind of a Maxim which a French Civilian of the Sixteenth Century has commented upon. It imports, that a man who takes upon him to attack the Religion which has been eſtabliſhed for ſeveral ages, ought not to be heard but upon this condition, that he ſhall be capitally puniſhed, if he does not convince the people, that his own particular opinion is truer than that of the Public. "Qui antiqua, legitima, atque ordinaria ſacra, audet in controverſiam "adducere, eum non audiendum eſſe, niſi periculo ſui capitis, ſi non perſuadeat "veriorem eſſe ſuam ſententiam." *Petrus Ætodius decretorum.* lib. I. p. xviii. *Paris* 1573. 8*vo.* He quotes upon this occaſion a remarkable example from Joſephus; Book XIII. Chap. vi. *of his Jewiſh Antiquities.* "The Jews and Samaritans having had a "conteſt in the City of Alexandria, upon the queſtion, whether the Temple of Jeruſa-"lem was preferable to that of Gerazim, the cauſe was brought before the Council of "Ptolemy Philometor King of Egypt: and before it was argued, it was determined, "that the Advocates of that party, which ſhould loſe the point, ſhould be condemned "to die. The Advocate of the Jews ſpoke firſt, and ſo clearly proved the juſtice of "his cauſe, that a decree was made agreeable to his deſire; ſo that Sabbeus and Theo-"doſius, the two Advocates of the Samaritans, were put to death."——One might here obſerve that Joſephus has not mentioned whether the Samaritan Advocates ſpoke at all or not. This might lead one to think, that Sentence was given without their being heard. It is not probable however, that Ptolemy would be guilty of ſuch a piece of injuſtice. Joſephus therefore has violated the laws of Hiſtory.——The abovementioned Civilian, preſently after, cites the Law of Zaleucus, by which, all thoſe that propoſed any innovations, were obliged to do it with a rope about their neck; that ſo, if they did not prevail for the abrogation of the old cuſtoms, they might be hanged upon the ſpot; and concludes with a wiſh that there was the ſame law in France. He thinks that this would have prevented thoſe factions and confuſions, which the deſire of novelty had occaſioned in that Kingdom. "Quibus omnino rationibus atque conditionibus, "ſi nos præſertim in hoc tempore uteremur, quo is demum nihil ſcire, & illiberalis "eſſe dicitur, cui non placent abſurdiſſima quæque, modo recentiſſima; non ita "planè res incertæ eſſent ac turbulentæ, neque tam multi multarum partium, factio-"num, opinionum, auctores evaderent: cum ſuo ſaltem periculo eo diſcerent amare, "colere, pacem patriamque, leges ac Magiſtratus, quæ odio ſane proſequuntur." It is evident he would have had the diſpute betwixt the Popiſh Clergy and the Proteſtants, determined like that of Alexandria. But was there a Tribunal in France like that of the King of Egypt? The latter conſiſted of perſons who were neither Jews nor Samaritans; and the contending parties might therefore expect an impartial judgment. Luther and Calvin and their followers could not promiſe themſelves the ſame thing; ſince the ſame perſons who would have been their Judges, were likewiſe parties. So that neither the Laws of Zaleucus, nor that of the King of Tenedos, nor laſtly the practice of the Romans either can or ought to be extended to matters of religion.—— Manlius was thrown headlong from the Capitol.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

That only one perſon ſhould be concerned, either in founding a new State, or making a thorough reform in an old one.

IT may be thought perhaps that I have entered too far into the Roman Hiſtory, before I make any mention either of the very Founders themſelves of that Republic, or the laws they made relating to Religion and Military diſcipline. Not to keep thoſe in ſuſpence any longer then, who may deſire ſome information in theſe matters, I ſay, that many may poſſibly think it a bad precedent in Romulus, the founder of a State, to kill his own brother firſt, and afterwards to connive at the death of Titus Tatius the Sabine, whom he had aſſociated with himſelf in the government [*f*]; as any of his own Subjects, if prompted by ambition and deſire of Command, might plead the example of their Prince, in diſpatching ſuch as endeavoured to oppoſe or impede their deſigns. And indeed their opinion would ſeem juſt and reaſonable, if the motives were not to be conſidered which induced Romulus to act as he did. For it muſt be laid down as a general rule, that it very ſeldom or never happens that any Government is either well founded at firſt, or thoroughly reformed afterwards, except the plan be laid and

[*f*] After the death of Remus, a war having been commenced betwixt the Sabines and Romans, upon the rape of the Sabine virgins, Tatius, the general of the former, made himſelf maſter of the Capitol, and otherwiſe ſo harraſſed the Romans, that Romulus was obliged to come upon terms with them, and not only to incorporate them into his new State, but to admit Tatius to an equal ſhare in the Sovereignty. Five years afterwards, however, as they were offering ſacrifice together at Lavinium, an inſurrection was raiſed, as ſome ſay by the contrivance of Romulus, in which Tatius loſt his life.—— Upon this paſſage, one E. Dacres, who tranſlated Machiavel's political diſcourſes, in the year 1636, ſays as follows, "Without queſtion the end was ambition, Royalty admitting no companion: of whom to free himſelf, it ſeems, that Romulus ſtood not much upon how lawful means he uſed, for Cain-like, he ſlew his brother, and conſented to Titus Tatius his death, without doubt, for venturing to take part in the authority." And touching this, it may be Machiavel will ſpeak truer, near the latter end of his eighteenth chapter of this book, where he ſays, "Becauſe the reſtoring of a city to civil and politique government pre-ſuppoſes a good man; and by violence to become Prince of a Common-wealth, pre-ſuppoſes an evil man, for this cauſe it ſhall very ſeldom come to paſs, that a good man will ever ſtrive to make himſelf Prince by miſchievous ways, although his ends therein be all good; nor will a wicked man, by wicked means attaining to be Prince, do good, nor ever comes it into his heart to uſe that authority well, which by evil means he came to." And ſo at the very end of the ſame eighteenth chapter he concludes, "That though the intent were not good, there might be a fair colour ſet upon it by a good ſucceſs." Whereby our Politician, however he winds and turns, comes at length to diſcover his evil ground, *Jus regnandi gratiâ violandum eſt, aliis in rebus pietatem colas.*"

conducted

conducted by one man only, who has the ſole power of giving all orders, and making all laws that are neceſſary for its eſtabliſhment. A prudent and virtuous Founder of a State therefore, whoſe chief aim it is to promote the welfare of many, rather than to gratify his own ambition; to make proviſion for the good of his country, in preference to that of his Heirs or Succeſſors, ought to endeavour by all means to get the ſupreme authority wholly into his own hands: nor will any reaſonable man ever condemn him for taking any meaſures, even the moſt extraordinary, if they are neceſſary for that purpoſe: the means indeed may ſeem culpable, but the end will juſtify them, if it be a good one, as that of Romulus was, and will always be admitted as a ſufficient excuſe; for he is only blameable who uſes violence to throw things into confuſion and diſtraction, and not he who does it to eſtabliſh peace and good order [*t*]. But a Legiſlator ought likewiſe to be ſo provident and diſintereſted as not to leave the authority he has aſſumed as an inheritance to another: for men being naturally more prone to evil than good, his Succeſſor perhaps may be tempted by ambition to abuſe that power which he himſelf made a wiſe and virtuous uſe of. Beſides, it is further to be conſidered, that although it is the moſt proper that one man alone ſhould form the firſt model, yet any Government that he ſhall eſtabliſh will be but of ſhort duration if it devolves upon a ſingle perſon: but if it is transferred to many it will be much better, becauſe many will be intereſted in the maintenance of it. For as it is not convenient that the multitude ſhould be concerned in laying the foundations of a government; ſince the diverſity of their opinions would not ſuffer them to agree in what may be moſt for its good: ſo when things are once ſettled upon ſome good and advantageous bottom, they will hardly ever all agree to abandon it.

That Romulus therefore was excuſable for putting to death both his brother and the other aſſociate in his government; and that what he did was not out of motives of ambition, but for the public good, plainly appears from his eſtabliſhing a Senate ſoon after they were dead, according to the reſolutions of which he acted in all things, reſerving only to himſelf the privilege of calling the Senators together, and of commanding their Armies in time of war. A proof of this we have

[*t*] Human Policy ſeems to be at great variance with ſound reaſon and true religion in this point: for the beſt Caſuiſts ſay, *Bonitas intentionis non ſufficit ad bonitatem actûs*, i. e. *A good end does not juſtify bad means to compaſs it*; but the Jeſuits ſay otherwiſe. The Maxim, however, *Let us do evil, that good may come*, is utterly diſclaimed by one of much higher authority than either of them.——A ſharper, perhaps, may avail himſelf of tricks and fineſſes for a while, but a fair and good player will have the advantage at the long run. Let any one conſider the conduct of Henry III. of France, as it is related by Davila, and he will ſoon be convinced how fatal ſuch meaſures prove in the end; and that *Honeſty*, according to the old proverb, *is the beſt Policy*.

from.

from what happened afterwards, when the Romans recovered their liberties by the expulſion of the Tarquins: at which time they made no change in their firſt conſtitution; except that inſtead of one King for life, they annually created two Conſuls: which ſhews that the firſt inſtitutions of that State were rather calculated for a free Republican Government, than the ſupport of abſolute and tyrannical power. To confirm what I have laid down, I might quote many more examples, as thoſe of Moſes, Lycurgus, Solon, and other Founders of Kingdoms and Republics, who, by aſſuming the ſole power were enabled to make excellent laws for the government of their reſpective States; but it is here unneceſſary, as they are already ſo well known: I ſhall therefore add only one more, which, though not ſo brilliant and illuſtrious perhaps as the reſt, is yet worthy of being conſidered by thoſe that would form a good eſtabliſhment. Agis, King of Sparta, being deſirous to reduce his Subjects to the obſervation of the laws that had formerly been given them by Lycurgus, for want of which he perceived they had loſt much of their ancient virtue, and conſequently their power and command, was killed, before he could accompliſhed his deſign, by the Ephori [u], who ſuſpected that he wanted to introduce tyranny and make himſelf abſolute Lord over them. But Cleomenes, his Succeſſor, being determined to purſue the ſame deſign by ſome papers that Agis left behind him, from which he perceived that his intention was only to reform the State; and finding he could not do his country that ſervice, any way but by taking the Government wholly into his own hands, (as the malevolence and oppoſition of a few, often prevent one man from doing a public good) he took a proper opportunity, and cauſed not only the Ephori, but all others that were capable of obſtructing his meaſures, to be put to death, and afterwards reſtored the laws of Lycurgus to their former vigour and authority. A reſolution that would have retrieved the glory of Sparta, and given as much reputation to Cleomenes as Lycurgus himſelf had acquired, if the overgrown power of the Macedonians, and the feeble condition into which the other Republics of Greece were then fallen, had not prevented it. For being ſuddenly invaded by the Macedonians, before it had gained ſtrength enough to defend itſelf; and having no allies that were capable of giving it any aſſiſtance, it was forced to ſubmit, and that great and laudable deſign proved abortive in the end. Theſe things being duly conſidered, I conclude, that in order to found a State, one perſon alone ſhould have all the power veſted in him; and that Romulus was excuſable, at leaſt, in putting Remus and Tatius to death.

[u] Magiſtrates at Sparta, like the Tribunes at Rome. The people uſed to appeal from their King to them, as the Romans did from their Conſuls to the Tribunes: at firſt they were choſen to be aſſiſtants to the King; but in a ſhort time their authority grew much greater than his.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

If thoſe that found States deſerve praiſe; others that introduce Tyranny ought to be held in deteſtation.

OF all men that are praiſe-worthy, thoſe are moſt ſo that have made Religion and Divine worſhip their chief care; and, in the next place, thoſe that have founded Kingdoms or Republics. After whom we may reckon great Commanders, who have either enlarged their own dominion or that of their Country. To theſe we may add Learned men of all kinds, that have excelled in their ſeveral profeſſions. And laſtly, all eminent Artificers and Mechanics, of whom the number is infinite, deſerve ſome ſhare of commendation. On the contrary, thoſe wretches are worthy of nothing but infamy and deteſtation, who extirpate Religion, ſubvert Kingdoms and Common-wealths, make war upon Virtue, Merit, Letters, Arts, Sciences and every thing elſe that is uſeful or honourable to mankind; in which rank are the prophane, the tyrannical, the ignorant, the idle, the diſſolute, and debauched. Now certainly there can be no man living, whether wiſe or ſimple, good or bad, but muſt praiſe the one ſort, and condemn the other, if at liberty to ſpeak his mind. Nevertheleſs, the generallit yof mankind, deluded by a falſe appearance of what ſeems good and great, ſuffer themſelves either wilfully or ignorantly to follow the example of thoſe that deſerve the higheſt degree of reproach, inſtead of any ſort of admiration, and when they might have founded a Kingdom or a Common-wealth to their immortal honour, become tyrants; not conſidering what glory, what reputation, what ſecurity, tranquillity, and peace of mind they forfeit by ſuch a manner of proceeding; and, to what infamy, abhorrence, remorſe, diſquietude, and to how many dangers and alarms they expoſe themſelves. Every man that reads and conſiders the Hiſtory of former times, whether he be a ſubject of a Common-wealth, or one that has advanced himſelf to Sovereignty, would certainly chuſe (if a Republican) to have been Scipio rather than Julius Cæſar; and, if he be a Prince, rather to have been Ageſilaus, Timoleon, or Dion, than Nabis, Phalaris, or Dionyſius; for he cannot help ſeeing how highly the former were admired and revered, and how much the latter were condemned and abominated by all good men. He will likewiſe ſee, that Timoleon and the others had as much authority in their reſpective countries, as either Phalaris or Dionyſius had in their States, and lived with infinitely more comfort and ſecurity. We ought not to be dazzled with Cæſar's falſe glory,

[redacted]

OF all [redacted] Religion [redacted] those that have [redacted] reckon great [redacted] or that of their [redacted] kinds, that have [redacted] eminent [redacted] deſerve [redacted] are [redacted] ſilvest [redacted] Merit, [redacted] [redacted] the ignorant [redacted] there [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

when we behold him ſo much extolled by ſome writers; for thoſe writers were either ſo corrupted by his good-fortune, or over-awed by the long continuance of his power, that they durſt not ſpeak truth. But, if thoſe Hiſtorians had been under no reſtraint, without doubt they would have ſpoken as freely of him, at leaſt, as others have done of Catiline; for Cæſar was certainly the more wicked of the two, if one man that actually commits a crime, is worſe than another, who only intended it. Such a Reader may alſo obſerve, what Eulogies they beſtow upon Brutus; for, as they durſt not ſpeak impartially of Cæſar, on account of his power, they were forced to content themſelves with magnifying his adverſary. Let it be conſidered likewiſe, by all ſuch as have changed Republics into abſolute governments, in what ſecurity thoſe Emperors lived who, after Rome became an Empire, ſtrictly obſerved the laws of their country, and reigned like good Princes; in compariſon of thoſe that behaved in a different manner: and they will find that Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Adrian, Antoninus, and Marcus Aurelius, had no occaſion either for Prætorian bands or legions to guard them; becauſe their own goodneſs, and the affections both of the Senate and people were a ſufficient defence to thoſe Princes. On the contrary, it may be remarked, that the moſt powerful armies, both in the eaſtern and weſtern parts of the Empire, were not able to ſecure Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and ſeveral other bad Emperors, againſt ſuch enemies as their wicked and tyrannical government had created them. Now, if the reigns of theſe different Emperors be well conſidered, they may ſerve as excellent leſſons to any other Prince, who is deſirous not only to avoid infamy, but to immortalize his name, to live in ſecurity, and free from dangers and alarms: for of twenty-ſix Emperors, who reigned betwixt the times of Julius Cæſar and Maximin, ſixteen were murdered, and ten only died a natural death. But if ſome of thoſe that happened to be murdered were good Princes (as Galba and Pertinax were) their death was owing to the corruption which their Predeceſſors had introduced amongſt the Soldiery: and, if any one of thoſe that died a natural death was a bad Prince (as Severus was) it may be attributed to ſuch a degree of good fortune and valour, as are ſeldom incident to the ſame perſon. One may further learn from the hiſtory of the Roman Emperors, upon what foundation a Monarchy ought to be built, in order to make it ſtable and permanent; for all the Emperors that ſucceeded to the Imperial dignity by inheritance, proved very bad, excepting Titus; and thoſe, on the contrary, who enjoyed it by adoption, were all good Princes, as might be inſtanced in the examples of Nerva, and the four ſucceeding Emperors in particular; but when the Empire became hereditary, it began to decline very faſt.

Let

Let a Prince then compare the times that happened betwixt the reigns of Nerva and Marcus Aurelius, with thoſe that went before and thoſe that came after, and then declare in which he would chuſe either to have been born or reigned. For when good Princes were upon the throne, he will ſee them reigning in ſecurity in the midſt of their Subjects, peace and juſtice firmly eſtabliſhed, the Senate in full authority, the Magiſtrates honoured and reſpected, the citizens enjoying their properties without fear or ſuſpicion, Nobility and virtue exalted, and the world in repoſe and tranquillity; all rancour, licentiouſneſs, corruption and ambition ſeemed to be extinguiſhed in thoſe golden times; every man was at liberty both to chuſe and maintain his own opinion [x]. In ſhort, he will ſee the world exulting in all manner of felicity; the Princes full of glory, and revered by their people; and the people happy and ſafe, under the protection and paternal affection of their Princes.

In the next place, let him examine the reigns of the other Emperors, and he will find them full of commotion, diſcord, ſedition, inhuman murders, aſſaſſinations of Princes both in peace and war, foreign and domeſtic broils, Italy diſtracted with daily alarms, its cities plundered and deſtroyed, the metropolis itſelf burnt, the Capitol demoliſhed by its own Citizens, the temples pulled down, Religion corrupted, the cities full of adulteries, the Sea covered with Exiles, and ſtained with blood; he will ſee endleſs enormities and cruelties in Rome, and not only riches and nobility, but even virtue itſelf looked upon as a capital offence. He will ſee infamous Accuſers and Calumniators rewarded, Servants bribed to betray their Maſters, children to rebel againſt their parents, and thoſe that had no Enemies, oppreſſed and undone by their friends [y].——Upon ſuch an examination it will appear, what mighty

[x] "Rara temporum felicitas," ſays Tacitus, "ubi ſentire quæ velis, & quæ ſentias dicere licet." Hiſt. I. Lib. I. C. i.

[y] Machiavel has borrowed this picture, and many others from Tacitus. "Opus "aggredior plenum caſibus, atrox prœliis, diſcors ſeditionibus, ipſâ etiam pace ſævum. "Quatuor Principes ferro interrempti. Tria bella civilia, plura externa, ac plerumque "permixta. Proſperæ in Oriente; adverſæ in Occidente res. Turbatum Illyricum, "Galliæ nutantes; perdomita Britannia, & ſtatim amiſſa. Coortæ Sarmatarum ac "Suevorum gentes, Nobilitatus cladibus mutuis Dacus. Mota etiam prope Parthorum "arma falſi Neronis Ludibrio. Jam vero Italia novis cladibus, vel poſt longam ſæcu-"lorum ſeriem repetitis, afflicta. Hauſtæ aut obrutæ urbes fœcundiſſimâ Campaniæ "orâ. Urbs incendiis vaſtata, conſumptis antiquiſſimis delubris, ipſo Capitolio civium "manibus incenſo. Pollutæ cærimoniæ, magna adulteria, plenum exiliis mare, infecti "cædibus ſcopuli, atrocius in urbe ſævitum. Nobilitas, opes, omiſſi geſtique honores "pro crimine, & ob virtutes certiſſimum exitium. Nec minus præmia delatorum inviſa "quam ſcelera; cum alii ſacerdotia & conſulatus ut ſpolia adepti, procurationes alii & "interiorem potentiam, agerent, ferrent cuncta. Odio & terrore corrupti in dominos "ſervi, in patronos liberti; & quibus deerat inimicus, per amicos oppreſſi." Hiſt. I. iii.

obligations Rome, Italy, and the whole world lay under to Julius Cæſar; and certainly, if a Prince, who reads theſe things, has any principles of humanity in him, he will not only be deterred from following the example of theſe wicked Emperors, but inflamed with a deſire of imitating the good. For one that aſpires to fame and reputation in the world would wiſh to ſucceed to a corrupted ſtate, not utterly to ſpoil and ſubvert it, as Cæſar did; but to new-model and reform it, like Romulus: and heaven cannot give, nor any one deſire a more favourable opportunity of acquiring true glory. If it ſhould happen, however, that he cannot effect that reform, without entirely giving up his power and authority, he would be in ſome meaſure inexcuſable without doubt, in caſe he did not do that; but, if he could accompliſh the one without loſing the other, he would be unpardonable if he neglected it. Let thoſe conſider, therefore, who are bleſſed with ſuch an opportunity, that they have the choice of two courſes, one of which will make them happy and ſecure whilſt they live, and crown their memory with glory; the other will lead them into continual troubles and dangers in this life, and make them for ever infamous after their death [z].

CHAP. XI.

Concerning the Religion of the Romans.

NOtwithſtanding Romulus was the original Founder of Rome, and that it owed its birth and the firſt rudiments of its conſtitution to him; yet Heaven foreſeeing that his laws and inſtitutions alone were not ſufficient either to form or ſupport ſo great an empire as that of Rome was ordained to be, inſpired the Senators of that City to make choice of Numa Pompilius to ſucceed Romulus in the government of

[z] Excellent was the advice which Antoninus Pius gave his ſon Commodus. Two days before he died, he aſſured his friends, that he did not deſire to live, becauſe the ill conduct of his ſon had made life uneaſy to him. However, he recommended him to the Soldiery; and we have an excellent diſcourſe of his in Herodian, in which he deſired his friends to aſſiſt him with their advice, and directed him in what manner he ought to govern. He further charged his friends to make him ſenſible, "That all the riches and "honours in the Univerſe were not ſufficient to ſatisfy the luxury and ambition of a Ty-"rant, nor the ſtrongeſt guards and armies able to defend him from the hatred and "inſults of his Subjects. That no tyrannical Prince ever enjoyed a long and peaceable "reign; but ſuch only as gained the hearts of their people by clemency. That not "thoſe who ſerved out of conſtraint, but ſuch as obeyed voluntarily, would continue "faithful in all trials, and free from either flattery or treachery. And laſtly, that it was "exceeding difficult, and yet highly neceſſary, for thoſe Princes to ſet bounds to their "paſſions, who had none to their power." *Herodian.* Lib. I. Cap. viii.

it;

it; that ſo, what was left defective by the former, might be completed by the latter. Numa, therefore, finding the people fierce and warlike, and being deſirous to civilize and make them obedient to laws by peaceable meaſures, had recourſe to Religion, as a thing abſolutely neceſſary to maintain civil polity: and in this he ſucceeded ſo well, that for many ages no ſtate ever ſhewed a greater degree of reverence for the Gods; which very much facilitated the execution of ſuch undertakings as the Senators and chief Magiſtrates had reſolved upon. For whoever will be at the pains of examining the many great actions that were performed, either by the people in general, or ſeveral particular perſons, will find they were always more afraid of violating an oath, than of diſobeying the laws; as they dreaded the power of the Gods much more than the authority of men. Of this we have a manifeſt proof in the examples of Scipio and Manlius Torquatus; for, after the great overthrow, which Hannibal had given the Romans at Cannæ, the people were in ſuch a panic, that numbers of them aſſembling together determined to quit Italy, and tranſport themſelves into Sicily: of which Scipio being informed, immediately went to them, and drawing his ſword, obliged them all to take a ſolemn oath never to abandon their country. Lucius Manlius, the father of Titus Manlius, afterwards ſurnamed Torquatus, had an accuſation lodged againſt him by Marcus Pomponius, Tribune of the People; but before the day appointed for hearing his cauſe, Titus went to the Tribune, and threatened to kill him directly, if he would not take an oath to withdraw the accuſation: which he accordingly did, and ſtrictly obſerved it. Here we ſee Citizens, whom neither the love of their country, nor regard of the laws could have prevented from leaving Italy, ſtill kept firm to it by the fear of violating an oath, though they had been compelled to take it: and a Tribune laying aſide the enmity he had with the father, forgetting the outrage received from his ſon, and diſdaining the reflections that muſt be caſt upon his own honour, only to avoid breaking his oath: all which was entirely owing to the Principles of Religion inculcated by Numa in that City.

It likewiſe appears, in the courſe of the Roman Hiſtory, of what admirable ſervice Religion was in governing armies, re-uniting the people, ſupporting virtue, and diſcouraging vice. So that if it ſhould be diſputed, whether Rome was more obliged to Romulus or Numa, I ſhould think Numa was the greateſt Benefactor to it; for where a due regard is had to Religion, it will be an eaſy matter to introduce military virtue and good diſcipline; but without that, it will be found very difficult to introduce it, and much more ſo to bring it to any degree of perfection. It is further obſervable, that, in forming a Senate, and eſtabliſhing certain other inſtitutions both civil and military, Romulus

mulus did not avail himſelf of Divine authority; but Numa, finding it abſolutely neceſſary, pretended to have private conferences with the Nymph Egeria, who dictated to him what he was to preſcribe to the people. This he did, becauſe he wanted to introduce ſome new laws and cuſtoms, and was afraid his own authority alone would not be ſufficient for that purpoſe. And indeed, no man could ever ſucceed in getting new and extraordinary laws admitted amongſt a people without the ſanction of Religion; for though a ſagacious and provident Legiſlator may foreſee their ſalutary effects, yet, if they do not appear obvious to the vulgar, he will not otherwiſe be able to convince them, either of the utility or neceſſity of them: upon which account, wiſe Lawgivers always have recourſe to Religion, in order to remove that difficulty. Lycurgus, Solon, and many others, acted in this manner, and for theſe reaſons: and thus the Roman people revering the piety and wiſdom of Numa, ſubmitted in all things to his inſtitutions [*a*]. It is true, the devotion of thoſe times was ſuch, and the ignorance of the people he had to deal with ſo great, that they contributed very much to facilitate his deſigns, and gave him an opportunity of making any new impreſſion upon them he pleaſed: and, without doubt, any perſon that ſhould undertake to found a State at preſent, would find a parcel of mountaineers, and illiterate uncivilized men, more tractable and obedient than others, who had been uſed to live in communities, and had their morals and principles corrupted: as a rough unhewn block of marble may more eaſily be wrought into a good Statue, than one that has been already ſpoiled by ſome bungling workman.

All theſe things being conſidered, I conclude, that the introduction of Religion at Rome by Numa, was one of the cauſes that chiefly contributed to its grandeur and felicity: for Religion produced good order, and good order is generally attended with good fortune and ſucceſs in any undertaking. And, as a ſtrict obſervation of Divine worſhip and religious duties, always tends to the aggrandizement of a State; ſo a neglect and contempt of them may be reckoned amongſt the firſt cauſes of its ruin. For, where there is no fear of God, it muſt either fall to deſtruction, or be ſupported by the reverence ſhewn to a good Prince; which indeed may ſuſtain it for a while, and ſupply the want

[*a*] "Religion, " ſays Biſhop Fleetwood, in his Charge delivered to the Clergy of the " Dioceſe of Ely, at Cambridge, Aug. 7, 1716," is ſo uſeful and ſo neceſſary to the well- " being of the world, and ſo perfective of human nature, that it commands the eſteem of " all men, and obtains it of all that are reaſonable. There never was a country in any " manner civilized without Religion; nor have any of our Travellers in their diſcove- " ries, either of the old or new world, found any populous town or City without a Tem- " ple or place of public worſhip."——In ſhort, human Society could not ſubſiſt without it, as might eaſily be ſhewn, if it was neceſſary at this time of day. See alſo a Book written not long ago by Wortley Mountague, Eſq. upon this Subject.

of

of Religion in his Subjects. But as human life is ſhort, the Government muſt of courſe ſink into decay, when the virtue that upheld and informed it is extinct. Hence it comes to paſs, that States which depend upon the ſpirit of one man alone, are generally ſhort-liv'd: for when he dies, his virtue dies with him, and ſeldom revives in his ſucceſſor, as Dante has juſtly obſerved.

Rade volte diſcende per li rami
L'umana probitate, e queſto vuole
Quel che la dà, perche da lui ſi chia m, &c.

The virtue of the Sire,
Seldom to heirs deſcends,
With him it oft begins,
And with him often ends;
Though wonderful to us,
Such is the will of Heaven,
That we may aſk of him,
By whom alone 'tis given.

It is not ſufficient, therefore, for the firm eſtabliſhment either of a Kingdom or Republic, that it is wiſely governed by a prince whilſt he lives: it is further neceſſary, that he ſhould lay the foundations in ſuch a manner, that it may be able to ſupport itſelf after he is dead. And though ignorant and unpoliſhed people are more ſuſceptible of new doctrines and laws, than thoſe that think themſelves already ſufficiently polite and civilized, yet it is not an impoſſible thing to make an impreſſion upon the latter. The Florentines do not look upon themſelves as either rude or ignorant people; and yet they were prevailed upon by Girolamo Savonarola to believe, that he converſed with God [*b*]. For my own part, I will not pretend to determine, whether that was true or not; becauſe ſo great a man ought not to be ſpoken of, but with the utmoſt reverence: this, however, I will take upon me to ſay, that many thouſands believed it, who never ſaw him perform any thing miraculous, that might be a good foundation for ſuch an opinion: his life, doctrine, and manner of converſation, being ſufficient, as they thought, to convince them. Let no one deſpair then, of being able to do what has been done by others: for mankind (as I have obſerved before, in my introduction to theſe diſcourſes) are born, live and die, in the ſame manner as formerly.

[*b*] See Chap. VI. of the Prince.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of what importance it is for the preſervation of a State, to pay a due veneration to Religion; and how much the neglect of it, occaſioned by the Church of Rome, has contributed to the ruin of Italy.

THE rulers of all States, whether Kingdoms or Common-wealths, who would preſerve their governments firm and entire, ought above all things to take care that Religion is held in the higheſt veneration, and its ceremonies at all times uncorrupted and inviolable; for there is no ſurer prognoſtic of impending ruin in any State, than to ſee Divine worſhip neglected or deſpiſed. This may eaſily be demonſtrated, by examining the foundation upon which the Religion of any Country is built; for the Religion of all nations is founded upon ſome principles. That of the Gentiles was founded chiefly upon the anſwers of Oracles, Divination and Auguries; all the reſt of their Rites, ceremonies, and ſacrifices, depending wholly upon theſe: for they thought the ſame Being that could foretell things to come, could alſo confer them if good, or avert them if evil; for which reaſon they erected Temples, offered up Sacrifices and Prayers, and inſtituted other ceremonies for the worſhip of that Supreme power: and thus the Oracle at Delphos, the Temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other celebrated ſhrines, kept the world in admiration and devotion. But when the Prieſts of theſe Temples began to give anſwers accordingly as they were influenced by great men, the fallacy was detected, and the people growing incredulous, became at laſt rebellious, and diſpoſed to throw off all civil government and reſtraint.

All rulers of Kingdoms and Common-wealths therefore, ought to have a ſpecial regard to the fundamental principles of the religion of their country: for whilſt they are kept ſacred and inviolate, it will be an eaſy matter to maintain devotion, and conſequently good order and union, amongſt their ſubjects. For which purpoſe, they muſt carefully attend to all circumſtances and events (how frivolous and inſignificant ſoever they appear to themſelves) that may ſeem in any wiſe conducive to this end; and take the advantage of them to eſtabliſh and propagate Religion, even though they ſhould know they had no foundation in truth or reality: and the wiſer and better acquainted they are with the natural courſe of things, the more they will avail themſelves of ſuch aſſiſtances [*b*]. This method being taken by prudent Governors, produced

[*b*] "Nothing," ſays M. Brucys, *Hiſtoire du Fanaticiſme*, p. 230, "has a greater "aſcendant over the mind of man than Religion; all things appear lawful to thoſe that "firmly

duced the opinion of miracles; many of which have been pretended to be wrought even in nations, under the influence of falſe religion: for ſuch Governors always endeavour to confirm the people in the belief of them, to what cauſes ſoever they may have been owing; and the authority of the Prince never fails to ſtrengthen the faith of the people. Many of theſe Miracles might be inſtanced from the Roman Hiſtory, but we ſhall produce only one. When the Romans ſacked the City of Veii, a party of Soldiers went into a Temple there, dedicated to Juno, and addreſſing themſelves to an image of that Goddeſs, aſked her if ſhe would go to Rome; to which ſome of them ſaid, ſhe gave her aſſent by a nod, and others affirmed, that ſhe actually ſpoke, and ſaid ſhe would. Now theſe men being more religious than Soldiers commonly are (as Livy infers from the ſilence, reſpect, and veneration, with which they entered the Temple) eaſily perſuaded themſelves they had an anſwer given them, which very likely they fully expected before they aſked the queſtion. However that might be, this opinion was induſtriouſly propagated, and encouraged by Camillus, and other leading men in the Common-wealth, who endeavoured by all means to foment the credulity of the people.

If Chriſtian Princes then had taken care to maintain their Religion in the purity it was delivered by its Author; it is certain Chriſtendom would have been much more happy and united than it is at preſent: but it is the ſureſt ſign of its declenſion, to ſee that thoſe who live neareſt to the Church of Rome, which is the Head of our Religion, have the leaſt devotion: for, whoever will examine its firſt principles, and compare

" firmly believe God is on their ſide, and that they only execute his orders. Thoſe " who know the uſe which the artful Greeks and Romans made of their Oracles, their " Soothſayers, their Augurs, their Aruſpices and Feciales, whoſe employment it was to " foretel the will of the Gods, whenever any important affair was debated; ſome in " viewing the entrails of Victims, the harmony, the flight, or various motions of cer- " tain birds: thoſe I ſay, who know of what uſe theſe things were formerly, know " likewiſe that perſons of good ſenſe gave no manner of credit to them, nor made any " other uſe of them, than to inſpire Nations and Soldiers with deſigns (as if dictated by " the Gods) which were nothing but what they had reſolved upon themſelves before they " had conſulted their Oracles."——Old Dacres ſays, upon this paſſage as follows: " Ammiratus here taxes Machiavel, ſaying, This was rather the opinion of a cunning " and crafty man, than of one that had either any Religion or Morality in him, whoſe " plain and ſimple conditions ought to be free from all fraud and falſhood; and however " the Romans were deceived here, which cannot be denied, yet without doubt they ne- " ver did this, thinking to deceive themſelves, or with intention to deceive others." Thus Ammiratus. And indeed it ſavours of Atheiſm to bring the Miſtreſs to ſerve the handmaid, Religion to ſerve Policy; as if the Seaſons of the year ought to accommodate themſelves to men, rather than men accommodate themſelves to the Seaſons; not conſidering that Religion propounds to men a further end than Policy points at. A Prince therefore ſhould be well aware of ſuch evil devices, believing conſtantly that Religion hath no need of help from falſhood, nor can gain any ſtrength by lies.

them with the practice of theſe times, will find it no difficult matter to perſuade himſelf, that either ſome dreadful ſcourge, or perhaps utter deſtruction is hanging over our heads [c]. But ſince there are ſome who maintain, that the welfare of Italy depends upon the Church of Rome, I ſhall endeavour to evince the contrary by ſome arguments, which, in my opinion, are unanſwerable. In the firſt place, then, the corrupt example of the Romiſh Court has extinguiſhed all ſenſe of Religion and Piety in that Province; and conſequently been the cauſe of numberleſs evils: for as all things go well where Religion is duly ſupported, ſo where that is neglected and trampled upon, every thing runs into confuſion and diſorder. We Italians, therefore, are certainly under great obligations to this Church and its Prieſts, for aboliſhing all Religion and polluting our morals; but under greater ſtill upon another account, which has been our utter ruin: and that is, for fomenting endleſs diſcords and diviſions amongſt us. For certainly no nation can ever expect to be happy, that is not united in obedience to ſome one Prince or Commonwealth, as France and Spain are at this time: and it is wholly owing to the Church of Rome, that Italy, at preſent, is neither entirely under a Republican, nor a Monarchial government. For though the Popes fixed their reſidence there, and obtained a temporal as well as ſpiritual juriſdiction, yet they never were able to poſſeſs themſelves of all Italy: and, on the other hand, they were never reduced to ſo low an ebb, but upon any apprehenſion of loſing their temporal dominion, they could call in ſome foreign potentate to defend them againſt other States that were grown too ſtrong for them; of which there occur many examples in the hiſtory of former times; particularly, when by the aſſiſtance of Charlemagne they drove out the Lombards, who had made themſelves maſters of almoſt all Italy; and in our own times, when they curbed the power of the Venetians by the help of France, and then drove out the French by the aid of the Swiſs. As the church then never was able to get Italy wholly into its own hands, it would not ſuffer any body elſe to do ſo; and this is the reaſon why it never could be united under one head, but ſtill continues divided into ſeveral Principalities and Republics; which has brought it into ſuch a State of diſunion and weakneſs, that it now lies at the mercy of the firſt Invader, and for this we may thank the Church alone. To prove the truth of which aſſertion, if it was poſſible, to tranſplant the Court of Rome and all its authority in Italy, into the territories of the Swiſs, who at preſent are the only people that have preſerved both their religious and military inſtitutions in their original vigour, it would ſoon be ſeen that the wickedneſs and depravity of that court

[c] Machiavel ſeems here to have had the Spirit of prophecy upon him, and to have foretold the Reformation which happened not long after in Chriſtendom.

would

would occaſion more diſorder and confuſion in Switzerland, than any other misfortune that ever did, or ever could happen to it [*d*].

CHAP.

[*d*] Voltaire, *in his general Hiſtory of Europe*, Part IV. Chap. vii. draws a ſtriking picture of that Court, and of thoſe times. "The Comedies of Arioſto and Machiavel, "ſays he, though not very delicate in regard to modeſty and Religion, were frequently "acted at this Court in the preſence of the Pope (Leo X.) and Cardinals, by young perſons of the higheſt rank in Rome. The merit alone of thoſe pieces, great indeed for "that age, made an impreſſion upon the Spectators. Whatever might be offenſive to "Religion paſſed unobſerved at a Court entirely intent upon intrigues and pleaſures, and "which had no notion that Religion could be injured by theſe liberties. And indeed, "as they attacked neither the Doctrine, nor Juriſdiction of the Church, the Court of "Rome took no more exceptions againſt them, than the Greeks and ancient Romans "did againſt the wit and raillery of Ariſtophanes and Plautus. Even affairs of the "higheſt importance, never broke in upon the Pope's pleaſures: he created thirty new "Cardinals, moſtly Italians, whoſe tempers were every way comformable to that of their "Sovereign. If they had not the ſame taſte and knowledge as the Pontif, at leaſt they "imitated him in his pleaſures. Almoſt all the other Prelates followed their Example. "Spain was at that time the only Country remarkable for the exemplary lives of the "Clergy. This ſtrictneſs of Morals had been introduced by Cardinal Ximenes: a man "of a ſour diſpoſition, who had no reliſh but for arbitrary power, and who ſtrutted in a "Cordelier's habit when he was Regent of Spain, and ſaid he knew how to bind the "Grandees to their duty with his *cord*, and would cruſh their pride under his Sandals. "In every other country the Prelates lived like voluptuous Princes, ſome of them being "poſſeſſed of eight or nine Biſhoprics. The whole torrent, both of Proteſtant and Popiſh writers, make loud complaints of the looſe morals of thoſe times. They tell us "that the Biſhops, the inferior Clergy, and the Monks, led moſt indolent and ſcandalous lives: that nothing was more common than for Prieſts to bring up their children "publicly, after the example of Pope Alexander VI. We have ſtill the will of Croui, "Biſhop of Cambray in thoſe days, in which he leaves ſeveral legacies to his children, "and reſerves a Sum *for the baſtards, which he ſtill hopes God will be ſo gracious to give "him, in caſe he recovers from his illneſs.* Theſe are the very words of the Will.—But "what gave the greateſt Scandal of all was, the public Sale of Indulgencies, Abſolutions, "and Diſpenſations of all prices; that Apoſtolic revenue, unlimited and uncertain before the time of Pope John XXII. but by him digeſted as a Code of the Cannon Law. "A Deacon, or Subdeacon, guilty of murder, was abſolved with permiſſion to hold three "Benefices, for about twenty Crowns. A Biſhop, or an Abbot might aſſaſſinate for "three hundred Livres: all manner of uncleanneſs, even the moſt ſhocking to nature, "had its ſettled price. Beſtiality was rated at two hundred and fifty Livres. Diſpenſations were granted, not only for paſt ſins, but for ſuch as any one had a mind to commit. In the Archives of Joinville an Indulgence was found, granted to the Cardinal "of Lorrain and twelve of his retinue, whereby the remiſſion of three Sins, which ever "they choſe to name, ſhould be anticipated to each of them. Le Laboureur relates of "of the Ducheſs of Burgundy and Auvergne, Siſter to Charles VIII. that ſhe had the "privilege of obtaining abſolution from all her ſins as long as ſhe ſhould live, for herſelf "and ten of her attendants, upon forty-ſeven feſtivals, without reckoning Sundays. This "created no ſurprize in thoſe times. Public offices of Indulgences were opened in all "parts, and they were farmed out like Cuſtom-houſe Duties. Moſt of thoſe public "offices were kept in alehouſes, by which means the Preacher, the Farmer, and the "Diſtributor were all gainers. The Pope gave part of the money to his Siſter, and no "body as yet complained. The Preachers declared openly from the Pulpit, *that if a "man was even to raviſh the Virgin Mary, he would be forgiven upon purchaſing an Indulgence*, and the people liſtened to them with devotion. But this farm in Germany happening to be given to the Dominicans, the Auguſtines, who had been long in Poſſeſſion

CHAP. XIII.

How the Romans availed themſelves of Religion in reforming the State, in proſecuting their wars, and in compoſing tumults.

IT may not appear foreign to our purpoſe, to ſhew by ſome examples in what manner the Romans availed themſelves of Religion in reforming their State, and in the proſecution of other enterprizes; and though many more might be produced out of Livy, yet I ſhall content myſelf with the following.

The people having created Tribunes with conſular power, and all of them, except one, choſen from amongſt the Plebeians; it happened that there was a great peſtilence and famine the ſame year at Rome: of which the Nobility making a handle at the next creation of Tribunes, pretended that the Gods were offended at the people, for debaſing the Majeſty of the Empire; and that there was no other way to appeaſe them, but by reducing the election of Tribunes to its ancient footing; at which the people were ſo terrified that they choſe all their Tribunes the next year out of the Nobility. We may ſee likewiſe how the Roman Generals had recourſe to Religion, to encourage their troops at the ſiege of Veii, for the Alban Lake having overflowed its banks, to the great ſurpriſe of every body, and the Soldiers being tired out with the hardſhips of a ten years ſiege, and impatient to be at home again, the Commanders pretended to conſult the Oracle of Apollo, from which they aſſured them they received for anſwer, that they ſhould take Veii the ſame year that the Alban Lake overflowed its banks. Animated with this hope, the Soldiers patiently ſubmitted to all the fatigues of war, till Camillus took the City; which he did that very year [*e*]. Thus Religion was of great Service in reducing that

" of it, grew jealous; and this little claſhing of intereſts betwixt thoſe two Orders of " Friars in a corner of Saxony, was the Source of the Reformation." *See Paolo Sarpi's Hiſtory of the Council of Trent*, towards the beginning.

[*e*] Livy relates a noble circumſtance concerning the behaviour of Camillus upon this occaſion.——It appears from a thouſand paſſages in the Ancients, that the Heathens imagined there were ſome Deities who envied the proſperity of mankind, and never failed, ſooner or later, to viſit thoſe that were remarkably happy, with ſome heavy misfortune. Camillus therefore could not ſee the triumphs of Rome, over the ruins of Veii, without apprehending ſome ſuch viciſſitude; upon which account, he prayed that if the proſperity of Rome was to be balanced by ſome evil, he alone, and not his Country, might ſuffer it. " Dictator Camillus, ſays Livy, Lib. V. Cap. xxi. captâ " Veiorum urbe, præcones edicere jubet, ut ab inermi turbâ abſtineatur: is finis ſanguinis " fuit. Dedi inde inermes cœpti, & ad prædam miles diſcurrit; quæ cum ante oculos " ejus aliquanto ſpe atque opinione major, majoriſque pretii rerum ferretur, dicitur " manus

that place, and reſtoring the Tribuneſhip to the Nobility; neither of which perhaps could otherwiſe have been effected without much difficulty.——Let me quote another example to the ſame purpoſe. There had been great Tumults in Rome, occaſioned by Terentillus, a Tribune of the people, who wanted to have a Law paſſed, (the tenour of which ſhall be taken notice of in its proper place) that would have borne hard upon the Nobility. To prevent this, the Nobility availed themſelves of Religion two ways. In the firſt place, they cauſed the Sibylline books to be conſulted, and this anſwer to be returned from them, *that the City would be in great danger of loſing its liberties that very year, if civil diſcords were not prevented:* which artifice, (though it was diſcovered by the Tribunes) had ſuch an effect upon the people, that they grew cool in the matter, and refuſed to ſupport them any longer. The other expedient was this. One Appius Herdonius, having put himſelf at the head of a multitude of Slaves and Exiles, which amounted to no leſs than four thouſand, ſeized upon the Capitol in the night, to the great conſternation of the whole City; it being feared that if the Æqui and the Volſci, perpetual enemies of the Roman name, ſhould make any attempt upon the City at that time, they would certainly take it; and the Tribunes ſtill obſtinately perſiſting in having the Terentillan law paſſed, and pretending that the report of the Capitol being ſeized upon, was only a falſe alarm, Publius Rubetius, a man of gravity and authority, came out of the Senate-houſe, and partly by fair words, partly by threats, ſometimes repreſenting to them what danger the City was in, ſometimes how unſeaſonable their demand was at that time, made ſuch an impreſſion upon the minds of the Plebeians, that having all taken an oath of fidelity and obedience to the Conſul, they preſently ran to arms, and recovered the Capitol. But the Conſul Publius Valerius, being killed in the attack, Titus Quintius was immediately made Conſul in his room; who not giving the people time to take breath, leſt they ſhould revive their clamours for the Terentillan law, ordered them to march with him directly againſt the Volſci; inſiſting that by the oath they had taken to obey the Conſul, they were obliged to

" manus ad cælum tollens precatus eſſe Dictator, ut ſi cui hominum Deorumve nimia ſua " fortuna populique Romani videretur, eam invidiam lenire ſuo privato incommodo, " quam minimo publico populique Romani liceret." Could any thing be more Heroic than this in a Heathen? What greatneſs of mind! does it not in ſome meaſure reſemble St. Paul's *wiſhing himſelf accurſed for the Iſraelites his brethren and kinſmen?* Plutarch obſerves that when Camillus beheld the devaſtation of ſo flouriſhing a City, he could not refrain from tears before he made his prayer to the Gods. " Αλλοσε " δε της πολεως κατα κρατος, και των Ρωμαιων αγοντων και φεροντων απειρον τινα πλουτον, εφορων " ο Καμιλλος απο της ακρας τα πραττομενα, πρωτον μεν ιστως εδακρυσεν, ειτα μακαρισθεις υπο των παροντων, " ανεχε τας χειρας τοις θεοις, και προσευχομενος ειπε" &c. *Plutarch in Vita Camilli.* See Valerius Maximus, Lib. I. Cap. v.

follow

follow him; and though this was oppoſed by the Tribunes, who alledged, that the oath they had taken extended no further than to the late Conſul: yet ſuch was the veneration for Religion in thoſe times, as Livy informs us, that the people choſe rather to follow the Conſul, than liſten to the ſuggeſtions of the Tribunes, and adds the following reflection to their great honour. " Nondum hæc, quæ nunc " tenet ſæculum, negligentia Deorum venerat, nec interpretando ſibi " quiſque jusjurandum & leges aptas faciebat." i. e. " That contempt " of the Gods which has overſpread this age, was not then known, " nor did private men dare to interpret oaths as they pleaſed, or " accommodate the laws to their own private intereſt and advan- " tage.' The Tribunes therefore apprehending they ſhould otherwiſe loſe all their power, promiſed to obey the Conſul, and not to inſiſt upon the Terentillan law for the ſpace of twelve months; provided the Conſuls did not lead out the people to war during the ſame term. And thus Religion enabled the Senate to ſurmount this difficulty; which they could not have done without that aſſiſtance.

CHAP. XIV.

The Romans interpreted their Auſpices according to the neceſſity of the times, and wiſely pretended to conform to the Inſtitutions of their Religion, even when they were obliged to act counter to them: but if any one openly and raſhly deſpiſed them, he was always puniſhed for it.

AUGURIES, as I have ſaid before, were a conſiderable part of the Gentile Religion, and contributed not a little to the grandeur and felicity of the Roman Common-wealth. Upon which account, the Romans held them in greater veneration than any other ordinance or Religious inſtitution, and always had recourſe to them in the election of Conſuls, before they engaged in any enterprize, in conducting their armies, in chuſing the time and place of battle, and in ſhort, in all undertakings of importance, whether civil or military: nor did they ever go upon any expedition, till they had poſſeſſed their Soldiers with a perſuaſion that the Gods had promiſed them ſucceſs. Now amongſt other orders of their Soothſayers, there were certain officers called *Pullarii* [*f*], who always attended their armies, and were to give their preſages when they were preparing to engage the enemy. If the poultry would eat, they looked upon it as a good omen, but

[*f*] They took Omens from the feeding of the *Sacred Poultry*, as they called the chickens that were under their care and inſpection for that purpoſe.

if

47.

The firſt Plan, ſhewing the form and order of a common Battalion of eighty ranks pany i
ſuch a manner that they may become the laſt, and d

rrrrr
rrrrr
rrrrr
rrrrr
rrrrr
rrrrr
rrrrr
rrrrr
rrrrr
rrrrr
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
oooox
*pppp
*pppp
*pppp
*pppp
*pppp
C
ooooo
rrrrr
pppp*
C

The Rear

if they would not, they carefully avoided an engagement. Nevertheleſs, when their own reaſon ſhewed them the abſolute neceſſity of acting in ſuch or ſuch a matter, they proceeded accordingly, though the auſpices proved ever ſo unfavourable; but in this they conducted themſelves ſo adroitly, and with ſuch caution, that they ſeemed not to have acted either in defiance or contempt of their Religion; as the Conſul Papirius did before an engagement with the Samnites, which was of ſo fatal conſequence to them that they never afterwards were able to make head againſt the Romans. For Papirius lying encamped with his army near that of the Samnites, in ſuch a ſituation and circumſtances, that he thought a victory certain if they came to action, was very deſirous to engage; and therefore ordered the Pullarii *to take an omen*; but the poultry refuſing to peck, and the chief of the Pullarii ſeeing the eagerneſs of the army to fight, as well as the aſſurance that both the Soldiers and the General had of a victory; and being loath to diſappoint them of ſo fair an opportunity of ſucceſs, reported to the Conſul, that he had taken an omen, and that it was a very propitious one. Upon which, Papirius immediately drew up his forces in order of battle; but ſome of the other Pullarii happening to blab it out amongſt the Soldiers that the poultry would not eat, they acquainted Spurius Papirius, the Conſul's Nephew, with it; who immediately carried the report to his Uncle. But the Conſul ſeeming to make little account of it, calmly replied, that for his own part he would endeavour to do his duty as well as he could; and that as the Auſpices were favourable to him and his army, if the Chief of the Pullarii had told him a lie it would turn to his ruin and confuſion alone. That the event therefore might correſpond with the omen, he ordered his Officers to place the Pullarii in the front of the Battle, and marched directly againſt the enemy. But as they were advancing, one of the Roman Soldiers throwing a dart at random happened to kill the Chief of the Pullarii; which being reported to the Conſul, "Then, ſaid he, "I am ſure all things will go well, the Gods are appeaſed, and the "death of the Pullarius has expiated his lie;" and thus by dexterouſly accommodating his reſolution to the Auſpices, he engaged the enemy, and beat them; his Soldiers being perſuaded he had not in anywiſe acted contrary to the rites of their Religion.——Appius Pulcher, on the contrary, happening to command in Sicily, during the time of the firſt Punic war, and being deſirous to engage the Carthaginian army, ordered the Pullarii to take an omen; and they informing him that the poultry would not eat, he ſaid, "let us ſee then whether they will "drink," and immediately threw them into the Sea. But coming to an engagement with the enemy, he loſt the day; for which he was

ſent

ſent for to Rome and diſgraced[g], whilſt Papirius, on the other hand, was honoured and rewarded; not becauſe one had gained a victory and the other been defeated; but becauſe one had prudently evaded the Auſpices, and the other had raſhly and openly defied them. For this ſort of Divination was calculated only to inſpire the Soldiery with that courage and aſſurance of ſucceſs in time of action, which ſo much contributes to victory; and it was practiſed not only by the Romans, but by other people, of which I ſhall give an example in the next Chapter.

CHAP. XV.

That the Samnites had recourſe to Religion, as the only Remedy when their affairs were become deſperate.

THE Samnites having been often defeated by the Romans, and reduced to the laſt extremity by the death of a great number of their Soldiers and Officers, who were killed in a battle that happened in Tuſcany; their allies alſo, the Tuſcans, Gauls, and Umbrians, being ſo weak that they were incapable of giving them any further aſſiſtance, Livy tells us, "nec ſuis nec externis viribus jam ſtare "poterant, tamen bello non abſtinebant, adeo ne infeliciter quidem "defenſæ libertatis tædebat, & vinci quàm non tentare victoriam "malebant." i. e. "They could neither ſupport themſelves by their "own ſtrength nor that of others, yet they continued the war; and "though they had been ſo unſucceſsful in the defence of their liberties, "they ſtill perſiſted in it, and choſe rather to be conquered, than not "endeavour to conquer." They reſolved, therefore, to exert their utmoſt

[g] Valerius Maximus relates this of Publius Claudius, L. I. C. iv. It is alſo told of Diagoras, or as ſome ſay of Protagoras, who was puniſhed by the Athenians for ridiculing their eſtabliſhed Religion: for he not only divulged the Eleuſinian myſteries and laughed at them, but cut a Statue of Hercules to pieces, for fire wood to boil his turnips; as we are told by the Scholiaſt on Ariſtophanes *in Nub.* Act III. Scene i. and by Athenagoras *in Legat.* Father Garaffe likewiſe ſpeaks of it in his *Doctrine curieuſe*, Liv. II. Sect. v. "Diagoras, ſays he, going one day into an Inn, in which he "found there was nothing to be had for dinner but a few turnips, laid hold of an old "Statue of Hercules, who was the tutelar Deity of the houſe, and accoſted him in "this manner, *Veni Hercules, tertium Decimum ſubi certamen, & exquoque lentem. Come "Maſter Hercules, here's a thirteenth labour for you, you muſt boil me theſe turnips.* "Another time, going into a Court-yard where the Prieſts were taking an Augury "for the feeding of birds, and ſeeing the whole College was greatly terrified becauſe "the chickens did not eat, he took them, in a ſeeming paſſion, and dipping them "three or four times over head in a tub of water, *you ſhall drink*, however, ſaid he, "*if you won't eat.*"

endeavours

endeavours in the laſt puſh they were able to make; but, as they well knew a victory was not to be hoped for, when the ſoldiers were diffident and diſpirited, and that nothing could ſo effectually inſpire them with courage as Religious means, they determined, by the advice of Ovius Paccius, one of their Prieſts, to revive an ancient ceremony that had long been neglected; which they did in this manner. Having erected an Altar, they offered up a ſolemn ſacrifice, and made the principal officers of their army ſwear at the Altar, never to run away in time of battle: after which they called the common ſoldiers one by one, into an area near the Altar, ſurrounded by Centurions with drawn ſwords in their hands; where they firſt obliged them to take an oath, not to divulge any thing they ſhould either ſee or hear there. When this was done, having repeated ſeveral forms of execration, and fearful curſes upon thoſe that ſhould violate their oath, they made them promiſe and ſwear again, that they would always be ready to march whitherſoever they were commanded by their Generals, that they would never turn their back in battle, that they would kill any of their fellow-ſoldiers, if they ſaw them do ſo; and then to pray, that if they did not religiouſly obſerve all this, deſtruction might fall upon themſelves, their families, and poſterity; but ſome of them making a ſcruple of taking theſe oaths, were inſtantly run through the body by the Centurions; which had ſuch an effect upon the reſt, who were terrified at the ferocity of the ſpectacle, that they all complied. To add ſtill more to the ſolemnity and magnificence of this ceremony, one half of the army, which conſiſted of forty thouſand men, were cloathed in white, with creſts and plumes of feathers upon their helmets; after which, they encamped near Aquilonia. But Papirius being ordered to march againſt them, told his ſoldiers at the concluſion of an harangue which he made to animate them, "Criſtas non vulnere facere, & "picta atque aurata ſcuta tranſire Romanum pilum." i. e. "That creſts "and plumes could do them no harm, nor were gilt and painted "ſhields proof againſt a Roman javelin:" and to prevent his men from being diſpirited by the effects which perhaps they might think the oaths beforementioned, would have upon the enemy, he ſaid, thoſe oaths were more likely to daunt than animate them; becauſe, they muſt of neceſſity be afraid, not only of the Gods, but of their enemy; nay, of their own fellow ſoldiers too, at the ſame time. However, when the two armies came to engage, the Samnites were routed: for the valour of the Romans, and the dejection of an enemy, who had been ſo often defeated by them, got the better of all the reſolution, which Religion and their oaths had inſpired them with. Nevertheleſs, we may ſee from hence, the opinion they had of theſe things, by having recourſe to them as the laſt and only expedient that could give

them any hopes of reſtoring their former courage: which fully ſhews how much confidence Religion is capable of creating in the minds of men when prudently applied. And though, perhaps, this diſcourſe might more properly have been inſerted amongſt thoſe, that relate to tranſactions which happened out of the City; yet, as it has ſome ſort of connexion with one of the moſt important inſtitutions in the Roman Common-wealth, I thought it better to introduce it in this place; leſt by leaving the Subject unfiniſhed, I ſhould be forced to return to it hereafter.

CHAP. XVI.

If a people accuſtomed to live under the dominion of a Prince, ſhould by any accident become entirely free, they will find it a very difficult matter to maintain their liberty.

HOW hard it is for a people that have been uſed to live in ſubjection to a Prince, to preſerve their liberty, if by any means they become free, as the Romans did after the expulſion of the Tarquins, may be ſhewn from numberleſs examples that occur in ancient hiſtory. Indeed it cannot well be otherwiſe: for the multitude differs but little from a wild beaſt, which, (how fierce a Savage ſoever it may be by nature) if it gets looſe by any chance, after it has been long confined, and kept in ſubjection, yet, not knowing how to ſupport itſelf, or whither to fly for ſhelter, may eaſily be taken and chained up again, by any one that pleaſes. So it is with a people, that has been uſed to be governed by others: for not knowing how to act either offenſively or defenſively for their own preſervation, and having no connexions with any other State, they ſoon ſubmit to the yoke again, which often proves more heavy and intolerable, than that which they had ſhaken off before [*b*]. Theſe difficulties they are ſure to encounter, even when

[*b*] Strabo ſays, Lib. XII. "That the Royal Family being extinct in Cappadocia, "the people refuſed the permiſſion which the Romans would have given them to be free, "and ſent Ambaſſadors to Rome, to declare, that liberty was inſupportable to them, "and to aſk a King. The Romans were ſurpriſed at it, and gave them leave to confer "the Kingdom on whom they pleaſed. Accordingly, they choſe Ariobarzanes, whoſe "poſterity failing in the third generation, Archelaus, though not at all related to that "family, was made their King by Mark Anthony!" Might we not juſtly ſay of them, *O homines ad Servitutem natos, O wretches born to ſlavery.* After all, it is plain, Monarchy was fitter for them than a Common-wealth: a certain turn of mind is neceſſary not to abuſe liberty, and all people have not that turn. Juſtin ſays, "the Roman Senate "choſe Ariobarzanes;" which is the more probable: for what likelihood is there that they ſhould leave the Election of a King to the diſcretion of the Cappadocians at ſuch a conjuncture?

the

Vol. II. p. 50.

re either of the flanks or the rear were before.

front, and afterwards to form it into a hollow ſquare.



VII.

the people are not totally depraved; but where the whole maſs is corrupted, they cannot maintain their freedom for any time, no not a moment, as I ſhall ſhew preſently. Let it be remembered then, that I here ſpeak of a people, amongſt whom corruption has not yet arrived at the laſt pitch, but where there are more ſparks of virtue than vice ſtill ſubſiſting. To the difficulties already mentioned, we may add one more; and that is, whenever a State becomes free, it is always ſure to have many enemies, that will endeavour to ſubvert it, and but few, or no friends to ſupport it. By enemies, I mean thoſe minions that found their advantage in living under a tyrannical government, and grow rich by the bounty and favour of their Prince; who, being deprived of theſe emoluments, cannot afterwards live contented, but endeavour to introduce tyranny again, that they may be reſtored to their former authority. The reaſon why ſuch a State will have few or no friends, is, becauſe free governments uſually confer honours and employments upon none but ſuch as have merited them by particular ſervices, and then too with a frugal hand: ſo that when a man enjoys no more than what he thinks he has deſerved, he does not look upon himſelf to be under any obligation to thoſe that gave it. Beſides, the value of thoſe benefits which reſult from living under a free State, is ſeldom either acknowledged or known by any, till after they are loſt; I mean the quiet enjoyment of their properties without fear or ſuſpicion, as well as the protection of their own perſons and children, and the honour of their wives: for no body will own that he is obliged to another man only for doing him no wrong.

To remedy ſuch diſorders and inconveniencies, therefore, as muſt naturally be occaſioned by theſe difficulties, in a State that is newly become free, the wiſeſt, the ſafeſt, the moſt efficacious and neceſſary expedient is, *to kill the ſons of Brutus*; who, as hiſtory informs us, entered into a conſpiracy with ſeveral other young Romans againſt their country, for no other reaſon, but becauſe they did not enjoy ſo much authority under a Conſular government, as they had done before, under a Regal one, and thought whilſt the generality were become free, they alone were become ſlaves [*i*]. For, whoever undertakes to govern a people, either under a Monarchial or Republican form of government, will find that he builds upon a ſandy foundation, if he does not ſecure thoſe that are averſe to his new eſtabliſhment. Indeed I muſt own, I think thoſe princes unhappy, who are obliged to have recourſe to violence, in order to maintain their authority, when the multitude are their enemies; for thoſe that are hated by a few only, may eaſily find

[*i*] They were ordered by their own father to be put to death, who aſſiſted at the execution.

means to rid themſelves of them, without much ſcandal or offence; but when the whole body of the people is provoked, they never can be ſafe: and the more rigorous they are, the weaker will their government become: ſo that the beſt way is, to make the people their friends.

Now though what I here ſay, may ſeem inconſiſtent with what I have juſt now laid down (as I was then ſpeaking of a Common-wealth, but now of a Prince) I ſhall diſcuſs the matter as briefly as I can in this place, that I may have no occaſion to revert to it hereafter.

If then a Prince would recover the affections of a people (I ſpeak of ſuch Princes as have loſt them by becoming Tyrants) he muſt in the firſt place conſider what they moſt naturally and ardently deſire; and he will find they chiefly wiſh for two things; one of which is, revenge upon thoſe that have been the occaſion of their ſlavery; and the other, an opportunity of recovering their liberties; in the former of which, a Prince has it in his power to give them full ſatisfaction; but, in the latter, only in ſome meaſure. As to the firſt caſe, the following example is exactly to the purpoſe.

Clearchus, the Tyrant of Heraclea, having been baniſhed from thence, it happened that the Nobility finding themſelves too weak to cope with the Plebeians, in ſome diſſentions which aroſe betwixt them there, entered into a conſpiracy with that Tyrant, and brought him into the government again, to the great mortification of the people, who thereby entirely loſt their liberties. But Clearchus ſoon perceiving himſelf wholly in the hands of the Nobility, who grew ſo inſolent and ambitious, that he could neither ſatiate nor reſtrain them; and that he was at the ſame time expoſed, on the other hand, to the reſentment of the people, who were enraged to the laſt degree, at the loſs of their liberties, reſolved to rid himſelf of the former, and to make the latter his friends. Taking a convenient opportunity, therefore, he had all the Nobility cut to pieces, to the great ſatisfaction of the people; and, in this manner, he gratified their revenge, one of the two appetites abovementioned, which are ſo natural to them.——But, as to the other, that is, the deſire of having their liberty reſtored, in which a Prince cannot wholly comply with them; he ought to examine upon what motives they ſo paſſionately wiſh to be free; and he will find that ſome few of them do it out of ambition and a thirſt of power; but that the generality aſpire to it, for no other reaſon, than that they may live in ſecurity, and without fear of oppreſſion. For in all Governments, howſoever they may be conſtituted, there are ſeldom more than forty or fifty perſons that have any ſhare in the adminiſtration; who being but few in compariſon with the reſt, may eaſily be guarded againſt, either by cutting them off, or by conferring ſuch honours and offices upon them, acccording to every man's rank and importance, that they may

all

all be ſatisfied. As to the others, who deſire nothing more than to live in ſecurity, they are ſoon contented, if ſuch laws and proviſions are made as are ſufficient to protect them, as well as to ſupport the power of the Prince. When this is once done, and the people obſerve that their Prince does not attempt to violate thoſe laws upon any occaſion whatſoever, they will be eaſy, and think themſelves ſafe. A proof of this we may deduce from the Kingdom of France, which entirely owes its tranquillity to the obligation its Kings lie under to obſerve an infinity of laws, which effectually provide for the welfare of their ſubjects. By the fundamental conſtitutions of that Realm, the King may diſpoſe of his armies and finances as he pleaſes; but in all other things he is circumſcribed by the laws.

Such Princes, therefore, or ſuch Republics as did not take proper care to ſecure themſelves at firſt, muſt either ſeize the firſt opportunity of doing it afterwards, as the Romans did, or they will certainly repent of it, when it is too late. For that people not being yet thoroughly corrupted when they recovered their liberty, after the expulſion of the Tarquins, and the execution of the ſons of Brutus, were enabled to maintain it, by ſuch expedients as we have already mentioned; but if they had been totally debauched, they could not have found any means ſufficient to preſerve it; and this we ſhall demonſtrate in the enſuing Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

If a corrupt people ſhould happen to recover their liberty, it is almoſt impoſſible they ſhould preſerve it.

IF the regal Government had continued any longer at Rome, I am apt to believe, that City would ſoon have become very weak and contemptible: for, conſidering what a pitch of corruption thoſe Kings were arrived at, had it been propagated through two or three other ſucceeding reigns, and the people been corrupted too, it would have been utterly impoſſible to find any means of reſcuing it from deſtruction. But, as the body of the people ſtill continued ſound, after kingly authority was aboliſhed, it did not prove a matter of any great difficulty to reſtore liberty and good order. We muſt lay it down then as a certain truth, that a corrupted State, which has been accuſtomed to the dominion of a Prince, can never become free, though that Prince and his whole race ſhould be exſtinguiſhed. For ſome new Lord will always ſtart up, out of the ruins of his Predeceſſor; nor will that State ever be ſettled till a good one ſucceeds, whoſe virtue may poſſibly reſtore

reſtore liberty; but even this will continue no longer than the life of ſuch a perſon: as it happened to Syracuſe, at two different times, that is, under the reigns of Dion and Timoleon, whoſe virtue re-eſtabliſhed liberty in that City whilſt they lived, though it relapſed into ſlavery after they were dead. But the moſt remarkable example is that of the Romans themſelves, who, after the expulſion of the Tarquins, preſently recovered their liberty, and maintained it: after the death of Julius Cæſar, Caligula, Nero, and the extirpation of all that family, however, the ſame people were never able to make the leaſt ſtruggle for the recovery of their liberties: and this contrariety of events in that State proceeded only from hence, that in the time of the Tarquins the people were not yet debauched; whereas in the reigns of the above-mentioned Emperors, they had ſunk into the loweſt degree of corruption. For, at the former period, it was ſufficient to make them take an oath, that they would never ſuffer any one perſon to rule over them again, in order to inſpire them with an averſion to the name of Kings, and to keep them firm in their reſolution to defend their liberties; but at the latter, neither the authority nor rigour of Brutus, though ſupported by all the Legions in the Eaſt, were capable of making them uſe any endeavours to maintain that freedom, which, after the example of the firſt Brutus, he had attempted to reſtore. This was owing to the corruption that had been introduced amongſt the people by the Marian faction, of which Julius Cæſar being afterwards the Head, took ſuch means to dazzle the eyes of the multitude, that they were not aware of the yoke which they themſelves were rivetting upon their own necks.

Now, though perhaps what I have already ſaid, may ſeem ſufficient to prove the truth of my aſſertion; yet, for a further corroboration of it, I ſhall take leave to adduce another example or two of more modern date, and ſuch as may be more familiar; ſince they relate to tranſactions that happened amongſt people well known in our own times. I ſay then, that no accident or revolution whatſoever, could have reſtored the liberties either of the Milaneſe or Neapolitans, becauſe their manners were totally corrupted: and this plainly appeared upon the death of Philip Viſconti, when the City of Milan made ſeveral efforts to recover its freedom, but could never effect it. Happy therefore was it for Rome, that its Kings diſcovered their corruption ſo ſoon; as it cauſed their expulſion before the venom had time to ſpread itſelf amongſt the people, and ſeize upon the vitals of the State: ſo that the tumults and inſurrections which it occaſioned there, were ſo far from being of any prejudice, that they were of the higheſt ſervice to the people; becauſe the intentions of thoſe that excited them were juſt and upright. From whence we may draw this concluſion, that where the

people

people are not corrupted, tumults and commotions cannot injure any State; but, where they are debauched, the beſt laws and inſtitutions will ſignify nothing, except they are enforced by ſome perſon of authority, with ſuch a degree of rigour, as will compel the multitude to obey, and become good by neceſſity. Now, whether this has ever been the caſe, I confeſs, I know not: nor am I able to judge, with any certainty, whether it ever can be: for, as I ſaid before, when a City is falling to ruin, through the corruption of the people, if it ſhould ever recover itſelf for a while, it muſt be owing to the virtue of ſome one man, who is then alive, and not to the multitude, who have neither diſpoſition or deſire to ſee good order reſtored, nor power to maintain it afterwards. And even in that caſe, it will ſink again into its former confuſion, as ſoon as ſuch a perſon is dead: as it happened to the Thebans, who were enabled, by the virtue of Epaminondas, to keep up the form of a republic whilſt he lived; but after his death it was quickly diſſolved: the reaſon of which, is, that the life of one man is not ſufficient to accuſtom a State to live quietly under wholeſome laws and inſtitutions, which has been long uſed to riot in miſrule and licentiouſneſs. And if one good man ſhould either live to extreme old age himſelf, or be ſucceeded by another equally virtuous, and neither of them can work a thorough reformation in the people, every thing will go to wreck and ruin again when they die; unleſs, as I before obſerved, it is prevented by much bloodſhed and running great riſques: for this corruption and inaptitude to live in freedom ariſes from an inequality in the State; and, in order to aboliſh that, it is abſolutely neceſſary to uſe very extraordinary means indeed, which few people either know, or would care to put in practice if they did, as ſhall be ſhewn more particularly in another place [*k*].

CHAP. XVIII.

How Liberty may be ſupported in a corrupt State, where it has been once eſtabliſhed; and in what manner it may be introduced, if it was not eſtabliſhed there before.

IT may appear neither unneceſſary nor incongruous with the foregoing diſcourſe perhaps, to conſider whether Liberty can be maintained in a corrupted State, where it has been once eſtabliſhed; and whether it is poſſible to introduce it, if it was not eſtabliſhed there before. I ſay then that it will be very difficult to do either: and though

[*k*] See the 26th and 55th Chapters of this book.

it

it is almoſt impoſſible to preſcribe any certain rules to be obſerved for the accompliſhment of thoſe purpoſes, (becauſe it will be neceſſary to proceed according to the degree of corruption in that State) yet, in order to form ſome judgment of the matter, I ſhall here enter into a diſcuſſion of it.

We muſt therefore ſuppoſe ſuch a State to be corrupted to the laſt degree, in which caſe the difficulty will be exceeding great; nay, indeed, it is almoſt impoſſible that any laws or regulations whatſoever ſhould be efficacious enough to reform a State, where the depravation is univerſal: for as good Manners cannot ſubſiſt without good Laws, ſo thoſe Laws cannot be put in execution without good Manners [*l*]. Beſides, the Laws that were made when a State was in its infancy, and whilſt the morals of the people were yet untainted, will no longer ſerve the purpoſe of government, after men are become wicked and corrupt: for though the laws of a State may be altered upon various accidents and emergencies, yet the fundamental conſtitutions are ſeldom or never changed; upon which account, new Laws are not ſufficient,

[*l*] "Political writers," ſays the Author of *the Eſtimate of the Manners and Principles of the times*, Vol. II. Sect. xi. "have generally attributed the fall of States to ſome de-"fective, falſe, or improper Principle woven into the original Conſtitution of their Laws." ——Now this, in that extent in which it is generally affirmed and underſtood, ſeems an entire miſtake. For Salutary Principles and Manners will of themſelves ſecure the duration of a State, with very ill modelled Laws: whereas the beſt Laws can never ſecure the duration of a State, where its Manners and Principles are corrupted. Of theſe truths, Hiſtory affords inſtances abundant. The general defect therefore of political Inſtitutions hath been, their not effectually providing for the continuance and ſtability of Principles and Manners; of Religion, public Spirit, Honour, Temperance, Fortitude. This truth will perhaps be readily allowed, as it regards nations that are deeply ſunk in effeminacy, and ready to be ſwallowed up by ſome warlike neighbour. But it is no leſs certain, as it regards the internal balance of power in any nation whatſoever; although volumes have been written on that ſubject, without ſo much as taking this truth into the account. To offer one inſtance out of innumerable that might be brought from every period of Hiſtory.——It is the ſole force of Manners and a Principle, that prevents France from falling into the deepeſt and moſt abandoned Deſpotiſm. This Principle and its correſpondent Manners give the French many of the Bleſſings of Liberty: whilſt their mere political Conſtitution favours as much of Deſpotiſm as that of many of their neighbours, who feel all the rigours of oppreſſion.

Hence then appears the important uſe of inveſtigating the real and particular State of the Manners and Principles of a Common-wealth: ſince, though it is a circumſtance totally overlooked by many ſuperficial Pretenders to political Science, and looſely and blindly declaimed upon by others, yet it is the only method by which we can rationally determine the ſtrength or weakneſs, the danger or ſecurity of a ſtate.—— And here the penetrating Machiavel ſeems to have erred in his determination upon this point. He ſays, "As good Manners cannot ſubſiſt without good Laws, ſo thoſe Laws "cannot be put in execution without good Manners." The latter part of the Sentence is a great truth; the former part is a vulgar error. So long as the cauſes of corrupt Manners are abſent, good Manners preſerve themſelves without Laws, or with bad Laws. Good Laws are only then neceſſary, as the means of prevention, when corrupt Manners or Cuſtoms take place.

becauſe

becauſe the ancient inſtitutions, which remain in force, often make them liable to be perverted.

For a further explanation of this matter, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that in Rome certain fundamental inſtitutions of government were firſt eſtabliſhed, and afterwards Laws made, by which the Magiſtrates kept the Citizens in their duty. By theſe inſtitutions, the Government was divided betwixt the People and the Senate, the Tribunes and the Conſuls; and forms eſtabliſhed for the ſollicitation of public offices, the creation of Magiſtrates, and enacting Laws: all which inſtitutions were little or not at all changed in the various revolutions which afterwards happened in that State. The Laws, however, which were calculated to reſtrain the licentiouſneſs of the people, as thoſe againſt adultery and ambition, the ſumptuary Laws, and ſeveral others, were either made or altered at different times, as the Citizens grew worſe and worſe. But the ancient inſtitutions, which ſtill ſubſiſted, at laſt becoming good for nothing, when the people grew corrupt, the new Laws were neither proper nor ſufficient to keep men in due bounds; yet they would have been highly ſo, if the old inſtitutions had been altered and accommodated to them when they were introduced. And that this was really the fact, plainly appears from the forms they obſerved in creating Magiſtrates and enacting Laws: for, in the former caſe, the Romans never conferred either the Conſulſhip, or other great office in the Commonwealth, upon any one that had not ſollicited them. Now this inſtitution, without doubt, was good in the beginning of that Republic, becauſe it was ſuppoſed that no Citizen would venture to ſollicit thoſe honours, except he was conſcious to himſelf that he had merited them: and that as a repulſe would be attended with ignominy, every man, in order to make himſelf worthy of them, would endeavour to behave well. But in courſe of time, when the Citizens were become exceedingly corrupt, this cuſtom, inſtead of anſwering the firſt deſign of it, was of very great prejudice: for then thoſe that had the moſt power, and not thoſe that were the moſt virtuous, began to ſollicit the higheſt honours in the ſtate; whilſt thoſe that were poor, though they were good men, durſt not offer themſelves as Candidates, for fear of meeting with a diſgraceful rebuff [*m*]. But

[*m*] Upon this paſſage, the laſt quoted Author ſays, Vol. II. Sect. xiii. "Mark the "uniform effects of the ſame Principles and Cauſes, working at the diſtance of two "thouſand years. As the times were tumultuous till the Union of the Houſes of York "and Lancaſter, it was common before that period for Sheriffs to omit or excuſe the not "making returns for ſeveral of the Boroughs within their Counties. Sometimes giving "for the reaſon of their omiſſion, that theſe Boroughs were not able to ſend any Bur-"geſſes, becauſe of their Poverty, which was never then complained of, or objected to by "the Boroughs themſelves; though ſeveral acts of Parliament had been made to com-"pel the Sheriffs to make returns for all the Boroughs: nay, ſeveral of the Boroughs, "after they had once or twice ſent up their Repreſentatives, found the burden too great,

But this inconvenience did not come upon the Romans all at once, but ſtep by ſtep, and like moſt other evils, by degrees: for, after they had conquered Aſia and Africa, and reduced by much the greater part of Greece into ſubjection to them, they began to grow too ſecure and negligent of their liberties, as they thought they had nothing to apprehend from any other quarter. To this fatal ſecurity on the one hand, and the weakneſs of their enemies on the other, it was owing, that in diſpoſing of the Conſulſhip, and other honours, they no longer had ſo much regard to merit and capacity, as to private favour, and advancing ſuch men to theſe dignities, as were better verſed in the arts of treating, and of canvaſſing votes at an election, than in thoſe of conquering an enemy. From this, they afterwards proceeded to prefer thoſe that were the richeſt and moſt powerful: ſo that through the defect of the original Inſtitution, all good and virtuous men were totally excluded from any ſhare in the Adminiſtration.

In the other caſe, that is, in making Laws, a Tribune, or any other Citizen, was at liberty to propoſe a new one to the people; that ſo every one might ſpeak either for or againſt it, before it was paſſed, if he pleaſed: and this likewiſe was a good Inſtitution whilſt the people continued uncorrupt. For then it was certainly of Advantage to the State, that any one who thought himſelf capable of doing the public a ſervice, ſhould have leave to offer his propoſals: and that every other perſon ſhould be indulged with the privilege of declaring his opinion of them; to the end, that when both ſides of the queſtion had been thoroughly examined and diſcuſſed, the people might chuſe that which ſeemed upon the whole to be moſt reaſonable and convenient. But after the Citizens had loſt their virtue, this Inſtitution alſo was attended with very bad conſequences, becauſe none but great and powerful men were then allowed to propoſe any law to the people; of which they made ſo ill an uſe, that they ſeldom propoſed any thing, but what contributed more to eſtabliſh and augment their own power and private intereſt, than to benefit the public: and what was ſtill worſe, the people were become ſo abject and corrupt, that no-body durſt oppoſe theſe innovators: ſo that being either deceived by their artifices, or over-awed by their power, they were forced to conſent to their own ruin.

In order therefore to have preſerved the liberties of Rome, even after it became ſo corrupt, it was neceſſary, as they made new laws, to have altered the fundamental Inſtitutions alſo: for good men and bad ones are to be governed in a very different manner, and where the matter is

" and procured perpetual exemptions, which remain to this day."——How differently do we value this Right at preſent, when no price is thought too great for the purchaſe of a Borough; and no Family, how ancient or honourable ſoever, is of any conſequence, but in proportion to theſe modern poſſeſſions?

not

not the ſame, the forms ought to be varied. But ſince theſe Inſtitutions muſt be altered, either all at once, as ſoon as their inconvenience is generally acknowledged; or by little and little, before it is obvious to every one; I ſay that it is hardly poſſible to do either; for to alter them by degrees, the wiſdom of ſome provident and ſagacious Citizen is requiſite, who can foreſee the danger at a diſtance, and warn the people of it before it happens. Perhaps, however, ſuch a man may never be born in a particular State; and if there ſhould, he may not be able to convince others of the expediency of what he himſelf finds neceſſary: for when men have been long accuſtomed to any way of life, it is no eaſy matter to introduce a change amongſt them; eſpecially if they do not immediately ſee the evil that is apprehended with their own eyes, but are to be wrought upon by arguments and probable conjectures.—As for altering theſe Inſtitutions all at once, when every body perceives they are no longer of any ſervice, but far otherwiſe; I ſay that it is much more eaſy to find out the inconvenience than to remedy it: becauſe this cannot be done by ordinary means, when thoſe very means themſelves have loſt their efficacy, and would even contribute to a contrary end. Recourſe therefore muſt neceſſarily be had to extraordinary means, ſuch as force and arms: for a man cannot new model a State as he pleaſes, except he firſt ſeizes upon the government, and takes it wholly into his own hands. Now as one muſt be ſuppoſed to be a good man who is deſirous to reform a State; and another a bad man, who makes uſe of violence to get the government of it entirely into his hands; it very ſeldom happens that an honeſt man will avail himſelf of forcible and injurious methods to become abſolute, be his intentions ever ſo upright; or that a wicked man, when he has made himſelf ſo, will ever do any good, or employ that authority well, which he has done ſo much evil to acquire.

From what has been ſaid, it will appear how difficult, or rather impoſſible it is, either to maintain liberty, or to re-eſtabliſh it, if loſt, in any State, when the people are become corrupt: but if any means could be found out to effect either, I ſhould think it muſt be by reducing it nearer the ſtandard of a monarchical than of a popular Government; that ſo the inſolence of ſuch as could not be kept within proper bounds by laws, might be effectually curbed by the power of a Magiſtrate, whoſe authority ſhould in ſome meaſure reſemble that of a King: and to attempt a reformation any other way, would be an undertaking that muſt prove either vain and fruitleſs, or attended with great violence and cruelty. For if Cleomenes ſucceeded, as I have ſaid before, by cauſing all the Ephori to be killed, in order to take the Government wholly upon himſelf; if Romulus put his Brother Remus, and Titus Tatius, the Sabine, to death for the ſame purpoſe, and afterwards made a good uſe of

their power; it muſt be obſerved, that the Subjects of neither State were corrupted to ſuch a degree as thoſe of whom we have been ſpeaking in this Chapter: and therefore they were both enabled to effect what they undertook, and to put a good face upon it too when they had done.

CHAP. XIX.

When a good foundation is once laid, if a weak Prince ſhould ſucceed an able one, he may ſupport himſelf in the Government: but if one weak Prince ſhould ſucceed another, it is impoſſible to maintain any State.

IF we conſider the abilities and conduct of Romulus, Numa, and Tullus Hoſtilius, the three firſt Kings of Rome, we ſhall find it was extremely fortunate for that City that its firſt King was courageous and warlike, the ſecond pacific and devout, and the third of the ſame ſtamp with Romulus again, more inclined to war than peace. For if a Prince was neceſſary, after the firſt Inſtitution of Government there, who ſhould civilize and form the people to the duties of Society, it was no leſs neceſſary that he ſhould be ſucceeded by another, who ſhould be animated with the ſame valour and martial ſpirit that Romulus was; otherwiſe the Citizens would have become effeminate, and the City fallen a prey to its neighbours.

From hence we may obſerve, that if a Prince who is not altogether ſo valiant and enterprizing as another whom he happens to ſucceed, the State may ſtill be ſupported by the merits of his Predeceſſor, and he may enjoy the fruit of his labours: but if it comes to paſs that either he himſelf lives a long time, or is not ſucceeded by another of the ſame turn with the firſt, the State muſt of courſe be ruined. On the contrary, if a martial and courageous Prince ſucceeds another ſuch a one, very great things are commonly effected, and ſuch as immortalize their names. David without doubt diſtinguiſhed himſelf no leſs by feats of arms, than by his piety and wiſdom: and ſuch was the effect of them, that after he had ſubdued all his enemies, he left his Kingdom in peace to his Son Solomon, who was enabled to ſupport it at all times by the arts of peace only, and reigned happily all his life; which was wholly owing to the virtues of his Father. But it happened otherwiſe to Rehoboam, who inheriting neither the valour of his Grandfather, nor the wiſdom of his Father, hardly was able to keep poſſeſſion of a Sixth part of his Kingdom. Bajazet II. Sultan of the Turks, though naturally more inclined to peace than war, ſtill maintaned the acquiſitions that had been made by his father Mahomet; who,

who, like David, having conquered all the neighbouring States, left a large Empire to his Son, and ſo well eſtabliſhed by his valour, that it might eaſily be preſerved firm and entire during his life, by pacific meaſures alone. Nevertheleſs, if Bajazet's Son Selim, the preſent Grand Seignor, had not been more like his Grandfather than his Father, that Empire muſt have been ruined; but as it happens, he ſeems more likely to excel his Grandfather than to fall ſhort of him.

From theſe examples we may ſee that a weak and puſillanimous Prince may ſupport himſelf, provided he ſucceeds a warlike and enterpriſing one: but if one weak Prince immediately ſucceeds another, it is impoſſible any Government ſhould ſubſiſt; except, like France, it be ſupported by virtue of its ancient laws and fundamental conſtitutions. By *weak* Princes, I mean thoſe that are not given to arms; and ſhall conclude this diſcourſe with obſerving that the tranquillity of Numa's reign, which laſted many years, was owing to the warlike Spirit of Romulus; which being revived in Tullus Hoſtilius, the third King, procured him the ſame degree of reputation. Tullus was ſucceeded by Ancus Martius, a Prince of ſuch a diſpoſition that he knew how to ſupport the State either by the arts of peace or war [*n*]. In the beginning of his reign he was inclined to pacific meaſures; but when he perceived that his neighbours judged from thence, that he was

[*n*] It muſt be owned that Machiavel has given us a curious Analyſis, or Inveſtigation of the firſt Principles of the Roman Government, according to the account he receives of their polity from the Hiſtorian he comments upon. But if the Hiſtory of the Seven Kings of Rome reſts upon no better a foundation than that of the Seven Champions of Chriſtendom, as ſome authors of great reputation have not ſcrupled to aſſert, then all that has been ſaid by ſo many writers concerning the remarkable good fortune of Rome, in having ſo many ſucceeding Princes of ſuch particular diſpoſitions as were exactly ſuited to the times, and abſolutely neceſſary for the eſtabliſhment of an infant State, muſt ſtand for nothing: Livy's Hiſtory itſelf muſt then be looked upon in no other light than that of a Romance, or *a well invented flam*, and conſequently the magnificent Superſtructure which the Florentine has erected upon it, of courſe fall to the ground. What pity it is that ſuch great and generous actions, and ſuch noble ſpeeches as we meet with in almoſt every page of that Hiſtorian; clothed with ſo many brilliant circumſtances, and related in ſo lively a manner, that one would be apt to imagine he had either ſeen or heard them done and ſpoken himſelf, or at leaſt had them from ſomebody elſe that did, ſhould, after all, prove not to have one word of truth in them, but to be cooked up only for perſons that probably never exiſted! What a ſhame that ſuch *Fathers of Hiſtory*, as they are ſometimes called, ſhould more juſtly deſerve the name of *the Fathers of lies!* But ſuch is the *frivolity* (if I may be indulged that word) of all Hiſtory, eſpecially of thoſe that are moſt ſolemn, and appear moſt ſpecious and plauſible. A mortifying conſideration indeed! who can forbear ſhaking his head, and crying out with the Poet,

O Curas hominum, & quantum in rebus inane!
Or rather with the Italians,
Se non è vero, e ben trovato?

effeminate,

effeminate, and made little account of him, he thought it neceſſary for the preſervation of his Kingdom, to convince them of the contrary, by following the ſteps of Romulus rather than of Numa. Let it be obſerved therefore by all Princes, that thoſe, who imitate Numa, may chance either to keep or loſe their dominions, according to the difference of the times and circumſtances of things: but ſuch as follow the example of Romulus, and arm themſelves like him, with prudence and valour, will be able to maintain their State in all times and circumſtances; except they are overpowered by ſome extraordinary and irreſiſtible force. It may then be looked upon as a certain thing, that if the third King of Rome had not been a warlike Prince, and one that knew how to retrieve the declining reputation of that State by dint of arms, it never could (or with very great difficulty at leaſt) have acquired ſuch a degree of ſtrength and firmneſs, nor have effected the prodigious things it afterwards did. It muſt be owned however, that whilſt it continued under a Monarchial Government, it was liable to the double danger of being ruined either by the weakneſs of one Prince, or the ferocity and tyranny of another.

CHAP. XX.

That if one martial Prince ſucceeds another, they may do very great things: and that as well governed Republics muſt of neceſſity have virtuous men to conduct them, their conqueſts and acquiſitions will be proportionable to their virtue.

AFTER the Romans had aboliſhed Monarchy, they were no longer expoſed to the dangers abovementioned, which they had been ſubject to before under every King, whether he was pacific and gentle, or fierce and warlike. For the Sovereign power was veſted in Conſuls, who arrived at that dignity, neither by right of ſucceſſion or inheritance, nor by fraud or violence of any kind; but by the free ſuffrages of their fellow-citizens, and therefore were always perſons of diſtinguiſhed merit and valour. So that the State, availing itſelf of a long ſucceſſion of virtuous men, arrived at its higheſt pitch of grandeur in the ſame number of years that it had been governed by kings. And no wonder, when we ſee that even two ſuch Princes (one ſucceeding the other) are ſufficient to conquer the world; as Philip of Macedon, and his Son Alexander did. If this was poſſible in a Monarchy, ſurely it is much more ſo in a Republic, which has it in its power to elect not only two, but an infinite number of ſuch men in a continual and uninterrupted ſucceſſion to one another: ſo that a ſucceſſion of this kind may

may eaſily be eſtabliſhed and kept up in a well governed Commonwealth [o].

CHAP. XXI.

Thoſe Princes and Republics are highly to be blamed that have not troops of their own [p].

IF any Princes or Republics in theſe times have not forces of their own, ſufficient either to defend their States, or attack their enemies upon occaſion, they ought to take the ſhame to themſelves: ſince it is plain, from the example of Tullus Hoſtilius, that ſuch a defect is not owing to any want of men that are fit to bear arms, but to their own fault in neglecting to inure their ſubjects to the exerciſe of them. For, when Tullus ſucceeded to the Kingdom, the Romans having been forty years in peace, he could not find a man in his dominions who had ever been a Soldier. Nevertheleſs, as he determined at laſt to engage in a war, he wiſely reſolved not to employ either the Samnites, or Tuſcans, or any other Mercenaries, but to avail himſelf of his own Subjects: and ſuch were his military abilities, that he ſoon made them excellent ſoldiers. And, it is moſt certain, that if there are not ſoldiers, wherever there are men enow, it is entirely to be imputed either to the negligence or incapacity of the Government, and not to any defect in nature, or peculiarity in the Country where they live; of which we have a very recent proof: for every body knows, that when the King of England invaded France a little while ago, he had not a man in his army who was not his own Subject; yet though that nation had not been at war for the ſpace of thirty years before, nor was there either an officer or private man in thoſe troops, who had ever ſeen the face of an enemy; yet they were not afraid to make a deſcent upon a Kingdom, where there were ſo many experienced Generals and ſuch numbers of well diſciplined forces, who had ſerved for many years together in the Italian wars. This was wholly owing to the wiſdom of the Prince, and the good order and military exerciſe kept up in that Kingdom: where they never ceaſe to diſcipline their troops and make them ready for war, even in time of the moſt profound

[o] A Commonwealth may certainly boaſt one advantage, which hereditary Kingdoms have not. In Commonwealths, the Sovereign is neither too young nor too old, and has neither the infirmities of childhood, nor thoſe of old age. But Kingdoms have not that happineſs: they experience at one time the diſorders of a minority, at another, the wild heat of youthful blood, and at another, the tardineſs and weight of declining years.

[p] See the 12th, 13th and 14th Chapters of the Prince.

peace-

peace [q]. After Pelopidas and Epaminondas had reſcued their countrymen, the Thebans, out of the ſubjection they were under to the Spartans, and ſaw they were become abject and ſpiritleſs by a long courſe of ſervitude; yet, ſuch were the abilities and courage of thoſe two chiefs, that they ſoon re-eſtabliſhed military diſcipline amongſt that people, and revived their ancient valour to ſuch a degree, that they not only marched boldly into the field againſt the Spartan army, but utterly defeated it. Upon which, the hiſtorian that relates this, remarks, that it was plainly ſeen from the conduct of theſe two Generals, that Soldiers were not born at Sparta alone, but were ſoon to be raiſed in every country where there were men, provided any one could be found that would be at the pains of diſciplining and training them up to arms. The juſtneſs of which remark is fully confirmed by the example of Tullus Hoſtilius, who preſently made excellent Soldiers of a raw multitude; as is well obſerved and expreſſed by Virgil in the following lines.

Reſideſque movebit
Tullus in arma viros, & jam deſueta triumphis
Agmina, &c. Æn. VI. 813.

Him Tullus next in dignity ſucceeds,
An active Prince, and prone to martial deeds.
He ſhall his troops for glorious fields prepare,
Diſus'd to toils and triumphs of the war.

DRYDEN.

[q] Upon this paſſage, the Author of the *Eſtimate, &c.* ſays as follows, Vol. II. Sect. vii. "If the Principles maintained in this work be true, the defect of valour in a "national Militia, will not lie amongſt the private men, but the Officers. And in- "deed, who can ſeriouſly believe that thoſe Gentlemen that find the attendance upon a "Quarter Seſſions for the ſervice of their Country, too ſevere a burden of duty upon "their enervated bodies and minds, will vigorouſly undertake and go through the dan- "gers and fatigues of warlike Service? It muſt therefore be expected, as a certain event, "that a Militia will, on its firſt inſtitution, and for a long time be uſeleſs. But this is "not ſaid with a view to diſcourage the Eſtabliſhment, but only to prevent groundleſs "expectations, which being diſappointed in the firſt raiſing of the Militia, might lead "the nation into a belief, that the inſtitution could never be uſeful. This, therefore, "is no reaſon why a Militia ſhould not be ſet on foot, but rather a good reaſon for its "ſpeedy eſtabliſhment: becauſe the continued exerciſe of a Militia, if undertaken with "that vigour and ſerious intention which it deſerves, is perhaps the moſt promiſing "means of rekindling by ſlow degrees the military Spirit amongſt us. As a rational "encouragement to the hopes of the nation, let us caſt our eyes back upon former times, "and hear the judgment of a great foreigner." He then quotes this paſſage from Machiavel.——The King of England abovementioned was Henry VII.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

What is to be obſerved from the Combat betwixt the three Horatii of Rome, and the three Curiatii of Alba.

BY the articles of a convention betwixt Tullus Hoſtilius King of Rome, and Mettius Dictator of Alba, who had been at war together, it was agreed, that three of each ſide ſhould decide the quarrel in a Combat; and that if the three Romans got the better of the three Albans, the latter State ſhould become ſubject to the former, and contrarywiſe. For which purpoſe, three brothers of the Horatian family being appointed by the Romans, and three brothers of the Curiatian by the Albans, as their Champions, to end the diſpute; it happened that all three on the Alban ſide were killed, and only one on the Roman was left alive. But the ſurviving Horatian returning in triumph to Rome, with the ſpoils of his Antagoniſts upon his back, amongſt which was a cloke that had been curiouſly wrought by his own Siſter, who was eſpouſed to one of the Curiatii; and chancing to meet that Siſter in his way back to the City, ſhe could not help burſting into tears at the death of her lover, which provoked him to ſuch a degree, that he immediately killed her. For this fact, however, he was brought to a trial; but acquitted after long debate: and at laſt, more through the interceſſion of his father, than any conſideration of his own merit [*r*].

From hence, there are three things to be obſerved. In the firſt place, that no State ought to ſtake its all upon a part of its forces only: in the next, that in a well ordered government deſerts and offences are not balanced againſt each other: and laſtly, that it is imprudent to enter into any engagements, where the performance of them is, or ought to be doubted of. For liberty is a thing of ſuch importance to every State, that no one can reaſonably imagine, that either of the two abovementioned would long have continued quiet after they had been reduced into ſubjection to another power, by the ill ſucceſs only of three of their own ſubjects.

This plainly appears from the ſubſequent conduct of Mettius, who, though he acknowledged himſelf ſubdued after the Horatii had got the better of the Curiatii, and promiſed obedience to Tullus as his Sovereign; yet, in the firſt expedition which the Romans afterwards undertook againſt the Veientes, he ſhewed, that he regretted the loſs he had ſuſtained by ſo raſh a covenant as he had lately made,

[*r*] Livy, Lib. I. Cap. xxvi.

and would have deceived Tullus, if he could. But as I have elſewhere diſcuſſed this point more at large [*f*], I ſhall only ſpeak of the two firſt in the two following Chapters.

CHAP. XXIII.

That a State ought not to venture its all upon a part of its forces only: upon which account, it is often of great prejudice to defend paſſes.

HE ſurely can never be thought a wiſe man who riſques his whole fortune, without exerting all his ſtrength at the ſame time. And yet, this has been done at various times and in different manners. As firſt, by acting like Tullus Hoſtilius and Mettius, when they committed the whole fortune and happineſs of themſelves, their Country, and of ſo many brave men as each of them had in their reſpective armies, to the valour and fortune of three of their ſubjects alone, who were but a very trifling part of their ſtrength indeed: not conſidering that by ſuch a manner of proceeding, all the pains which their Anceſtors had taken, in founding and forming thoſe States, to eſtabliſh liberty upon the firmeſt bottom, and to enable their Succeſſors to defend it, were rendered vain and ineffectual, by putting it in the power of ſo few to loſe it: which was certainly an act of extreme raſhneſs and imprudence.

Thoſe likewiſe are guilty of the ſame error, who, upon the approach of an Enemy, riſque all upon the defence of certain paſſes and ſtrong holds: for this is almoſt always a very dangerous ſtep, except it can be conveniently done with all their force; in which caſe, without doubt, ſuch a courſe ought to be taken: but if thoſe places are either ſo rough or ſo ſtrait that they can neither ſupport nor contain all their forces, it may prove of fatal conſequence. What induces me to think ſo is, the example of ſuch as having been invaded by a powerful enemy, though their country was ſurrounded with mountains, never offered to make any ſtand againſt them in the paſſes upon thoſe mountains, but always either advanced to meet them, or waited for them in ſome ſuch plain and open part of the country nearer home, as they thought would beſt ſuit their purpoſe. The reaſons of which have been already aſſigned: for, as they could not poſt any conſiderable number of men to guard thoſe paſſes, becauſe there would neither be proviſions ſufficient to ſupport them long there, nor room enough to hold many ſoldiers, it would not be poſſible to ſuſtain a numerous army that came to attack

[*f*] See the 18th Chapter of the *Prince*, and the 41ſt and 42d Chapters of the third book of theſe diſcourſes.

them:

them: and *that* an enemy may do with as many as they pleaſe, becauſe it is not their intention to ſtay in that place, but to paſs it as ſoon as they can, and be gone; whereas, a great number of the other ſide cannot wait long for them, in thoſe barren and ſtrait places; which yet, perhaps, they would find neceſſary from the uncertainty of the Enemy's arrival. So that when that paſs is abandoned, which you had hoped to maintain, and upon which you and your Soldiers chiefly depended, both your Subjects, and the reſt of your army will be ſo diſpirited, that you will be ruined without ſtriking a ſtroke, by having ſtaked your all upon part of your ſtrength only.

Every one knows what difficulties Hannibal encountered, when he paſſed the Alps, which divide France from Lombardy, and afterwards thoſe mountains that ſeparate Lombardy and Tuſcany: and yet the Romans waited for him firſt upon the Teſino, and afterwards upon the plains of Arezzo, chuſing rather to venture an engagement with him in the field, where their army might have ſome chance to defeat the Enemy, than to lead it into places where it was ſure to periſh through want and other inconveniencies. And if we read Hiſtory with care and attention, we ſhall find that very few good Generals ever thought of defending ſuch paſſes; not only for the reaſons already given, but becauſe it is impoſſible to ſecure them all; both the mountains and plains having their by-roads, as well as thoſe that are common and uſually frequented: and though ſtrangers, perhaps, may not know them, yet the people of the country are well acquainted with them, and always ready enough to ſhew one how to elude all oppoſition; of which we had a remarkable example, no longer ago than the year 1515. When Francis I. King of France, had formed a deſign to invade Italy, in order to recover the State of Milan; the chief objection that was urged by ſuch as oppoſed it, was, that the Swiſs would obſtruct his paſſage over the mountains. But experience afterwards ſhewed the futility of that objection: for the King turning out of the common road, in which the Swiſs had ſtrongly fortified two or three paſſes, and taking a by-way that they knew nothing of, arrived in Italy cloſe upon their backs, before they heard any thing of his paſſage: at which they were ſo diſmayed, that they quitted thoſe poſts and retired into Milan; where the Lombards, finding themſelves deceived in their opinion that the French would be ſtopped in the mountains, preſently ſubmitted to them.

CHAP. XXIV.

That well governed Republics appoint proper rewards and puniſhments, according to the merits or demerits of their Citizens, and never balance one againſt the other.

VERY great, to be ſure, was the merit of the ſurviving brother of the Horatii; as he alone had conquered all the three Curiatii, and ſaved his Country: great likewiſe was the crime he committed afterwards in killing his Siſter; at which the Romans were ſo offended, that they brought him to a trial for it, notwithſtanding his ſervices were of ſuch importance, and the ſenſe of them ſo freſh upon their minds. Now, this perhaps, may ſeem to thoſe that conſider the matter but ſuperficially, a piece of the higheſt ingratitude in that people: but whoever weighs it more maturely, and duly reflects how neceſſary a thing juſtice is in every Republic, and how impartially it ought to be adminiſtered, will rather be apt to blame them for acquitting, than for having brought him to a trial. For no well governed Commonwealth ever cancels the demerit of its Citizens, on account of their merit; but having appropriated rewards to the one, and penalties to the other; and having recompenſed a man for doing well; if he afterwards does ill, it puniſhes him according to the nature of his fault, without any regard to his former good actions. Where theſe ordinances are ſtrictly obſerved, a State may preſerve its liberties a long time; but where they are neglected, it will ſoon fall to ruin: for, if a man who has done his Country ſome ſignal ſervice, ſhould expect not only to be honoured and rewarded for it, but to be indulged with impunity, and a privilege to commit any crime afterwards, his inſolence would ſoon grow inſupportable and inconſiſtent with all civil government.

It is highly neceſſary, therefore, for the diſcouragement of bad men, to reward thoſe that are good, as the Romans always did: and, though a State ſhould be poor, and cannot afford to give any conſiderable reward to the higheſt degree of merit, yet it ſhould always ſhew itſelf grateful, and give as much as it is able: for any little preſent or favour that is conferred as a reward for virtuous actions (though of the moſt important ſervice) will always be conſidered by the receiver as great and honourable. The ſtories of Horatius Cocles and Mucius Scævola, are generally known; the former of whom alone, bravely maintained the bridge over the Tiber, againſt the enemy, who wanted to paſs it, till the bridge was cut down behind him, and their paſſage obſtructed: and the latter went to the camp of Porſenna, King of the Tuſcans,

The eighth Plan, repr[illegible]n up in order of battle.

I.	Q.			oo.	ooo.	oo.			Q.	I.
75.	75.	250.	500.	450.	450.	500.	250.	75.	75.
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eee	r*ddd*r	r*ddd*r	eee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eee	r*ddd*r	r*ddd*r	eee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eee	r*ddd*r	r*ddd*r	eee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eee	rxoooxr	rxoooxr	eee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eee	rxoooxr	rxoooxr	eee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eee	rxoooxr	txoooxr	eee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eee	rxoooxr	rxoooxr	eee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eee	rxoooxr	rxoooxr	eee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
			eee			eee			
			eee			eee			
			eee			eee			
			eee			eee			
			eee			eee			
			eee			eee			
			eee			eee			
			eee			eee			
			eee			eee			
			eee			eee			
			eee	450.	450.	eee			
			eee	r*ddd*r	r*ddd*r	eee			

maintained the bridge over the [illegible] against the enemy,
to pass it, till the bridge was cut down behind him, and their passage obstructed: and the latter went to the camp of Porsenna, King of the Tuscans,


80 feet deep.
Feet wide.
Light Horse.
150.
10 in file.
15 in Rank.
60.
Interval.
Gens d'armes.
150.
10 in file.
15 in Rank.
16.
Interval.
60.
Ex. Velites.
500.
20 in file.
25 in Rank.
50.
Interval.
20.
560 feet deep.
Extraordinary Pikemen 1000.
140 in file.
7 in Rank
28

The ninth Plan. Repr[illegible]way only. Vol. II. p. 69.

I.	Q.		oo.	oo.	oo.		oo.	Q.	I.
150.	150.	500.	1000.	450.		1000.	500.	150.	150.
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eeee	r*ddd*r		eeee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eeee	r*ddd*r		eeee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eeee	r*ddd*r		eeee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eeee	rxoooxr		eeee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eeee	rxoooxr		eeee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eeee	rxoooxr		eeee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eeee	rxoooxr		eeee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
yyyyy	ggggg	tttt	eeee	rxoooxr		eeee	tttt	ggggg	yyyyy
			eeee			eeee			
			eeee			eeee			
			eeee		oooo	eeee			
			eeee		SPZ	eeee			
			eeee		oooo	eeee			

Vel's calculations, it is hoped these draughts
cr.

Tuſcans, with a deſign to aſſaſſinate him; but miſtaking his man, he thruſt his own hand into a fire, and held it there till it was entirely burnt away, to ſhew the courage and reſolution of the Romans: for which extraordinary ſervices, each of them was rewarded with two acres of land [*t*]. The example of Manlius Capitolinus is no leſs remarkable, who, having driven away the Gauls from before the Capitol, which they had beſieged, was recompenſed for it by his fellow-citizens with a preſent of a ſmall quantity of corn; which, according to the neceſſity of the times, was looked upon as an honourable and adequate reward. But the ſame Manlius, either out of envy or ambition, afterwards endeavouring to excite ſedition and tumults in the City, and to make himſelf too popular, was thrown headlong from the Capitol, which he had relieved with ſo much glory and reputation to himſelf, without the leaſt regard to the merit of his former actions.

CHAP. XXV.

Whoever would reform the Government in a free State, ought to retain the ſhadow at leaſt of its ancient Cuſtoms and Inſtitutions.

IN order to reform a Government in ſuch a manner as to make it not only firm and permanent, but agreeable to the people, the Reformer ought to keep up the ſhadow and form at leaſt of its ancient cuſtoms and inſtitutions, that ſo the multitude may be as little aware as poſſible of the innovations, though the new ordinances ſhould be wholly different from the old ones: for the generality of mankind not penetrating very far into things, are often amuſed with the ſhadow as much as the ſubſtance, and ſometimes indeed exterior appearances make a deeper impreſſion upon them than realities. The Romans, therefore, being ſenſible of this in the infancy of their Commonwealth, and having created two Conſuls inſtead of one King, thought proper to allow them but twelve Lictors, that ſo they might not exceed the number of thoſe that were wont to attend upon their Kings. Beſides, as there uſed to be an anniverſary Sacrifice at Rome, which could not be cele-

[*t*] Machiavel ſays, "*due ſtaiora di terra per ciaſcuno.*" The words of Livy are as follows, "Tum Cocles, *Tiberine Pater*, inquit, *te ſancte precor, hæc arma & hunc militem* "*propitio flumine accipias:* ita ſic armatus in Tiberim deſiluit, multiſque ſuper incidenti- "bus telis incolumis ad ſuos tranavit; rem auſus plus famæ habituram ad poſteros, quam "fidei. Grata erga tantam virtutem civitas fuit: ſtatua in comitio poſita; agri quantum "uno die circumaravit datum: privata quoque inter publicos honores ſtudia eminebant: "nam in magnâ inopiâ, pro domeſticis copiis unuſquiſque ei aliquid, fraudans ſe ipſe "victu ſuo, contulit."——"Patres C. Mucio virtutis cauſâ trans Tiberim agrum dono "dedêre, quæ poſtea ſunt *Mucia prata* appellata." Liv. Lib. II. Cap. x. xiii.

brated

brated by any perſon but the King himſelf, the Romans, fearing the people would otherwiſe wiſh for Kings again, created an Officer, whom they called, *Rex Sacrificulus*, or a ſort of *Maſter* of the *Ceremonies* (but in ſubordination to their *Pontifex Maximus*, or High Prieſt) who was to preſide at that ſolemnity; by which expedient, the people were well ſatisfied with the manner of the Sacrifice, and did not at all repine at the expulſion of Kings, becauſe their ancient forms and cuſtoms ſeemed ſtill to be kept up.

This method, therefore, ought to be obſerved by any one that would cancel old Inſtitutions, and eſtabliſh a new and free government; for mankind being naturally averſe to any alterations in their laws and cuſtoms, care ſhould be taken that ſuch an innovation ſhould retain as much as poſſible the reſemblance at leaſt of their ancient conſtitution: and if the Magiſtrates ſhould differ from the former, either in power or number, or the duration of their authority, the ſame Names and Titles however ſhould be continued. This courſe, I ſay again, muſt be followed by thoſe that would introduce a new and ſatisfactory kind of government into any State, whether a Monarchy or a Republic [*u*]; but for thoſe that want to found an abſolute Government, or Tyranny, (as it is called by political writers) they muſt make a thorough alteration in every thing, as we ſhall ſhew in the next Chapter.

CHAP. XXVI.

That a new Prince muſt change every thing in a State which he has ſeized upon by force.

WHOEVER makes himſelf Maſter of a State, and deſigns to form a government that ſhall neither be a free Kingdom nor yet a Republic, but altogether abſolute, will find it his ſureſt way to alter every thing in it from top to bottom, in order to ſupport himſelf; eſpecially if he perceives his foundations are weak and unſtable, as probably he may do, being a new Prince. That is, he muſt create new Magiſtrates in every City, give them new titles, make choice of new perſons, confer new authority, advance the poor, impoveriſh the rich, *fill the hungry with good things, and ſend the rich empty away*, as David did when he became a King. Beſides this, he muſt build new Cities, demoliſh the old ones, and tranſport the inhabitants of the country from one place to another: in ſhort he muſt turn every thing in it upſide down in ſuch

[*u*] Thus our King Edward VI. at the Reformation, leaving much of the exterior untouched, the people were in a great meaſure ſooner reconciled to it than perhaps they otherwiſe would have been.

a man-

a manner, that no-body ſhall enjoy either honours, or riches, or authority, or privilege of any kind, but what is immediately derived from him. Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, may ſerve him for a pattern: of whom the Hiſtorians ſay, that he removed the people he conquered from one Province to another, as Shepherds remove their flocks; and yet, by proceeding in this manner, from a petty Prince he became Maſter of all Greece. But nothing ſurely can be more barbarous than ſuch a conduct, nothing more directly oppoſite to the ends of all civil government, or unworthy not only of a Chriſtian, but of any one who has the leaſt ſpark of humanity left in his heart. Every one therefore ought to abhor it, and chuſe rather to live like a private man, than to make himſelf an abſolute Prince, or rather a Tyrant, by the deſtruction of ſo many thouſand innocent people. Nevertheleſs, he that determines to tranſgreſs the bounds of virtue and moderation, muſt of neceſſity be obliged to take this courſe, in order to ſecure himſelf: but the generality of mankind being neither perfectly good nor wholly evil, are apt to halt betwixt both, and take a middle way; which, if it is not altogether pernicious, will never enable them to do any great thing, as ſhall be ſhewn in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XXVII.

That very few men can reſolve to be either perfectly good, or totally bad.

POPE Julius II. marching with an army in the year 1505, to drive the Bentivogli out of Bologna, of which that family had been Sovereigns a hundred years; determined at the ſame time to wreſt Perugia alſo out of the hands of Giovanni Paolo Baglioni, who uſurped that State; and in ſhort to diſpoſſeſs all thoſe that had ſeized upon any territories belonging to the Church. When he arrived therefore at Perugia with this deſign, which was well known to every one, he did not wait till his army came up to ſupport him, but immediately entered the City attended only by his train and a very ſlender guard, though Baglioni was there in perſon with a good body of troops which he had got together for his defence. In this manner, proceeding with the ſame boldneſs and impetuoſity that he did in all other things, he put himſelf entirely into the hands of his enemy; whom yet he brought out of the City with him, and left another Governor of his own appointment there to account for the revenues of that State to the Church. Upon which, all wiſe and conſiderate men could not help being ſurprized at the temerity of the Pope, and the puſillanimity of Baglioni: wondering how it ſhould come to paſs, that the latter did not take the opportunity of ſecuring

ing

ing his enemy, as he might have done with great reputation to himſelf, when he had him fairly in his power, and of filling his coffers not only with the ſpoils of his Holineſs, but of his train too, in which were all the Cardinals with their equipages, and an immenſe booty of treaſure and jewels. For it ſeemed hardly credible that he ſhould be reſtrained by religious motives; becauſe they thought a man who had been ſo wicked as to commit inceſt with his own Siſter, and to murder ſeveral of his couſins and nephews to make his way to the Sovereignty, would have eaſily digeſted any other ſcruple of conſcience. They concluded therefore, that as few men can reſolve to be abſolutely good, ſo it ſometimes happens that others cannot prevail upon themſelves to do a very wicked thing, even when it might be attended with ſome ſort of glory: for ſuch actions ſeeming to carry a certain air of magnanimity and generoſity, they know not how to ſet about them [x]. Thus Baglioni, who had made little account of Inceſt and Parricide, knew not how, (or to ſpeak more properly) had not the Spirit to attempt any thing (even when he had ſo juſtifiable and fair an occaſion) for which every body would have admired his courage, and extolled him to the ſkies: as he would have been the firſt that had ſhewn the Cardinals how little reſpect thoſe deſerved who lived and domineered like them, by an action of ſuch *Eclat* as would effectually have extinguiſhed all infamy, and ſecured him againſt any future danger.

[x] Mr. Bayle ſays that the Phænomena in the Hiſtory of man puzzle Philoſophers, as much as the Phænomena in Natural Hiſtory, and that few act according to their own principles. The Mahometans, according to their principles, are obliged to make uſe of force to deſtroy all other Syſtems of Religion: and yet they have tolerated them for ſeveral ages. "When you meet with infidels, ſays Mahomet in the ninth Chapter of the Alcoran, kill them, cut off their heads, or make them priſoners, and bind them till they have paid their ranſom: be not afraid to perſecute them till they have laid down their arms, and ſubmitted to you." For all this, it is certain that the Saracens ſoon left off thoſe violent methods, and that the Greek Churches have maintained themſelves under the yoke of Mahomet to this day. They have their Patriarchs, their Metropolitans, their Synods, their Diſcipline, and their Monks.—On the other hand, Chriſtians were commanded only to preach and inſtruct: notwithſtanding which, many Chriſtian nations have extirpated thoſe who were not of their perſuaſion with fire and ſword, time out of mind, and done nothing but perſecute, though the Goſpel abſolutely forbids it. One may be certain that if the Chriſtians of the Weſt had borne ſway in Aſia, in the room of the Saracens and Turks, the leaſt traces of the Greek Church would not have been left at this day; and that they would not have tolerated Mahometaniſm, as the Infidels have tolerated Chriſtianity there. The Reader, if he pleaſes, may ſee much more to this purpoſe in the Note *A A*, under the word Mahomet I. in Bayle's Dictionary. But the compariſon is truly ſhocking.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Whence it came to paſs that the Romans were not ſo ungrateful as the Athenians to their Citizens.

WHoever reads the hiſtories of Republics will find a ſpice of ingratitude in them all to their Citizens; but leſs of it at Rome than at Athens, or perhaps in any other Commonwealth. The reaſon of this, with regard to thoſe two States, I take to be, that the Romans had not ſo much cauſe to be jealous of their Citizens as the Athenians had. For at Rome no man ever invaded the liberty of others, from the expulſion of their Kings to the times of Marius and Sylla: ſo that there was no great occaſion for jealouſy or apprehenſion of that kind; and conſequently all puniſhment was unneceſſary. But the caſe was far otherwiſe at Athens: for that State being deprived of its liberty by Piſiſtratus, when it was in its moſt flouriſhing condition, under a pretence of advancing it to a ſtill higher pitch; as ſoon as the Citizens recovered it, and began to reflect upon the bitterneſs of their ſufferings, whilſt they were ſubject to a tyrannical government, they gave a full looſe to their revenge, and puniſhed not only real faults in their Citizens, but even the leaſt ſhadow or appearance of them; for which many excellent men were put to death, and many baniſhed; and from hence aroſe the cuſtom of Oſtraciſm [y], and many other ſorts of rigorous puniſhments, which were inflicted from time to time upon the moſt conſiderable of their Subjects. Very juſt therefore is the obſervation of ſome writers upon government, that thoſe who have recovered their liberties, always bite ſharper than others who have only preſerved them [z].

Theſe

[y] See the Notes upon the fourth Book of the Hiſtory of Florence.

[z] There are two Letters preſerved in Laertius, which ſhew the ſenſe the Athenians had of their Sufferings under Piſiſtratus; the firſt runs thus. "Epimenides to Solon.—"Be of good comfort, my friend; for if Piſiſtratus was Ruler of Athenians inured to ſer-"vitude and void of diſcipline, his Government perhaps might be perpetual. Thoſe "however that are now in ſubjection to him, are not men of baſe minds, but ſuch as be-"ing mindful of Solon's inſtructions are aſhamed of their bondage, and will not bear his "tyranny long. But though Piſiſtratus ſhould make himſelf Maſter of the State, I "hope, it will not deſcend to his children: for it is hard for free perſons, brought up un-"der excellent Laws, to ſuffer bondage. As for you, do not wander about, but haſten "to me in Crete; where no Tyrant will be troubleſome to you. If in travelling up and "down, you ſhould chance to meet with any of his friends, I fear, they will do you a "miſchief."—This ſeems to be in anſwer to the following Epiſtle to Epimenides.—"Solon to Epimenides.—Neither are my Laws likely to be of any ſervice to the Athe-"nians, nor have you advantaged the City by Luſtration. For Divine Rites and Law-"givers alone cannot benefit States; it is of great conſequence of what mind thoſe are

Theſe things then being duly conſidered, there will appear no great reaſon either to condemn the conduct of the Athenians in this point, or to applaud that of the Romans; ſince the former were neceſſitated to act as they did, by various exigencies and accidents which happened in their State. For whoever examines the matter to the bottom, may be convinced, that if the Romans had once been deprived of their liberties as the Athenians were, they would neither have been leſs jealous of them afterwards, nor more merciful in puniſhing their Citizens than the others: of which we may be aſſured from what happened after the expulſion of the Kings to Collatinus and P. Valerius; the former of whom (though he had been very active in aſſerting the liberties of his Country) was ſent into exile upon no other account, but becauſe he bore the name of Tarquin: and the latter very narrowly eſcaped the ſame puniſhment, only for having built a houſe upon Mount Cælius; from whence it was apprehended that he had ſome deſign upon the liberties of the Public. One may naturally conclude therefore, that if the Romans were ſo ſuſpicious and ſevere in theſe two examples, they would have been as ungrateful to their Citizens as ever the Athenians were, had they been injured by them in like manner before their Empire was firmly eſtabliſhed. But that we may have no occaſion to return to this Subject hereafter, it ſhall be more thoroughly diſcuſſed in the next Chapter.

" who lead the common people. Divine Rites and Laws are profitable if well directed: " if ill, they are of no ſervice. Neither are thoſe Laws which I gave in any better con- " dition; thoſe perſons who had the care of the Commonwealth not preventing Piſiſtratus " from making himſelf a Tyrant, and thereby mortally wounding it, which they would " not believe when I foretold it. The Athenians choſe rather to give credit to his flatte- " ries, than to me who told them the truth. They ſaid I was mad. Laying down my " arms therefore before the Citadel, I declared that I was wiſer than thoſe who could not " ſee that Piſiſtratus was aiming at Tyranny; and more reſolute than ſuch as durſt not aſ- " ſert the liberty of their Country. At laſt I left my Country with this farewel. " O " my Country! behold Solon ready to aſſiſt thee in word or deed. But I am thought " mad, it ſeems. I am forced therefore to abandon thee, though I love all my Country- " men, but Piſiſtratus. Let them be his friends, if they like it." " For you know, my " Friend, by what artifice he obtained the Government. He begun with flattering the " common people: and then wounding himſelf, he came to Eliæa, pretending he had re- " ceived thoſe wounds from his Enemies, and deſired a guard of four hundred young men " armed with halberds; which they, paying no regard to my remonſtrances, ſimply granted " him. After this he diſſolved the popular Government. I endeavoured to have reſcued " the poor people from mercenary ſervitude; but they are now all ſlaves to Piſiſtratus." *Laert. in vitâ Solonis.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIX.

Whether a Prince or a Commonwealth be generally the more ungrateful.

INgratitude uſually proceeds either from avarice or ſuſpicion: for when a Prince or a Republic ſends a General upon ſome important Expedition, and he executes it with great honour to himſelf, and reputation to thoſe that employed him, they certainly ought to reward him for it: but if, inſtead of doing that, they either caſhier or diſgrace him to ſave the expence of a reward, their ingratitude is inexcuſable, and will leave a ſtain behind it that can never be wiped out. Too many Princes however are guilty of this vice; for as Tacitus ſays, *Proclivius eſt injuriæ quam beneficio vicem exolvere; quia gratia oneri, ultio in quæſtu habetur.* "*Men are naturally more apt to return an injury, than* "*to requite a ſervice; becauſe revenge is ſweet, and ſometimes attended* "*with advantage; but it is thought troubleſome and expenſive to diſcharge* "*obligations*" [*a*]. But when ſuch a General is not rewarded; or (to ſpeak

[*a*] Dion Caſſius, in giving a detail of Caligula's crimes, takes notice of his ingratitude to Macro and his wife Ennia, whom he had reduced to the hard neceſſity of diſpatching themſelves; though one of them had been his Miſtreſs, and it was owing to the other that he mounted the throne without any Collegue. He did not content himſelf with this, however, but baſely traduced Macro's character after he was dead, and even reproached his memory with crimes, the diſgrace of which reflected chiefly upon himſelf; for he declared that Macro had been his Pimp. As Macro, whilſt he was Miniſter to Tiberius, had more than once ſaved Caligula's life, he took upon him to give him his advice with much freedom, correcting the faults of an Emperor whom he had created, and inſtructing him in the Duties that would tend to his glory and reputation. But Caligula deſpiſed his precepts, and boaſted that he had no occaſion for ſuch a Tutor. In this manner Macro drew his hatred upon him to ſuch a degree, that he reſolved to get rid of him, and ſought only for a plauſible pretence, which at laſt he thought he had hit upon; accuſing him of ſaying every where, "Caligula is the work of my hands; he is "my creature as much as if I had begot him. It was owing to my intreaties that the "intended orders of Tiberius to put him to death were three different times prevented. It "was owing to me that he ſucceeded alone to the Government after the death of that "Prince." Macro lived but a little while after this, and his whole family was extirpated at the ſame time.—There were three things then that concurred to Macro's ruin, any one of which was ſufficient to have effected it. He had ſaved Caligula's life, and procured him the Empire of the world; he boaſted of this, and took the liberty of reprehending his conduct. There are very few men in great power, that can love thoſe to whom they are too much obliged. "Beneficia eo uſque læta ſunt (ſays *Tacitus*, Annal. "Lib. IV. Cap. xviii.) dum videntur exſolvi poſſe: ubi multum antevenêre, pro gratiâ "odium redditur." A ſaying which was applied to the cold reception Monſieur du Pleſſis Mornai met with from Henry IV. of France. See his Life, p. 257. One ſeldom ſees that thoſe who have raiſed a private perſon to a throne long enjoy his good graces: they become hateful to him, either becauſe one has an averſion to men who think they have a right to demand every thing; or becauſe they boaſt too much of their good offices, and

ſpeak more properly) when he is diſgraced, not out of motives of avarice, but ſuſpicion, then his Maſter, whether a Prince or a Republic, is in ſome meaſure excuſable. Many inſtances, and reaſons too indeed,

complain that they are not ſufficiently rewarded for them. But ſuch in general is the nature of mankind. Caligula therefore, one of the baſeſt and moſt vicious of all Princes, could not long bear with a Benefactor, who ſet forth the important ſervices he had done him in the ſtrongeſt light, and took the freedom of giving him advice as a Tutor. In the ſame manner Abdalla, ſurnamed Motaſeb Billah, who drove the Aglabites out of Africa, and placed one of the family of Ali, named Obeidallah, upon the throne, was ſerved by that Prince; for he ſoon after put him to death: and this act of royal ingratitude has ſometimes been practiſed in other Countries that boaſt of greater humanity than Africa. Thus Lord Stanley was requited by our Henry VII. The Duke of Buckingham by Richard III. The Earl of Warwick by Edward IV. and the Piercies by Henry IV. But it is ſometimes dearly paid for. "The Services which Kings cannot repay," ſays Father *Orleans*, in his *Revolutions of England*, tom. II. p. 296, and the following; under the year 1464 "commonly make them ungrateful. A man who has done a great deal for them, ſeems "to have a right to aſk a great deal: and whoever has a right to claim all, is troubleſome, even when he demands nothing. Edward IV. was indebted to the Earl of Warwick for his Crown: this was a ſervice beyond all requital; and being attended alſo "with many other great exploits, had gained the Earl infinite reputation amongſt the "people. The King in ſhort grew jealous of him, and ſuſpecting his Subjects would "compare him with the Earl, in the ſame manner that Saul was compared with David, "began to be afraid, leſt they ſhould ſay in England, as formerly in Iſrael, *Saul has ſlain "his thouſands, and David his ten thouſands.*" This was the firſt cauſe of diſcontent, the Earl was not rewarded as he thought he deſerved, and he perceived the King looked upon him with a jealous eye; for it is impoſſible that a Prince who envies the glory of one of his Subjects, ſhould not diſoblige him ſeveral ways. The ſecond cauſe of diſguſt was, the Earl's being ſent Ambaſſador to negociate his Maſter's marriage with Bonne of Savoy, Siſter to the Queen of France. This marriage was agreed upon, and nothing more waited for but the return of an Ambaſſador, whom the King of France had ſent to have the treaty ſigned by Edward, when it came to be known that the King of England had married a Knight's widow. "All that nation, "ſays the above cited Author," beheld "this match with the utmoſt indignation: but nobody was ſo much chagrined at it as "the Earl of Warwick, who made no doubt but the King did it to expoſe and make "him ridiculous to all Europe, by ſending him to demand a great Princeſs, and afterwards marrying a private Gentlewoman only. . . . . But King Edward's behaviour "to him, after his return to London, exaſperated him to the laſt degree. He was in "hopes, however, that his Majeſty would endeavour to mitigate his vexation by good "words, or ſome lame excuſe at leaſt: but he was ſo far from making any Apology, that "he treated him with ſuch a degree of haughtineſs, that a man leſs ſtomachful than the "Earl could hardly have helped reſenting it: and to complete his mortification, he heard "that the King had attempted to debauch his Niece, or, as others ſay, his Siſter; and "would have taken a Miſtreſs out of *his* family, whilſt he thought fit to take a wife "out of another." The Earl therefore, with a heart full of revenge, determined to reſtore Henry VI. to the throne, and ſucceeded in his deſign. Thus he ſported with the Crown; he deprived Henry VI. of it to give it to Edward; and then took it again from him to return it to Henry. He had credit enough to have raiſed himſelf to the throne, but he thought it more glorious to make Kings than to reign himſelf: for ſuch was the turn of his ambition, that it inclined him not to reign, but to govern thoſe that reigned. ——This ſort of behaviour has been ſo common both in Princes and Subjects, that moſt Hiſtorians, as well as other Writers, take notice of it: from whom numberleſs examples might be quoted, if neceſſary. But Machiavel himſelf cites ſeveral in this Chapter. See alſo Chap. III. of the *Prince* at the end: and the Note upon *Franciſco Spinola*. Hiſt. Flor. B. V. not far from the beginning.

might

might be deduced from Hiſtory to evince the truth and neceſſity of this. For a General, who by his valour has extended his Maſter's dominions, extirminated his enemies, enriched his Soldiers, and acquired great glory himſelf, muſt neceſſarily conciliate the affections both of the army and his other fellow ſubjects to himſelf in ſuch a manner, that his Services will be apt to excite jealouſy in the Prince that employ'd him: and ſince mankind are naturally ambitious as well as jealous, and apt to aſpire to ſtill greater power, it is almoſt impoſſible, when ſuch a General is become elated with his ſucceſſes, and his Prince has begun to grow ſuſpicious of him upon that account, that the jealouſy of the latter ſhould not be ſtill more enflamed either by ſome inſolent ſpeech or action in the former. The Prince therefore ſeems to be under a neceſſity of ſecuring himſelf againſt his General, either by putting him to death, or by taking away his command, or by leſſening the reputation and influence he has acquired in the army and amongſt his other countrymen, by induſtriouſly inſinuating that his ſucceſs was not owing to his valour or good conduct, but to accident, or the puſillanimity of the enemy, or the ſuperior abilities of his other Commanders.

When Veſpaſian was ſaluted Emperor by the forces which he commanded in Judea, Antonius Primus being at the head of an army in Illyria, declared for him there alſo, and marching into Italy againſt Vitellius who then was the reigning Emperor, he defeated him twice, and got poſſeſſion of Rome: ſo that Mucian, who had been ſent by Veſpaſian for the ſame purpoſe, found every thing ſettled, and all difficulties already ſurmounted by the expedition and valour of Antonius. But obſerve how Antonius was rewarded for his pains: in the firſt place, Mucian deprived him of all command in the army, and reduced him by degrees to live in a very private condition, without the leaſt power or authority of any kind at Rome: upon which, he went to make his complaints to Veſpaſian, who was at that time in Aſia, from whom he met with ſo cold a reception, that he ſoon after died in obſcurity and deſpair.—Many other examples might be cited from Hiſtory. Every one muſt remember, (as it happened in our own times) that Conſalvo of Cordova, the King of Arragon's General in the Kingdom of Naples, entirely drove the French out of that Country, and reduced it into ſubjection to his Maſter Ferdinand, with great glory to himſelf at the ſame time: in recompence for which, Ferdinand upon his arrival at Naples, firſt turned him out of the government of the ſtrong places which he held for him there, and then deprived him of his command in the army; after which, he took him back with him into Spain, where he ended his days in diſgrace.

Theſe jealouſies therefore are ſo naturally incident to Princes, that they cannot be prevented; nor is it poſſible for them to be grateful to thoſe

thoſe that have done them the moſt important Services. And if this be the caſe with Princes, it ought not to ſeem ſtrange that it is the ſame with Commonwealths: for all free governments having two principal ends, one of which is to enlarge their dominions, and the other to preſerve their liberties, it will of neceſſity happen, that they muſt fall into ingratitude and other inconveniencies by too rigid an obſervation of the Maxims, they have eſtabliſhed for the accompliſhment of either of thoſe ends. The errors and inconveniencies that attend making new acquiſitions ſhall be ſpoken of elſewhere: but amongſt others that reſult from being too jealous of their liberties, we may chiefly reckon the diſguſting ſuch Citizens as ought to be rewarded, and the ſuſpecting thoſe in whom they ought to put the moſt confidence. Now tho' theſe things occaſion great evils in a Commonwealth that is become corrupt, and often produce Tyranny at laſt, as it happened to Rome in the time of Julius Cæſar, who took that by force, which the ingratitude of his fellow-citizens had refuſed to give him; yet they are of a great advantage in a State that is not yet corrupted, as they conduce to the preſervation of its liberties, by keeping ambitious and enterprizing men in awe, through the fear of puniſhment.

To the reaſons already aſſigned therefore, it was owing that no people ever ſhewed themſelves leſs ungrateful to their Citizens than the Romans did: nay it may truly be ſaid, that they never behaved with ingratitude to any one but Scipio. For as to Coriolanus and Camillus [*b*], they were baniſhed for the injuries they both had done to the

[*b*] Coriolanus was baniſhed for propoſing to humble the Plebeians by famine. See Chap. vii. and Camillus for behaving himſelf with too much pride, in the Triumph which was granted him after he had taken Veii; and for dividing the Spoil amongſt the Soldiery only, without giving the people any ſhare of it. His triumphal Car was drawn by four white horſes. Upon which Plutarch obſerves, that no General ever triumphed in that manner either before or after him, and that the people thought ſuch a Chariot was too magnificent and glorious for any one but a God. "Τα τε αλλα σοβαρως εθριαμβευσε και τετριππον υποζευξαμενος λευκοπωλων επιβη, και διεξηλασε της Ρωμης, οδενος τουτο ποιησαντος προτερον ουδ' υστερον: ιερον γαρ ηγουνται το τοιουτον οχημα τω Βασιλει και πατρι των Θεων επι φημισμενον." In vitâ Camilli. He triumphed four times, was five times Dictator, and honoured with the title of the *Second Founder of Rome:* in a word, he acquired all the honour a man can gain in his own Country. During his Cenſorſhip, he found means to make all the ſingle men in Rome marry the widows of thoſe that had been killed in war; and had the glory of putting an end to the war with the Veientes, the ancient Rivals of Rome, See Chap. xiii. But as he prevented many of the Roman Citizens from going to ſettle at Veii afterwards, they were ſo provoked at it, that they took an opportunity of revenging themſelves upon him. He had made a vow to give the tenth part of the ſpoils of that City to Apollo, but forgot to do it: upon which, the Senate being informed by the Aruſpices, that the Gods were offended, ordered every Soldier to reſtore the tenth of his ſpoil. This exaſperated the people ſtill more againſt him. Soon after, a war broke out with the Faliſci, in the courſe of which, he generouſly ſent back the children to their parents, whom a School-maſter in one of the towns he beſieged, had perfidiouſly delivered up to him; which had ſuch an effect upon them, that they voluntarily ſubmitted to

the people; and though indeed one of them continued in perpetual exile, becauſe he ſtill perſiſted obſtinate in his prejudice to the people; yet the other was not only recalled, but honoured like a Prince afterwards as long as he lived. But the ingratitude that was ſhewn to Scipio was owing to ſuch a degree of jealouſy as they had never entertained of any citizen before: and this aroſe from a conſideration of the powerfulneſs of the enemy he had conquered; the reputation he had acquired by bringing a long and dangerous war to ſo ſpeedy and ſucceſsful a concluſion, after he was appointed Commander in chief of their armies; the favour which his youth, his prudence, and other admirable accompliſhments had gained him in the eyes of the people; all which made him ſo popular that the Magiſtrates began to dread his authority, a circumſtance that was as galling to the graver ſort, as it was new and unuſual to the whole City [*c*]. Indeed it appeared ſo extra-

to the Romans. See Chap. xx. Book III. of theſe Diſcourſes. But this depriving the people of the booty they expected there, gave them a freſh handle to exclaim againſt him: ſo that looſing all patience, at laſt Lucius Apuleius, one of the Tribunes, proſecuted him to make him give an account of the Spoil taken at Veii; in conſequence of which, he was condemned to pay a heavy fine, and afterwards voluntarily baniſhed himſelf to Veii. During this baniſhment, he performed the moſt noble action of his life; for inſtead of rejoicing at the ſacking of Rome by the Gauls, (See Chap. viii. of this Book) and of joining them to be revenged on his Country, he exerted all his wiſdom and courage to drive the Enemy away, and yet obſerved the Laws of Rome with the utmoſt ſtrictneſs, in refuſing to accept the command which ſeveral private people offered him. See *Valerius Maximus*, Lib. IV. Cap. i. He waited for the orders of the people, who were repreſented by the few inhabitants of Rome that ſtill held out in the Capitol. But before this he had raiſed troops at Ardea, where he then was, and gained ſome advantages over the Enemy. The Romans therefore that were beſieged in the Capitol appointed him Dictator; in which poſt he acted with ſo much bravery and conduct, that he drove the Gauls entirely out of the Roman territories. This important ſervice however, with ſeveral other victories which he afterwards got, could not ſecure him againſt the rage and envy of the Tribunes, for even whilſt he was Dictator, they ſent a common Officer to ſummon him, who had the audaciouſneſs to lay hands upon him. He appeared before the people attended by the whole Senate; and, as the affair was determined to the ſatisfaction of the people, was conducted back again to his houſe with the higheſt acclamations. What Lucan ſays of this great man, when in baniſhment, is highly in his honour, *viz. that wherever Camillus dwelt, there was Rome*; the Poet's own words expreſs it much ſtronger,

Tarpeiâ ſede peruſtâ
Gallorum facibus, Veioſque habitante Camillo;
Illic Roma fuit. Pharſal. Lib. V. xxvii.
When Gallic flames the burning City felt,
At Veii Rome with her Camillus dwelt. Rowe.

[*c*] Livy in the 26th book of his Hiſtory Cap. xix. gives us a fine account of the means by which Scipio made himſelf ſo popular. "Fuit enim Scipio, non veris "tantum virtutibus mirabilis, ſed arte quoque quâdam ab juventâ in oſtentationem "earum compoſitus: pleraque apud multitudinem, aut per nocturnas viſa ſpecies, aut velut "divinitus, mente monita, agens: ſive et ipſe capti quadam ſuperſtitione animi, ſive ut "imperia conciliaque velut ſorte oraculi miſſa, ſine cunctatione aſſequeretur. Ad hoc jam "inde ab initio præparans animos, ex quo togam virilem ſumpſit, nullo die prius ullam "publicam privatamve rem egit, quam in Capitolium iret, ingreſſuſque ædem conſideret: "& ple-

extraordinary to Cato the Elder, a man of ſevere and inflexible virtue, that he made a formal complaint of it, and ſaid, that a State could not be called free where the Magiſtrates ſtood in awe of any particular Citizen: ſo that if the people of Rome inclined to Cato's opinion in this caſe, they may in ſome meaſure be juſtified in a thing that ſo nearly concerned their liberties, as I ſaid before of Princes and Commonwealths that are forced to be ungrateful by motives of Suſpicion. To conclude this diſcourſe, I ſay, that ingratitude being occaſioned either by avarice or jealouſy, Commonwealths are hardly ever influenced by the former, and much ſeldomer than Princes by the latter, as they have leſs occaſion; which ſhall be ſhewn in its proper place.

CHAP. XXX.

What means a Prince or a Commonwealth ought to take in order to avoid the imputation of Ingratitude; and how a General or other Citizen muſt act to ſecure himſelf againſt the effects of it.

A Prince who would avoid the neceſſity either of living in continual jealouſy, or of being ungrateful, ought to go in perſon with his forces upon any expedition, as the firſt Roman Emperors uſed to do, as the Grand Turk does at preſent, and as all brave and generous Princes always have done, and ſtill do [*d*]. For if they ſucceed, the honour

" & plerumque tempus ſolus in ſecreto ibi terreret. Hic mos, qui per omnem vitam " ſervabatur, ſeu conſulto, ſeu temere vulgatæ opinioni fidem apud quoſdam fecit, ſtirpis " eum divinæ virum eſſe; retulitque famam, in Alexandro magno prius vulgatam, " & vanitate & fubulâ parem, anguis immanis concubitu conceptum, & in cubiculo " matris ejus perſæpe viſam prodigii ejus Speciem, interventuque hominum evolutam " repente, atque ex occulis elapſam. His miraculis nunquam ab ipſo eluſa fides eſt, " quin potius aucta arte quâdam, nec abnuendi tale quicquam, nec palam affirmandi. " Multa alia ejuſdem generis, alia vera, alia aſſimulata, admirationes humanæ in eo " juvene exceſſerant modum: quibus freta tunc civitas, ætati haudquaquam maturæ " tantam molem rerum, tantumque imperium permiſit." It might be obſerved here by the bye, that there are conſiderable families in Europe, which pretend to be deſcended from the intercourſe of a woman with ſome ſpirit. Marſhal de Baſſompiere relates it of the founder of his family. See his Memoirs.

[*d*] " If any one ſhould offer to maintain," ſays a French Author " that it is better " for a Prince to carry on wars by others than in his own perſon, Fortune will furniſh " him with examples enow of thoſe whoſe Lieutenants have brought great enterprizes " to a happy iſſue, and of thoſe alſo whoſe preſence hath done more hurt than good. " But no virtuous and valiant Prince can bear to be tutored with ſuch ſcandalous leſſons, " under the colour of ſaving his head, like the Statue of a Saint, for the happineſs of " his Kingdom, they degrade him from, and make him incapable of his Office, " which is military throughout. I know one who had much rather be beaten, than ſleep " whilſt another fights for him; and who never heard of any brave thing done, " even by his own Officers, in his abſence, without envy. Selim the firſt ſaid, with " very good reaſon, in my opinion, *that Victories obtained without the Sovereign's preſence* " *were*

honour and advantage of the conqueſt redounds ſolely to themſelves: but if they ſtay at home, another reaps the glory, they begin to apprehend they ſhall not be able to maintain ſuch acquiſitions in peace, except they either eclipſe or totally extinguiſh that glory in their Officers, which they could not accquire themſelves; and this forces them into injuſtice and ingratitude, though without doubt much more to their own prejudice than advantage; as they will ſuffer more by loſing their reputation than they will profit themſelves by any new acquiſition [*e*]. However in this caſe, if they are either ſo imprudent, or ſo indolent, or puſillanimous, as to ſtay inglorioufly at home, and be content with ſending out a Subſtitute, they themſelves muſt needs know what they have to do afterwards, as well as I can tell them. But I will venture to ſay, that if the General finds he cannot otherwiſe eſcape the effects of jealouſy and ingratitude, he muſt have recourſe to one or other of theſe two expedients; that is, he muſt either voluntarily quit the command of the army as ſoon as the expedition is over, and not only reſign it into his Maſter's hands, before it is demanded of him, but take great care not to diſcover any ſigns of inſolence or ambition: that ſo when there is no manner of reaſon given for ſuſpicion, he may be duly rewarded, at leaſt not diſgraced, for his Services. But if he

" *were never complete.* Much more readily would he have ſaid, that a Sovereign ought " to bluſh for ſhame, who pretended to any ſhare in one, when he had contributed " nothing to it but his voice and thought; nor even ſo much as thoſe, conſidering that " in ſuch works as that, the direction and command that deſerve honour, are only ſuch " as are given upon the place, and in the heat of the action. The Princes of the " Ottoman family (the chief in the world for military fortune) have always warmly " embraced this opinion. Bajazet the ſecond, and his Son, who ſwerved from it, ſpending " their time in Sciences and other employments within doors, gave great blows to their " Empire: and Amurath the third, following their example, did the ſame. Edward the " third of England ſaid of our Charles the fifth, *There never was any King who ſo " ſeldom put on his armour, that had cut him out ſo much work.* Indeed he might well think " it ſtrange, as it was the effect of chance more than of reaſon. Is it not abſurd to " reckon the Kings of Caſtile and Portugal amongſt warlike and magnanimous " Conquerors, becauſe at the diſtance of twelve hundred leagues from the place where " they reſided in idleneſs and eaſe, they made themſelves maſters of both the Indies, " by the conduct of their Agents; which too, they never had the courage ſo much as " to viſit themſelves." Mr. Bayle ſays, in his Hiſtorical Diſcourſe upon the Life of Guſtavus Adolphus, " That though the conqueſts of a warlike Prince are frequently of " no ſervice to his Subjects, and perhaps it might be full as well for them, if their " Monarch was contented with the dominions left him by his Predeceſſors; yet they " are ſtruck with I know not what admiration, blended with love for one whoſe name " is renowned throughout the whole world. The *Te Deum*, when ſung frequently, and " bonfires made for the taking of Cities, or for Battles won, incline them to furniſh " ſubſidies for the continuation of a war with greater cheartulneſs." Of the truth of this, the year 1761 may afford a memorable example in our own country, when the Supplies granted by Parliament amounted to almoſt nineteen Millions.

[*e*] Cecil, Prime Miniſter to Queen Elizabeth, uſed to ſay, *That nothing could be for the advantage of a Prince, which any way made againſt his reputation.*

cannot ſubmit to this, he muſt take a very different courſe, and boldly reſolve to ſet up for himſelf; for which purpoſe, he muſt endeavour by all means to make it generally believed, that the merit of the late acquiſition is wholly due to him, and that his Maſter had not the leaſt ſhare in it; he muſt ſpare no pains to ingratiate himſelf with the Soldiery, and his other fellow Subjects; to contract Alliances with his neighbours, to ſeize upon fortreſſes, to corrupt the principal Officers in the army, to ſecure thoſe, ſome other way, whom he cannot corrupt; and by theſe means effectually to guard himſelf from the ingratitude of his Maſter. Beſides theſe two, there is no other remedy that I know. But ſince very few men can prevail upon themſelves to be either perfectly good or thoroughly wicked, as I ſaid before, and it almoſt always happens that a General is loath to quit his command after a ſucceſsful campaign, they ſeldom either know how to keep their ambition within due bounds, or to have recourſe to extremities, even when they ſeem to have ſomething great and honourable in them: ſo that whilſt they ſtand in ſuſpence and halting betwixt two reſolutions, they are commonly ruined.

A Republic indeed that would avoid the ſcandal of ingratitude, has it not in its power to avail itſelf of the ſame remedy that a Prince may do; for not being able to conduct its armies in perſon, that command muſt neceſſarily be delegated to ſome of its Citizens. The beſt way, therefore, in my opinion, for a Commonwealth to avoid ingratitude as much as poſſible, would be to follow the example of the Romans, who perhaps had leſs of it than any other people. This was owing to the conſtitution of their Government; for as all ſorts of people, both noble and ignoble, were employed in their wars without diſtinction, ſo many brave and virtuous men, and ſuch a number of illuſtrious Generals aroſe in every age, that the State had no occaſion to be afraid of any one of them, when there were others enow of equal abilities to check and oppoſe him. Hence it came to paſs that every man diſcharged his duty with the utmoſt integrity, carefully avoiding any ſtep that might ſavour of ambition, and give the people the leaſt offence or reaſon to puniſh them as deſigning and aſpiring men; nay, when any one was created Dictator, he piqued himſelf upon laying down his authority again, as ſoon as ever the neceſſity of affairs could poſſibly admit of it. Such a manner of proceeding, therefore, preventing all ſuſpicion, likewiſe prevented ingratitude; ſo that a Republic, that would avoid the imputation of being ungrateful, ſhould conduct itſelf as that of Rome did; and the perſon, who would guard againſt the effects of it, ought to imitate the behaviour of the Roman Citizens [*f*].

CHAP.

[*f*] The Romans made a great difference betwixt thoſe Generals, who only gained victories, and others that put an end to a war. Thoſe that entered the City in triumph with

CHAP. XXXI.

That the Romans never puniſhed their Generals with any extraordinary degree of Severity, when they had been faulty; not even when the Commonwealth had ſuffered, either through their ignorance or miſbehaviour.

THE Roman Republic was not only leſs ungrateful than any other, as I have ſaid before, but alſo more gentle and merciful in puniſhing its Generals when they had offended: for, if their offence proceeded from wilfulneſs or malice, even in that caſe, their chaſtiſements were mild and moderate; but if from ignorance or error, inſtead of puniſhing, they often rewarded them. This, however, was very well judged: for they thought it of ſuch importance, that thoſe, who commanded their armies, ſhould have their minds free and diſengaged from all other concerns, in forming their deſigns and taking their reſolutions, that they never clogged an enterprize, which was difficult and dangerous of itſelf, with additional apprehenſions and incumbrances, leſt they ſhould be diſcouraged from acting with ſufficient ſpirit and vigour. When they ſent an army againſt any enemy, they imagined the Commander in chief had weight enough already upon his mind, conſidering the cares, perplexities, and embarraſſments, that always attend ſuch expeditions; which muſt of themſelves be neceſſarily very great. Now, if beſides theſe diſcouragements, weighty as they are, their Generals had been diſheartened by the examples of ſeveral, who

with the effigies of ſeveral Provinces or Cities which they had conquered, were much more honoured than thoſe, who could only boaſt they had killed a great many men. They ſeldom continued their Generals above two or three years in Commiſſion; but almoſt every year ſent a new Conſul to relieve the Conſul of the foregoing year: ſo that the General did all that lay in his power to put an end to the war, leſt his ſucceſſor ſhould have the honour of finiſhing what he had begun; they all aimed at the glory *debellandi*. But when a General is certain that he ſhall command the army till the end of the war, he is not always diſpoſed to haſten it; he puts off the peace as long as he can, and regulates his conduct according to the old maxim, *make a golden bridge for a vanquiſhed enemy:* it is his private intereſt to give them an opportunity of retrieving their affairs, and continuing the war a great while longer. This is the reaſon why battles are ſeldom deciſive. The General of the victorious army being afraid of a peace, will not reduce the enemy to a neceſſity of ſuing for it: according to the practice of the Italian *Condottieri* or *hired Commanders*, ſo often mentioned in the Hiſtory of Florence. A Prince, on the contrary, who commands his own forces in perſon, makes the beſt advantage of his victories, in order to bring the war to a concluſion the ſooner; as peace in general muſt be more for his intereſt, and that of his Subjects: but a general, who protracts a war, only ſerves himſelf, and does little or no good to others, except ſuch as deal in crape and black cloth.

had either been crucified, or put to ſome other cruel kind of death, after they had loſt a battle, it would have been impoſſible, that ſuch Commanders, amidſt ſo many cares and apprehenſions, ſhould ever exert themſelves properly, or attempt any thing great and generous. So that the ignominy of having failed in any enterprize being a ſufficient puniſhment in their opinion, they did not care to add to it, leſt it ſhould appear too heavy, and deter them from engaging in it at all.

Let us ſhew in the firſt place, how an offence was puniſhed, that proceeded not from error or ignorance, but from wilful and deliberate perverſeneſs. The two Conſuls, Sergius and Virginius, had laid ſiege to Veii: the former was poſted, with part of the Roman army, on that ſide of the town, where they expected to be annoyed by the Tuſcans; and the latter, with the reſt, on the other ſide. Sergius, accordingly being attacked by the Faliſci, and other people of Tuſcany, choſe rather to be defeated, than to aſk for any aſſiſtance of his Collegue; whilſt Virginius, on the other hand, expecting his ſtomach would come down at laſt, waited ſo long before he ſent him any ſuccour, that thoſe forces were utterly routed, to the great diſgrace of his Country [g]. A bad example indeed, and not only worthy of all reprehenſion, but ſufficient to give us a very unfavourable impreſſion of the Roman Government, if both thoſe Commanders had not been puniſhed. Nevertheleſs, though any other people would have put them to death, the Romans contented themſelves with inflicting only a pecuniary fine upon them: not becauſe their offence did not deſerve a ſeverer puniſhment, but becauſe the Romans were unwilling, even in this caſe, to deviate from their ancient cuſtoms, for the reaſons which have been already aſſigned. As to excuſing errors or faults that proceeded from want of judgment, we have a remarkable inſtance, in the caſe of Terentius Varro, by whoſe temerity the Romans were ſo totally routed at the battle of Cannæ, that their liberties were in the utmoſt danger. However, as this was owing to raſhneſs and imprudence alone, they were ſo far from puniſhing him, that they ſhewed him great honour: for at his return to the City, the whole Senate went out to meet him in their formalities; and, not having it in their power to congratulate him upon a victory, they thanked him for his return to Rome, and that he had not abandoned them out of deſpair, *quod de ſalute Reipublicæ non deſperaſſet*. When Papirius Curſor, the Dictator, would have had Fabius put to death, becauſe he had engaged the Samnites contrary to orders, the chief reaſon, which the Father of Fabius urged againſt the Sentence, was, that the Roman people had never proceeded with ſo

[g] Upon this occaſion, it is not poſſible to forget the conduct of the Admirals Matthews and Leſtock in the Mediterranean, at the beginning of the late French war.

much

much rigour even againſt any of their Commanders who had loſt a battle, as Papirius then would have them do, againſt one that had gained a victory.

CHAP. XXXII.

That a Prince or Commonwealth ought not to defer their beneficence till it is extorted from them by neceſſity.

ALTHOUGH the Romans found their account in being liberal to the people in time of danger, when Porſenna invaded them in favour of the Tarquins, and the Senate (apprehending the Commonalty would rather chuſe to have Kingly Government reſtored, than undergo the burden of a war) thought proper to remit all their taxes, in order to keep them firm and ſteady to the new eſtabliſhment; and declared at the ſame time, that *the poorer ſort of people contributed ſufficiently to the good of the public, by getting children and bringing them up*; (all which was done to make them more chearfully ſubmit to the hardſhips of a Siege) yet, I would not adviſe any other Republic or Prince to truſt ſo far in this example, as to neglect or defer the uſe of proper means to ingratiate themſelves with the people, till they actually fall into diſtreſs and adverſity. If they do, they muſt not expect to ſucceed as the Romans did: for then the multitude will not think themſelves ſo much obliged to them as to the enemy, for this ſudden guſt of beneficence, and be apt to conclude, that as ſoon as the danger is over, they will take that away again, which they had been forced to give them.

But if the Romans ſucceeded in acting thus, it was becauſe their Government, being a new one, was hardly ſettled at that time, and the people had already ſeen ſeveral laws made in their favour, particularly that which allowed of appeals to them in judiciary matters: ſo that they were eaſily perſuaded, that the laſt indulgence, which was ſhewn them, proceeded rather from the affection of the Senate, than the fear of the enemy; beſides, the remembrance of the injuries and oppreſſions, they had ſuffered under a regal Government, was ſtill freſh upon their minds. But as caſes of this nature ſeldom occur, it will likewiſe very rarely happen, that the ſame remedies will have the ſame effect: upon which account, every Commonwealth and Prince ought well to conſider before any exigency compels them to it, what ſort of people they may beſt avail themſelves of at that time; and afterwards to behave to them in ſuch a manner, as they muſt otherwiſe be obliged to do, in caſe of neceſſity. Whoever does not purſue this method, whether he be a Governor

Governor of a Commonwealth or a Prince, but eſpecially if he be a Prince, and thinks it time enough to court the people, when the ſtorm is ready to break upon him, will find himſelf deceived, and that ſuch a conduct, inſtead of doing him any good, will only ſerve to accelerate his ruin [*b*].

CHAP.

[*b*] This was the caſe of our King James II. who did himſelf more harm by ſoothing and careſſing his Subjects, and annulling every thing he had done before to their prejudice, when the Prince of Orange was upon the point of invading his dominions, and he ſtood in need of their aſſiſtance, than if he had continued firm to his former meaſures; for by ſo doing, he might at leaſt have ſpared himſelf the mortification of making ſo public and authentic a confeſſion of what was laid to his charge. Beſides, this piece of meanneſs only ſerved to encourage his Enemies the more in the proſecution of their enterprize.

" A certain Perſian King (ſays the Editor of *Guliſtan*, or *Roſarium Politicum*) having grievouſly oppreſſed his people, many wealthy and trading men amongſt them withdrew themſelves and their effects into foreign countries, as the only method to ſecure their liberties and properties; ſoon after this, a war breaking out, the Prince finds his Kingdom deſerted by its inhabitants, his revenues ſunk to nothing, his Exchequer empty, and no way left to raiſe the ſupplies neceſſary to oppoſe the Enemy, but a military force, which encreaſes the miſchief. For, ſays he, in Perſian verſe,

The Prince who deſires to have neceſſary ſupplies in time of war,
Should govern his people mildly and gently in time of peace.
For even Slaves, though bound with golden chains, will abhor a tyrant:
If you would have men ſerve you freely, treat them like free men.

It happened about this time, that a piece of Hiſtory out of the *Treaſury of Princes*, a celebrated Perſian book, was read to the ſame King, viz. how Suhac, one of the moſt powerful Princes in the Eaſt, was depoſed from his Kingdom; and Feridun, a private man, advanced in his room. Upon which, the King aſked one of his Courtiers (and as it happened an honeſt one too) who ſtood near him, " How this Feridun, who had nei- " ther arms, nor treaſure, nor followers, could poſſibly obtain the Kingdom? Juſt as " your Majeſty hath heard from the Hiſtory, anſwered the Courtier; the people eſteem- " ing him for his liberality and juſtice, flocked to him from all parts, and exalted him " to the throne with unanimity and reſolution. Seeing therefore, continued he, that " the affection of the people is the beſt ſecurity of the Prince, how could your Ma- " jeſty, by liſtening to evil Counſellors, take ſo much pains to render your Subjects diſ- " affected, except you was grown weary of your Kingdom? For ſince Kings are known " to reign by the favour of the people, they ought to value their favour as much as their " Crown." The King then aſking by what means he might gain the love of his Sub- " jects; " Ah, Sir (replied the other) every King that would depend upon their free " aſſiſtance in time of need, ſhould govern them with juſtice, benevolence, and cle- " mency, before he has occaſion for their help: that ſo they may think themſelves ſecure " at all times of being protected in their liberties and properties under his Government: " for an oppreſſive Prince can no more be ſaid to be a King, than a Wolf that attends a " flock of ſheep can be termed a Shepherd; and that King who injures his Subjects under " the colour of Law, deſtroys the fundamentals of his own Government." The King enraged at this honeſt freedom, ordered the Courtier to be thrown into priſon: but in a ſhort time after, the whole Kingdom rebelling, thoſe that had fled their country returned, and added weight to the defection; and the agents of his oppreſſion, and even the King's own creatures, joining in the revolt, concurred to ruin him. For, ſays the ſame author,

If

CHAP. XXXIII.

That when an evil or inconvenience is arrived at ſuch a height, either at home or abroad, as to become dangerous, it is better for a State to temporize and give way to it, than to endeavour to remove it by violence.

WHEN the Romans had ſo well eſtabliſhed themſelves, that their power, reputation, and dominion encreaſed every day, their neighbours, who had made but little account of them before, began to be aware what a thorn that new Republic was like to prove in their ſides, when it was too late to correct their error; but reſolving to apply ſome new remedy to an evil which they ſhould have taken care to prevent, no leſs than forty little States entered into a confederacy againſt them. The Romans, therefore, amongſt other expedients, which they generally had recourſe to in times of imminent danger, thought fit to create a Dictator; that is, they committed the whole power of the State to one perſon alone, who was to form ſuch reſolutions as he judged moſt proper for the public ſafety, without conſulting any one, or being ſubject to the leaſt controul whatſoever, in the execution of them. This expedient was of ſignal advantage, and not only enabled them to extricate themſelves out of very great difficulties and dangers at that time, but afterwards proved of admirable ſervice in all the various accidents and diſaſters that befel that Commonwealth, before it arrived at its higheſt pitch of grandeur.

From hence, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew in the firſt place, that when any evil or inconvenience threatens a State, either at home or from abroad (whether owing to interior or exterior cauſes) and is got to ſuch a head, that every one begins to be alarmed at it, without doubt, it is much better to temporize and give way to it, than to offer to eradicate it: for it almoſt always happens, that thoſe who endeavour to extinguiſh

If a King will do what is unjuſt, though under the ſanction of laws,
Even the inſtruments of his oppreſſion will become his enemies in the day of trouble.
Therefore, let Princes make friends of their Subjects in peaceful times;
That ſo they may ſecure them againſt their enemies in time of war:
For even the meaneſt wretch will fight boldly for a juſt and good King."

The ſame author, in many other parts of his work, endeavours to excite noble ideas of generoſity in his readers. See the pages 233, 435 to 445, and 586, 587. He much applauds the following inſcription upon the monument of Bihram Cour, a King of Perſia, *A liberal hand is better than a ſtrong arm*; importing, that the authority of Princes is better ſupported by bounty and munificence, than by a violent exertion of power, and force of arms.

it,

it, ſtill add to its ſtrength and malignity, and immediately pull down that ruin upon their own heads, which they only apprehended before. Now theſe calamities are more frequently occaſioned in a Republic, by interior than exterior cauſes; as when any Citizen aſſumes a greater degree of power and authority than he ought to do, as it often happens; or when ſome law, on which the very life and ſoul of its liberty depended, is either abrogated or neglected, and the evil has been ſuffered to grow ſo predominant, that it is become more dangerous to attempt a remedy, than to let it take its courſe: for it is difficult to diſcover thoſe inconveniencies in their original, becauſe mankind are naturally apt to favour the beginning of things, eſpecially of ſuch as ſeem to have ſome ſort of greatneſs or merit in them, and are patronized by young men. So that if any young man of a noble family, and extraordinary virtue, happens to ſpring up in a Commonwealth, the eyes of the whole City are ſoon turned upon him, every one vying with another in ſhewing him ſuch extravagant honours, that if he has any ſpark of ambition or vain glory in him, his natural endowments, added to the favour of the people, may ſoon ſtrengthen his hands ſo effectually, that when his fellow-citizens are ſenſible of their error, they will hardly find any remedy, but ſuch as will tend only to augment and eſtabliſh his power the ſooner. Many examples might be adduced to ſupport this; but I ſhall content myſelf with one alone, which happened in our own City.

Coſimo d'Medici, from whom the houſe of Medici in Florence originally derive their grandeur, arrived at ſuch a degree of power, by the reputation of his wiſdom and the favour of a blind multitude, that the Republic began to be afraid of him; and the Magiſtrates thought it would be very dangerous to meddle with him, and ſtill more ſo to let him alone. But Niccolò da Uzzano, who was reckoned a man of conſummate experience in State-affairs at that time, perceiving the errors his fellow-citizens had been guilty of, and the dangerous conſequences that muſt of neceſſity happen, from ſuffering Coſimo to grow ſo popular, prevented them from running into a ſecond whilſt he lived, and never would let them uſe any means to depreſs him, becauſe he knew ſuch an attempt would end in the ruin of the State, as indeed it did after Uzzano's death. For thoſe that ſurvived him, not following his advice, began to enter into combinations againſt Coſimo, and at laſt prevailed ſo far, that they drove him out of Florence, to the great vexation of his party; who likewiſe prevailing in their turn, ſoon after recalled him, and made him head of the Commonwealth; to which dignity he never could have attained, if it had not been for ſo violent an oppoſition from his enemies [*i*]. The ſame happened at Rome in

[*i*] See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book IV. towards the end.

the

the caſe of Julius Cæſar, whoſe great virtues and excellent qualifications recommended him in ſuch a manner to the favour of Pompey, and his other fellow-citizens, that by degrees he became ſo powerful and formidable, that they no longer loved, but feared him, as Cicero tells us, who ſays, "It was too late when Pompey began to be afraid "of Cæſar." Theſe apprehenſions put them upon ſeeking means to rid themſelves of him; but the remedy proved worſe than the diſeaſe, and only haſtened the ruin of that Commonwealth.

I ſay then, that ſince it is difficult to diſcover theſe evils in their beginning (becauſe men are liable to be ſeduced by favour and flattering appearances at firſt); it is wiſer to temporize and ſubmit when they are clearly diſcerned, than to oppoſe them by force: for in the former caſe, perhaps they may entirely paſs away of themſelves, or at leaſt be averted for ſome time [*k*], and in the latter, men ought to be very cautious and circumſpect, leſt whilſt they are endeavouring to eradicate an inveterate evil by violent meaſures, they ſhould ſtill add to its virulence, and either cruſh themſelves by attempting to pull down another, or drown the plant by over-watering it. They ſhould well conſider the nature of the malady, and if they find themſelves able to work a cure, let them ſet about it immediately without any ceremony; if not, they had better give the matter up and ſit ſtill, leſt it ſhould happen to them as it did to the little Princes abovementioned, that confederated againſt Rome, who would have acted more prudently in endeavouring to make that Commonwealth their friend, and to have kept upon fair terms with it, after it had ſo well eſtabliſhed itſelf, than in provoking it by hoſtilities to think of new inſtitutions, and making freſh proviſions both of offence and defence. For this confederacy not only ſerved to keep the Romans united, and conſequently to ſtrengthen them ſtill more, but put them upon creating other officers, and trying new expedients, by which they ſoon extended their power to a very great degree. Accordingly, amongſt other Inſtitutions, was that of a Dictator, to which it was owing, that they not only then, but afterwards ſurmounted many imminent difficulties and dangers, and prevented numberleſs evils which otherwiſe muſt have befallen that Commonwealth.

[*k*] "Experience has taught me (ſays Montaigne, Part III. Chap. xiii. of his Eſſays) "that Evils have their proper limits and duration, and that we often ruin ourſelves by "impatience. Whoever endeavours to cut them ſhort by force in the middle of their "courſe, does but lengthen and multiply them, and enflames inſtead of appeaſing them. "I am of Crantor's opinion, that we ought neither obſtinately and wilfully to oppoſe "evils, nor truckle to them for want of courage; but that we are naturally to give "way to them according to their circumſtances and our own: I find they ſtay leſs with "me who let them alone, and have loſt thoſe which are reputed the moſt obſtinate and "tenacious. To kick againſt Neceſſity, is like the folly of Cteſiphon, who undertook "to kick with his mule."

CHAP. XXXIV.

That the Authority of a Dictator was always of ſervice to the Roman Commonwealth, inſtead of any prejudice: and that the power which is uſurped by any Citizen, not that which is conferred by the free ſuffrages of the people, is pernicious to liberty.

THE inſtitution of the Dictatorial authority at Rome has been condemned by ſome writers, as a thing that chiefly contributed to the eſtabliſhment of Tyranny there at laſt. They alledge that Julius Cæſar, the firſt Tyrant that ever was in that Republic, ſet himſelf up under the title of Dictator, and that without it he never could have put any tolerable face upon his Tyranny.

Thoſe however, who aſſert this, ſeem not to have examined the matter to the bottom, and therefore their opinion ought to have but little weight. For neither the name nor the power of the Dictator was the cauſe of Rome being enſlaved; but the authority which had been aſſumed by thoſe that afterwards made the office perpetual: ſo that if there had been no ſuch Title, Cæſar would certainly have taken ſome other, that would have ſerved his purpoſe as well; becauſe where a man has the power in his own hands, he may aſſume any Title he pleaſes; but it is not the Title that gives him the power. We ſee accordingly, that whilſt the Dictatorſhip was diſpoſed of by the ſuffrages of the people, agreeably to its firſt inſtitution, and not ſeized upon by private violence, it was always of great ſervice to the State; for, thoſe magiſtrates who forced themſelves into office, and that authority which is illegally obtained, are prejudicial to a Commonwealth; not thoſe that are called to it in the lawful and ordinary courſe of Government: and we may obſerve, that no Dictator, who had been duly appointed, ever did the Roman Republic any harm during ſo long a period; but, on the contrary, much ſervice. The reaſons of this are very evident. For many circumſtances, which would not be ſuffered in an uncorrupted Republic, muſt concur to enable a man to aſſume an extraordinary degree of authority, and oppreſs his Fellow-Citizens. In the firſt place, he muſt be exceeding rich, and have a great number of partizans and adherents; which no well governed Commonwealth would endure: and even if he had, ſuch men are always ſo dreaded in a free State, that he would not have the ſuffrages of the Generality. Beſides this, the Dictator was not appointed for life, but for a time only, and with a limited authority, extending no further than the preſent danger or exigency which he was created to remedy: and though, indeed, he was commiſſioned during that term to make ſuch proviſions as he thought proper for the occaſion, without conſulting any one elſe, and to ſentence offenders

offenders in a ſummary manner; yet he had no power to do any thing to the prejudice of the State: he could neither deprive the Senate nor the people of their ſhare in the adminiſtration; he could neither abrogate old laws nor make new ones. So that if we jointly conſider the ſhort duration of the Dictator's power, the limited authority he was veſted with, and that the Roman people were not then corrupted, it was impoſſible he could tranſgreſs the bounds of a good Citizen, or injure the State: on the other hand, it plainly appears from experience; that ſuch an officer was always of the higheſt ſervice to it.

It muſt be allowed then, that amongſt many other admirable inſtitutions in the Roman Commonwealth, this deſerves particular regard, and may be reckoned as one of the principal cauſes, that contributed to exalt it to ſuch an amazing height of grandeur: for without it, that State could never have extricated itſelf out of many ſudden emergencies and difficulties; in which their ordinary forms of proceeding, being ſlow and tedious, would have had but little efficacy; becauſe, where no particular Council or Magiſtrate has power to do every thing, but ſtands in need of the other's aſſiſtance to aſſent in many points, when it happens that the neceſſity is ſo preſſing, that it requires an immediate remedy, time and opportunity ſlip away, and are often loſt, whilſt they are deliberating upon the matter in council; and when they come to any reſolution at laſt, it is generally ſo late that the remedy to be applied proves very dangerous.

All Republics, therefore, ſhould have ſome inſtitution of this kind to fly to, in caſes of extreme neceſſity: and indeed the State of Venice (which at this day is the beſt regulated Commonwealth in the world) has reſerved the prerogative of veſting a power in ſome few of its Citizens, in times of imminent danger; by virtue of which, they may act according to their own diſcretion, without the advice or concurrence of any other Council: for, if there is not ſome proviſion of this kind made in a Commonwealth, it muſt of courſe either be ruined, by ſticking to its old forms, or break them to ſave itſelf. Certainly it is much to be wiſhed, that ſuch emergencies might never happen in a State, as make it indiſpenſibly neceſſary to have recourſe to extraordinary means for its preſervation: for though ſuch means may be of admirable ſervice for the preſent, yet the example may afterwards prove of very pernicious conſequence; becauſe, when men have once been taught to break old laws and cuſtoms to ſerve a good purpoſe, they may, perhaps, another time, plead that precedent for breaking them again to anſwer a bad one. No Commonwealth however can be perfect, which has not provided by its laws againſt particular exigencies, prepared remedies for every accident, and taken care to ſecure itſelf in all events by ſpecial Inſtitutions; which cannot be done more effectually

than by creating a Dictator, or ſome ſuch Magiſtrate or Magiſtrates upon extraordinary occaſions; for without that, it muſt inevitably be overwhelmed by any conſiderable ſhock [*l*].

We may conclude this Chapter with obſerving, how providentially and cautiouſly the Romans proceeded in the election of this officer; for, as the creation of a Dictator muſt of courſe diminiſh the Conſular power, and ſeem to reflect ſome ſort of diſgrace upon thoſe, who from commanding were reduced to obey, this wiſe people, apprehending that ſuch a ſtep might excite reſentment and diſſentions amongſt the Citizens, prudently left the choice of a Dictator to the Conſuls, well judging that, whenever there ſhould be abſolute occaſion for ſuch an officer, though his authority was equal to that of a King, they would be ſo far from complaining, that they would cheerfully ſubmit to him, as he was appointed by themſelves: and in fact, we ſee that men ſeem to feel much leſs pain from wounds which they give themſelves, than from thoſe they receive from others. Beſides, in ſucceeding times, inſtead of creating a Dictator, they veſted that authority in the Conſuls themſelves by this form of words, *Videat Conſul ne quid detrimenti capiat Reſpublica*, i. e. *Let the Conſul take care that the Commonwealth receives no damage.* Upon the whole, I ſay, that the neighbouring States, by endeavouring to cruſh the Romans when they did, inſtead of ſucceeding in their deſign, only obliged them to make ſuch proviſions and inſtitutions as not only ſerved to defend themſelves more effectually, but enabled them to act offenſively againſt their enemies, with more vigour, wiſdom, and authority.

CHAP. XXXV.

How it came to paſs that the Creation of the Decemvirate was prejudicial to the liberties of Rome, though it was done by free and public ſuffrage.

THE choice which the Romans made of ten Citizens to new model their laws, who yet ſoon after encroached upon their liberties, and became Tyrants, may ſeem, perhaps, to overthrow my former aſſertion, "That authority legally conferred by the ſuffrages of the "people is not dangerous to the State, but that which is uſurped and "aſſumed by violence." We muſt conſider, therefore, the bounds and limitations of that authority, and the term for which it was granted:

[*l*] The States General accordingly inveſted the Prince of Orange with a ſort of Dictatorial power in the year 1688, when it was reſolved to invade England; ſecreſy and expedition being abſolutely neceſſary to ſecure ſucceſs in that Enterprize.

for

for an abſolute authority, when granted for a long time (that is, for a year or more) will always be very dangerous, and produce either good or bad effects, according to the diſpoſition of thoſe to whom it is given. If then we compare the power of the Decemviri with that of the Dictators, the former will appear to have been much more extenſive than the latter: for after the creation of a Dictator, neither the majeſty of the Senate or the Conſuls was aboliſhed, nor were the Tribunes deprived of their authority. The Dictator could not do that, and if he had the power to remove any one out of the Conſulſhip, or Senate, or Tribuneſhip, yet he could not annul the order nor make new laws: ſo that the Senate, Conſuls, and Tribunes, ſtill ſubſiſting, were a check upon him, and prevented him from doing the State any harm. But the caſe was quite otherwiſe in the creation of the Decemviri; for the Senate, Conſuls, and Tribunes, were totally laid aſide, and not only the power of making laws, but of doing every thing elſe, in ſhort, that of the whole people, was entirely transferred to theſe ten Citizens, who, finding themſelves thus free from all check or controul, and no right of appeal reſerved to any one from them to the people, became inſolent and intolerable the very next year after their creation; of which, we have a remarkable inſtance in the ambitious proceedings of Appius.

It muſt be obſerved then, that when I ſay an authority, legally conferred by the free ſuffrages of the people, never hurts any Commonwealth, I preſuppoſe that the people do not confer it without proper reſtrictions, or for any longer than a limited time: for when they are either ſo raſh or ſo blind as to give an abſolute and unlimited power to one or more Magiſtrates, as the Romans did to the Decemviri, they will always ſuffer for it in the ſame manner. This will plainly appear, if we examine to what cauſes it was owing that the Dictators were always good Citizens, and the Decemviri became Tyrants; and conſider likewiſe in what manner thoſe States acted that were eſteemed wiſe and provident, and maintained good order and liberty, though they conferred the ſupreme authority upon ſome or more for a long term, as the Spartans did to their Kings, and the Venetians ſtill do to their Doges: for then we ſhall find that ſuch reſtraints and limitations were annexed to their power, as effectually prevented them from abuſing it, if they were ſo diſpoſed. Nor is it of any importance in this caſe whether the people are become corrupt, or not; for abſolute authority will very ſoon corrupt a people and create itſelf friends and partizans: nor whether the perſon that is poſſeſſed of it be rich or poor, of high or low extraction; becauſe ſuch a degree of power will ſoon ſupply the want of riches, and birth, and every thing elſe; as we ſhall ſhew more

be) it is certain, that whenever the Agrarian Law was brought into queſtion at Rome, every thing was turned almoſt upſide down in that City.

The heads of this Law were, firſt, that no Citizen ſhould be allowed to poſſeſs above ſo many acres of land; ſecondly, that all the lands that were taken from an enemy ſhould be equally divided amongſt the people; both which articles gave great offence to the Nobility: for by the former, all thoſe that poſſeſſed more land than that Law allowed of (who were Nobles for the moſt part) were to be ſtripped of the overplus; and in conſequence of the latter, they were deprived of all means of further enriching themſelves. The Patricians, therefore, being moſt intereſted in the matter, and the Plebeians thinking they were defending the cauſe of the Public at the ſame time that they were aſſerting their own rights, ſuch an uproar was raiſed whenever it was brought upon the carpet, that the whole City was in a manner turned topſy-turvy, as I ſaid before [*n*]. Sometimes the Nobility openly oppoſed it, ſometimes they endeavoured to ward it off, either by engaging the people in a war, or ſetting up one Tribune to oppoſe another; ſometimes again, by giving up a part of their lands, and at others, by ſending a colony to take poſſeſſion of the Country that was to be divided; as they did to Antium, upon a diſpute that was occaſioned by this law about the diviſion of that territory: but the people in general were ſo averſe to going thither, that very few could be found who would ſet down their names for that purpoſe: upon which Livy obſerves, that they were better contented, even with aſpiring to a ſettlement at Rome, than the certain poſſeſſion of one at Antium. The conteſts occaſioned by this Law continued till the Romans had extended their conqueſts to the uttermoſt bounds of Italy, and even beyond them; after which they ſeemed to be at an end: for the terri-

[*n*] Appius Claudius, the grandfather of him that was afterwards the Chief of the Decemviri, in order to prevent the complaints of the Plebeians, propoſed that ten Commiſſioners ſhould be choſen by the Senate, to make a ſtrict enquiry concerning thoſe lands which originally belonged to the Public; that part of them ſhould be ſold for the uſe of the Commonwealth; that another part ſhould be diſtributed amongſt the pooreſt Citizens, who had no land of their own; that marks ſhould be ſet up to diſtinguiſh the limits of every one's poſſeſſions; the want of which had occaſioned the grievance of which the people then complained. What remained of the Public lands, he propoſed to let out for five years at a reaſonable rent; which rent was to be laid out in corn for thoſe Plebeians that ſerved in the army, and for their pay. This, he imagined, would hinder the people from thinking any more of having the lands divided afreſh amongſt them; and that they would rather chooſe to have corn, money, and a ſettled allowance during the whole campaign, than a piece of ground which they would be obliged to cultivate themſelves. He added, that he knew no better method to reform abuſes, than to put things upon the ſame footing again that they were at firſt. His advice was followed, though moſt of the Senators, who had lands that originally belonged to the Commonwealth, could not bear the very name of a retroſpection: however, to amuſe the people, they made a Decree according to the propoſals of Appius: but it was not put in execution till five and thirty years after, when his grandſon was made the firſt of the Decemviri. *Dion. Halicarnaſſ.* Lib. VII.

tories

tories which had been taken from their enemies, being at a great diſtance from Rome, and in countries whither the people could not conveniently go to cultivate them, they became leſs deſirous of what did not lie immediately under their own eyes: beſides, the Romans after a while grew more gentle and merciful to their enemies, and if they deprived any State of its lands, they diſtributed the inhabitants amongſt the Colonies which they ſent thither.

For theſe reaſons the Agrarian Law was dropt till the time of the Gracchi, who revived it, to the utter deſtruction of the Roman liberties: for the Nobility were then grown much ſtronger, and oppoſed the Plebeians with ſuch inveteracy, that they at laſt came to an open rupture, which occaſioned much bloodſhed and infinite confuſion amongſt them: ſo that the Magiſtrates finding their authority inſufficient to remedy theſe evils, and neither faction expecting to find any redreſs from them, they both had recourſe to other expedients, and each ſide began to look out for ſome Chief to head and defend them. The Plebeians therefore fixed upon Marius, and threw all their weight into his ſcale in ſuch a manner, that he was four times choſen Conſul, with a very ſhort interval betwixt each Conſulſhip; during which time, he ſo firmly eſtabliſhed his power, that he made himſelf thrice Conſul afterwards. The Nobility therefore, having no other remedy left, were forced to throw themſelves into the arms of Sylla; and having made him the Head of their faction, a civil war immediately enſued; in which, after terrible ſlaughter on both ſides, and many changes of fortune, that of the Nobility at laſt prevailed. Theſe animoſities being afterwards revived in the time of Cæſar and Pompey, Cæſar put himſelf at the head of the Marian, and Pompey eſpouſed the Syllan faction: but Cæſar getting the better of all oppoſition, was the firſt that made himſelf abſolute in Rome; after which, that State never recovered its liberties.

Such was the beginning and ſuch the conſequences of the Agrarian Law, which may ſeem perhaps to invalidate what I have aſſerted elſewhere, *viz.* "That the diſſentions which happened at Rome betwixt "the Patricians and Plebeians contributed to preſerve its liberties, by "occaſioning many good laws for that purpoſe." However I am ſtill of the ſame opinion: for ſuch is the ambition of the Nobility in every Republic, that if they are not effectually reſtrained by proper laws, the State muſt ſoon be ruined. So that if it was above three hundred Years before the diſſentions about the Agrarian Law, occaſioned the ſubverſion of the Roman Commonwealth, that event, in all probability, would have happened much ſooner, if the ambition of the Nobility had not been frequently curbed by the terror of that Law, and ſeveral other ſtruggles, which were made by the Plebeians for the ſupport of their liberties.

From hence we may likewiſe obſerve, how much greater value men ſet upon riches than honours: for whenever there was any diſpute about the latter, the Nobility often gave up a ſhare of them to the people without much reluctance or oppoſition: but when their eſtates were at Stake, they defended them with ſuch obſtinacy, that the people were obliged to have recourſe to extraordinary means in order to gratify themſelves, as I have juſt now ſhewn; to which they were inſtigated by the Gracchi, whoſe good intentions were more to be commended than their prudence. For to think of eradicating an evil that is grown inveterate in a Commonwealth, by making a Law that looks back too far, is a great piece of indiſcretion, and only ſerves to bring it to a criſis the ſooner, as I have demonſtrated before at large: whereas by temporizing, it may be palliated a longer time, if not totally diſcuſſed, before it comes to a head, and cauſes a general diſſolution.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

That weak Republics are always irreſolute, and take wrong meaſures: and if they come to any reſolution, it is rather the effect of neceſſity than choice.

THE Volſci and Æqui being informed that Rome was viſited with a dreadful peſtilence, thought the time was then come when they ſhould be able to conquer that State; and having aſſembled a powerful army, they invaded the territories of the Latini and Hernici, ſpoiling and laying waſte their country in ſuch a manner, that they were forced to apply to the Romans for aſſiſtance; who being prevented from ſending any by the peſtilence, returned for anſwer, that they muſt arm themſelves, and make the beſt defence they could, ſince it was not in their power to ſuccour them. From this inſtance we may obſerve the prudence and generoſity of that Senate, which maintained its dignity in all viciſſitudes of fortune, and conſtantly preſcribed the conduct that was to be obſerved by thoſe that were dependent upon it; being never aſhamed to take a reſolution that was contrary to their uſual manner of proceeding or former maxims, when neceſſity required it. This I ſay, becauſe the ſame Senate had forbad thoſe people to take up arms upon any occaſion whatſoever; and any other Senate leſs prudent than this, perhaps would have thought it derogatory to their honour, if it had ſuffered them to arm and defend themſelves at that time. But that body rightly judged that in ſuch caſes, to chooſe the leſs of two evils was the beſt reſolution that could be taken: and though it mortified them, without doubt, not only to find they were not able to protect their ſubjects, but

but that they muſt be obliged to ſuffer them to defend themſelves, for many reaſons, (ſome of which have been already aſſigned, and others are obvious to every one); yet ſeeing it was abſolutely neceſſary, as the enemy had already invaded them, they took the moſt honourable courſe, and with great majeſty ſent them word they had their leave to defend themſelves if they pleaſed; which indeed they muſt have been forced to do without it; but this was to ſave appearances, and to prevent them from doing ſo upon other occaſions without their permiſſion, when there was no neceſſity for it.

Now though it is eaſy to ſay any other Republic muſt have done the ſame; yet I affirm, that weak and ill adviſed Commonwealths neither can, nor know how to act in that manner, nor to ſave their honour in ſuch exigencies of the State. Duke Valentine having made himſelf maſter of Faenza, and compelled Bologna to ſubmit to his own terms, ſent an officer to demand a paſſage for ſome of his troops through Tuſcany, that were upon their march back again to Rome: upon which, a Council being called at Florence to deliberate in what manner they ſhould act upon that occaſion, it was unanimouſly reſolved not to comply with the Duke's demand. This was not behaving like the Romans: for the Duke having a very powerful army, and the Florentines being in no condition to oppoſe him, it would have been more for their honour to grant him a free paſſage, than to ſuffer him to force one: that ſo what they could not poſſibly prevent, might ſeem to be the effect of courteſy; which would have been a means of preſerving their reputation, at leaſt in ſome degree. But the worſt property in weak Commonwealths, is that they are irreſolute; and if ever they take any laudable reſolution, it is rather through neceſſity, than the effect of wiſdom or good counſel: of which I ſhall produce two inſtances that happened in Florence in our own times.

In the year 1500, Lewis XII. King of France, having repoſſeſſed himſelf of the Duchy of Milan, was inclinable to have reſtored Piſa to the Florentines, in conſideration of fifty thouſand Ducats, which they promiſed to pay him upon the reſtitution of it. In conſequence of this, the King ſent an army towards Piſa, commanded by Monſieur Beaumont, who, though a Frenchman, was much eſteemed and confided in by the Florentines. Beaumont accordingly arriving with his troops before Piſa, and intending to batter the town, began to make the neceſſary diſpoſitions for a Siege: but whilſt he was thus preparing for it, the Piſans ſent Deputies to him, with an offer of ſurrendering the town to the French, provided the King would give them his word, that he would not deliver it up to the Florentines before the expiration of the four next months: to which the Florentines ſeeming very averſe, the Siege was carried on, and at laſt raiſed with great diſgrace to thoſe

that had begun it. The reaſon why the Florentines rejected this propoſal, was becauſe they were doubtful of the King's honour: for ſo weak were their counſels, that they threw themſelves into his arms, though they durſt not truſt him; not conſidering how much better it would be for them, that the King ſhould have poſſeſſion of the town (that ſo he might either deliver it up to them, or give them an opportunity of diſcovering his deſigns if he refuſed it) than to pay him for promiſes only, before he could poſſibly be in a condition to put it into their hands. Certainly then it would have been much more for their intereſt to have ſuffered Monſieur Beaumont to get poſſeſſion of the town upon any terms whatſoever, as may appear from another event, which happened about two years after. Upon the revolt of Arezzo, the ſame King ſent Monſieur Imbalt with a body of French forces to the ſuccour of the Florentines, who ſoon after his arrival near that town, finding the inhabitants (like the Piſans) inclinable to ſubmit to him upon certain conditions, began to enter into a treaty with them for that purpoſe. But the Florentines, not liking the conditions, would not conſent to it: upon which, Imbalt, rightly judging that they did not underſtand their own intereſt, came to a private agreement with the inhabitants, without communicating it to the Florentine Commiſſaries; in conſequence of which, he entered the town with all his forces, and having upbraided the Florentines with their little experience in the affairs of the world, he repreſented to them, that if they really deſired to have Arezzo reſtored to them, *that* was their time to apply to the King, who having got poſſeſſion of it, then had it in his power to oblige them, which he could not have done before. The Florentines indeed were highly exaſperated at Imbalt for proceeding in this manner, and ſpoke very hardly of him; nor could they be pacified till they were at laſt convinced that if Beaumont had done as he did, they might have recovered Piſa as well as Arezzo. I ſay therefore, that weak and irreſolute Commonwealths never act as they ought to do, except they are abſolutely compelled to it: for their weakneſs will not ſuffer them to come to any reſolution in a matter that is doubtful; ſo that they always continue in ſuſpence till their doubts are removed either by downright neceſſity or violence [*o*].

[*o*] See Book II. Chap. xv. of theſe Diſcourſes.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIX.

That the ſame accidents often happen to different people.

WHOEVER compares theſe times with thoſe that are paſt, will find that the ſame appetites, humours and deſires are, and always have been, incident to all States and people: ſo that by diligently examining the courſe of former ages, it is an eaſy matter for men to foreſee what will probably happen again in any Commonwealth, and not only to provide ſuch remedies againſt future evils as their predeceſſors did, but (if there be no precedents) to ſtrike out new ones, according to the nature and ſimilitude of the caſe. But ſince reſearches of this kind are too often neglected, and hiſtory is either not much read, or little underſtood, eſpecially by thoſe that govern States, it comes to paſs that the ſame evils and inconveniencies happen in all times.

The Republic of Florence having loſt Piſa and ſeveral other territories about the year 1394, was forced to make war upon thoſe that had ſeized on them. But as they were very powerful enemies, the war was attended with a heavy expence, and but little advantage, which occaſioned grievous taxes, and conſequently much clamour and diſcontent amongſt the people: and becauſe the war was conducted by a Magiſtracy conſiſting of ten Citizens, who were called *Idieci della guerra*, the Commonalty began to be out of all patience with them, accuſing them with being the authors of the war, and all the burdens conſequent upon it; and ſeeming to be convinced that if their authority was aboliſhed, thoſe troubles would ſoon be at an end: ſo that when the time came that thoſe Magiſtrates were to go out of office, inſtead of chuſing a new *Council of ten*, they threw all their power into the hands of the Signiory. But this ſtep, inſtead of putting an end to the war, as the generality had perſuaded themſelves, threw things into ſtill greater diſorder, and proved the occaſion of much heavier misfortunes: for when that Magiſtracy was aboliſhed, which had conducted their affairs with ſome degree of prudence, they likewiſe loſt Arezzo and many other places; ſo that the people beginning to repent of their folly, and perceiving that their weakneſs proceeded from the diſeaſe, and not from the remedy that had been made uſe of to cure it, thought proper to reeſtabliſh the *Council of ten*.

The ſame thing happened at Rome with regard to the Conſuls: for the Plebeians there ſeeing they were entangled in one war after another, in ſuch a manner, that they enjoyed neither comfort nor reſt, inſtead of imputing it to the ambition of their neighbours, who were perpetually

ſeeking

ſeeking their deſtruction, thought it entirely owing to the malice of the Nobility; and that as they could not wreak their revenge upon them whilſt they continued at home, and under the protection of their Tribunes, they led them abroad under the Conſuls, in order to harraſs and diſtreſs them when there was no body at hand to defend them: upon which account, they reſolved either to aboliſh the name and authority of Conſuls entirely, or at leaſt to lay them under ſuch reſtrictions, that they would not have it in their power to oppreſs them either at home or abroad. The firſt that endeavoured to get a Law paſſed for this purpoſe was Terentillus, one of the Tribunes, who moved that a Committee of five perſons might be appointed to enquire into the abuſes of the Conſular power, and to reſtrain it: at which the Nobility were not a little alarmed, as they thought the Majeſty of the Empire would be degraded, and they ſhould have no ſhare left in the adminiſtration of the Republic. Such however was the obſtinacy of the Tribunes in this point, that the name of Conſuls was wholly extinguiſhed; and after trying ſeveral other expedients, they choſe rather to have Tribunes created with Conſular power: ſo that they ſeemed to be more averſe to the name than the authority of Conſuls. Upon this footing things continued a long time; till at laſt, the people being aware of their error, reſtored the Conſuls, as the Florentines did their *Council of ten.*

CHAP. XL.

Concerning the creation of the Decemviri at Rome; what is moſt worthy of notice in it; and whether ſuch an Inſtitution may be of greater prejudice or advantage to a Commonwealth.

BEFORE I ſay any thing of the troubles and commotions that happened at Rome in conſequence of creating the Decemviri there, it may not be amiſs perhaps to give ſome account of the Inſtitution itſelf, and then to point out ſuch things as ſeem moſt worthy of notice in it; which are many indeed, and deſerve to be well conſidered both by thoſe that would maintain the liberties of a Commonwealth, and thoſe that have any deſign to enſlave it. For, upon a thorough examination, we ſhall find many errors committed by the Patricians, many by the Plebeians to the prejudice of their liberty, and ſtill more by Appius, the Head of the Decemviri, to the deſtruction of that Tyranny which he intended to have eſtabliſhed in Rome.

After many conteſts and diſputes therefore, betwixt Nobility and the People, concerning the introduction of ſeveral new laws for the further ſecurity of their common liberties, it was agreed by both ſides to ſend

Spurius

copy of thoſe
ſo they might
ir own. After
ppoint a Com-
ſuch as might
hich, ten Citi-
tinue in office
ius, a man of
ſpoſition. And
int or controul,
er Magiſtrates
ly the Conſuls
o that this Ma-
the favour of
ad made him-
at it was won-
and that one,
mplacable per-
become their

great modeſty
re than twelve
nd though the
ne of the Ci-
ear before the
r. The new
ic before they
of reading and
ght be ſupplied
Decemviri ex-
mplete body of
of two more
people readily
another year;
becauſe they
s without the
cauſes ſeemed
re.
of a new De-
intereſt to be
o ſollicited the
ith ſuch a ſhew
ſuſpect him of
ſome

ſeeking their de
Nobility; and
whilſt they con
bunes, they led
diſtreſs them w
which account,
of Conſuls enti
they would no
home or abroad
this purpoſe was
Committee of fi
of the Conſular
not a little aları
be degraded, an
the Republic.
point, that the
trying ſeveral o
created with Cor
the name than tl
tinued a long tin
reſtored the Con

Concerning the cr
of notice in it
prejudice or aa

BEFORE I
happened
it may not be an
ſelf, and then to
it; which are m
thoſe that would
that have any del
we ſhall find ma
Plebeians to the p
the Head of the
he intended to ha
After many co
People, concerni
ſecurity of their

Spurius Poſtumius and five other Citizens to Athens for a copy of thoſe laws which Solon had formerly given to that State; that ſo they might form a new body out of them for the government of their own. After the return of theſe Deputies, it was thought proper to appoint a Committee to examine and digeſt theſe Laws, and to eſtabliſh ſuch as might ſeem moſt ſalutary and convenient: in conſequence of which, ten Citizens were fixed upon for that purpoſe, who were to continue in office for a whole year; amongſt whom was Appius Claudius, a man of great parts and ſagacity, but of a reſtleſs and turbulent diſpoſition. And that they might be at liberty to act without the leaſt reſtraint or controul, in adapting theſe Laws to their own conſtitution, all other Magiſtrates were ſuſpended from their reſpective offices, particularly the Conſuls and Tribunes, and no appeal to the people allowed of: ſo that this Magiſtracy was veſted with abſolute power. But Appius by the favour of the people engroſſed the authority of all the ten: for he had made himſelf ſo popular by his affable and obliging behaviour, that it was wonderful to ſee ſuch a total change as it were in his nature; and that one, who but a little before had been the moſt inveterate and implacable perſecutor of the Plebeians, ſhould now all on a ſudden become their avowed Protector and favourite.

During the firſt year, every thing was conducted with great modeſty and decency, the Decemvir of the day having no more than twelve Lictors to attend him in the diſcharge of his office; and though the authority of this Magiſtracy was abſolute, nevertheleſs, one of the Citizens having committed a murder, they cited him to appear before the people, and left them to take cognizance of the matter. The new Laws were written upon ten tables, and expoſed in public before they were ratified; that ſo every one might have the liberty of reading and canvaſſing them, to ſee if there was any defect which might be ſupplied before their confirmation. But before the power of the Decemviri expired, Appius cauſed it to be whiſpered about, that a complete body of laws could not be well compiled without the addition of two more tables to the other ten; upon which inſinuations, the people readily conſented, that the Decemvirate ſhould be continued for another year; not only to prevent the revival of Conſular power, but becauſe they were in hopes they ſhould be able to ſupport themſelves without the aſſiſtance of Tribunes; ſince the cognizance of capital cauſes ſeemed now to be wholly referred to them, as we have ſaid before.

A time being appointed accordingly for the election of a new Decemvirate, the chief of the Nobility exerted all their intereſt to be choſen; and none with more eagerneſs than Appius, who ſollicited the votes of the people with ſo much earneſtneſs, and yet with ſuch a ſhew of humility and complaiſance, that his aſſociates began to ſuſpect him of

ſome

ſome bad deſign, "*credebant enim*, ſays Livy, *haud gratuitam in tantâ* "*ſuperbiâ comitatem fore*;" *for they could not imagine that a perſon of his pride would ſtoop ſo low without ſome private view*; and therefore not daring to oppoſe him openly, they reſolved to try ſome other expedient: and though he was the youngeſt of all the Candidates, they gave him the power of propoſing all the ten to the choice of the people; not dreaming that he would name himſelf for one, becauſe that would be not only a ſhameleſs thing, but what had never been practiſed at Rome before. "*Ille vero impedimentum pro occaſione arripuit*;" *but he made an advantage of what they deſigned as an impediment*, and named himſelf firſt of all, to the great ſurprize and diſguſt of all the reſt of the Nobility: after which, he named nine other ſuch perſons as he thought were fitteſt for his purpoſe.

But this election was hardly over, before both the Nobility and people began to be ſenſible of their error: for Appius ſoon "*finem fecit ſe-* "*rendæ alienæ perſonæ*," *threw off the maſque*, and not only began to ſhew his own innate pride, but in a ſhort time made his Collegues as bad as himſelf; increaſing the number of Lictors from twelve to an hundred and twenty, in order to over awe the whole City. All ſides at firſt were equally terrified; but after a while the Decemviri began to wheedle the Senate, and oppreſs the people: and if any perſon had injuſtice done him by one of them, he was ſtill worſe treated upon appealing to another. So that the Plebeians being at laſt aware of their folly, and ſoundly mortified, began to turn their eyes upon the Nobility in their afflictions, "*Et inde libertatis captare auram, unde ſervitutem timendo, in eum ſtatum* "*Rempublicam adduxerant*," *and to look up to thoſe very perſons for the preſervation of their liberties, whoſe power they had oppoſed with ſuch a degree of virulence, out of a dread of being enſlaved by them, as had reduced the Commonwealth to that condition.* But the Nobility for their part, inſtead of ſympathizing with the people in their miſery, could not help rejoicing at it, "*ut ipſi tædio præſentium Conſules deſiderarent*," *in hopes that the grievouſneſs of their ſufferings would make them wiſh to ſee Conſular power reſtored.* At laſt however when the ſecond year of the Decemvirate expired, the two additional Tables were finiſhed, but not yet expoſed to public view: from whence the Decemviri took a handle to continue themſelves ſtill longer in office. For which purpoſe they had recourſe to violence, and appointed guards out of the young Nobility to ſecure them in their uſurpation, to whom they gave the goods and eſtates of ſuch perſons as they thought fit either to put to death or impoſe fines upon; "*quibus donis*, ſays the Hiſtorian *juventus cor-* "*rumpebatur, & malebat licentiam ſuam, quam omnium libertatem*," *by which bribes the youth were debauched, and choſe rather to live in licentiouſneſs themſelves, than to ſee the liberties of their country reſtored.*

Whilſt

The XIIth Plan. Shewing how presently form a front on any side.

Q.			oo.	oo.	oo.	oo.		Q.	I.
150.	500.	333.	450.	33 450.	450.	333.	500.	150.	150.
gggggg	rrrrrr	eeeeee	tddddt	eeetddddt	tddddt	eeeeee	rrrrrr	gggggg	yyyyyy
gggggg	rrrrrr	eeeeee	tddddt	eeetddddt	tddddt	eeeeee	rrrrrr	gggggg	yyyyyy
gggggg	rrrrrr	eeeeee	tddddt	eeetddddt	tddddt	eeeeee	rrrrrr	gggggg	yyyyyy
gggggg	rrrrrr	eeeeee	tddddt	eeetddddt	tddddt	eeeeee	rrrrrr	gggggg	yyyyyy
gggggg	rrrrrr	eeeeee	toooot	eeetooooot	toooot	eeeeee	rrrrrr	gggggg	yyyyyy
gggggg	rrrrrr	eeeeee	toooot	eeetooooot	toooot	eeeeee	rrrrrr	gggggg	yyyyyy
	rrrrrr	eeeeee	toooot	eeetooooot	toooot	eeeeee	rrrrrr		
	rrrrrr	eeeeee	toocot	eeetooooot	toooot	eeeeee	rrrrrr		

	tdddooo	ooooo	ooooo	ooodddt
	tdddooo	SPZ	SPZ	ooodddt
	tdddooo	oodoo	oodoo	ooodddt 450.
450.	tdddooo			ooodddt
	tdddooo			ooodddt
	tdddooo			ooodddt
	tdddooo			ooodddt
		45450.		
	tdddooo	tddddddt		

hate,

Whilſt

Whilſt things were in this ſituation, the Sabines and Volſci invaded the Romans, which threw the Decemviri into no ſmall conſternation, when they conſidered how looſe they ſat in their Seats, and upon how weak a foundation their power was built: for they were not able to carry on a war without the aſſiſtance of the Senate; and if the Senate ſhould be ſuffered to aſſemble, they knew there would preſently be an end of their uſurpation. Nevertheleſs, as the neceſſity was urgent, they reſolved to run that riſque; and having called the Senators together, many of them ſpoke with great acrimony againſt the arrogance and Tyranny of the Decemviri, particularly Valerius and Horatius; and their authority would certainly have been aboliſhed at that time, if the Senators had thought fit: but they were ſo jealous of the Plebeians, that they would not exert their whole ſtrength upon that occaſion, leſt if the Decemviri were obliged to reſign their power, the people ſhould ſet up Tribunes again. The matter therefore was compromiſed for the preſent, and a war being reſolved upon, they ſent two armies againſt the enemy, commanded by ſome of the Decemviri, whilſt Appius ſtaid at home to take care of the City. But he happening to fall in love during that interval with a young woman, whoſe name was Virginia, and attempting to carry her off by force, her father killed her with his own hands to ſave her honour and that of his family. This immediately occaſioned ſuch an uproar in Rome, and ſuch tumults in both armies, that the Soldiers leaving the camp, and the people the City, retired to Mons Sacer, where they ſtaid till the Decemviri abdicated the Magiſtracy: after which, new Conſuls and Tribunes were created, and Rome once more recovered its liberty.

From this ſhort narrative, we may obſerve in the firſt place, that the inſtitution of this Tyranny at Rome was owing to the ſame cauſes which often occaſion it in other States; that is, the too great and ill governed deſire of liberty in the people, and the immoderate ambition to command in the Nobility: for when they cannot both agree about any law that is to be made in favour of liberty, and either ſide throws all its weight into the ſcale of ſome one perſon, whom they have made choice of for their champion and protector, from that moment, Tyranny may be ſaid to commence. The Decemviri were created at Rome, and veſted with ſo great a degree of authority by the conſent both of the Nobility and Plebeians, but with different views; one ſide hoping to aboliſh the Conſular Power, and the other, that of the Tribunes: accordingly after their creation, the Plebeians looking upon Appius as their firm friend, began to court and careſs him exceedingly, and to ſtrengthen his hands in ſuch a manner, that he might be able to depreſs the Nobility. But when things once come to ſuch a paſs that the people are weak enough to exalt ſome one man only, to humble thoſe whom they

hate, if he is a perſon of any ſubtilty and addreſs, he will ſoon make himſelf abſolute Lord over them all if he pleaſes: for he may extinguiſh the Nobility by the help of the Plebeians, whom he will take care to favour and cheriſh till he has thoroughly effected that; after which, the people having no body to protect them upon occaſion, will begin to perceive when it is too late, that they have loſt their liberty and lie wholly at his mercy. This courſe has always been taken by ſuch as have become Tyrants over free States; and if Appius had followed it, his Tyranny would have taken deeper root and continued longer. But he did quite the contrary, and imprudently incurred the hatred of thoſe perſons that had advanced him to power, and were able to have ſupported him in it; whilſt he ingratiated himſelf with thoſe that were neither pleaſed at his exaltation, nor ſtrong enough to defend him afterwards; thus abandoning his friends to court others who never could be ſo. For though the Nobility are naturally deſirous to rule and domineer themſelves, yet ſuch of them as have no ſhare in a tyrannical government will always hate the Tyrant; nor can he for his part ever gain them all: for ſo great, generally ſpeaking, are their avarice and ambition, that it is not poſſible any Tyrant ſhould have either riches or honours in his diſpoſal ſufficient to ſatiate them. Thus Appius in leaving the Plebeians, and joining the Nobility, was guilty of an egregious error, for the reaſons juſt now aſſign'd; and becauſe it is neceſſary that a man who would keep poſſeſſion by violence of what he has got, ſhould be ſtronger than thoſe that endeavour to wreſt it out of his hands again: and therefore thoſe Tyrants who make the people their friends, and are hated by the Nobility only, will be more ſecure; becauſe they have a ſtronger foundation to depend upon than others, who make the people their enemy, and the Nobility their friends. For by thoſe means, they may always ſupport themſelves without foreign aſſiſtance, as Nabis the Tyrant of Sparta did; who having ſecured the affections of the people, did not give himſelf much trouble about the Nobility; and yet he defended himſelf againſt all Greece, and the whole power of the Romans, which he never could have done without the favour of the people. But, on the other hand, when a Tyrant depends on the Nobility alone, as the number of his friends is ſmall at home, he cannot ſupport himſelf without foreign aid; for he will want guards for the ſecurity of his perſon, Soldiers to ſerve as Militia, inſtead of his own people, for the defence of the country, and powerful allies to ſuccour him in diſtreſs: all which if he can procure, he may poſſibly maintain his power without the affections of the people. But Appius deſpiſing the people, whom he might have kept his friends, and having no other reſource, was ſoon pulled out of his Seat.

The

The Senate and people of Rome likewiſe committed a groſs error in the creation of the Decemviri: for though we have aſſerted before, in the diſcourſe concerning Dictators, that thoſe Magiſtrates only endanger the public liberty who force themſelves into office, and not thoſe who are legally appointed by the free ſuffrages of the people; yet the people that chuſe them, ought at the ſame to take great care to lay them under proper checks and reſtraints to prevent their abuſing their power: but the Romans, inſtead of taking ſuch meaſures to oblige the Decemviri to keep within due bounds, entirely freed them from all controul, by making their power abſolute, and aboliſhing all other Magiſtracies, that might in any wiſe have ſerved to balance it, and this merely out of the exceſſive deſire (as we have ſaid before) which the Senate had to ſuppreſs the Tribunes, and the People the Conſuls. Theſe paſſions ſo blinded their underſtandings, that both ſides equally contributed to the diſorders that enſued: for men, as King Ferdinand of Arragon uſed to ſay, often reſemble certain little birds of prey, which purſue others with ſuch eagerneſs, that they are not aware of a greater bird that is hovering over their heads, and ready to ſouſe down upon them and tear them to pieces. But enough has been ſaid to ſhew the error which the Romans were guilty of at the creation of the Decemviri to preſerve their liberty; and that of Appius in the means he took to eſtabliſh Tyranny.

CHAP. XLI.

That it is impolitic in any man who was humble and merciful before, to become arrogant and cruel on a ſudden, and without obſerving any gradation.

AMONGST the other falſe ſteps which Appius took to ſupport his Tyranny, the changing his diſpoſition and manner of conduct ſo ſuddenly was of no ſmall prejudice to him. It muſt be owned indeed, that his artifice in cajoling the people by pretending to be their Champion; the addreſs he made uſe of in getting the Decemvirate prolonged; his reſolution in propoſing himſelf again, contrary to the expectation of the Nobility; and his naming ſuch Collegues as he could make tools of, were maſterly and well timed ſtrokes of policy. But when he had done all this (as we have ſhewn before) he certainly judged very wrong in changing his deportment ſo inſtantaneouſly, in perſecuting and oppreſſing the people after he had been their avowed protector, in becoming ſo fierce and arrogant, after ſuch an appearance of humility and affability; and that too without any excuſe to juſtify himſelf, and in ſo ſudden a manner, that every body preſently diſcovered the deceitfulneſs

and villainy of his heart. For a man that has worn the maſk of honeſty and goodneſs for a while, and finds it neceſſary at laſt to throw it off, and alter his conduct for the accompliſhment of ſome great purpoſe, ſhould do it by inſenſible degrees, and avail himſelf of proper opportunities and conjunctures; not *per ſaltum*, by a ſudden leap and all at once: that ſo the difference of his behaviour may not deprive him of his old friends, before [*p*] he has had time to gain new ones to ſupport his authority: otherwiſe his deſigns will immediately be ſeen through, and finding himſelf deſtitute of all ſorts of aſſiſtance, he muſt inevitably be ruined.

CHAP. XLII.

How prone Mankind are to corruption.

IT may further be obſerved, from what happened under the Decemvirate, how liable men are to be debauched, let their firſt principles and education be ever ſo good. If the example of the young Nobility, whom Appius took for his guards, and corrupted to ſuch a degree, that they became friends to Tyranny and ſupporters of his uſurpation, merely for the ſake of lucre, and indulging themſelves in their licentious deſires, was not ſufficient, we might add that of Quintus Fabius, one of the Decemviri of the ſecond creation, who though a virtuous and good man before, was ſo blinded by ambition, and ſeduced by the cunning of Appius, that he ſeemed totally to have changed his natural diſpoſition, and became as bad as the other [*q*]. A due conſideration therefore of human frailty ſhould teach all Legiſlators, either in Kingdoms or Commonwealths, to make the moſt effectual proviſions they can to bridle the appetites and paſſions of mankind, and to deprive them of all hopes of impunity when they violate the laws of their country.

CHAP. XLIII.

That thoſe who fight out of a principle of honour make the beſt and moſt faithful Soldiers.

FROM what has been related above concerning the Decemviri, it may likewiſe be remarked how great a difference there is betwixt Soldiers that are well affected to their Commanders, and fight for their

[*p*] Cromwell excelled moſt other Tyrants in this ſort of Policy.

[*q*] Virum egregium olim domi militiæque Decemviratus Collegæque ita mutaverant, ut Appii quam ſui ſimilis mallet eſſe. *Liv.* Lib. III. Cap. xli.——A fatal but uſual conſequence of power, which is too often exerted to oppreſs others.

own

own glory, and thoſe that are led into the field againſt their inclination, and fight only to gratify the ambition of others. For though the Roman armies were almoſt always victorious when commanded by Conſuls, yet under the conduct of the Decemviri, they were never ſucceſsful. From hence alſo we may diſcern one of the reaſons at leaſt, why forces are ſo little to be depended upon who have no other motive to fight than their pay, which is by no means ſufficient to ſecure their fidelity, or to make them ſo much your friends as to lay down their lives for you. For Soldiers whoſe hearts are not warmly affected in the cauſe and intereſts of thoſe for whom they fight, will make but a very feeble reſiſtance if vigorouſly attacked: and ſince this ſort of affection and emulation is not to be found, or indeed expected in Mercenaries, thoſe that govern Kingdoms and Commonwealths ought above all things to fortify themſelves with the love and eſteem of their own Soldiers, as in fact all thoſe have ever done who have performed the greateſt exploits. The Roman armies had not loſt their ancient valour under the reign of the Decemviri; but as they were but coldly affected towards them, they did not exert themſelves with their uſual Spirit, nor ſucceed in the manner they had been wont to do. But when the Decemvirate was aboliſhed, and they had recovered their liberties, they fought courageouſly again like free men in the defence of their country; and conſequently their enterprizes were crowned with glory and ſucceſs as before [r].

[r] "With regard to Fleets and Armies, ſays the Author of the *Eſtimate of the Manners and Principles of the times*, Vol. II. Sect. vi. another Truth offers itſelf to obſervation. Here the love of Glory is neceſſary in the Leaders, as a motive to great and daring Enterprizes. But amongſt the inferior ranks, the fear of ſhame will generally be of ſufficient influence to compel them to their Duty. The reaſon is evident: for, with regard to the Leaders, as it is impoſſible to point out to them the particular track of their Duty in every inſtance; ſo their conduct muſt be left in general to the determinations of their own mind. Great actions will naturally be attended with glory: but the mere omiſſion of great actions, where peremptory orders are not given, is not neceſſarily attended with ſhame. It is the love of Glory only therefore, that can urge a Leader to great and dangerous attempts. But with regard to the inferior ranks, there the particular track of Duty is pointed out, which is only this, "obey the commands of your Leader." Under this circumſtance no evaſion can take place: every man muſt obey, or Infamy overtakes him; and thus the fear of ſhame becomes ſufficient. This diſtinction will clearly account for that ſtrange difference of conduct in our Britiſh troops during the laſt, as well as the preſent war. It has been remarked, that at ſometimes they have fought like Lions, and at others have been as timorous as Hares. Their bravery in particular inſtances, has been brought as a proof againſt the exiſtence of the *Ruling Principle of Effeminacy* which runs through this work. But whoever views this matter, according to the diſtinctions here pointed out, will at once ſee the veil drawn off from this myſterious appearance of things. Where did our troops diſtinguiſh their Valour? was it not at Dettingen? at La Feldt? and above all, on the dreadful field of Fontenoy, where honeſt Fame forſook the Standard of the Victor, and wept over the Banners of the retreating Engliſh? And who were their Leaders upon theſe important days? They were ſuch as were inſpired and actuated by the generous love of glory."

CHAP.

CHAP. XLIV.

That a multitude without a Head can do but little; and that they ſhould not threaten to make an ill uſe of power, before they have obtained it.

UPON the violence that had been offered to Virginia [ſ], the Plebeians of Rome having taken arms and retired to Mons Sacer, where they were joined by the army, the Senate ſent to demand the reaſon of that Seceſſion, and by what authority the Soldiers had abandoned the camp: and ſo great was the reverence in which the multitude ſtill held the authority of the Senate, that as they had no Head over them, no particular perſon would preſume to return an anſwer: for though, as Livy ſays, there was matter enough for an anſwer, yet no body cared to deliver it. From whence we may obſerve how weak a thing a multitude is without a Head.

But Virginius (the father of Virginia) being aware of this defect, had the addreſs to get twenty military Tribunes created with power to treat and confer with the Senate: after which they deſired that Valerius and Horatius might be ſent to them, to whom they would communicate what they had to ſay. Theſe two Senators, however, refuſed to go upon any ſuch errand, except the Decemviri would firſt abdicate their authority: which being at laſt complied with, they went to the people, who demanded that their Tribunes ſhould be reſtored, that appeals to them from the Sentence of any magiſtrate ſhould be allowed of, and that the late Decemviri ſhould be delivered up to them, whom they would burn alive. The two firſt requeſts were approved by Valerius and Horatius; but they could not help condemning the laſt as Savage and inhuman, telling them, "*crudelitatis odio, in crudelitatem ruitis,*" *whilſt you abhor cruelty in others, you would be guilty of the higheſt degree of barbarity yourſelves*; and adviſing them to drop all further mention of the Decemviri at that time, that ſo they might attend more effectually to the recovery of their own liberty and authority; after which, they might find ſufficient means to take proper ſatisfaction. Hence we may learn, how weak and imprudent it is to aſk for a thing, and to declare at the ſame time, that we deſign to make a bad uſe of it as ſoon as ever we can: certainly in ſuch a caſe a man ſhould conceal his bad intentions, at leaſt till he has ſucceeded in his ſollicitations, which he ought by all means to make his firſt and principal endeavour. If a perſon had a deſign upon the life of another, would it not be ſufficient to ſay to him,

[ſ] Appius had made a forcible attempt to raviſh her.

"pray

"pray lend me your Sword," without telling him you intended to kill him with it; ſince when you have got the Sword in your hand, you may do what you pleaſe with it?

CHAP. XLV.

That it is a bad precedent to break a new Law; eſpecially in the Legiſlator himſelf: and that it is very dangerous for thoſe that govern States to multiply injuries and repeat them every day.

WHEN the public tranquillity was reſtored at Rome, and the ancient form of Government re-eſtabliſhed, Appius was cited by Virginius to anſwer for his miſdemeanours before the people; and making his appearance in the midſt of a great number of the Nobility, he was immediately ordered to priſon. Upon this, he proteſted againſt it, and appealed to the people: but Virginius inſiſted that he who had aboliſhed all appeals, was not worthy of being indulged in one himſelf, or of being allowed to implore the protection of a people whom he had ſo grievouſly injured. But Appius replied, that they who had been ſo zealous to re-eſtabliſh that privilege, ſhould not be the firſt to break it. After all, however, he was committed to priſon, and killed himſelf before his trial came on.

Now though without doubt Appius deſerved the ſevereſt puniſhment for his crimes, yet it was a thing of very dangerous conſequence in the Roman people to violate their own laws, and eſpecially one that was ſo lately made: for I think there cannot be any thing of worſe example in a Commonwealth than to eſtabliſh laws, and not obſerve them; eſpecially when they are firſt broken by the Legiſlators themſelves. A reform in the State having taken place at Florence in the beginning of the year 1495, by the aſſiſtance and advice of Friar Girolamo Savonarola (whoſe writings give ſufficient proof of his learning, abilities, and Spirit), a new law was made for the further ſecurity of the Citizens, by virtue of which they were allowed to appeal to the people from any Sentence paſſed in matters of State, either by the *Council of eight*, or the Signiory. But notwithſtanding this law, which he had ſollicited with ſuch earneſtneſs, and obtained with ſo much difficulty, five Citizens who had been condemned to death by the Signiory, and afterwards deſigned to appeal to the people, were denied that privilege: a circumſtance that hurt the Friar's reputation more than any thing elſe that could poſſibly have befallen him; for if this law was of ſuch importance as he pretended, it ought to have been ſtrictly obſerved; if not, why was it preſſed with ſuch importunity? This was the more taken notice of becauſe he never made

made the leaſt mention of the violation of the law in any of his Sermons or harangues, though he afterwards delivered many to the people, nor either condemned or excuſed thoſe that had broke it; for ſince it ſerved his own purpoſes, he knew not how to condemn it, and as to an excuſe, there was no poſſibility of making any; which ſort of behaviour fully diſcovering the partiality and ambition of his heart, entirely ruined his reputation, and loaded him with infamy and reproach [*t*].

It likewiſe creates great diſguſt in a State, when the Citizens are terrified every day with freſh proſecutions; as it happened at Rome after the expiration of the Decemvirate, for not only all the Decemviri, but ſo many other Citizens were accuſed and condemned at different times, that the Nobility were in the utmoſt conſternation, and began to apprehend there would be no end of theſe ſeverities, till their whole order was extinguiſhed; and this manner of proceeding would certainly have excited great troubles and inconveniencies, if they had not been foreſeen and prevented by Marcus Duellius, one of the Tribunes, who publiſhed an edict, prohibiting every one either to cite or accuſe any Roman Citizen during the ſpace of a year; by which act of moderation, the Nobility were delivered from all further diſquietude and apprehenſion. From hence it appears, how dangerous it is either for a Prince or a Commonwealth to keep their Subjects in continual fear and alarm by daily executions. Indeed nothing can be more prejudicial to their intereſt [*u*]: for when men begin to dread theſe evils, they will naturally endeavour to ſecure themſelves at all events, and become bolder and more reſolute in attempting a change of government. Upon ſuch occaſions therefore, it is the beſt way either to puniſh no body at all, or to finiſh the executions at once, and afterwards to give the people no occaſion to fear any thing further; that ſo they may live ſecurely and quietly [*x*].

[*t*] See Chap. vi. of the *Prince*, and the Notes upon it.

[*u*] Witneſs the caſe of our King James II. who terrified and diſguſted his Subjects to the laſt degree, by the unreaſonable number of Executions which he ordered in the weſt of England at different times upon the Duke of Monmouth's affair.

[*x*] As the Emperor Auguſtus did, who after a moſt cruel proſcription and a multitude of Executions, preſently became ſo remarkably indulgent and merciful to his Subjects, that he afterwards reigned in peace and ſecurity all his life, and has been more extolled than almoſt any other Emperor.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLVI.

That men uſually riſe from one degree of ambition to another; endeavouring in the firſt place to ſecure themſelves from oppreſſion, and afterwards to oppreſs others.

AFTER the people of Rome not only recovered their liberty and former power, but were become ſtronger and ſtill more ſecure under the protection of many new laws, it might have been expected they would at laſt have enjoyed ſome repoſe; yet it happened quite contrary, and every day produced new tumults and diſſenſions. The reaſon of which, according to Livy, was that the Nobility and Plebeians being at perpetual variance, when one ſide was humbled, the other grew inſolent; when the populace were content, the young Nobility began to abuſe them; nor was it in the power of the Tribunes to provide any effectual remedy for this, as they were liable to be inſulted themſelves. The Nobility, on the other hand, though they could not help being ſenſible, that the younger part of their order were too arbitrary and licentious, yet if the bounds of decency and good order were to be tranſgreſſed either by one ſide or the other, choſe rather that their own ſhould be the treſpaſer than that of the Plebeians. So that the immoderate deſire of preſerving their reſpective privileges, was the cauſe that when either faction prevailed, they oppreſſed the other; for it generally happens, that whilſt men are guarding againſt violence themſelves, they begin to encroach upon others, and when they pull a dagger out of their own breaſt, endeavour to plunge it into their neighbour's; as if they muſt of neceſſity either injure or be injured.

From hence we may obſerve (amongſt other things) in what manner Republics are at laſt diſſolved, how natural a tranſition there is from one degree of ambition to another, and that what Salluſt ſays in the perſon of Julius Cæſar is very juſt, "*quod omnia mala exempla, bonis initiis orta* "*ſunt;*" *that all diſorders and abuſes ariſe from good beginnings.* Ambitious Citizens in all Commonwealths, make it their buſineſs in the firſt place, as I ſaid before, not only to defend themſelves againſt private violence, but the authority of the Magiſtrates; for which purpoſe, they endeavour to cultivate friendſhips and dependencies by ways ſeemingly honeſt and honourable; as by lending money to thoſe that are poor, or protecting the weak and helpleſs, againſt the oppreſſor and extortioner; all which, carrying a fair and good appearance, the people are eaſily deluded to take no care to prevent the conſequences till it is too late, and not only private Citizens but even the Magiſtrates themſelves begin to ſtand in

awe of them [y]. After they have arrived at this height without any oppoſition, it becomes very dangerous to meddle with them, for reaſons which I have given before, in diſcourſing of the folly and imprudence of endeavouring to eradicate an evil that is grown to too great a head in a Commonwealth; ſo that when things are once come to this paſs, you muſt either endeavour to pull them down again, which cannot be done without the utmoſt hazard of utter ruin to the State; or you muſt patiently ſubmit to loſe your liberties, except their death, or ſome other accident ſhould chance to deliver you. For when they perceive both the people and Magiſtrates are afraid of them and their friends, they will ſoon begin to domineer and play the tyrant. A Commonwealth therefore ought above all things, to take timely care to prevent its Citizens from doing evil under the appearance of good; and that they may not become ſo popular as to prejudice the State inſtead of advancing its welfare; but of this we ſhall treat more at large in another place [z].

CHAP. XLVII.

Though the People are ſometimes miſtaken in general points, yet they ſeldom or never err in particulars.

THE people of Rome, as I ſaid before, growing weary of their Conſuls, and deſirous to have them choſen out of the Plebeians for the future, or at leaſt ſome bounds preſcribed to their power; the Nobility in order to prevent their authority from being debaſed either way, took a middle courſe, and conſented that four Tribunes with Conſular power ſhould be elected indifferently out of the Patricians and Plebeians. The people likewiſe were pretty well ſatisfied, imagining that in conſequence of this, the Conſulſhip would at laſt be utterly aboliſhed, and they ſhould have an equal ſhare in the adminiſtration. But it was very remarkable that at the creation of theſe Tribunes, when they had it in their power and every body expected they would have choſen them out of the Plebeians, they were all elected out of the Nobility. Upon which, Livy ſays, "*quorum commitiorum eventus docuit, "alios animos in contentione libertatis & honoris, alios ſecundum depoſita "certamina in incorrupto judicio eſſe;*" *the event of this election ſhewed that the people were of one mind in the heat of their conteſts for liberty and*

[y] Such was the conduct of Coſimo de' Medici and his poſterity; by which they at laſt made themſelves Sovereigns of Tuſcany. See the four laſt Books of the Hiſtory of Florence.

[z] See Chap. lii.

honours,

honours, and of another when thoſe conteſts were over, and their judgment grown cool again.

Conſidering with myſelf therefore what might be the reaſon of this, I think it is becauſe men are more apt to be miſtaken in generals than particulars. The Plebeians at Rome thought themſelves more worthy of the Conſulſhip than the Nobility, as they were ſo much the more numerous body, and not only bore the chief burden and hardſhips in all wars, but were the greateſt ſupport of public liberty, and contributed moſt to the aggrandizement of their country; upon which, their pretenſions ſeeming to them in no wiſe unreaſonable, they reſolved to aſſume that honour themſelves at all events. But when they came to make choice of proper perſons out of themſelves to fill the Conſulſhip, they began to find their weakneſs, and ſoon perceived, that no particular man amongſt them was equal to what they thought they had deſerved altogether. Aſhamed of their incapacity therefore, they gave their votes for ſuch as they knew were really more worthy; upon which occaſion, Livy cries out in ſome ſort of admiration, "*hanc modeſtiam, æqui-*
"*tatemque & altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quæ tunc populi*
"*univerſi fuit?*" *Where ſhall we ſee now a days that degree of modeſty, equity, and magnanimity even in any one man, which was then ſo conſpicuous in a whole people?* For a further confirmation of this matter, I ſhall produce a remarkable proof from what happened in Capua, after Hannibal had defeated the Romans at the battle of Cannæ. Upon that overthrow, all Italy, and the Capuans in particular, began to rebel againſt their Governors, out of an ancient emulation which ſubſiſted betwixt the Senate and the People there. But Pacuvius Calavius being then firſt Magiſtrate in that City, and ſeeing the ferment it was in, hit upon the following expedient to reconcile the People and Senate. In the firſt place, he called the Senate together, and having repreſented to them how implacably they were hated by the people, the danger they were in of having their brains knocked out by them, and the City delivered up to Hannibal, now the affairs of the Romans were in ſo deſperate a condition, told them at laſt that if they would leave things to him, he would reconcile all differences betwixt them; but that is was abſolutely neceſſary for their preſervation, that they ſhould be all locked up together in the Senate houſe, and delivered up into the hands of the people; after which, he would anſwer for their ſafety. The Senators ſubmitting to this, he told the people in a conference, that the time was come at laſt, when they might ſufficiently humble the Nobility if they pleaſed, and take a full revenge upon them for the many injuries they had received at their hands; for he had them all ſhut up together in his cuſtody: but as he imagined they would not think of leaving the City wholly unprovided with Magiſtrates and Senators, he was of opinion they

ſhould create new ones firſt to ſupply the vacancies, in caſe they had a mind to diſpatch the old ones: for which purpoſe, he had brought a purſe thither with the names of all the Senators in it, out of which he deſired they would draw them one by one, and he would take care that every man of them ſhould be put to death immediately, as ſoon as they had appointed another in his room. The drawing accordingly begun, and upon the firſt name that came out, a great out-cry was ſet up of *tyrant*, *oppreſſor*, &c. and Pacuvius aſking whom they would have to ſucceed him, a general ſilence enſued; after which, one of the Plebeians was propoſed: no ſooner was he mentioned however, but ſome burſt out a laughing, others began to hiſs, and others to abuſe him, ſome in one manner and ſome in another: ſo that in ſhort, as they proceeded to name the others, there was not ſo much as one that was thought worthy of that dignity. Pacuvius, therefore, taking the advantage of this diſpoſition in the people, told them, that ſince they did not think it convenient the City ſhould be without a Senate, and could not agree in the choice of new Senators, they had better be reconciled to the old ones, who would be ſo humbled by the apprehenſions they had been in, that they might expect to find that moderation as well as ability in them, which it ſeemed they could not hope for in others. A reconciliation accordingly enſued betwixt them; and the miſtake they had lain under in generals was ſoon diſcovered, when they came to the diſcuſſion of particulars.

The people are likewiſe often deceived in judging of the circumſtances and ſituation of things; and are not capable of being diſabuſed, till they come to view them more nearly. After the year 1414, moſt of the principal Citizens of Florence being driven out of that City, and no regular Government left, but rather a licentious ſort of miſrule, under which, things fell into greater confuſion every day, ſeveral of the popular party, who ſaw the Republic could not hold together at that rate; and not being able to penetrate into the true cauſe of this, imputed it to the ambition of certain leading men amongſt them, who (as they gave out) fomented theſe irregularities, in order to deprive them of their liberties, and mold the State into ſuch a form, as they beſt liked themſelves: theſe aſperſions were induſtriouſly propagated in every part of the City, by perſons who daily abuſed the principal Citizens, both in public and private companies, threatening, that if ever they ſhould get into the Signiory, they would not fail to bring their miſdeeds to light, and puniſh them ſeverely. But afterwards, when ſome of thoſe very men came into authority, as they had wiſhed, and from that degree of eminence were enabled to ſee further and clearer into things, they ſoon began to perceive the cauſes of theſe diſorders, the dangers that hung over their heads, and the difficulty of providing

any

Plan XIII.

The form of an Encamp

EAST



any effectual remedy: and finding they were owing rather to the malignity of the times, than to any particular men, they preſently changed both their opinion and conduct; as a more intimate knowledge of particulars had opened their eyes, and convinced them of the prejudices they had conceived, and the errors they had lain under, whilſt they judged of things by general appearances. So that thoſe who had heard them talk in another ſtrain, whilſt they were private men, and ſaw them act in a manner ſo different from their former profeſſions, when they had got into power, could not be perſuaded that this was the effect of more experience, or deeper inſight into the ſtate of affairs, but that they were either corrupted by others, or intoxicated with their own power: and the ſame thing happening ſeveral times afterwards, gave riſe to the proverb, *Coſtoro hanno un' animo in piazza, & uno in palazzo, theſe men are of one opinion in the houſe, and another out of doors.*

What has been ſaid, therefore, being duly conſidered, it appears, that it is an eaſy matter to undeceive the people, by ſetting particulars before their eyes, when they have been miſled by judging of things in general, as Pacuvius did at Capua, and the Patricians at Rome; and, I think, we may conclude upon the whole, that no prudent man ought to deſpiſe the judgment of the people in particular matters, ſuch eſpecially as the diſtribution of offices and honours, in which they are ſo ſeldom wrong, that if a ſmaller number were to have the diſpoſal of them, they would err much oftener [*a*]. It may not then ſeem foreign to

[*a*] Very different is old Montaigne's opinion upon this point. "A dozen men, ſays he, muſt be called out of a whole nation, to judge of an acre of land; and the judgment of our inclinations and actions, the hardeſt and moſt important thing that is, we muſt refer to, *vox populi*, the mother of ignorance, injuſtice, and inconſtancy. Is it reaſonable that the life of a wiſe man ſhould depend upon the judgment of fools? "*An* "*quidquam Stultius*," ſays Tully in the fifth book of his Tuſculan Diſputations, "*quam* "*quos ſingulos contemnas, eos aliquid putare eſſe univerſos?*" *Can any thing be more fooliſh than to think, that thoſe you deſpiſe when ſingle, can be of any value in the bulk?* He that makes it his buſineſs to pleaſe them, will never ſucceed; it is a mark that never is to be reached or hit. "*Nihil tam ineſtimabile eſt quam opinio multitudinis.*" *Nothing is to be ſo little eſteemed as the judgment of the multitude.* Demetrius pleaſantly ſaid of the voice of the people, "That he made no more account of that which came out of their mouth, than of what "ſum'd from their lower parts." Cicero goes further in his ſecond book *definibus*. "*Ego* "*hoc judico*, ſays he, *ſi quando non turpe ſit, tamen non eſſe non turpe, quum id a multitudine laudatur.*" *I am of opinion that though a thing be not foul in itſelf, yet it cannot but become ſo when it is commended by the multitude.* No art, no dexterity, could conduct our ſteps in following ſo wandering and ſo irregular a guide. In the confuſion and noiſe of vulgar opinion no good path can be choſen: let us not then propoſe to ourſelves ſo variable a Conductor: let us conſtantly follow our own right reaſon; let the approbation of the public *follow us*, if they will; and as it wholly depends upon fortune, we have no cauſe to expect it ſooner any other way than that,

—— Non

to our purpoſe, to ſhew in the next Chapter what methods the Senators of Rome took to over-reach the Plebeians, in diſtributions of this nature.

CHAP. XLVIII.

To prevent a mean or wicked man from being advanced to the Magiſtracy, care ſhould be taken to ſet a Candidate of the nobleſt family, and moſt eminent merit, in competition with one of the baſeſt and vileſt of the People.

WHEN the Patricians began to be apprehenſive that the Tribunes, veſted with Conſular power, would be choſen out of the Plebeians, they always had recourſe to one or other of theſe two expedients; they either ſet up ſome of the worthieſt and moſt reſpectable men in the Commonwealth, or corrupted ſome of the moſt ſordid and baſeſt of the Plebeians to ſtand Candidates, amongſt other competitors of better reputation in that body, and boldly to ſollicit that honour for themſelves. The latter method made the people aſhamed of beſtowing it upon ſuch unworthy men; and the former of not giving it to

—— Non quicquid turbida Roma
Elevet, accedas, examenque improbum in illâ
Caſtiges trutinâ, nec te quæſiveris extra.

—— Whatever reſtleſs Rome
Extols or cenſures, truſt not to its doom:
Stand not th' award of an ill-judging town,
Nor by its falſer ſcale adjuſt your own.
No, no, for other judgments aſk no more,
To know thyſelf, thyſelf alone explore.

PERSIUS, Sat. i. v. 5,

If popular opinion, nevertheleſs, be of that uſe to the Public, as to keep men in their duty; if ſome are thereby excited to virtue; if Princes are moved by hearing the world bleſs the memory of Trajan, and abominate that of Nero; if it moves them to ſee the name of that great beaſt, once ſo terrible and dreaded, now ſo freely curſed and reviled by every ſchool-boy, let it, in the name of Heaven, increaſe and be cheriſhed as much as poſſible amongſt us. For even Plato himſelf, bending his whole endeavour to make his Citizens virtuous, adviſes them not to deſpiſe the good eſteem of the People, and ſays, "That it happens by a certain Divine inſpiration, that even the wicked themſelves, "as well by word as opinion, can often diſtinguiſh the good from the evil." This Perſon and his Tutor are marvellous bold Artificers, to add Divine operations and Revelations wherever human force is wanting: and perhaps it was for this reaſon, that Timon railing at him, calls him *the great Forger of Miracles*, as Cicero ſays in his firſt book *de naturâ deorum*, Cap. xx. "*Ut Tragici Poetæ confugiunt ad Deum aliquem, cum aliter explicare argumenti exitum non poſſunt.*" *As Tragic poets have recourſe to ſome Deity, when they cannot otherwiſe tell how to wind up the plot.*" Book II. Eſſay 16.

thoſe

thoſe that were the moſt deſerving. This may ſerve as a corroboration of what I ſaid in the preceding Chapter, that though the people are frequently deceived in judging of generals, they very ſeldom err in particulars.

CHAP. XLIX.

If ſuch Cities as Rome, which were originally free, found it exceeding difficult to make laws ſufficiently effectual to ſecure their liberties; it is almoſt impoſſible for thoſe that have always been in a ſtate of ſervility and dependence ever to become free.

HOW difficult a matter it is to eſtabliſh ſuch laws in a Commonwealth, as may at all times effectually preſerve its liberties, is ſufficiently evident from the hiſtory of the Roman Republic. For though many good proviſions were at firſt made by Romulus, and afterwards by Numa, then by Tullus Hoſtilius, Servius, and laſtly by the Decemviri who were created for that purpoſe; yet in proceſs of time freſh exigencies and accidents often made new laws neceſſary; as it happened when they created the Cenſorſhip, which was one of thoſe Inſtitutions that chiefly contributed to preſerve the liberties of Rome ſo long; for as the Cenſors were appointed to inſpect the manners and conduct of the Citizens, and to correct their enormities and extravagancies, it was in a great meaſure owing to them that they continued uncorrupt for ſuch a number of years. They were guilty of a great error however, in the creation of thoſe officers, as they were to continue five years in power: but this was afterwards wiſely corrected by Mamercus the Dictator, and the term of their authority reduced to eighteen months: at which the Cenſors were exaſperated to ſuch a degree, and watched his conduct ſo narrowly, that they found means at laſt to expel him the Senate, to the great regret both of the Patricians and the Plebeians. That Livy does not inform us whether Mamercus found any redreſs upon this occaſion, muſt either be a neglect in the Hiſtorian, or a defect in the laws: for ſurely that Commonwealth cannot be wiſely conſtituted, where a Citizen is liable to be perſecuted without reſource or means of defence, only for promulging a law for the maintenance of the public liberty.

But to our purpoſe: I ſay that from the creation of theſe Magiſtrates, we may obſerve how difficult it is, even in Cities that were free from the beginning, like Rome, and ſubject to no other power, to make ſufficient proviſions for the ſupport of liberty: and, how almoſt impoſſible for other Cities, which were founded, and always have lived in ſubjection

jection, ever to make ſuch laws as may effectually ſecure them in the enjoyment of liberty and tranquillity. We might inſtance in the caſe of Florence, which being ſubject to the Roman Empire from the beginning, and always accuſtomed to live under the government of others, continued a long time in that State of ſervility, without ſo much as ever aſpiring to liberty: at laſt, however, ſome little attempt was made, and the Citizens began to form new laws for themſelves; but as they were mixed and entangled with the old ones, which were bad, they had little or no efficacy: and thus they continued two hundred years, as appears from authentic hiſtory, without any regular form of Government that deſerved the name of a Republic. The ſame difficulties and inconveniencies that occurred in that State, have ever been incident to all others, which had the like beginnings: and though ample authority has often been truſted in the hands of a few Citizens, to new model it by the free ſuffrages of the people, yet they never conſulted the good of the public in thoſe reformations, ſo much as their own private advantage: whence it came to paſs, that things grew worſe and worſe, inſtead of better, and their confuſion daily increaſed.

But to be ſtill more particular: Amongſt other things which ought to be conſidered by a Legiſlator, he ſhould take great care in whoſe hands he lodges the cognizance of capital cauſes, and the execution of penal laws [*b*]. This was well attended to at Rome; an appeal to the people being

[*b*] Lord Bacon, in a piece entitled, *A Propoſition to his Majeſty for the compilement and amendment of our Laws*, ſays, "It is certain that our Laws, as they now ſtand are ſubject to great uncertainty and variety of opinions, delays, and evaſions: from whence it follows: 1. That the multiplicity and length of ſuits are great; 2. That the contentious perſon is armed, and the honeſt ſubject wearied and oppreſſed; 3. That the judge is more abſolute, who has a greater liberty in doubtful caſes; 4. That the Chancery Courts are more filled, the remedy of the Law being often obſcure and doubtful; 5. That the ignorant Lawyer ſhrouds his ignorance of Law in this, that there are ſo many and ſo frequent doubts; 6. That mens aſſurances of their lands and eſtates by Patents, Deeds, and Wills, are often ſubject to queſtion and precarious; and many inconveniencies of that nature." He then obſerves, "That if it had not been for Sir Edward Coke's Reports, the law by that time would have been almoſt like a Ship without Ballaſt; ſince the Caſes of modern experience are fled from thoſe that have been adjudged and ruled in former times." "But the neceſſity of this work," continues he, "is yet greater in the Statute Law. For firſt, there is a number of enſnaring penal laws, which lie upon the ſubject, and if they ſhould be awaked, and put in execution in bad times, would grind them to powder. There is a learned Civilian who expounds that paſſage in the Scripture, "*Pluet laqueos ſuper eos*," *It ſhall rain ſnares upon them*, of a multitude of penal Laws, which are worſe than ſhowers of hail and tempeſt upon Cattle, becauſe they fall upon men. There are ſome penal Laws fit to be retained, but their penalty is too great; and it is ever a rule, that any over-great penalty (beſides the acerbity of it) deadens the execution of the Law. There is a further inconvenience of penal Laws, obſolete and out of uſe; for that it brings a gangrene, neglect, and habit of diſobedience upon other wholeſome Laws, that are fit to be continued in practice and execution: ſo that our Laws endure the torment of Mezentius,

being allowed in moſt caſes: and in any matter where the neceſſity was preſſing, and it might be dangerous to delay the execution of juſtice by an appeal, they created a Dictator, who ſaw it immediately performed; they never had recourſe to this remedy however, except upon very urgent occaſions. But Florence, and other Cities of the ſame ſervile caſt, had a foreign officer ſent to reſide amongſt them by their Prince, who veſted this authority in him: which cuſtom they kept up after they became free, and continued the ſame power in a foreigner, whom they called their *Captain*; a dangerous practice indeed! conſidering how eaſily ſuch a perſon might be corrupted by the more powerful Citizens [*c*]. But other revolutions happening in that State, this cuſtom was afterwards changed, and eight of their own Citizens were appointed to execute the Office of Captain, which was ſtill worſe and worſe; becauſe, as I have ſaid elſewhere, where there are but few Magiſtrates, they are always liable to be made tools of to thoſe, that have the chief power in their hands. Againſt this inconvenience, they have made admirable proviſion at Venice, where there is a *Council of Ten* appointed, with power to puniſh any Citizen without appeal: and leſt their authority ſhould not be ſufficient to controul perſons of more than ordinary power or quality, there are two *Councils of Forty* [*d*], and the *Pregadi* [*e*] beſides, (which is the higheſt Court in that City) and all of them commiſſioned to take cognizance of capital offences, and to puniſh them: ſo that, if there is any body to accuſe, there are always judges enough, and of ſufficient authority to curb offenders of the higheſt rank. If Rome then, which was originally free, and governed by ſo many wiſe Citizens of its own, found daily occaſion to make new laws for the maintenance of its liberties, according to the variety of unexpected contingencies; it is no wonder that other Cities, which ſtood upon ſo much weaker foundations, ſhould meet with ſuch difficulties and obſtacles in their way, that they could never ſurmount them, and become perfectly free.

" tius, the living die in the arms of the dead. Laſtly, there is ſuch an accumulation of " Statutes concerning one matter, and they are ſo croſs and intricate, that the certainty " of the Law is loſt in the heap." If there was reaſon for ſuch a repreſentation at that time; ſurely there is much more at preſent. But we may thank Heaven, that *the cognizance of capital cauſes, and the execution of penal Laws are lodged in ſuch hands as they are*; otherwiſe what would become of us?

[*c*] See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book II. towards the beginning, and *alibi paſſim*.

[*d*] *Le Quarantie* are two Tribunals, each of which conſiſts of forty judges, and has its particular juriſdiction, one taking cognizance of criminal, the other of civil cauſes.

[*e*] This Council is compoſed of two hundred Senators, and is called the *Pregadi*, or *Court of Requeſts*, becauſe at its firſt inſtitution it was *prayed* to charge itſelf with the care of the Commonwealth.

CHAP. L.

That no one Magiſtrate or Council ſhould have it in their power to ſtop the courſe of public affairs in a Commonwealth.

TITUS Quintius Cincinnatus, and Caius Julius Mento, being Collegues in the Conſulſhip at Rome, but diſagreeing and thwarting each other in their meaſures, all public buſineſs was at a ſtand: upon which, the Senate adviſed them to create a Dictator to expedite the affairs, which their quarrels would not ſuffer them to diſpatch as they ought to do themſelves. But the Conſuls, though they differed in every thing elſe, unanimouſly agreed to oppoſe the creation of a Dictator: ſo that the Senators having no other remedy, were obliged to have recourſe to the Tribunes, who, with the aſſiſtance of the Senate, at laſt compelled them to ſubmit. From hence, in the firſt place, we may obſerve, of how great utility the Inſtitution of Tribunes was to that Republic, not only in curbing the ambition and inſolence of the Patricians to the Plebeians, but in moderating the differences and emulations that happened amongſt themſelves: and in the next, that ſpecial care ſhould be taken in a Commonwealth, not to put it in the power of a few perſons to clog or impede the common courſe of affairs, particularly of things, the diſpatch whereof, is abſolutely neceſſary for the ſupport and welfare of the State. For example, if you lodge the power of diſtributing honours and emoluments in the hands of ſuch a Council, or appoint ſuch an officer to execute any other of your commands, you ought either to make ſome proviſion beforehand, that will force them to diſcharge thoſe functions; or in caſe they will not, to reſerve a power of appointing others that may and will: otherwiſe that Inſtitution will be both defective and dangerous; as it would have proved at Rome, in the inſtance juſt now quoted, if they had not had the authority of the Tribunes to quell the obſtinacy and perverſeneſs of the Conſuls.

In the Republic of Venice, where the majority of the great Council have the diſpoſal of all honours and employments, it once happened, either through diſguſt, or ſome other motive, that they would not appoint any new Magiſtrates to ſucceed the old ones in their ſeveral departments either at home or abroad, when their authority expired; which preſently occaſioned great confuſion and diſorder: for the towns that depended upon them, and indeed their own City itſelf, being left deſtitute of lawful judges, could obtain no redreſs in any injury, till either the majority of that council were appeaſed, or ſome other expedient

pedient found out. And certainly this would have been attended with fatal conſequences, if they had not been prevented by ſome of the moſt prudent Citizens, who took a favourable opportunity to get a law paſſed, that no office or employment whatſoever, either within the City or without it, ſhould ever be vacated till new officers were choſen to ſuperſede the old ones: and thus this defect was remedied, and the great Council deprived of a power to interrupt the courſe of juſtice and other public affairs, which otherwiſe muſt have ended in the total diſſolution of that State.

CHAP. LI.

That a Prince or Republic ſhould ſeem to do that out of favour and liberality, which they are forced to do by neceſſity.

WISE men make the beſt of all times and accidents, and if ever they find themſelves under an abſolute neceſſity of acting in ſuch or ſuch a manner, yet they always contrive to do it with ſo good a grace, that it ſeems rather the effect of favour and liberality. Of this addreſs the Roman Senate availed itſelf, when it reſolved to pay the Soldiery out of the public treaſury, who before were obliged to maintain themſelves in time of war at their own expence. For the Senate perceiving that no war could be long ſupported upon that footing, and conſequently that they ſhould neither be able to carry on any ſiege of importance, nor tranſport their armies into diſtant countries, both which they thought muſt ſometime become neceſſary, reſolved to pay them out of the public ſtock: yet it was done in ſuch a manner, that they made a merit of what was entirely owing to neceſſity: by which they firmly ſecured the affections of the people, who were overjoyed at a favour ſo extraordinary, that they never had conceived any hopes of obtaining, nor even ſo much as thought of ſoliciting it. And though the Tribunes took great pains to perſuade them, that it was ſo far from being an Act of Grace as they imagined, that it would rather be a very heavy burden than otherwiſe, as grievous taxes muſt be laid upon them to defray that expence, and conſequently that if the Senate was bountiful, it was out of other men's purſes; yet all their remonſtrances were to no purpoſe, for the people ſtill looked upon it as a great obligation, which too they thought conſiderably enhanced by the manner of raiſing the taxes; much the heavier part of them being levied upon the nobility and firſt demanded.

CHAP. LII.

The beſt, the ſafeſt, and leaſt offenſive way to repreſs the inſolence of a private perſon, who grows too powerful in a Commonwealth, is to be beforehand with him in the means he takes to advance himſelf.

WE have ſeen in the laſt Chapter how wonderfully the Senate ingratiated themſelves with the Plebeians, by their ſeeming bounty, in allowing them pay in their wars, and by their lenity in collecting the taxes: and if they had perſiſted in that courſe, they would not only have prevented all ſubſequent diſſenſions in Rome, but wholly deprived the Tribunes of their credit with the people, and conſequently of all authority in the City. For indeed there is no better method, nor eaſier, nor leſs apt to excite diſturbances in a Commonwealth, eſpecially a corrupt one, when an ambitious and overgrown Citizen is to be oppoſed, than to anticipate him in the ways and means by which he propoſes to accompliſh his deſigns. It is certain, if this method had been followed by Coſimo de' Medici's enemies, it would have been better for them than driving him out of Florence: for had they imitated his example in careſſing and cajoling the people, they might have diſarmed him of thoſe weapons which he moſt effectually availed himſelf of, without violence or diſguſt. Pietro Soderini acquired all the power he had in Florence merely by favouring and cheriſhing the people, which gave him the general reputation of their Protector and Champion of the public liberty: and without doubt thoſe Citizens, who began to grow jealous of his authority, would have acted much more wiſely, more honourably, and ſecurely in foreſtalling him in the ways he took to aggrandize himſelf, than in oppoſing him with ſuch vehemence as to endanger their country at the ſame time: for, if they had deprived him of thoſe arms, in which his ſtrength chiefly conſiſted (as they eaſily might have done) they would have had it in their power to over-rule and defeat his meaſures in all Councils and public deliberations, without any violence or the leaſt apprehenſion of the people. But ſhould any one object, that if the Citizens, who oppoſed Pietro, were guilty of an error, in not being beforehand with him in the methods by which he gained ſuch a reputation amongſt the people; I anſwer, that Pietro likewiſe was wanting to himſelf in not guarding againſt the means which they took to make themſelves formidable to him. In this however, he was in ſome meaſure excuſable, becauſe, in the firſt place, it would have been exceeding difficult and dangerous; and in the next, he did not think it conſiſtent with his honour: for the means

they

they took to pull him down were to ſet up the Medici againſt him, by whoſe co-operation they ſucceeded in their deſigns, and at laſt effected his ruin. Pietro therefore, could not in honour deſert the people, whoſe liberties he had undertaken to defend, and go over to the Medici: nor, if he had ſo deſigned, could he have done it ſo ſecretly and ſuddenly, but the people would have been aware of it, which muſt have been of fatal conſequence to him; for then they would have perſecuted him as much as ever they had careſſed him before: ſo that it would have encreaſed the ſtrength of his enemies, and given them a fairer opportunity of ruining him.

It is neceſſary therefore, in all undertakings, to conſider every thing maturely beforehand, and not to take a reſolution in which the danger is ſure to over-balance the advantage propoſed, how feaſible ſoever it may appear in ſome lights: otherwiſe, a man may expect to be ſerved as Cicero was; who, inſtead of ruining Marc Anthony, as he deſigned, ſtill added to his reputation and greatneſs: for when Anthony had aſſembled a powerful army, conſiſting chiefly of the ſoldiers who had followed the fortune of Julius Cæſar, and was declared an enemy to his Country by the Senate, Cicero, in order to alienate the affections of his Soldiers from him, adviſed the Senate to put Octavius at the head of their army, and ſend him with the Conſuls againſt Anthony; alledging, that the very name of Octavius Cæſar (as he was Nephew to Julius) would bring over all his uncle's friends to him, by which Anthony muſt be ſo weakened, that it would be an eaſy matter to ſuppreſs him. But it happened quite contrary; for Octavius being corrupted by Anthony, deſerted the intereſts of Cicero and the Senate, and joined their enemy; by which alliance, both they and their whole party were utterly ruined. And this indeed might have eaſily been foreſeen: ſo that they ſhould by no means have liſtened to Cicero's advice, but have been jealous of the very name of a perſon, who had enſlaved his Country, and made himſelf abſolute lord over it: and not to have ſo fondly hoped that any of his family or followers would ever do any thing in favour of liberty.

CHAP. LIII.

That the People, deluded by a falſe appearance of advantage, often ſeek their own deſtruction: and that they are eaſily moved by magnificent hopes and promiſes.

AFTER the Romans had taken the City of Veii, the people became poſſeſſed with a conceit, that it would be much for the advantage of the State, if one half of them ſhould go to live there;

as

as the country was ſo rich and full of good buildings, that it would ſupport them very well, and the City ſo near Rome, that it could not occaſion any confuſion or alteration in the government of the Commonwealth. But the Senate and wiſeſt of the other Citizens thought this would be of ſo pernicious conſequence, that they freely and publicly declared they would ſooner die, than ever conſent to it: ſo that when the thing came to be debated, the people were exaſperated at the Senate to ſuch a degree, that they would certainly have taken up arms, and great tumults and bloodſhed muſt have enſued, if ſome of the oldeſt and moſt reſpectable Citizens had not interpoſed their authority and checked the fury of the multitude.

From hence we may obſerve, in the firſt place, that the populace are often ſo far deceived with a falſe appearance of good, as to ſolicit their own ruin and bring infinite dangers and difficulties upon the Commonwealth, if they are not undeceived by ſome perſon whom they reverence and confide in, and convinced by him that they are in the wrong. But when it happens that they have been formerly deceived either by perſons, or in the appearance of things, and cannot repoſe that confidence in any one, then ruin muſt of neceſſity enſue. So true is what Dante tells us in his Canto upon Monarchy.

Il popolo molte volte grida
Viva la ſua morte, & muoia la ſua vita.

Strange caprice! oft the ſenſeleſs multitude
Chuſe death inſtead of life, and ill for good.

To this diffidence in the people it is ſometimes owing that a Commonwealth cannot come to any good reſolution, as we have obſerved before with regard to the Venetians, who, being attacked by many enemies at once, could not reſolve to make their peace with any one of them, by reſtoring what they uſurped; which was the cauſe [*f*] of the war wherein ſo many powers combined againſt them, that they were brought almoſt to the brink of ruin.

If we conſider therefore, to what things it is eaſy, and to what it is difficult to perſuade the multitude, we ſhall find, that if the meaſures propoſed to them appear at firſt ſight to be either magnanimous, or like to be attended with great profit, they come into them with much eagerneſs, though ever ſo deſtructive at the bottom: on the other hand, if they ſeem puſillanimous, or ſuch as may expoſe them to loſs, it will be very difficult, if not impoſſible to make them go down, notwith-

[*f*] The famous League of Cambray.

ſtanding

ſtanding others may be convinced, that they will really prove ſalutary and advantageous in the end. The truth of this may be confirmed by numberleſs examples out of the Roman, and other Hiſtories, both ancient and modern. From hence aroſe the bad opinion which the people of Rome conceived of Fabius Maximus, who never could perſuade them that it was the ſafeſt way to act upon the defenſive againſt Hannibal, and to waſte his forces by ſlow meaſures, without hazarding an engagement with him: for they thought it looked like cowardice, and not being able to diſcern the expediency of proceeding in that manner, his arguments had not the leaſt effect upon them. Nay, ſo obſtinately do people ſometimes perſiſt in errors of this kind, that though they gave the officer who was next in command under Fabius, authority to fight the enemy, in ſpite of his General and their army, would certainly have been routed, if it had not been prevented by the prudence of Fabius; yet they were ſo far from being convinced of their error, that they afterwards made Varro Conſul upon no other account, but becauſe he had boaſted up and down, in every public place of the City, that if they would veſt him with proper authority, he would ſoon give a good account of Hannibal and his army. What was the conſequence? He fought him indeed, but ſuffered ſo total a defeat at Cannæ, that Rome was never before in ſuch danger of utter ruin. Let me cite another inſtance out of the ſame Hiſtory. Hannibal having been in Italy eight or ten years, had filled that Province with the ſlaughter of the Romans, when Marcus Centenius Penula (a man of very mean extraction, but of ſome rank in the army) preſented himſelf one day to the Senate, and told them, that if they would give him a Commiſſion to raiſe an army of volunteers, he would engage to deliver Hannibal either dead or alive into their hands very ſoon. Now, though the Senators looked upon this only as a piece of fool-hardineſs, yet, conſidering, that if his requeſt ſhould be refuſed, and the people come to know of it, perhaps it might occaſion ill-blood and ſedition in the City, if not a diſguſt to their order, they thought fit to comply with it; chuſing rather to hazard the loſs of thoſe that were ſimple enough to follow him, than to run the riſque of exciting freſh diſcords at home; as they well knew how much ſuch a reſolution would be applauded by the people, and how impoſſible to convince them of its abſurdity. In conſequence of this Commiſſion, he marched with a diſorderly and undiſciplined body of men againſt Hannibal, whom he engaged, but failed of his promiſe; for he, and all the reſt of them were cut to pieces. If we look into the Grecian Hiſtory, we ſhall there find, that Nicias, one of the wiſeſt of the Athenians, could never make that people ſenſible of the pernicious conſequences that muſt proceed from their invading Sicily: ſo that in contempt of his opinion, and that of other prudent men,

men, they perſiſted in an expedition which proved the ruin of their State. When Scipio was made Conſul, he deſired to have Africa for his province, and ſaid he would undertake to demoliſh Carthage; but as the Senate, by the advice of Fabius Maximus, refuſed him that favour, he threatened to propoſe it to the people, well knowing how fond they were of ſuch enterprizes. We might likewiſe produce ſeveral examples in our own City, as when Hercules Bentivoglio, and Antonio Giacomini, generals of the Florentine forces, had routed Bartolomeo de' Alviano, at St. Vincenzo, and went to lay ſiege to Piſa. This undertaking was reſolved on by the people, who were in a manner faſcinated by the poſitive aſſurance of ſucceſs they had from Bentivoglio, though moſt of the wiſeſt Citizens oppoſed it: but the tide ran ſo ſtrong againſt them, and the people were ſo dazzled with thoſe promiſes, that it was all to no purpoſe.

I ſay then, that there is no ſurer way to ruin a Commonwealth, in which the people have any conſiderable ſhare of authority, than to propoſe gallant, but dangerous enterprizes to them; for where they have the greateſt weight, ſuch undertakings will always be embraced as ſeem to carry an air of magnanimity with them; nor will any other perſon who diſſents from them, how wiſe ſoever he may be, have it in his power to provide a remedy.

But let it be remembered, at the ſame time, that if theſe things moſt commonly end in the deſtruction of the State, the particular promoters and conductors of them very ſeldom eſcape ruin: for, as the people make not the leaſt doubt of ſucceſs, ſo they never impute any miſcarriage to ill fortune, or want of power in the Commander, but to treachery or ignorance; for which, he is almoſt certainly either put to death, or baniſhed, or impriſoned: as it happened to many of the Carthaginian and Athenian Generals. Nor are their former ſucceſſes and ſervices in the leaſt conſidered upon theſe occaſions: their preſent misfortune cancels the memory of all paſt merits; as it fell out in the caſe of the abovementioned Antonio Giacomini, who, not taking Piſa as he had promiſed [g], and the people expected, fell into ſuch diſgrace with them, that, notwithſtanding the many great ſervices he had formerly done the Republic, he was ſuffered to live more through the lenity and gratitude of thoſe that were in authority, than from any conviction of his innocence, or deſire in the people to ſave him.

[g] Machiavel ſays a little before that it was Bentivoglio, that gave them aſſurance of ſucceſs: ſo that he ſeems to have made a miſtake here.

CHAP.

CHAP. LIV.

How greatly the preſence of a grave man in authority contributes to appeaſe an enraged multitude.

THE ſecond thing obſervable from the paſſage related in the beginning of the laſt Chapter, is, that nothing conduces more to bridle the rage of an angry multitude, than the preſence of ſome grave man in authority: for as Virgil ſays,

> Tum pietate gravem ac meritis ſi forte virum quem
> Conſpexêre, ſilent, arrectiſque auribus adſtant. ÆN. I. 154.
>
> If then ſome grave and pious man appear,
> They huſh their noiſe, and lend a liſt'ning ear. DRYDEN.

Thoſe therefore that command armies or govern cities, ſhould always upon any mutiny or ſedition, take care to preſent themſelves (whether to their Soldiers or Citizens) in the moſt reſpectable and awful manner, clothed in all their enſigns of office and authority, to inſpire the greater veneration and reverence. Not many years ago Florence was divided into two factions, called the *Frateſchi* and *Arrabiati*, who at laſt fell together by the ears: but the former being worſted, and the mob on the other ſide going to plunder the houſe of Paolantonio Soderini, (one of the heads of the Frateſchi, and a Citizen of great reputation in the Republic at that time) his brother Franciſco, then Biſhop of Volterra, and now a Cardinal, happening to be there and hearing the uproar, immediately put on his richeſt robes and Epiſcopal Rochet, and went out to meet the armed multitude, whom he ſoon appeaſed by gentle language and the dignity of his perſon: a circumſtance that was much talked of, and applauded at that time. I conclude then, that there is no way ſo proper or neceſſary to compoſe a popular commotion, as the interpoſition of ſome perſon of a grave and reſpectable preſence. —To return therefore to the ſubject of the laſt chapter, we may ſee from the inſtance there cited, how obſtinately the Roman people were bent upon removing to Veii, becauſe they had taken it into their heads that it would be greatly for their advantage, without ever conſidering the diſadvantages that lay concealed under ſo ſpecious an appearance: and that from the tumults which aroſe upon that occaſion great miſchiefs muſt have enſued, if the Senate had not wiſely applied the authority and good offices of ſome grave and reſpectable perſons to prevent them.

CHAP. LV.

How eaſy a matter it is to govern a State where the People are not corrupted; how hard to erect a Principality where there is an equality amongſt them; and that where there is no equality, a Commonwealth cannot be eſtabliſhed.

THOUGH we have elſewhere already diſcourſed at large concerning what is to be hoped or feared from corrupted States, it may not appear altogether ſuperfluous however, to conſider a reſolution of the Roman Senate, upon a vow made by Camillus to dedicate a tenth part of the ſpoils taken from the Veientes to Apollo. But this booty having fallen into the hands of the Commonalty, and there being no other way of getting an exact account of it, the Senate publiſhed an edict, requiring every one to bring a tenth part of his plunder to the public Treaſury. Now though this edict was ſoon after revoked, and another method found of ſhewing their gratitude to Apollo, without diſguſting the people [*b*], yet it ſhews the confidence which the Senate had in their honour, and that they made no doubt of their punctually fulfilling the purport of the edict as they were commanded: and on the other hand, we ſee that the people did not take any indirect means to evade the force of it by delivering falſe accounts, but openly and honeſtly oppoſed it as an illegal exaction. This and many other examples which I have adduced before upon other occaſions, may ſerve to demonſtrate the probity and devotion of that people, and what confidence was repoſed in them upon that account. Indeed no good at all is to be expected where theſe principles are not to be found, as we have ſufficient experience at preſent in thoſe States that are moſt corrupted; but above all in Italy, and even in France and Spain too, which are not without their ſhare of corruption: and if there are not altogether ſo many diſorders in the two laſt mentioned, as daily happen in Italy, it is not ſo much owing to the virtue of the people, who are much degenerated, as to the form of their government, which being Monarchial, keeps them united by the power of their Princes and the vigour of their laws, which are not yet totally corrupted. In Germany indeed there ſtill remain ſtrong traces of ancient goodneſs and virtue: to which it is owing that many Republics

[*b*] As it was reſolved to ſend a golden veſſel to Delphos, and there was no gold to be had in the City, the Roman Ladies did a very generous thing upon this occaſion, which delivered the people out of their perplexity: for they met together, and agreed to conſecrate all their Jewels to this purpoſe. In acknowledgement of which ſacrifice, the Senate granted them the honour of funeral Orations, which the men only had been favoured with till that time.

there

there retain their liberty, and keep up their laws and diſcipline in ſuch force, that no enemy, either foreign or domeſtic, dares to attack them [*i*]: and that this is really matter of fact, I ſhall prove from an example not altogether unlike that juſt now mentioned relating to the Senate and people of Rome. When theſe Republics have occaſion for money upon the public account, the Councils or Magiſtrates in whom the ſupreme authority is lodged, lay a tax of one, and ſometimes perhaps of two *per cent.* according as the exigency requires, upon every man's property: after which, at the time and place appointed, the people having firſt taken an oath that they pay their reſpective proportions to the full of their property, throw their money into a cheſt provided for that purpoſe by the Collectors of the taxes, who never count it, or require any other proof or voucher, but their own conſciences. From hence it appears, how much virtue and regard to Religion are left amongſt this people: for we may be aſſured that every man pays his due; becauſe if they did not, the whole would not amount to the ſum it uſed to do at the ſame rate; in which caſe the fraud would have been long ago detected and another method taken. And this degree of honour and integrity is ſo much the more to be admired, as it is now ſo rare, and to ſpeak truth, hardly any where elſe to be found; which I think is chiefly owing to two cauſes. In the firſt place, they never have had much commerce with their neighbours, being ſeldom viſited by them, and ſeldomer going abroad themſelves; but living contented with the food and clothing which are the product of their own country, and thereby preventing all opportunities of evil converſation that might corrupt their manners: by which means they have kept themſelves untainted by the example of the French, the Spaniards, and Italians, three nations that are wicked enough to debauch the whole world. In the next place, thoſe Commonwealths that have kept themſelves free and uncorrupt, will not ſuffer any of their Subjects to live like gentlemen; on the contrary, they always maintain as much equality amongſt them as they can: and in Germany they hold ſuch perſons in ſo great abhorrence, that if by chance any of them fall under their laſh, they certainly put them to death as the authors of all corruption and diſorder. By *Gentlemen*, I mean ſuch as live in idleneſs and luxury upon the income of their eſtates, without any profeſſion or employment; a ſort of Subjects that are very pernicious in every Republic and Province: though indeed thoſe are ſtill more ſo that are called Lords, and have Caſtellanies and Juriſdictions and Vaſſals of their own. With theſe two ſorts of men the Kingdom of Naples, the territories of Rome, Romagna, and Lombardy abound: from

[*i*] The great and rapid conqueſts which Charles V. made in this Country but a few years after, ſhew, either that our Author's Maxim does not always hold good; or that the Germans were become very corrupt, all on a ſudden as it were.

CHAP. LVI.

Before any great misfortune befals a State, it is generally either prognoſticated by ſome Portent, or foretold by ſome Perſon or other.

WE ſee from many inſtances, both in ancient and modern Hiſtory, that before any great misfortune happens to a State, it is commonly foretold either by ſoothſayers, or revelation, or ſigns in the heavens, or ſome other prodigy [*m*]. How this comes to paſs I know not: but

[*m*] As the turn of this Chapter is remarkably ſuperſtitious, it may not be amiſs to take a little more than ordinary notice of it. The notion it chiefly inculcates cannot be better refuted, I think, than it is in a *Diſcourſe publiſhed at Cambridge by the learned Dr. Spencer in the year* 1663, *concerning Prodigies: wherein the vanity of Preſages by them is reprehended, and their true and proper ends aſſerted and vindicated:* a ſecond edition of which was publiſhed at London in 1665. This excellent diſcourſe was written upon occaſion of ſome pieces printed under the title of *Annus Mirabilis*, containing an account of ſeveral Prodigies ſaid to have happened immediately after the Reſtoration, viz. in the years 1660, 1661, 1662, and drawn up by ſome one or more of the Nonconformiſts, in order to prejudice weak minds againſt Conformity to the eſtabliſhed Religion, as a Scheme which was bringing down God's Judgments upon this nation. The Author alludes to theſe pieces in his Preface, where he ſays, "We have been of late perſuaded by three or four ſeveral impreſſions of books (more than were ever vented in any Ethnic or Chriſtian Commonwealth in a much larger period of time), that England is grown Africa, and preſents us every year ſince the Reſtoration of his Majeſty, with a new ſcene of monſtrous and ſtrange ſights held forth to the people as black clouds before a ſtorm, or harbingers of ſome ſtrange and unuſual plagues approaching the State. And this by Perſons (for the Prefaces ſpeak in the plural) pretending an intimacy with the Scripture, the Fathers, both Greek and Latin, and with ancient and modern writers. An example more juſtly meriting the public wonder, than any thoſe books contain, but that the nation (like the womb of Rebecca) carries ſuch ſtriving and conteſting parties in it." The following extract from the ſame Preface, though a long one indeed, may not ſeem altogether ſuperfluous perhaps, as the Subject is important, and the book itſelf become very ſcarce. He obſerves, "that the deſign of this Diſcourſe is, with freedom and ſobriety, to make enquiry how far any kind of Prodigies, *Signal* or *Penal*, may be drawn into conſequence, to conclude the counſels of heaven from them: and whether that faith and Religion with which the Multitude receive them, be not eſpecially owing to thoſe two credulous and ſuperſtitious Principles, *Fear* and *Ignorance*, which uſually manage and deprave their affections and concluſions. I readily foreſee, that as to ſome perſons more eaſily moved by the common air of popular Suffrages, Religion will ſeem too much concerned in the argument, to be diſhonoured to a queſtion: ſo to others of more ſevere and examined principles, it will appear to hold too much of imagination or impoſture to receive the credit of a ſerious debate: and therefore had I deſigned no higher in theſe papers than barely to be public, I ſhould have made choice of ſome more obliging theme, and wherein I ſhould be leſs forced to go upon truſt for my ſubject. But that which has reconciled me to the argument, was a regard to the *profitableneſs*, *pleaſure*, *and reaſonableneſs* of a Diſcourſe thereupon. Firſt, it will (in deſign at leaſt) be *profitable* to very great purpoſes. 1. *To ſecure the peace and tranquillity of common life.* For if whenever the ſky is red and lowering, and the face of Heaven puts on a different colour and appearance from what it uſually

but not to go far for a proof, every one knows that friar Girolamo Savonarola foretold the return of King Charles VIII. of France into Italy before

uſually looks upon us with, we muſt conclude ſome approaching ſtorm in the State, every man muſt needs hold the ſerenity of his mind by a very cracked and litigious title. How can a man (as he is counſelled) *eat his bread with joy, and drink his wine with a cheerful heart*, if every ſtrange accident muſt perſuade him, that there is a Sword of vengeance hanging over his head by a thread, and ready to fall down either upon himſelf, or that common body he is related to, in whoſe welfare every good man concerns himſelf? 2. It will alſo ſerve the honour of Religion, which the common reverence of Prodigies doth greatly treſpaſs upon: and that, firſt, as it detains men under a conſtant Pædagogy to many baſe and ſervile fears: whence Religion is eaſily concluded a great adverſary to (what it mainly deſigns to bring upon the world) a true generoſity and univerſal freedom of Spirit; and that its whole buſineſs is to ſubdue the Spirits of men to ſome little obſervances and feminine fears. Hence men quickly grow weary of it, as a yoke that continually galls them, and conclude themſelves gainers, if they may but purchaſe manhood with Atheiſm. This was that eſpecially which gave Epicurus the confidence of thruſting God and Religion quite out of the world, and of ſolving all the Phænomena of nature without calling in any aſſiſtance from the power and providence of any Agent ſuperior to natural; even that bondage and ſervility which he obſerved bored into men's ears by the Religion of his times, which was nothing but a timorous and baſe obſervance of the ſigns of Heaven, direful omens, and prodigious occurrences, againſt which evil abodements men armed themſelves with (paper againſt pot-guns) a few bodily and ineffective rites and ceremonies. Great fears, but eſpecially of God, bind in the powers of the Soul, debar it the eaſy uſe and enjoyment of itſelf, and therefore the Soul hates the womb that is thought to bear them. Religion can never become amiable, till it appears deſigned, not to throw men from themſelves by perpetual jealouſies of God, but truly to ſettle and aſſure them. In the next place, the ſuperſtition of Prodigies commits no ſmall waſte upon Religion, as the fears it creates, abuſe the minds of men. For the fears it gives them are but general for the preſent, threatening a vengeance to they know not whom, to fall they know not when, and in the iſſue vain as the ſtartlings of a child before the ſhadows of the night. Now as all the falſe miracles amongſt the Papiſts moſt fatally wound Religion, becauſe they derive a ſuſpicion upon the true ones, when once detected; ſo deluſive fears, introduced upon Religious pretences, diſcredit all the true ones, and Religion is in danger to be concluded but a kind of officious lie, abuſing the ſoftneſs and credulity of ſome men, to the ſervice of the common peace and quiet. Religion is too chaſte and ſacred to be dallied with; *non patitur luſum fides*. Pious frauds may, perhaps, help Religion in a fit, as ſtrong waters do the body; but if uſed familiarly, they diſable the native heat and ſtrength thereof. *Hay and Stubble* (ſuch I account well-meant forgeries in Religion) laid upon a good foundation, will catch fire and conſume at laſt, and leave a great ſtain and ſoil upon the very foundation. Thirdly, as it reports Religion a Syſtem of ſome Ethnic rites, ſneaking and beggarly entertainments of the mind. Now there is nothing that more effectually inclines ſubtle minds to Atheiſm, than the evaporating of Religion in the doctrine thereof into a multitude of perplexed queſtions and doubtful diſputations, which make no man wiſer or better; and in the practice thereof, into a crowd of touchy and critical modes or obſervations, that cannot command a reverence to themſelves before diſcerning minds, which ſoon ſee through them, they are ſo thin and airy. 3. It may be of uſe to reprehend a very *vulgar and pernicious error*. 1. A very *vulgar* error. I profeſs not to know any one error with which all times and perſons have been ſo fatally abuſed, as the opinion of preſages by prodigies. Whereas there are ſome falſe notions, which are *errors of the perſons*, others which are *errors of the age*, holding of the peculiar temper, condition, or circumſtances of the perſon or age in which they are found. But this ſeems to be in a manner the *error of the world*, having been juſtified by Jews, Gentiles, Chriſtians, ſome ancients, ſome moderns, ſome learned, and many ſimple. 2. A

very

very *pernicious* error; as having a moſt malign influence upon the Underſtanding, upon Philoſophy and Divinity. Firſt upon the underſtanding itſelf. No two things do ſo uſurp upon and waſte the faculty of reaſon as Enthuſiaſm and Superſtition, the one binding a faith, the other a fear upon the Soul, to which they vainly entitle ſome Divine diſcovery; both train a man to believe beyond poſſibility of proof; both inſtruct the mind to conceive (like the Mares in Pliny) merely by the wind, the vain words of ſome paſſionate man that can but pretend a Revelation or tell a ſtrange Story; both teach a man to deliver up himſelf in a kind of captivity of underſtanding, to the confident dictate of the Sons of imagination, to determine of things by meaſures fantaſtical, rules which cannot maintain themſelves in credit by any ſober and ſevere diſcourſes; both inure the mind rather to divine than judge, and to diſpute from Maxims rather vehement than ſolid; both make a man afraid to believe himſelf, and to acknowledge that truth, which overpowers his mind, and would reward its cordial entertainment with aſſurance and true freedom of Spirit; both place a man (if he prove ſo unhappy as to miſtake) beyond a poſſibility of conviction; it being in vain to preſs an argument againſt him that thinks he can confront a Revelation, a Miracle, or ſome ſtrange Judgment from Heaven upon his adverſary, to your concluſion. In ſum, there is not a greater evil in the State, than *wickedneſs eſtabliſhed by a Law*, as Bacon ſays in his *Novum Organum. Aphor.* 65. *Peſſima res eſt errorum Apotheoſis, & pro peſte intellectus habenda eſt, ſi vanis accedat veneratio:* nor is there a greater error in the Church, than error by Religion and an ignorant Devotion towards God; and therefore no pains or care can be too great to remove theſe two beams from the Eye of human underſtanding, which render it ſo inſufficient for a juſt and faithful diſcovery of objects either in Religion or common ſcience. 2. Upon Philoſophy. For when ſuperſtition hath preferred theſe Prodigies to be Divine Meſſengers, it will eaſily be inferred a neceſſary reſpect towards them, to keep ſome diſtance and not to approach them too nearly, by too buſy and curious an enquiry into their natural and immediate cauſes. Amongſt the Grecians of old, thoſe Secretaries of Nature, who firſt made a tender of the natural cauſes of lightenings and tempeſts to the rude ears of men; were blaſted with the reproach of Atheiſm, and fell under the hatred of the untutored rabble, becauſe they did not, like them, reſolve every thing extraordinary in nature as an immediate expreſſion of the power and diſpleaſure of the Deity, being able to reſolve them into their neceſſary and immediate cauſes. The Reaſon whereof ſays Pomponatius, lib. 10 *de incant.* was, becauſe whilſt aſſigning theſe neceſſary cauſes of things, they were thought, *Numen divinum quibuſdam neceſſitatibus ac terminis circumſcribere*, though they did not appoint, but report the neceſſities in nature, and thoſe not as binding to the firſt, but ſecond cauſes. An experience of which humour in the people, gave the Philoſophers the diſcretion to ſacrifice their reputation to their peace, and to ſeal up their myſteries in Symbols, Hieroglyphics, and Riddles, ſo that only ſome few, who had their own heifer to plow with, being initiated into them, were able to expound them. Ουκ εβουλετο δι αρα Σωκρατης απιχθανεσθαι τουτοις, προς ους διελεγετο, και δια τουτο αινιγματωδως αυτους ηφιειχετο και πλαγιως, ſays Ælian. Var. Hiſt. Lib. XIV. C. xv. And amongſt ourſelves the noble attempt to ſatisfy the ſubtile Phænomena of nature from cauſes natural and immediate, is thought by ſome to have ſo much of the Philoſopher, that it hath the leſs of the Chriſtian therein, and ſeems to make nature all; as if to ſhew how many wheels in a vaſt Engine move in ſubordination to the production of ſome great work, was to obſcure and eclipſe the art of the artificer. 3. Upon Divinity alſo. Not only becauſe the conceit authoriſes a liberty for men to bring into it what Divine Signs they pleaſe, without warrant from Scripture or reaſon; but becauſe it conciliates reverence to a Lie, and chriſtens the vain and ſoft fears of ignorance by the name of prudent foreſights and Religious obſervances of God; whence the Soul is brought like ſome of the ancient Heathens, to worſhip its very paſſions and diſeaſes. Stories of Prodigies may perhaps ſerve to deceive the *tædium* of a winter night; but when they once advance *a focis ad aras*, from the chimney corner to the Church, and are adopted the meaſures of Chriſtian faith, as faith, and advanced as the ſerious motives of repentance, it is time to throw contempt upon them, ſince a Lie never did, nor never can ſerve the intereſt of truth. The Church of Rome (whether to ſerve the intereſt of Philoſophy or Divinity,

I ſhall

I ſhall not here concern myſelf to enquire) hath ſometimes expreſſed herſelf by ſome of her wiſer Repreſentatives (*fas eſt & ab hoſte doceri*) a great adverſary to this inſtance of ſuperſtition, the obſervation of portentous accidents: for in the catalogue of books prohibited by Urban VIII. we find one interdicted which has this title, *Chronicum prodigiorum & Oſtentorum ab excidio mundi uſque ad annum*, 1557: and Gregory the Great, who is repreſented to poſterity as one moſt ſtudious of the propagation of Chriſtianity, was actuated by ſo great a zeal againſt it, that we are told, he took care to have Livy (that otherwiſe excellent Hiſtorian) utterly baniſhed out of all Libraries, *ob tam frequentem & accuratam portentorum enumerationem*; *for his ſo frequent and critical enumeration of all the portents which ſeemed to attend any great action and change in the State. Non abhorret a veré fide quod memoriæ proditum eſt a nonnullis, Gregorium Magnum, Pontificem Religionis Chriſtianæ propagandæ ſtudioſiſſimum, hoc tanti ſcriptoris ridiculâ ſuperſtitione offenſum, ex omnibus Bibliothecis ejus Hiſtorias curaſſe tollendas.* Caſaub. Epiſt. Dedic. in Polybium. Though I think this was too haſty and ſevere a judgment paſſed upon that Hiſtorian; whom we ſhall eaſily perceive not more leavened in mind or writing with this kind of ſour ſuperſtition, than Herodotus, Plutarch in his Lives, Dion Caſſius, Tacitus, and other Ethnic Writers (Polybius only excepted), who ſtood in no better light than he did. However this eminent perſon diſcovered a great zeal againſt the abuſe of men's minds by ſuch ſolemn follies, as the ſacred regards to prodigies are; and a great deal of zeal carries in the very nature thereof its pardon for a little over-doing. The mind of man was made for truth and goodneſs, and therefore ſhould not in any matter (if the remedy falls within our compaſs) be put off with the bare form or idol of either: but where an error hath once ſeized it, which is (what ſome ſay of a Comet) *both an evil itſelf, and a pregnant cauſe of evil*; then is there no need of the voice of thunder to awaken Charity to endeavour, as it can, its remedy and removal." In the third Section of the ſecond chapter, p. 58. 59. our Author obſerves that "the agency of the Devil ſeems not a little engaged in ſtrengthening this opinion of prodigies, with which the minds of men are ſo much poſſeſſed, for he ſerves no ſmall ends upon perſons entertained with ſuch obſervations. By ſuch curious ſpeculations he calls men off from more neceſſary ſearches and enquiries. Humble ignorance, he knows, in matters too high for us, is a fruitful mother of Devotion. It is his uſage to tempt men, like flies and moths, into the fire, by ſetting the appearance and hopes of a greater light before them. Beſides, he works men hereby into ſervile and ſuperſtitious apprehenſions of God, (for the opinion of ſuch Prodigies repreſents him to the Soul with a rod of vengeance perpetually in his hand) than which there is not a more fatal cauſe of Atheiſm in the world. A belief of a God is a Fort, which the Devil could never ſtorm by any direct temptation; and therefore he proceeds by ſuch terrible and ſervile conceits, wrought in the hearts of men, to undermine it; for perpetual jealouſies and ſlaviſh fears of God, like our heated waters, boil over at laſt, and extinguiſh that fire, that faith, and ſenſe of God, which firſt produced them. When the notion of a Deity ſtands always before the mind, like a Gorgon's head, pregnant with nothing but horrors and diſmay, it quickly works and turns it to a ſtupid neglect of him, ſo to get rid of that Οικειον Δαιμονιον, that domeſtic fiend, that mighty fear, which was its continual Executioner. Moreover, the Devil, no doubt, loves to bring men off from a noble and generous temper; and as it is the deſign of Religion to *caſt out* ſlaviſh *fear*, and to introduce a ſpirit of true freedom and confidence towards God; ſo it is the work of the Devil to call in a *Spirit of bondage* and perpetual fear, that ſo he may ſee in men the more lively and expreſs images and portraitures of himſelf, who *believes and trembles*. He would have his rites of worſhip of old Φρικτα μυστηρια, *frightful and horrible myſteries*: the idols wherein he was worſhipped, bear in their very names and titles a remembrance of that baſeneſs and ſervility of Spirit, which attended his votaries in the ſervice of ſo abſolute a tyrant, being ſtiled ſometimes *Mephelatſath*, *horrors* (as it is rendered in the Margin, 2. Chron. xv. 16. ſometimes *Gnatſabim & Aimim*, *trouble and terror*, Jer. l. 38. and the Devils are called *Sharim*, Pſalm. cvi. 36. which comes from a word that ſignifies *horrere*, becauſe uſually tendering themſelves to view in the moſt frightful ſhapes." In the fourth Section of the ſame chaptor, p. 87. 88. he remarks that, "the ſuſpicion of Atheiſm renders Machiavel not a little liable to the

suspicion of superstition. The Heathens of old styled Αθεοι εν κοσμω, *without God, or Atheists, in the world.* Ephes. ii. 12. were the most superstitious observers of Presages and Omens. Those that live in the greatest neglect of God, think they see tokens of a Divine *Nemesis* in every strange accident they behold. Superstition and Atheism, like water and ice, produce one another; slavish and superstitious fears of God leading to Atheism as their cure, and Atheism leading to greater fears of him, as its deserved punishment. Tully hath left the following passage upon record concerning Epicurus, whose doctrine was wholly calculated to bear down all fears of God, *Nec quemquam vidi, qui magis ea quæ timenda esse negaret, timeret; Mortem dico & Deos. I never saw any one more afraid than himself, of those very things which he affirmed were not to be feared at all; I mean death and the Gods.* And it is great justice that that wickedness should be punished with false fears, which hath discarded the true. Those, that will not fear God, and Hell, and Sin, will yet fear a Prodigy; being therein like the horse (to which they stand compared, Jer. viii. 6.) which will start at its own shadow, and yet run furiously and without fear into the battle." Amongst the remedies which he proposes against the superstition of Prodigies *signal* in the fifth chapter Sect. i. p. 289, the first is *the discarding of all jealousies of God.* Synesius hath observed, *de regno*, p. 9. that however the nations were, δοξαις ετερογνωμοσι μερισαμενοι, distanced from each other (like lines in a circumference) by very different sentiments in reference to God and Religion in other matters; yet still αγαθον κατα Θεον υμνουσιν απαντες απανταχου, και σοφοι δημοι, και ασοφοι, all centered and met in this great doctrine, both wise and unwise, that God was a good, bountiful and benign Being. The greater wonder it is, that so many doctrines amongst the Heathens and Christians too (which I am not here to take notice of) should be received with a *non obstante* to this native and easy sense of the Divine goodness and philanthropy, lodged in their minds. That which my present argument leads me to observe, is how apt the minds of men are to be leavened with the sour conceit, and belief of God's goodness, which Plutarch justly challengeth in Heroditus, that Θειον παν φθονερον το και ταραχωδες, the Deity is of an envious and troublesome disposition; that his counsels are especially taken up with contriving new miseries for a world which he hates: than which, never did a more pestilential air breathe from the bottomless pit, seizing the very vitals of Religion, and corrupting the earliest notion rising up in the Soul, when conceiving of a God. Hence grows this easy conclusion, that all Prodigies are a kind of van-guard to give notice of the many troops of furies and miseries that are advancing; that so hated man may be tortured before he be killed, and not have so much as the airy hopes of felicity to refresh his labour, nor be able to deceive his present pains so much as with a dream. . . . . If men did not look upon God through the gross medium of those impatient and envious humours which predominate in themselves, it would be impossible that he should not be represented to them in more lovely colours, and they might easily understand all the evils which are sometimes sent down upon the world to be, in the language of the Moralist, την επι τοις ημαρτημενοις θειαν ψηφον, only a Divine testimony given in against sin; and not intended as instances of ill will, but to discipline the mad world into some sober and wise thoughts: and they would believe the fairer reports which the scriptures make of God, where he tells us, *that he doth not willingly grieve the children of men; that fury dwells not with him; that Judgment is his strange work, &c.* Then would they easily be persuaded, that Prodigies come forth upon some other errand than to let them understand they must look to be speedily miserable. Did men once believe the goodness, patience, and long-suffering of God, they could not imagine he lets his creatures fall out of his hands (as Moses did the Tables) and break into disorder at a discovery of his frequent anger. I shall close this particular with that pertinent speech of Plutarch, "Let a man, says he, set it down with himself, that he cannot offer up to God a more acceptable sacrifice or more grateful service, than to entertain true and good opinions concerning him; by which he will avoid superstition, an evil not much inferior to Atheism." *De Iside & Osiride.*—To the second edition of Dr. Spencer's book is added, *A Discourse concerning Vulgar Prophecies: where the Vanity of receiving them as certain indications of any future event is discovered; and some characters of distinction between true and pretending Prophecies are*

laid.

laid down. In the Preface he obſerves that " the Soul of man was made for intimacy and converſe with God, and therefore in a tacit ſenſe thereof is continually reaching and aſpiring after it. But luſt and pride having blinded its eye, it is apt to effect and ſeek it in fond and fantaſtic ways. Whereas good men, as Antoninus ſpeaks, are δι ἐργων οσιων συνηθεις τῳ Θεῳ γινομενοι, *become familiar with God by good works*, by profound humility, by abſtractions from luſt and the world. Some men have conceited it is procured and maintained by going off from reaſon, by raptures, viſions, prophecies, enthuſiaſms, hot and vigorous impreſſions of the Spirits; and have verily thought (as the ancient Heathens of their Prophets) that they are ſcarce ever *full of God*, till they are half beſide themſelves. And therefore the lives of the Romiſh Saints are ſtuffed out with Stories of ſuch things as theſe, which do but render them contemptible to men that have a true and ſober notion of Religion. In confidence of this conceit, ſuch numbers of Devotees in all times have pretended enthuſiaſm and extraordinary illapſe from Heaven, though for different ends and purpoſes, according as a different habit of body or mind, and ſome mutable circumſtances of the age or courſe of life, might determine a hot humour and buſy fancy (for it is little elſe) to exert itſelf." In the fourth chapter he conſiders, what is urged concerning the eminent Sanctity of the modern pretenders to Prophecy; and obſerves, p. 69. " that there is nothing more misjudged than Sanctity. It is too commonly thought to ſtand in ſome more ſolemn looks at a Sacrament, in viſiſting a conſecrated ſhrine, in ſome extatical devotions, in the uſe of ſome interpreting garbs, faces, and phraſes, in declaiming with much zeal againſt ſome odious names, Hereſy, Antichriſt, and Superſtition, in carrying very moroſely towards men of a different form from one's ſelf, in ſome ſeverer diſciplines and neglects of the body; and therefore, it is unſafe truſting our faith with a Prophecy upon a report of the Sanctity of the Prophet. Beſides, no men are more ſubject to ſuch deluſions than men of devout affections, if of ſtrong fancies, impreſſive tempers, and weak intellectuals; for in ſuch perſons an indiſcreet uſe of Religion by very penſive and ſolemn thoughts, affected retirements and ſilences, too intenſe meditations, continual fervours and endeavoured heats, unreaſonable faſtings and watchings, the neglect of innocent diverſions and relaxations, eſpecially if joined with the continual ſtudy of ſome dark Prophecies and viſions in ſcripture (more proper entertainments for men of great learning) cannot eaſily fail of intoxicating the mind with wild and extravagant imaginations. The over ſtraining them by ſuch intenſe devotions and perpetual fervours, hath produced ſo many cracked brains, pretended Prophets, and Viſioniſts in the Religious houſes of the Romiſh Church; which yet is ſo ill adviſed as to cite them as proofs of that Prophetic Spirit ſhe lays claim to. *De multis in Religione & auſteritate vitæ conſtitutis, incredibilia ferè ſunt quæ idoneis teſtibus referentibus audivi*, ſays *Gerſon*, *de diſtinguendo veras viſiones a falſis.* Moreover, it has ever been the policy of the Devil to do the Church the greateſt miſchief by men of the greateſt name for Religion. He knows good men are ſooneſt decoyed by thoſe who ſeem to be like themſelves; and that error will ſooner be entertained from a pious, than truth from a profane perſon: and therefore the Jews, amongſt the four things which they ſay deſtroy the World, number *a Religious Man that is a fool.* God perhaps permits it thus to be, that men might learn to make him only Lord of their faith; and not to give an abſolute truſt of his due alone to the wiſeſt or beſt of men. Good men are no more exempt from miſtakes and lunacies, than they are from a fever, or the infirmities of age. But we are further told that many of theſe Prophetic perſons *are ſealed by the ſingular gift of praying in the Holy Ghoſt.* Their lips ſeem touched by *a coal from the altar*; ſo fervent and ſo ſcripture-like are the expreſſions they beſpeak God withal on a ſudden.——I anſwer, that this devout ardour, with the effects conſequent thereunto, extremely enchant the minds of men with great opinions of thoſe in whom it appears, and is readily received (like the Divine fire that came down upon the Sacrifice) as the teſtimony of God to the perſon and to all he ſays. David George obtained the repute of a Prophet, as Spanheim informs us, *de origin. Anabapt.* Sect. 24. chiefly *aſſiduo ac ardenti in ſpeciem preces ad Deum fundendi Studio:* whereas all theſe ſtrange phænomena may be ſolved from mere mechanical principles; all generally being but the iſſue of a natural pregnancy and fervour of temper, exerting itſelf in fluent words tinctured with

before it happened [*n*]; and that, beſides this prediction, it was reported all over Tuſcany, that armed men were ſeen fighting in the air over the town

Religion and ſcripture phraſes. Where there is *naturalis quædam* animi mobilitas (which Quintilian requires in order to ſpeaking well *extempore*) a natural moveableneſs of Soul, whereby it is enabled to turn itſelf nimbly and with eaſe, to new thoughts and words, and this aſſiſted, or rather created, by ſome briſk and active Spirits, it may equal, perhaps exceed, the performances of more adviſed thoughts. A moderate heat, wherein all the Spirits flow to their proper principles and fountains, the vital to the heart, and the animal to the brain, and are put into quick, but manageable motions, raiſes in a man a more fine and exquiſite power of perception, and cauſes the images of things to appear more diſtinct, and to come faſter upon his mind, than otherwiſe they would, and by conſequence makes the underſtanding more pregnant, and the expreſſions more fluent and eaſy. And therefore, when the orators of old attributed their more fortunate performances, and rhetorical enlargements in their *extempore* declamations to the people, (then much in uſe) to the ſpecial aſſiſtance and incitation of a Deity, Quintilian judiciouſly gives them to the preſent heat and fermentation of the Spirits, the great inſtruments whereby the Soul performs all its works in this embodied State. *Inſtitut. Orat.* Lib. X. Cap. vii. . . . . Now our admired Prophets, having this natural fervour and pregnancy of Spirit to wing their fancies, and this heat attended by the new forces of an ατμος ενθεος (as Longinus ſtyles the earthly vapour, which inſpired the Pythia) an enthuſiaſtic vapour of heated melancholy, ariſing from the hypochondria, it cannot fail of diſplaying itſelf in ſuch rapturous and lofty ſtrains, as ſhall be verily thought to flow *e venâ Iſraelis*, from the ſame Divine Spirit which inſpired the Prophets, when the perſons are but heightened by a fume, ſomewhat more groſs and unruly, than that which inſpires our common Poets, whoſe more happy heats and ſprucer fancies have been thought the iſſue of borrowed Spirits, and therefore the blood of the grape has been generally vouched by them, to be the moſt natural exciter of the poetic vein. Beſides, theſe Prophets are much advantaged for a more lively imitation of inſpiration above the vulgar pretenders to it, by an exalted imagination. For the moſt ſtriking objects of Religion, God, Heaven, Hell, the glories of the new Jeruſalem, and ſome prophetic ſchemes, being made familiar to their ſofter fancies, ſtand before their minds in very diſtinct and affecting ideas. Now, where the imagination is thus boiled up, and often rubbed upon by the moſt moving objects, it fails not of raiſing affections, and conſequently expreſſions, great and vehement as the objects are from whence they ariſe. Quintilian, therefore, in the third capter of the ſixth book of his Inſtitutions, in order to aſſiſt the power of ſpeaking very movingly and fluently *extempore*, adviſes to imprint φαντασιας, the images of things we are to ſpeak about, upon the imagination; as if we were to ſpeak about the murder of any perſon, to make all the terrible images of the bleeding man to walk upon the ſcene of fancy, and to ſet, as it were, before our eyes all the black circumſtances of the action, thereby to quicken affection, and, by that, expreſſion."

Every body knows that Prophecies have likewiſe been forged, ſometimes to ſerve intereſts of State, ſometimes to excite Rebellion, and for many other bad purpoſes. But thoſe that would ſee more upon this ſubject, and of forming preſages from prodigies, may conſult Mr. Bayle's diſcourſe, to prove that Comets are not forerunners of misfortunes. Another written by Dr. Becker, a celebrated Dutch Divine, upon the ſame ſubject. Montaigne upon *Prognoſtication*, Book I. Chap. xi. Lord Shafteſbury upon Enthuſiam, *Characteriſtics*, Vol. I. Plutarch upon Superſtition, and his doctrine in favour of Preſages, examined by Mr. Bayle, in his Dictionary, in the firſt Note, upon the word *Pericles*.

[*n*] See what is ſaid of this Prophet in Chap. vi. of the *Prince*. Chap. xi. and xlv. Book I. *of the Political Diſcourſes*. Savonarola foretold the return of that Prince into Italy indeed, but it did *not* happen; as Mr. Bayle has proved at large in his Notes upon the word *Savonarola*, in his Dictionary: where likewiſe the Reader will find ſufficient argument

town of Arezzo, and the clashing of their arms heard by the people there [o]. It is likewise generally known, that before the death

gument to convince him, that notwithstanding the extraordinary austerity of his life, the fervour and eloquence of his Sermons, and his pretension to Divine Revelations, he was certainly an impostor, a false Prophet, and influenced by worldly considerations, to act the part he did. The whole, though very curious, is much too long to be inserted here. See likewise *General Dictionary*, Vol. IX. p. 83, *& seq.*

[o] It grieves one to find such stories as these, scattered in great abundance, not only through the works of Pagan Authors, but even through those of the greatest and best of the Jewish and Christian Historians.——To give but two or three instances. The writer of the History of the Maccabees, Book II. Chap. v. says, "About the same time Antiochus prepared for his second voyage into Egypt. And then it happened, that through all the City, for the space of almost forty days, there were seen Horsemen running in the air in cloth of gold, and armed with lances, like a band of Soldiers: and troops of horsemen in array, encountering and running against one another, with shaking of shields, and multitudes of Pikes, and drawing of Swords, and casting of darts, and glittering of golden ornaments, and harness of all sorts. Wherefore, every man prayed that Apparition might turn to good." Thus likewise, d'Avila tells us, in the tenth Book of his History of the Civil Wars of France, "That there was a *Prophecy* current, not only in the camp, but through the whole Kingdom, that Henry III. should be killed by a Friar." See Vol. II. p. 52. of the last Translation. And in the eleventh book he says, "That before the battle of Yvry, a heavy storm of rain falling from the Heavens, with dreadful thunder and lightening, threw the whole army into a terrible panic: not only because retreats have an ill aspect to those that are not acquainted with the secret motives of their Commanders, but on account of the fame that was spread abroad of the prodigious strength of the enemy's forces, and because both fortune and the weather seemed to conspire against their own army, which was almost half-drowned, and marched as if it was flying under favour of the night, though close drawn up, and in good order. The the terror of the rawer men was increased by a frightful Phænomenon, which, as the rain ceased, appeared in the middle of the sky: for there were seen two large armies of a blood-red colour, which visibly rushed together in the air, amidst horrible claps of thunder, and soon after disappeared, leaving the event uncertain, and were covered again with exceeding thick and dark clouds. This spectacle, though diversely interpreted by many, seemed most probably, as they thought, to portend the ruin and destruction of their army, which being inferior in strength, and entirely destitute of any other assistance than their own forces, retired, as if it was already conquered, whilst the Enemy kept advancing: and the rather, because these were the very places where the king's predecessors and his faction of the Hugonots lost the first battle against the Duke of Guise, in the late Civil wars, and in which, the prince of Condè was both wounded and taken prisoner amidst a terrible slaughter of his men." p. 116, 117.

The story of the Apparition of St. James of Compostella mounted upon a white Horse, and fighting like a Dragon for the Spaniards, against the Moors, might likewise here be recited out of the Spanish Historians, and a thousand more out of our own, if such trash was worth transcribing.——Montaigne, however, seems to approve of these things; for speaking of Tacitus, Book III. Chap. viii. he says, "A man may think him bold in his stories, as where he says, that a soldier carrying a burden of wood had his hands so frozen to it, that they were severed from his arms. *Annal.* XIII. Cap. xxxv." I always submit to so great authorities in such things. In what he says also of Vespasian, Hist. Lib. IV. Cap. lxxxi. that by the favour of the God Serapis, he cured a blind woman by anointing her eyes with his spittle, and I know not what other miracles, he follows the example and duty of all good Historians, who keep Registers of such events as are of importance. Amongst public accidents are also common rumours and opinions; for it is their part to relate the things

death of Lorenzo de' Medici, the Dome and moſt part of the Church of St. Reparata in Florence, were beat down by lightening [p]; that before the diſgrace and baniſhment of Pietro Soderini (who had been appointed Gonfalonier for life by the Florentines) the Palace was demoliſhed in the ſame manner. Many other examples of this kind might be produced; but for the ſake of brevity, I ſhall mention only one more, and that out of Livy, who tells us, that one Marcus Cædicius, a Plebeian, reported to the Senate, that as he was paſſing along the *Via Nova* at midnight, he heard a voice, much louder than that of any man, which commanded him to go and tell the Magiſtrates, that the Gauls were upon their march to Rome [q]. The cauſe of theſe things, I think, is not unworthy of diſcuſſion by ſuch as are better verſed in the knowledge of natural and ſupernatural matters than I pretend to be. Perhaps, (as ſome Philoſophers are of opinion) the air may be full of intelligent Beings, which foreſeeing future events and compaſſionating mankind, give them timely warning by theſe notices, to provide againſt the calamities that are to befal them [r]. However that may be, nothing

things commonly believed, not to regulate them: that is the province of Divines and Philoſophers, who are the guides of men's conſciences. Quintus Curtius therefore, wiſely ſays, Lib. IX. Cap. i. *Equidem plura tranſcribo quam credo: nam nec affirmare ſuſtineo de quibus dubito, nec ſubducere quæ accepi*, i. e. *Indeed I relate more things than I believe, for as I will not take upon me to affirm things whereof I doubt, ſo I cannot ſmother what I have heard.* We might likewiſe quote the authority of Livy in this reſpect, Lib. I. in the preface, and Lib. VIII. Cap. vi. *Hæc neque affirmare neque refellere operæ pretium eſt . . . . . famæ rerum ſtandum eſt*, i. e. *It is not worth while either to affirm, or to refute theſe matters; we muſt ſtand to report.* And as Tacitus wrote in a century, when the belief of Prodigies began to decline, he ſays, he ſhould not omit giving a place to things, however, received by ſo many worthy men, and with ſo great reverence to Antiquity. This was well ſaid: let them deliver Hiſtory to us, more as they receive, than as they believe it."——If ſuch Hiſtorians are to be commended, certainly our good Sir Richard Baker, and ſome others, of more recent dates deſerve the higheſt applauſe.

[p] See the end of the laſt book of the *Hiſtory of Florence.*

[q] See Lib. V. Cap. xxxii.

[r] The Philoſophers here meant, are probably the Cabbaliſts, or Roſicrucians, who ſuppoſe there are elementary Beings called Sylphs, Gnomes, Salamanders, &c. and that this Science introduces people into the ſanctuary of nature. They pretend that the Hebrews knew theſe aereal ſubſtances; that they borrowed their Cabbaliſtic knowledge from the Egyptians; and that they have not yet forgot the art of converſing with the inhabitants of the air. The Abbè de Villars pleaſantly expoſes the ridiculous ſecrets of theſe Roſicrucians in his *Compte de Gabalis.* It is certain, however, that the notion of good and bad Angels, Genii, Dæmons, Intelligences, Spirits, or by what other name any one has a mind to call them, was ſpread all over the Eaſt long before the promulgation of Chriſtianity, both the Jews and Heathens believing that, not only every nation, but every particular perſon, had one of each ſort of theſe Beings, that was continually endeavouring to do him either good or harm, according to the degree of their reſpective powers; as might be ſhewn at large from a thouſand paſſages both in ſacred and prophane hiſtory. Every one remembers the Dæmons of Socrates, Plotinus, Brutus, &c. Indeed all the Chriſtian Churches countenance it: in the Liturgy of our own we pray, "Tha God,

thing is more certain than that ſuch preſages have been obſerved, and that ſome great and heavy misfortune has always attended them.

God, who has ordained and conſtituted the ſervices of Angels and men in a *wonderful* order, would mercifully grant, that as his holy Angels always do him ſervice in Heaven; ſo, by his appointment, they may ſuccour and defend us on earth, &c." The Calviniſts admit of it; and the Romiſh Church makes it a practical Doctrine. "No ſyſtem is better adapted, ſays a great Modern, to bring the Doctrine of the Platoniſts (duly rectified) into repute, than the Doctrine of occaſional cauſes. I know not what may happen, but it is my opinion, that mankind will be forced, one time or other, to abandon mechanical Principles, unleſs they aſſociate to them the wills of intelligent Beings or Spirits: and to ſay the truth, no Hypotheſis is better fitted to account for events, than that which admits of ſuch an aſſociation; I mean ſuch events eſpecially as go by the name of caſualty, fortune, good luck, ill luck, dreams, &c. the cauſes of which are certainly regulated and determined by general laws, that are unknown to us; but which are probably only occaſional cauſes, like thoſe that make our ſouls act upon our bodies.." Some have taught that the whole world is filled and animated by Genii: others have compared the nature of theſe Intelligences with triangles. For, according to them, the Divine nature is like that of an equilateral triangle; that of Dæmons to a triangle, two ſides of which are equal, and the other unequal; whilſt that of man is like one, all ſides of which are uneven.——But as the field is large, thoſe that are deſirous of making further diſcurſions into it are referred to the learned Dr. Dodwell's Diſſertation on the Genius or Fortune of the Emperors. *Prelect. 2. ad Spartiani Hadrianum*, p. 174, *& ſeq.* To Vol. I. p. 192. IV. p. 19. VII. p. 336. VIII. p. 436. IX. p. 527. X. p. 221. *of the General Dictionary: to* Vol. I. No. 12. *of the Spectator: and to* Vol. I. No. 13, *and* 48. *of the Tatler*, where this Subject is much better handled.

"Milton, (ſays Mr. Addiſon) has finely deſcribed this mixed communion of men and Spirits in the *earthly* Paradiſe; and had doubtleſs his eye upon a verſe in old Heſiod, which is almoſt word for word the ſame with his third line, in the following paſſage."

——— Nor think though men were none,
That Heav'n wou'd want Spectators, God want praiſe:
Millions of ſpiritual creatures walk the Earth
Unſeen, both when we wake and when we ſleep.
All theſe with ceaſeleſs praiſe his works behold
Both day and night. How often from the ſteep
Of echoing hill or thicket, have we heard
Celeſtial voices to the midnight air,
Sole, or reſponſive to each other's note,
Singing their great Creator? Oft in bands
Whilſt they keep watch, or nightly rounding walk,
With heav'nly touch of inſtrumental ſounds
In full harmonic number join'd, their Songs
Divide the night, and lift our Soul to Heaven..

CHAP.

CHAP. LVII.

The Multitude united is ſtrong and formidable; but ſeparated, it is weak and contemptible.

MANY of the Romans, after their country had been plundered and laid waſte by the Gauls, left Rome, and went to live at Veii, contrary to the expreſs injunctions of the Senate. Upon which, another Edict was publiſhed, to remedy this diſorder, commanding every one, upon very ſevere penalties to return to his former habitation before a certain time fixed: and though every body made a joke of this Edict at firſt; yet, when the day appointed drew near, they all thought fit to obey it; for as Livy ſays, "*Ex ferocibus univerſis, ſingŭli, metu ſuo, obedientes fuêre:*" *though they were ſo ſtubborn and contumacious all together; yet ſingly, every man began to be afraid of himſelf, and that made them all at laſt become tractable and obedient.* And certainly nothing can give us a more juſt idea of the populace in ſuch caſes than this inſtance: for they are always refractory and bold at firſt, and ſpeak freely againſt the decrees of their Sovereign; but when they ſee the rod ſhaken over their backs, they begin to diſtruſt each other, and every one takes care of himſelf.

From hence it appears, how little account is to be made of what the multitude ſays, either for or againſt the government of their Prince; provided he is in a condition to keep them in a good humour, when they are ſo, and to prevent them from doing him any hurt when they are in a bad one. By a bad humour, I mean ſuch as proceeds from any common occurrence, and muſt except that regret which is owing either to the loſs of their liberties, or of ſome Prince that was much beloved by them, and is ſtill alive; for, upon ſuch occaſions, their reſentment is always very ſharp indeed, and cannot be kept under without rigorous meaſures. But as to diſguſts which ariſe from other cauſes, they are eaſily diſſipated; eſpecially when they have no body to head them: for as there is nothing ſo terrible as their fury in one caſe, ſo nothing is more weak and contemptible in the other; becauſe, though they may have arms in their hands, they are preſently reduced, if one can ſtand their firſt ſhock: ſince when their ardour begins to cool, they muſt naturally be ſenſible they are doing wrong; and therefore, every man beginning to be afraid of himſelf, will endeavour to provide for his own ſafety, either by flight, or making his peace ſome other way. When the populace therefore are once in motion, it is their beſt way to chuſe ſome head, in order to ſhelter themſelves, who may not only

only regulate their proceedings, but keep them firm together, and take proper meaſures for their ſecurity; as the Roman people did when they left the city upon the death of Virginia, and appointed twenty Tribunes to protect them: otherwiſe it will always happen, as Livy obſerves, that when they are united, they will be ſtrong and reſolute; but when divided, and every man thinks only of himſelf, they will become feeble and abject.

CHAP. LVIII.

That the Multitude are wiſer and more conſtant in general than a Prince.

LIVY, and all other Hiſtorians agree, that nothing is more changeable than the multitude: they often condemn a man to death, and afterwards bitterly lament the loſs of him; as it happened in the caſe of Manlius Capitolinus, whom the Roman people firſt ſentenced to die, and then bewailed his death: *populum brevi*, ſays Livy, *Poſtea-quam ab eo periculum nullum erat, deſiderium ejus tenuit; after the people were out of all danger from him, they heartily wiſhed him alive again* [*f*]. And in another place, where he is ſpeaking of what happened at Syracuſe, after the death of Hieronymus, nephew to Hiero, he ſays, *Hæc natura multitudinis eſt, aut humiliter ſervit, aut ſuperbè dominatur. Such is the nature of the multitude, they either ſervilely obey, or inſolently domineer.*

I know not therefore, whether in endeavouring to defend a notion that is exploded by all other authors, I may not have taken a taſk in hand, which I ſhall either be obliged to abandon with diſgrace, or find very difficult to acquit myſelf of with reputation: but however that may be, I think, and always ſhall think, there can be no harm in maintaining an opinion by arguments and reaſoning alone, where no violence is offered to enforce it. I ſay then, in regard to the fault with which writers in general reproach the multitude, that particular men, and Princes eſpecially, are as liable, or more ſo perhaps, to be accuſed of it: for every one that does not regulate his conduct by laws, will behave himſelf as ill as a multitude that has broke looſe from all reſtraint. This may plainly appear, if we conſider how few good and wiſe Princes there

[*f*] Thus likewiſe the ſame Hiſtorian ſays, in the caſe of Appius Claudius (not the Decemvir) Lib. II. Cap. lxii. "Haud ita multum interim temporis fuit: ante tamen quam prodicta dies veniret, morbo moritur: cujus laudationem cum Tribuni plebis impedire conarentur, plebs fraudari ſolenni honore ſupremum diem tanti viri noluit: & laudationem tam æquis auribus mortui audivit, quam vivi accuſationem audierat, & exequias frequens celebravit."

are, or ever have been in the world; I mean ſuch Princes as have had it in their power to violate the laws, and break down the barriers that were oppoſed to their licentiouſneſs or ambition [*t*]. Amongſt ſuch indeed, we may number the Kings of Egypt, who reigned in the moſt early times, when that country was governed by laws; to whom we might add thoſe of Sparta, and in our own age thoſe of France alſo, which Kingdom is ruled with more moderation and regard to the laws, than any other that we know of at preſent [*u*]. But Princes that live in ſuch governments as theſe and are reſtrained by laws; are not to be compared with a diſſolute and unbridled multitude, or ranked amongſt thoſe whoſe natural diſpoſition we are to examine in common with that of other particular men, to ſee whether it reſembles the diſpoſition of the multitude; becauſe, in that caſe we ought likewiſe, on the other hand, to ſet a multitude in competition with them that is under the ſame reſtrictions as they are, and then we ſhall find full as much goodneſs in one as the other, and that the populace are neither apt to be too inſolent when in power, nor too abject in ſubjection; but like the Roman people, who whilſt their Republic continued incorrupt, ſhewed no ſigns either of one or the other, but kept up their proper dignity with honour, and lived like free men, in due obedience to the laws and authority of their Magiſtrates. If it became neceſſary indeed, at any time, to make a ſtand againſt ſome deſigning and over-powerful Citizen, they did it effectually; as in the caſe of Manlius Capitolinus, the Decemviri, and ſeveral others, who were taking meaſures to oppreſs and enſlave them. On the contrary, when the intereſt of the public required it, they were no leſs obedient to their Conſuls and Dictators, than they had been ſtubborn and inflexible in maintaining their rights and liberties at other times. Nor was their regret for the death of Manlius at all to be wondered at, ſince it was the memory of his virtues that occaſioned it, which were ſuch as made every one lament the loſs of him, and might have made a Prince behave as they did, in the ſame circumſtances; for nobody can deny that it is natural for all men to praiſe and admire virtue, even in their enemies; and it is my opinion, that if Manlius could have been raiſed from the dead, in the midſt of their lamentations for him, the people would have paſſed the very ſame ſentence upon him again. In like manner we read of ſeveral Princes, and ſuch as have been accounted wiſe ones too, that have put people to death, whom they heartily wiſhed

[*t*] Diocleſian uſed to ſay, *That nothing was more difficult than to govern well*; and he perfectly knew the reaſons of that difficulty. They are recited by Vopiſcus, an author who remarks, that in the great number of Roman Emperors, there were reckoned but very few good Princes, and commends the expreſſion of a Jeſter, who uſed to ſay, *That all the good Princes might be painted in a ring. Vopiſc.* Cap. xliv.

[*u*] Some exceptions might be made in theſe times.

alive

alive again; as Alexander did in the caſe of Clitus and others of his friends, and Herod with regard to Mariamne. But what Livy ſays concerning the nature of the multitude, is not meant of ſuch a one as is reſtrained by a regard to Laws, like the Roman people; but of a ſeditious unbridled rabble, like that of Syracuſe, which have broke their reins, and behave like madmen; committing a thouſand irregularities and extravagancies, as Alexander and Herod did.

The multitude therefore is no more to be accuſed of fury and inconſtancy than a Prince: for they are both ſubject to caprice and enormities when they are above the Laws, and can tranſgreſs with impunity: of which ſeveral examples might be produced (beſides thoſe already quoted) from amongſt the Roman Emperors and other Princes and Tyrants, who were guilty of as much levity and inconſiſtency in their conduct as ever any multitude was. I muſt beg leave then to differ from the common opinion, that the people when maſters are more light, changeable, and ungrateful than particular Princes: indeed if any one ſays they are both ſo, he will be pretty near the mark; but if he declares in favour of the latter, he is very much miſtaken. For a people that have the authority wholly in their own hands, and conduct themſelves according to the Laws, will act with as much, or perhaps more ſteadineſs, prudence, and gratitude than any Prince, be he accounted ever ſo wiſe: on the contrary, a Prince that has got above the power of the Laws will be more fickle, imprudent, and ungrateful than any multitude whatſoever; which does not proceed ſo much from any diverſity in their natures, (for they are pretty much the ſame; or if there be any meliority it is on the ſide of the people) as from the difference in the regard which they reſpectively have for the laws of their Country. If we examine the conduct of the Roman people, we ſhall find that for the ſpace of four hundred years they hated the very name of *King*, as much as they were fond of glory, and ſtudious for the good of the Commonwealth, which plainly appears from numberleſs inſtances. But if any one ſhould object that they were ſhamefully ungrateful to Scipio, a former diſcourſe, wherein I have proved at large that the people are not ſo ungrateful as Princes, may ſerve for a ſufficient anſwer [*x*]. As to prudence, ſtability, and judgment, I maintain that they far exceed Princes in thoſe qualifications: and there is much reaſon in that ſaying, *Vox populi vox Dei: the voice of the People is the voice of God:* for it is certain that the generality ſeldom err in their prognoſtications; ſo that it ſeems as if they foreſaw the good or evil that was to befal them by ſome ſecret inſtinct or inſpiration. In judging of doubtful matters they are very rarely miſtaken: when two Orators for inſtance, equally emi-

[*x*] See Chap. xxix. of this Book.

nent in their profeſſion, have harangued them upon different ſides of a queſtion, they hardly ever fail to incline to what is moſt rational; which ſhews that they are capable both of diſcovering truth and embracing it: and if they ſometimes err in their judgment concerning ſuch enterprizes as appear either magnanimous, or highly for their advantage, (which we have allowed before) [y], are not Princes oftener miſled by a variety of paſſions, to which they are much more ſubject, and greater ſlaves than the people? In the election of Magiſtrates they make a more judicious choice than Princes; for it is a very difficult matter to perſuade them to advance a man of corrupt morals or infamous character; which yet is an eaſy and common thing with Princes. If they take a diſguſt to any thing they retain it for ages; but Princes ſoon change their opinions: of both which things, I will give an inſtance in the Roman people, who during the courſe of ſo many hundred years, and in the choice of ſo many Conſuls and Tribunes, did not make above four elections of which they had any cauſe to repent; and held the name of King in ſuch deteſtation, as I have ſaid before, that no Citizen, how much ſoever they were obliged to him, ever affected that name or power, who did not feel the weight of their reſentment. It is evident likewiſe that thoſe States where the people have had the chief authority, have always extended their dominion further, and in a ſhorter time, than ever they were able to do under the government of any Prince; as the Romans did after the expulſion of Kings, and the Athenians when they had ſhook off the yoke of Piſiſtratus: for which no other reaſon can be aſſigned, than that a popular Government is better than a Regal one. Nor can the paſſages quoted out of Livy at the beginning of this chapter, or elſewhere, in any wiſe ſerve to invalidate this aſſertion: for when all the good and ill qualities are duly ſtated betwixt a Prince and a popular Government, it will plainly appear that the balance will be greatly in favour of the latter, eſpecially in point of probity and true glory [z]. But if a Prince ſeems to have the advantage in enacting good

[y] See Chapters xlvii. and liii. of this book.

[z] "I know ſome men of parts, ſays Mr. Bayle, who are ſurprized, that in Kingdoms where the Prince's authority is unlimited, the inſtructors of youth are allowed to read the books of the ancient Greeks and Romans to them, in which we find ſo many examples of the love of liberty, and ſo many antimonarchical Maxims." But this is not more ſurprizing than to ſee Republican States permit their Law-Profeſſors to explain the Code and Digeſt, in which there are ſo many principles which ſuppoſe the Supreme and inviolable authority of the Emperor. Here we ſee two things which ſeem equally ſurprizing, but in reality ought not to ſurprize any body: for omitting ſeveral reaſons which might be urged, may we not ſay, that the ſame books which contain the poiſon with regard either to Monarchs or Republics, contain likewiſe the Antidote? If we ſee on one hand the great Maxims of liberty, and the noble examples of courage, with which it has been maintained or recovered; we ſee on the other, factions, Seditions, and tumultuous humours, which diſturbed, and at laſt ruined that infinite number of little States, which

good Laws, and eſtabliſhing new Statutes and inſtitutions for the benefit of civil ſociety and converſation; the other without doubt have ſo much the ſuperiority in maintaining and improving what is already eſtabliſhed, that they deſerve more glory than the founder.

which ſhewed themſelves ſuch zealous enemies to tyranny in ancient Greece. Does not this picture ſeem to be a leſſon very capable of diſabuſing thoſe that are terrified at Monarchy? Mr. Hobbes thought ſo; for he publiſhed a Tranſlation of Thucydides with this view. Turn the tables, and you will find that this picture will be very proper to give an inſtruction different from the former, and to ſtrengthen the horror againſt Monarchy: for whence came it (ſome one may ſay) that the Greeks and Romans choſe rather to be expoſed to theſe confuſions than to live under a Monarchy? Did not this ariſe from the hard condition to which Tyrants had reduced them? And muſt not an evil be very grievous, inſufferable, and deplorable, when people chuſe to deliver themſelves from it at ſo dear a rate? It is certain that the deſcription which Hiſtory has left us of the conduct of ſeveral Monarchs gives us horror, and makes our hair ſtand of an end. It is to no purpoſe to object, that generally ſpeaking, more diſorders have been occaſioned by the conſpiracies which have put an end to Tyranny, than there would have been by ſuffering it; or to urge what happened upon the death of Hiero the Syracuſan. The people of Syracuſe, who had enjoyed great happineſs under the long reign of that Prince, immediately loſt their patience under his Succeſſor, who governed in a tyrannical manner, and not only killed him in the very beginning of the ſecond year of his reign, but ſoon after put two of Hiero's daughters, and three of his grand-daughters, to death alſo. Of theſe five Princeſſes, there were three againſt whom no complaint had been made, and who had fled as it were to the foot of the altar. Was not this removing one Tyranny to eſtabliſh a greater, *ut tyrannos ulſciſcendo, quæ odiſſent ſcelera ipſi imitarentur*, as Heraclea, one of Hiero's daughters, repreſented to her murderers? Was Livy in the wrong to remark upon this occaſion, "that the people are incapable of keeping within due bounds, and that they are humble even to baſeneſs when they obey, but inſolent to the laſt degree when they command?" The maſſacre of theſe five Princeſſes was not the raſh action of ſome private perſons only: it was commanded by the Senate and people of Syracuſe, and this too whilſt the memory of Hiero was ſtill freſh amongſt them, a Prince whom they had loved ſo tenderly and juſtly. But the injuſtice of their barbarous decree was ſo manifeſt, that they immediately perceived it and revoked it; which ſignified nothing, for it was already executed. The factions however were not extinguiſhed by the entire extirpation of that family; they encreaſed daily, and in a ſhort time overturned the liberty of the country; for they expoſed Syracuſe to the Romans, who beſieged and conquered it. Silius Italicus finely deſcribes the confuſion into which that City fell after the Tyrant Hieronymus and his relations were killed.

Sævos namque pati faſtus, Juvenemque cruento
Flagrantem luxu, & miſcentem turpia duris,
Haud ultra faciles, quos ira metuſque coquebant
Jurati obtruncant, nec jam modus enſibus, addunt
Fæmineam cædem, atque inſontum rapta ſororum
Corpora proſternunt ferro, non ſævit in armis
Libertas, jactatque jugum: pars Punica caſtra,
Pars Italos & nota volunt: nec turba furentum
Deſit, quæ neutro ſociari fœdere malit. Lib. XIV.

A man may repreſent this as long as he pleaſes, he will not convince thoſe that are prejudiced againſt Monarchy: they will anſwer him, that from the very conſideration, that the diſorders of it cannot be remedied but by ſuch ſhocking miſeries, he ought to conclude that it is a very great evil.

To

To cut this matter ſhort, I ſay that if ſome Principalities have ſubſiſted for a long courſe of years, there are inſtances of Republics of no leſs antiquity; but that both have owed the length of their duration to the obſervation of their laws: for a Prince that follows no other rule but the dictates of his own will, if he has it in his power ſo to do, is unwiſe and counteracts himſelf; and a people that proceed in the ſame manner deſerve no better a title [*a*]. Since the compariſon therefore is betwixt a Prince that is reſtrained by laws, and a people in the ſame circumſtances, I am convinced there will be no more virtue found in the latter than in the former: but if we are to compare them as equally free from all ties and reſtrictions of that kind, and perfectly at their own liberty, we ſhall ſtill find fewer and leſs pernicious errors in the people than in the Prince, and thoſe too much eaſier to be remedied. For a licentious and tumultuous people are ſoon appeaſed and reduced to right reaſon by the interpoſition of ſome grave and reſpectable perſon [*b*]: but who can plead againſt a Tyrannical Prince, or what redreſs is there but the ſword? From hence we may eaſily come to a determination betwixt them, and conclude that evils and diſorders which require the ſharpeſt remedies, are certainly more dangerous than thoſe that may be cured by gentle means. Beſides, when the people are in a ferment, and have thrown off all reſtraint, there is not ſo much to be immediately apprehended from any preſent miſchief they are likely to commit, as from what may afterwards enſue; for ſuch a State of confuſion, may chance to end in tyranny: but with regard to a Prince the caſe is quite different; becauſe the preſent evils are moſt grievous, and it is hoped that his enormities will at laſt make him ſo odious, that the people will ſhake off his yoke and reſume their liberties. We ſee the difference then; in one caſe the calamity is actually preſent, and in the other there is only a probability at moſt of its happening: the ſeverity of the people extends only to ſuch as they think are conſpiring againſt the public good; whilſt

[*a*] The following Reflection made by Oernhielm, in his Life of Pontus de la Gardie, a Swediſh General, is a very good one, viz. that a Prince, who hearkens only to his paſſions without regarding what is due to God, his Subjects, and the laws of his country, deprives himſelf of the moſt neceſſary ſupports of his power: for he cannot expect to find that fidelity in his Subjects, which is ſufficient to oppoſe an enemy that ſhall attack him. This he exemplifies in the caſe of Eric, King of Sweden, "Prævenit adventum ducum fama collecti in regem exercitus; ad quam excitus, implorat opem civium, quorum plerique pertæſi acerbi regiminis, ſurdas obvertunt aures precanti, hilares adveniſſe tempus quo jugi indies ingraveſcentis leventur onere, antequam ſuccumbant penitus interituri. Itaque ſubnixus ope paucorum in quorum animis nondum obſoleverat majeſtas ſui principis, congreſſuſque cum pluribus ac fortioribus, non poterat non redigi ad anguſtias. Atque tum præferoci regi adparuit, & favore civium & ſucceſſu fulciendæ potentiæ deſtitui potentes rerum, cum exutâ reverentiâ numinis & legum, examplâ poteſtate uſurpant nil præter trucem quidvis in ſubjectos agendi licentiam. Id Erico regi accidit, quem ſolio ſublimem vidit, ſol oriens, eundum occidens vidit provolutum ad aliena genua."

[*b*] See Chap. liv. of this book.

that

that of a Prince is chiefly exerted upon thoſe that he imagines may injure his particular intereſts. But the tide of prejudice I know runs high againſt the people: becauſe every body is at liberty to ſpeak ill with impunity of them, even when they have the government in their hands; but againſt a Prince no man dares to open his mouth without much caution and reſerve. Now ſince the ſubject ſeems naturally to lead me to it, it may not be amiſs perhaps to ſay ſomething in the next chapter concerning leagues and confederacies made with Princes or Commonwealths; and to conſider which of them are moſt to be depended upon.

CHAP. LIX.

Whether an Alliance made with a Prince or a Commonwealth is moſt to be confided in.

SINCE it daily happens that Treaties and Alliances are made either betwixt Princes, or Commonwealths, or betwixt both, it ſeems neceſſary to examine whether the fidelity of a Prince or a Commonwealth be the more ſtable, and to conſider which of them is moſt to be truſted in: and upon enquiry it appears that in moſt caſes they are much alike, though they differ in ſome. I am perſuaded however, that when either a Prince or a Commonwealth is forced to enter into a treaty by downright neceſſity, neither of them will obſerve the conditions of it; eſpecially if their State ſhould be endangered by it; for in ſuch a caſe, both one and the other would preſently break it, how kindly ſoever they may have been uſed. Demetrius, ſurnamed Poliorcetes, had ſhewn the Athenians many great favours: but happening to be defeated by his enemies, and flying to Athens for refuge, as a people that were his allies, and under conſiderable obligations to him, he was refuſed ſhelter there; a circumſtance that mortified him much more than the loſs of his army [*c*]. After Pompey was routed by Cæſar at Pharſalia, he fled into Egypt to Ptolemy, in hopes of finding protection there, as he had formerly reſtored that Prince to his Kingdom: but Ptolemy, inſtead of protecting him, baſely cauſed him to be murdered. In both theſe caſes

[*c*] Though he had ſhewn them many great favours, yet he had been guilty of ſuch oppreſſion that they could never forget it. Amongſt other inſtances which might be quoted, he exacted two hundred and fifty talents of them at one time, which he ſaid was for pin-money for his concubine Lamia, a ſaying that galled them more than the loſs of their money: after which he upbraided them with their meanneſs, and told them there was not ſo much as one man amongſt them that had the leaſt ſpark of courage: like the taunt of Tiberius to the Roman Senate mentioned by Tacitus, *Annal.* Lib. III. Cap. lxv. "Memoriæ proditur Tiberium quoties curiâ egrederetur Græcis verbis in hunc modum eloqui ſolitum, *O homines ad Servitutem paratos!* Scilicet etiam illum, qui libertatem publicam nollet, tam projectæ Servientium patientiæ tædebat."

the

the ingratitude was owing to the ſame cauſe; yet the humanity of a Commonwealth we ſee was greater than that of a Prince [*d*]. But whenſoever either one or the other is afraid of ſuffering any great damage, they will both act in the ſame manner.

It muſt be obſerved likewiſe, that if any Prince or Commonwealth ſhould ſo punctually adhere to their engagements as to run the riſque of being ruined by it, their motives for ſo doing may proceed from the ſame cauſes: for as to a Prince, it may probably happen that he is confederated with ſome other great Potentate, who though he cannot protect him at that time, may (as the other is perſuaded) be able to reſtore him to his dominions afterwards, if he ſhould chance to loſe them; or if he has always firmly ſupported his intereſts, he may either think an accommodation with the enemy impoſſible, or that he cannot depend upon his word: which was the caſe of all the Neapolitan Princes who took part with the French when they invaded the Kingdom of Naples. And as to Republics, it was exactly the ſame with Saguntum, which was ruined by continuing firm to its alliance with the Romans; and with Florence in the year 1512, when it ſided with the French.

All things being duly conſidered however, I am of opinion, that where the danger is imminent, it is better to truſt to a Republic than a Prince: for though they ſhould both be diſpoſed to act in the ſame manner, yet the former being ſlow in its motions, will be longer than a Prince before it comes to any reſolution, and conſequently before it determines to violate its engagements. Treaties are generally broken for the ſake of ſome advantage: and in this reſpect, Republics always behave with much more honour than Princes: for we might produce many examples, where a very ſmall matter of gain has tempted a Prince to forfeit his honour, when a proſpect of the greateſt advantage could not corrupt a Commonwealth. Themiſtocles in an harangue to the Athenians ſaid he had ſomething to propoſe, which would be of infinite advantage to their Country; but that he durſt not make it public to every one, becauſe that would prevent its being put into execution. Upon this, the Athenians deputed Ariſtides to hear his propoſals, and to take ſuch reſolutions upon them as he ſhould think moſt proper. Themiſtocles therefore repreſented to him in private, that the whole

[*d*] A certain modern ſays, "that *Kings* do not look upon any one as naturally either their friend or their enemy; but that their private intereſt is the only conſideration by which they judge with whom they are to enter into an alliance. None but the ignorant would rely on the friendſhip of Sovereigns, even towards one another. To ſee the preſents which they exchange, and the intercourſe of reſpectful letters betwixt them in time of peace, would make one believe they are the moſt ſincere friends, and will love each other as long as they live: but it is very often true that they are at the ſame time negotiating a treaty in order to a rupture, and intend to ſerve one another no longer, than till they have an opportunity of commencing hoſtilities with advantage."

Navy

Navy of Greece lay in a place (though indeed under the protection of their good faith) where they might eaſily either take or deſtroy every Ship, which would make them abſolute maſters of all the other States in Greece. But when Ariſtides came to make his report to the people, he told them that Themiſtocles had imparted ſomething to him which indeed would be of exceeding great advantage, but highly diſhonourable to the Commonwealth; upon which account it was unanimouſly rejected, without any further enquiry into the nature of it. Now Philip of Macedon and many other Princes, who were governed by ſelf-intereſt in every thing, would not have been ſo ſcrupulous and delicate upon ſuch an occaſion; eſpecially Philip, who gained more by violating his faith than any other method whatſoever. As to breaking a Treaty, by not punctually obſerving every article of it, it is ſo common a thing that I ſhall ſay nothing of it here: I ſpeak only of outrageous and extravagant infractions; of which, I am of opinion, a Republic will always be more tender than a Prince, and conſequently is more to be confided in.

CHAP. LX.

That the Conſulſhip and all other Dignities in Rome were conferred without reſpect of age.

IT appears from the Hiſtory of the Roman Commonwealth, that after the Plebeians obtained the Honour of the Conſulſhip, they admitted any Citizen to it without any reſpect either of age or extraction: indeed the Romans at no time ever regarded age, but conſtantly preferred men of merit and virtue whether they were old or young; as is manifeſt from the inſtance of Valerius Corvinus, who was made Conſul when he was but twenty-three years of age; which gave him occaſion to ſay (a little oſtentatiouſly indeed) in one of his harangues to his Soldiers, that the Conſulſhip was "*præmium virtutis, non ſanguinis,*" *the reward of virtue, not a privilege of high birth.* Now whether they acted wiſely in this, or not, would bear ſome debate. As to Nobility of blood, they were under a neceſſity indeed of diſpenſing with that; and the ſame neceſſity that operated at Rome, muſt likewiſe have its weight in any other State that aſpires to the grandeur which Rome attained to, as we have elſewhere obſerved: for men will not expoſe themſelves to all manner of hardſhips and perils without any hope of reward; nor can they be deprived of the hope of ever obtaining that reward, without manifeſt danger. It ſoon became expedient therefore to inſpire the Plebeians with the hope of being admitted to the Conſul-

ſhip; with which they were amuſed a conſiderable time without obtaining that honour: but afterwards being reſolved to feed upon expectations only no longer, it was found neceſſary to admit them to it. A State however that has no occaſion to employ the Plebeians in any great and glorious undertaking, may treat them in another manner if it pleaſes, as I ſaid before; but if it affects to emulate the Romans, it muſt make no diſtinction amongſt its Subjects. So much for this part of the queſtion.

As to the matter of age, it ſeems clear that it is abſolutely neceſſary to make no difference in that point: for in advancing a young man to ſome dignity which requires the prudence of maturer age, we may be aſſured (if the power of electing is in the people) they will never prefer any one that has not highly merited it by his virtue and extraordinary ſervices: and if a young man has diſtinguiſhed himſelf in that manner, it would not only be very ungrateful, but of bad conſequence, if a Commonwealth, inſtead of availing itſelf of ſuch abilities, ſhould wait till he was grown old, and had loſt that vigour of body, that courage and activity which might then have been of eminent ſervice to his country [*e*]: accordingly

[*e*] Our Laws, ſays Montaigne, Book I. Chap. lvii. abſurdly determine that a man is not capable of managing his Eſtate till he is twenty-five years of age. Auguſtus cut off five years from the ancient Roman Standard, and declared that a man was old enough at thirty to be a Judge. Servius Tullius excuſed Gentlemen of above forty ſeven-years of age from the fatigues of war; Auguſtus diſmiſſed them at forty-five; though methinks it ſeems a little unreaſonable that men ſhould be ſent home to their fire-ſides, till they are fifty-five or Sixty. I am of opinion that our vocation and employment ſhould be extended as far as poſſible for the public good; but I think it a fault on the other hand that we are not employed ſoon enough. This Emperor was Arbiter of the whole World at nineteen, and yet would have a man to be thirty before he could bear the loweſt office. For my part I believe our underſtandings are as ripe at twenty as they ever will be or are capable of being. A mind that did not give evident proof of its force by that time, never gave proof of it afterwards. Natural parts and Genius exert themſelves at that term or never. They ſay in Dauphiny

Si l' eſpino no picquo quan nai
A pena que picquo giamai. i. e.

If the thorn does not prick then, it will ſcarce ever prick.

Of all the great actions I ever heard or read of, I have obſerved both in former ages and in our own, that more have been performed by men before the age of thirty than after; and often too in the lives of the very ſame perſons. May I not ſafely inſtance in thoſe of Hannibal and Scipio? The bettter half of their lives they lived upon the glory they had acquired in their youth: they were great men after, it is true, in compariſon of others; but by no means in compariſon of themſelves. As to my own part, I do certainly believe, that ſince that age, both my underſtanding and my conſtitution have rather decayed than improved, and retired rather than advanced. It is poſſible that with thoſe who make the beſt uſe of their time, knowledge and experience may encreaſe with their years: but the vivacity,

accordingly we ſee the Romans advanced Valerius Corvinus, Scipio, Pompey, and many others of that age; and to ſo good purpoſe, that they decreed them the honour of a triumph in the flower of their youth.

vivacity, quickneſs, ſteadineſs, and other parts of much greater importance, and more eſſentially our own, languiſh and decay

—— ubi jam validis quaſſatum eſt viribus ævi
Corpus, & obtuſis ceciderunt viribus artus,
Claudicat ingenium, delirant linguaque menſque. Lucret. Lib. III. 452.

Sometimes the body firſt ſubmits to age, ſometimes the mind, & I have ſeen enow whoſe brains have failed them and grown weak, before their Stomach and their legs: and as it is a diſeaſe of no great pain to the Patient, and of obſcure Symptoms, the danger is ſo much the greater. For this reaſon it is that I complain of our Laws; not that they keep us too long to our work, but that they employ us too late. For conſidering the frailty and ſhortneſs of life, and to how many common and natural ſhocks it is expoſed, methinks we ſhould not ſpend ſo great a part of it in ſquabbles about maturity, in idleneſs and education."——Philip de Comines ſays, "it is obſervable that all men whoever became illuſtrious, or performed great actions, began very young; and that this is owing either to education or the grace of God." Lib. I. Chap. x. and Sir William Temple ſeems to be of the ſame opinion, though indeed he allows a longer ſpace for it. "When I was younger than I am, ſays he, and thereby a worſe Judge of age, I have often ſaid that what great thing ſoever a man propoſed to do in his life, he ſhould think of atchieving it by that time he is fifty years old. Now I am approaching that age I am ſtill more of that opinion than I was before, and that no man rides to the end of that Stage without feeling his journey in all parts, whatever diſtinctions are made betwixt the mind and the body, or betwixt judgment and memory. And though I have known ſome few, who perhaps might be of uſe in Council upon great occaſions till after threeſcore and ten, and have heard that the two late Miniſters in Spain, the Counts of Caſtriglio and Pignoranda, were ſo till fourſcore; yet I will not anſwer that the conduct of public affairs under their Miniſtry has not ſometimes taſted of the lees of old age.—I obſerve in this Aſſembly at Nimeguen from ſo many ſeveral parts of Chriſtendom, that of one and twenty Ambaſſadors, there are but three above fifty years old; which ſeems an argument of my opinion being in a manner general. Nor can I think the period ill calculated, at leaſt for a General of Armies, or Miniſter of State in times or Scenes of great action, when the care of a State or an army ought to be as conſtant as the Chymiſt's fire to make any great production; for if it goes out, but for an hour, perhaps the whole operation fails. Now I doubt whether any man after fifty be capable of ſuch conſtant application of thought, any more than of long and violent labour and exerciſe, which that certainly is, and of the fineſt parts. Beſides, no man that ſenſibly feels the decays of age and his life wearing off, can figure to himſelf thoſe imaginary charms in riches and praiſe, that men are apt to do in the warmth of their blood: and thoſe are the uſual incentives towards the attempt of great dangers, and ſupport of great trouble and pains. To confirm this by examples, I have heard that Cardinal Mazarine about five and fifty, found it was time to give over: that the preſent Grand Vizier, who paſſes for one of the greateſt men of that Empire, or of this age, began his Miniſtry about eight and twenty; and the greateſt which I have obſerved, was that of Mr. de Witt, who began at three and thirty and laſted to forty-eight, and could not, I believe, have gone on many years longer at that height, even if he had not come to that fatal end." *See the Eſſay upon curing the Gout by Moxa.*

The END of the FIRST BOOK.

POLITICAL

DISCOURSES

UPON THE FIRST DECAD OF

LIVY.

By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence.

BOOK II.

POLITICAL

DISCOURSES

UPON THE FIRST DECAD OF

LIVY.

By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence.

BOOK II.

THE

PREFACE.

MEN generally praiſe former ages, and find fault with the preſent, though ſometimes without reaſon: nay, ſo partial are they to Antiquity, that they not only admire things long ſince paſt, the knowledge of which, has been handed down to them by Hiſtory, but fondly prefer the times they remember themſelves in their youth, to thoſe they live in when they are grown old [*a*]. Now when they happen to be miſtaken in this point (as they often are) I think the deception may be accounted for ſeveral ways.

In the firſt place, the truth of things ſo very remote cannot be certainly and preciſely known, ſince many events which might entail infamy upon thoſe times, are almoſt buried in ſilence, whilſt others, that may contribute to immortalize their glory, are ſet in the faireſt and fulleſt light. For ſo obſequious are moſt writers to the fortune of a Conqueror, that in order to render his victories more glorious, they not only exaggerate his own exploits, but magnify even the conduct and bravery of his enemies in ſuch a manner, that whoever ſhall chance to read the hiſtory either of the Conqueror or the Conquered, in ſucceeding times, cannot help being filled with wonder at ſuch men and ſuch times, and therefore muſt naturally be led to praiſe and admire them. Beſides, as either envy or fear are the common motives of hatred amongſt mankind, thoſe two powerful cauſes being extinguiſhed by

[*a*] See the Note upon Zanobi del Pino, Hiſt. Flor. Book. IV. See alſo the fourth of Sir Thomas Pope Blount's Eſſays, *concerning the Antients, the reſpect that is due to them; and that we ſhould not too much enſlave ourſelves to their opinions:* and his fifth Eſſay, the ſubject of which is, *whether the men of this preſent age are any way inferior to thoſe of former ages, either in reſpect of virtue, learning, or long life.*

time,

time, cannot affect ancient tranſactions, which no longer excite either jealouſy or apprehenſion in any one.——On the contrary, in affairs that we ſee and tranſact ourſelves, of which we have ſo intimate and perfect a knowledge, that no circumſtance can be concealed from us, and wherein we find many things that either hurt or diſguſt, as well as ſome that pleaſe us, we are forced to give the preference to Antiquity, even when, in reality, it deſerves not the ſame degree of glory and praiſe. I would not here be underſtood to ſpeak of arts and ſciences, the progreſs or ſtandard of which is ſo well known, that it is not in the power of time either to add to, or detract any thing from their due credit: I ſpeak only of things that relate to the lives and actions of men, the evidence of whoſe merit is not ſo clear.

I ſay then, that nothing is more common than this cuſtom of praiſing the paſt, and finding fault with the preſent times. It cannot be ſaid, however, that thoſe who do ſo are always in the wrong; nay, they muſt of neceſſity ſometimes have reaſon on their ſide: for, ſince the affairs of this world are perpetually ebbing and flowing, every thing muſt have its viciſſitude of better and worſe. A City or State, for inſtance, which has been reformed and new modelled upon good Principles, by ſome wiſe and able Legiſlator, will continue to flouriſh and increaſe for a conſiderable time, perhaps, under his influence and adminiſtration. Thoſe then, that happen to be born there during that period, and yet cannot help giving the preference to former times, are certainly guilty of an error: and that error is owing to the cauſes I have juſt now aſſigned. But others who live afterwards in the ſame City or State, when it is upon the decline, and things grow worſe and worſe every day, cannot juſtly be accuſed of an error in paſſing ſuch a judgment.

When I conſider the courſe of theſe things therefore, ſometimes with myſelf, I am apt to think the world has always been pretty much the ſame, and that there hath at all times been nearly the ſame portion of good and evil in it; but that this good and evil have ſometimes changed their ſtations, and paſſed from one City or Province to another; as we may ſee from the hiſtory of thoſe ancient Kingdoms and Empires, the Dominion of which has been transferred from one to another according to the variation of their manners and cuſtoms, whilſt the face of the world in general has ſtill continued the ſame. Thus, virtue, which once ſeemed to have fixed itſelf in Aſſyria, afterwards removed its ſeat into Media, from thence into Perſia, and at laſt came and ſettled amongſt the Romans: and if there has been no other Empire ſince the Roman of ſo long duration, or where the virtue of the whole world ſeems to have been collected into one maſs, it has nevertheleſs been

diſtributed

diſtributed and parcelled out amongſt ſeveral nations, as France, Turkey, Egypt, ſome time ago, and Germany at preſent; but firſt and above all amongſt the Saracens, who performed ſuch wonderful exploits and conquered ſo many States, that they utterly deſtroyed the Empire of the Romans in the Eaſt. In all theſe nations then, after the ruin of the Roman Empire, there was, and ſtill is in ſome of them, that portion of virtue which I have been ſpeaking of, and in ſuch a degree as juſtly merits praiſe and admiration. So that the man who happens to be born there, and takes upon him to prefer paſt times to the preſent, is ſurely miſtaken in his computation: but another that lives in Italy, and is not a Tramontane in his heart, or in Greece, and is not a Turk, has ſufficient reaſon to bewail his lot in falling into ſuch times, and to extol thoſe of his Anceſtors, in which, indeed, he will find many things truly enviable; whilſt in the preſent he meets with nothing but extreme miſery, infamy, and contempt; no regard to religion, laws, good order or diſcipline; but every thing corrupted and polluted to the laſt degree of abomination: and ſo much the ſharper will be his regret and the higher his deteſtation, when he ſees thoſe that ſit *pro tribunali, in the judgment Seats*, cloathed with power and authority to correct vice in others, and demanding adoration, ſtill more profligate and abandoned themſelves [*b*].

But to return to my diſcourſe; I ſay that though human judgment is frail, and may err in determining whether the paſt or preſent times are the better, eſpecially in things of which it cannot have ſo perfect a knowledge on account of their great antiquity, as of others that have fallen under their immediate notice; yet that will not excuſe men who deceive themſelves, and indiſcriminately prefer the times and tranſactions that happened when they were young, to thoſe which they experience when they are grown old, ſince they have ſeen both one and the other with their own eyes: nor would they be of that opinion, if the judgment, appetites, and paſſions of men, continued the ſame all their life long. But as theſe vary, though the times may not, it is impoſſible they ſhould ſee the ſame things in the ſame light in their old age that they did in their youth, when their views and inclinations are in a manner totally changed. For ſince our judgment and prudence uſually increaſe as our bodily vigour declines, thoſe things which ſeemed tolerable, or perhaps good, when we were young, muſt neceſſarily appear evil, and probably inſupportable, when we are grown old: ſo that inſtead of carping at the times, we ought to lay the fault upon our own judgment. Beſides, our deſires being inſatiable (as nature ſuffers us to wiſh for every thing, though fortune allows us to obtain but few things)

[*b*] The Popes and Cardinals are here meant, it is ſuppoſed.

the mind of man is continually diſſatisfied, and apt to grow weary of what it poſſeſſes: from whence it comes to paſs that we deſpiſe the preſent times, whilſt we commend the paſt, and wiſh for the future, though we have no reaſonable motive for ſo doing. I know not therefore, whether I may not deſerve to be numbered amongſt thoſe who deceive themſelves in this manner, for having been too liberal in my panegyrics in theſe Diſcourſes, upon the ancient times and exploits of the Romans, whilſt I have ſpoke ſo harſhly of our own [c]: and indeed if the virtue of the one as well as the wickedneſs of the other, had not been as clear as the ſun, I ſhould have been more ſparing both of my praiſe and cenſure, that ſo I might not ſeem to have fallen into that error myſelf which I ſo freely condemn in others. But the caſe being ſo plain that no body can deny it, I ſhall make no ſcruple of declaring my opinion without any reſerve concerning both the paſt and preſent times, in order to excite ſuch young men as may chance to read my works, to imitate the virtues of the one, and avoid the vices of the other, whenever their fortune ſhall call them out into action: For certainly it is the duty of a good man to point out what is great, virtuous, and praiſe-worthy to others, though perhaps either the adverſity of his fortune, or the malignity of the times will not ſuffer him to execute it himſelf: that ſo when many are inſtructed in what they ought to do, ſome of them perhaps, to whom Heaven is more propitious, may be bleſſed with an opportunity of bringing it to effect. Having therefore ſhewn in the firſt book, how the Romans proceeded in their interior eſtabliſhments, I ſhall in the next, conſider the meaſures they took to augment and extend their dominion abroad.

[c] Eſpecially in *the Art of War*.

POLITICAL

DISCOURSES

UPON THE FIRST DECAD OF

LIVY.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Whether the grandeur of the Roman Empire may be aſcribed to the Virtue, or good Fortune of that people.

PLUTARCH, a very grave author, and many others, are of opinion, that the Romans were more indebted to their good Fortune than their Virtue for the largeneſs of their Empire: and amongſt other reaſons which he aſſigns to confirm the truth of this, he ſays they plainly acknowledge it themſelves, in having erected more Temples to Fortune than to any other of their Deities. Livy himſelf ſeems to incline to this way of thinking: ſince he very ſeldom introduces any Roman ſpeaking of virtue, but he makes him ſay ſomething of Fortune alſo. But I confeſs I am not of that opinion myſelf; nor do I think it can be properly ſupported by any one elſe: becauſe if no other Commonwealth ever made ſo great a progreſs as the Roman, it is well known that no other Commonwealth was ſo well conſtituted for that purpoſe: for as the valour and excellent diſcipline of their Soldiery were the chief cauſes of their acquiring ſo extenſive a dominion; ſo their wiſe conduct and the inſtitutions eſtabliſhed by their firſt Lawgivers, were means of preſerving what they got, as we ſhall ſhew more at large

in the following Diſcourſes. It is objected indeed by ſuch as take the other ſide of the queſtion, that it muſt neceſſarily be owing to the influence of Fortune, rather than the effect of Wiſdom or Virtue, that the Romans never had two wars of any great importance upon their hands at the ſame time. For they had no quarrel with the Latins, till they had ſo thoroughly ſubdued the Samnites, that they were obliged to enter into a war for the defence and protection of that people: nor were they engaged with the Tuſcans till they had conquered the Latins, and reduced the Samnites to the laſt extremity, by the frequent victories they had gained over them: whereas if any two of theſe States had confederated againſt them at firſt, whilſt thoſe States were yet firm and unbroken, without doubt the Romans muſt have been in great danger of being utterly ruined in the very infancy of their Government.

To what cauſe ſoever it might be owing, it is certain nevertheleſs, that the Romans were never involved in two wars of any conſequence at once: on the contrary it appears, that when a freſh war broke out, they always put an end to any they happened to be engaged in at that time, and never began one till they had concluded another. This may be particularly obſerved throughout the whole courſe of their quarrels: for not to mention thoſe they were concerned in before Rome was taken by the Gauls, we do not find they had any other enemies to deal with but the Æqui and Volſci, whilſt thoſe two nations were in a condition to cope with them. When they were vanquiſhed, a war was commenced with the Samnites; and though it is true the Latins revolted from the Romans before that war was entirely concluded, yet before any hoſtilities were committed, the Samnites had entered into a confederacy with the Romans, and aſſiſted them with their forces to chaſtiſe the inſolence of the Latins. After they were reduced, the war with the Samnites was revived, in which they were defeated in many battles. That being concluded, a quarrel enſued with the Tuſcans; at the end of which, the Samnites were encouraged to try their fortune once more with the Romans, by the arrival of Pyrrhus with an army in Italy: but he being driven back again into Greece, the firſt Punic war begun, which was hardly ended when the Gauls on both ſides of the Alps combined againſt the Romans, and coming to an engagement with them were routed with very great ſlaughter betwixt Popolonia and Piſa, in the place where the Tower of St. Vinenzo now ſtands. When this was over, they had no war of any great importance during the next twenty years; as they had no body to give them any trouble except the Ligures [e], and ſome few of the Gauls that were left in Lombardy: ſo that they were in a great meaſure at peace till the ſecond Punic war, in which Italy was engaged

[e] Now called the Genoeſe.

for

for the ſpace of ſixteen years. This being concluded with great glory, the Macedonian war broke out; at the end of which, another happened with Antiochus in Aſia; who being ſubdued, there was neither any Prince nor Republic left in the whole world that was able either of themſelves, or in conjunction with others, to make head againſt the Romans. But whoever conſiders their conduct and manner of proceeding in their wars, even before this laſt deciſive ſtroke, will find great virtue and conſummate prudence mixed with their good fortune; ſo that the cauſe of their ſucceſs is eaſily diſcovered. For it is moſt certain that when any State has acquired ſo high a degree of reputation, that all its neighbours ſtand in awe of it, no one will venture to attack it ſingly, except compelled by downright neceſſity: from whence it muſt come to paſs, that it will always have it in its choice to be at war with which of them ſoever it pleaſes, and to keep fair with the reſt by other proper means; who being partly afraid of its power, and partly lulled into ſecurity by the other methods it may take to amuſe them, will eaſily be prevailed upon to ſit quiet and contented. As to others that are more powerful, but at ſuch a diſtance that they have little or no commerce with it, they will not give themſelves much trouble about people that are ſo remote, and in whoſe concerns they ſeem to be in no wiſe intereſted: in which error they generally continue till the next houſe to them is in flames, and then they have no reſource left to truſt to but their own forces, which will not be ſufficient to oppoſe an enemy who by that time is become irreſiſtible.

I might here obſerve how the Samnites ſtood by like unconcerned Spectators, whilſt the Romans ſubdued the Æqui and Volſci: but for the ſake of brevity I ſhall confine myſelf to the example of the Carthagians alone, who were in very great power when the Romans were engaged in the war with the Samnites and Tuſcans, as they were then in poſſeſſion of all Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, and part of Spain. But truſting in their own ſtrength, and ſecure, as they imagined, by their great diſtance from the Romans, they never thought either of attacking them at that time, or of ſending any ſuccours to the Samnites or Tuſcans: on the contrary (as it uſually happens to growing States) they rather ſeemed to favour their enterprizes by courting their friendſhip and entering into an alliance with them; not perceiving their error till the Romans had conquered all the people betwixt Rome and Carthage, and were grown ſtrong enough to diſpute the poſſeſſion of Sicily and Spain too with the Carthaginians themſelves. What happened to the Carthaginians, happened likewiſe to the Gauls, to Philip of Macedon, and to Antiochus, every one of them being fully perſuaded, that as the Romans were ſo embroiled in wars with other nations, they would certainly be ſubdued by thoſe nations at laſt, or if they were not, that they ſhould have time enough to

make

make ſufficient proviſion for their ſafety, by war at leaſt, if not by other means. I am of opinion therefore, that any other Prince or people endued with the ſame degree of Virtue and Courage, and obſerving the ſame wiſe meaſures, would likewiſe have the ſame good fortune that the Romans had.

I ſhould here have taken notice of the methods which that Commonwealth took, in order to get footing in other nations which they invaded, if I had not already diſcuſſed that point at large in a Treatiſe called *the Prince:* yet I cannot help briefly obſerving, that they always took care to gain over ſome powerful friend in thoſe States to their intereſt, whoſe aſſiſtance they made uſe of not only to open a paſſage into them at firſt, but to keep poſſeſſion of them after they were conquered. Thus they availed themſelves of the Capuans in the territories of the Samnites, of the people of Camerino in Tuſcany, of the Mamertines in Sicily, of the Saguntines in Spain, of Maſſiniſſa in Africa, of the Etolians in Greece, of Eumenes and other Princes in Aſia, and of the Maſſilians and Edui in Gaul: and ſo dexterous were they both in forming and conducting ſuch alliances, that they never were at a loſs for friends of that kind, who greatly contributed to facilitate all their enterprizes, and enabled them both to conquer other nations and afterwards to retain the dominion over them. Thoſe then that carefully follow the ſame Maxims, will always have much leſs occaſion for the aſſiſtance of Fortune than others that do not: and that there may be no further room left to doubt that their own Wiſdom and Virtue conduced much more than Fortune to the aggrandizement of that Empire, we ſhall ſhew in the next Chapter, what ſort of people they were whom the Romans ſubdued, and how obſtinately they defended their liberties.

CHAP: II.

With what Nations the Romans were engaged in their wars; and how obſtinately thoſe Nations defended their liberties againſt them.

THE exceſſive love of liberty, and the obſtinacy with which both the neighbouring nations, and ſome of thoſe that lay at a great diſtance from the Romans, defended it againſt them in thoſe times, made it ſo difficult to conquer them, that it never could have been effected, without an uncommon degree of virtue and courage. This is evident from the many and great dangers to which they expoſed themſelves, ſometimes to preſerve, and ſometimes to recover it; as well as from the ſevere revenge they took when an opportunity offered, upon thoſe that had uſurped it. It likewiſe ſufficiently appears from Hiſtory what

what grievous evils and miſeries were the conſequence of ſervitude in many Nations and States. And though there is but one nation at preſent that can boaſt of having free Cities in it [e], yet, in ancient times there was no inſtance of any which had not ſeveral. We ſee for example, how many free people there were then in one angle of Italy alone, as the Tuſcans, the Romans and the Samnites; not to mention many others in all the different parts of it: but there is nothing at all ſaid of any Kings, except thoſe that reigned at Rome, and Porſena, King of Tuſcany; concerning the extinction of whoſe family, though Hiſtory is altogether ſilent, it is certain, however, that when the Romans laid ſiege to Veii, Tuſcany was not only entirely free itſelf, but abhorred the name of King, even amongſt others, to ſuch a degree, that the people of Veii having elected one for their defence, and demanding the aſſiſtance of the Tuſcans againſt the Romans, the former, after much deliberation, abſolutely refuſed to ſend them any, whilſt they continued under Kingly Goverment, and ſaid, they ſhould not concern themſelves in ſupporting a Country that had already forfeited its liberties.

Now it is eaſy to diſcern from what cauſe this fondneſs for liberty in mankind is derived: for experience ſhews us, that no ſtate ever extended its dominion, or increaſed its revenues any longer than it continued free. On the contrary, if it ſeems wonderful to ſome, how the Athenians arrived to ſuch a height of grandeur, in the ſpace of an hundred years only, after they had ſhaken off the yoke of Piſiſtratus; and much more amazing, perhaps, that the Roman Empire ſhould encreaſe in ſo prodigious a manner after the expulſion of Kings, yet it may readily be accounted for; ſince it is not a regard for the good of one particular man, but for that of the public, which makes a State great and powerful; and it is paſt doubt, that the good of the public is not ſo much conſidered in any other form of Government, as in a Commonwealth; for there every meaſure is purſued, that may conduce to the benefit of the whole, how prejudicial ſoever it may prove to the intereſt of any private perſon; and there is always ſuch a majority of thoſe that are advantaged by this manner of proceeding, as will be ſufficiently able to carry their point, in ſpite of any oppoſition from others that muſt ſuffer by it. But the caſe is quite different in States that are under the Government of a Prince; for there it generally happens, that what makes for the advantage of the Sovereign, tends to the prejudice of the Public, and vice verſâ [f]: ſo that whenever free States

[e] The German Empire.

[f] How this will hold, ſays E. Dacres, with the general, and almoſt received tenent, I cannot ſee; being, that the Prince and the People are ſaid to make only one politique body,

States degenerate into Tyranny, the leaſt evil they muſt expect is to make no further progreſs in riches, power, or dominion: and it is pretty well if that be the worſt, ſince they commonly, nay almoſt always indeed, from that time begin to decline and fall to decay. For, if the Tyrant ſhould chance to be a ſpirited enterprizing man, and extend his Empire by war, the Public would not be at all advantaged by that, nor any body benefitted but himſelf; becauſe he dares not honour or advance any of his Subjects, how worthy and virtuous ſoever they may be, leſt he ſhould make them ſo powerful that he might afterwards have occaſion to grow jealous of them: nor will he venture to make thoſe States which he conquers, either tributary or dependent upon that which he has uſurped, becauſe he will not think it for his own intereſt to let his Subjects grow ſtrong and united, but to keep every Town and Province divided, and wholly dependent upon himſelf: ſo that he alone, and not his country, is the better for thoſe acquiſitions; for a further confirmation of which (if there can ſtill remain any ſort of doubt) let any one read Xenophon's *Treatiſe upon Tyranny*, wherein he will find ſufficient matter for his conviction.

Theſe things being conſidered, it is no wonder that people in ancient times abhorred Tyranny, and were ſo paſſionately fond of Liberty, that they adored the very name of it; a remarkable inſtance of which, we have in the caſe of Hieronymus, Nephew to Hiero the Syracuſan; for, upon the news of his death, the army, which at that time lay encamped not far from the City, at firſt took up arms againſt the Conſpirators, who had aſſaſſinated the Tyrant; but, when they were informed that the people in the City declared for Liberty, they were ſo charmed with that name, that they ſoon laid them down again, and began to take meaſures for the re-eſtabliſhment of the Commonwealth.

body, and the welfare of the part cannot be ſeparated from the whole." Famous is that Fable of Æſop, concerning the Belly, and the reſt of the members, which Menenius Agrippa made uſe of to reconcile the Commons of Rome upon a diſtaſte againſt the Senate, gone apart in the holy mount. Whereby it came to appear, that the Belly afforded its ſervice too, and as well gave as received nouriſhment, diſtributing by the veins, throughout the whole body out of the meat which it had digeſted, the blood well concocted, whereby each part was nouriſhed. Who is it that feels not, when any part fails, that the whole is in diſorder? And who ſees not likewiſe, when any part of the body draws into it more than its proportionable nouriture, that the whole pines thereupon? As from the ſwelling of the ſpleen, the health of the whole body is diſturbed, and therefore, by ſome Politiques, not unfitly compared to a Prince's Exchequer, which, when it exceſſively abounds beggars the whole country. *It is folly to think* (ſays a Spaniſh Author) *that the poverty of the Commonalty will not redound to the breaking of private patrimonies, nor can great revenues continue where the Commonwealth is raked to the very bones.* All theſe things ſerve to argue the mutual ſympathy, as between the head and the members, ſo between the Prince and his ſubjects; and to divide the intereſt of the Prince from that of the people cannot agree with good policy: for, as in the natural body it breeds diſeaſes, ſo in the politique it produces diſorders and deſtruction.

Nor

Nor can it ſeem ſtrange, that the people ſhould ſhew but little mercy to thoſe that have deprived them of their freedom, ſince there have been ſo many examples of their rage upon ſuch occaſions. I ſhall content myſelf with one only, however, which happened at Corcyra, a City in Greece, during the courſe of the Peloponeſian war: for Greece being divided into two factions, one of which adherred to the Athenians, and the other to the Spartans; many towns had partizans of each ſide within the ſame walls. But the Nobility having got the upper hand at Corcyra, and depriving the people of their liberties there, the latter, by the aſſiſtance of the Athenians, were enabled to take up arms, and riſing upon the Nobility ſoon overpowered them: after which, they ſhut them all up together in one priſon, from whence they took them out by eight or ten at a time, under a pretence of baniſhing them into different parts, but afterwards put them to the moſt cruel kinds of death. Of which the reſt being at laſt informed, reſolved to behave themſelves like men in that extremity, and exert their utmoſt efforts to avoid ſo ignominious an end. For this purpoſe, having armed themſelves as well as they could in their circumſtances, they reſolutely defended the entrance of the priſon, and would let no body come in, till the people ran tumultuouſly together, and got to the top of the building, which they uncovered, and throwing down the roof and walls of it upon their heads, ſoon buried them in the ruins. Many other inſtances of the like terrible nature happened in that country; from whence the truth of the old obſervation is ſufficiently evinced, that people generally run greater lengths in revenging the loſs of their liberty, than in defending it.

Conſidering therefore, ſometimes with myſelf, what ſhould be the reaſon, that people are not ſo zealous in aſſerting their liberties at preſent, as they were in former times, I think it is owing to the ſame cauſe, that makes them not ſo bold and courageous as they uſed to be; namely, the difference betwixt their Education and ours, occaſioned by the difference betwixt the Chriſtian and Pagan Religion. For our Religion having ſhewn us the true way to real happineſs, inſpires us with a contempt of worldly glory: which being the chief end of the Pagans, and the object wherein they placed their *Summum bonum*, made them more fierce and daring in their actions. This may appear from many of their Inſtitutions, particularly their Sacrifices, which were very magnificent indeed, when compared with the humility of ours, in which the ceremonies are rather delicate than pompous or ſtriking, and not attended with any circumſtances of ferocity or *Eclat*. In thoſe of the Pagans, beſides the ſplendour of the Solemnity, the very action of the Sacrifice was full of blood and cruelty, as great numbers of victims were butchered upon thoſe occaſions: which inured men to horrid

ſpectacles, and made them ſanguinary and hard-hearted. Beſides which, they deified none but men full of worldly glory, ſuch as great Commanders and illuſtrious Governors of Commonwealths. But our Religion, inſtead of Heroes canonizes thoſe only that are meek and lowly, and given to the contemplation of heavenly things, rather than to an active or buſy life; and the chief happineſs which the Pagans ſought from courage, from bodily ſtrength, and other things that conduced to make them hardy and fierce; we look for in humiliation, in ſelf-denial, and contempt of this world: ſo that if our religion ever requires us to ſhew any degree of fortitude, it is to be manifeſted in our ſufferings, rather than in any thing elſe. This manner of living then, ſeems to have enervated mankind, and given up ſome as a prey, tied and bound into the hands of others that are more wicked; who may diſpoſe of them as they pleaſe; ſince, in order to obtain Paradiſe, they perceive the generality of them are more ready to ſuffer injuries than to revenge them. Now that the world is thus crippled and hamſtrung, and heaven itſelf appears to be in a manner diſarmed, is owing to the pitiful and erroneous explication, which ſome have taken upon them to give of our Religion, as if it enjoined ſolitude and indolence, and forbad an active and ſerviceable life: for if they had conſidered that it allows us to defend and exalt our Country, it certainly allows us alſo to love and honour it, and to qualify ourſelves for its defence [g]. This ſort of Education

[g] Upon this Paragraph, the abovementioned E. Dacres, ſays as follows, "Here Machiavel falſely imputes the cauſe of mens cowardlineſs to the Chriſtian Religion. I neede not alleadge any battells foughten by Chriſtians, to proove him a Lyar: hiſtories frequently affoarde us examples, as well ancient as modern, where they have been as reſolutely foughten by the Chriſtians, as ever were any by the Pagans; nay, our own memories may well ſupply us with ſome if we want. If we marke from whence Machiavel takes his argument, it is from that the Pagans ſlew a multitude of ſacrifices, the ſight of which being terrible, made men of the ſame diſpoſition. By the ſame reaſon it muſt follow, that our Butchers and Surgeons are more valiant than other men, as who cuſtomarily have their hands imbrued in bloud. I may well allow them to be more cruel; and therefore our Laws exclude them from being upon a jury of Life and Death: but of being more valiant, I never heard they had the reputation."——Let us hear alſo what a great Prelate of our Church ſays upon this paſſage, which is much more to the purpoſe. "It is objected (ſays he) that the Chriſtian Religion is apt to diſpirit men, and to break the courage and vigour of their minds by the precepts of patience, humility, meekneſs, forgiving injuries, and the like. This objection hath made a great noiſe in the world, and hath been urged by men of great reputation and inſight into the tempers of men and the affairs of the world. It is *ſaid* to be particularly inſiſted upon by Machiavel, and very likely it may; though I think that elſewhere he is pleaſed to ſpeak in terms of great reſpect, not only of Religion in general, but likewiſe of the Chriſtian Religion. . . . . But howſoever this objection may be, I dare appeal both to reaſon and experience for the confutation of it. 1. To reaſon, and that as to theſe two things. 1. That the Chriſtian Religion is apt to plant in the minds of men principles of the greateſt reſolution and trueſt courage. It teacheth men upon the beſt and moſt rational grounds to deſpiſe dangers, yea and death itſelf, the greateſt and moſt formidable evil in this world; and this principle is likely to inſpire men with the greateſt courage:

Education then, and theſe falſe Interpretations, have been one great cauſe, that there are not now ſo many Republics in the world as there were

courage: for what need he fear any thing in this world, who fears not death, after which, there is nothing in this world to be feared? And this the Chriſtian Religion does, by giving men the aſſurance of another life, and a happineſs infinitely greater than any that is to be enjoyed in this world. And, in order to the ſecuring of this happineſs, it teacheth men to be holy, juſt, and to exerciſe a good conſcience, both towards God and man; which is the only way to free a man from all inward tormenting fears of what may happen to him after death. *This makes the righteous man*, ſays Solomon, *as bold as a Lion.* Nothing renders a man more undaunted, as to death and the conſequences of it, than the peace of his own mind; that is, not to be conſcious to himſelf of having wilfully diſpleaſed him, who alone can make us happy or miſerable in the world. So that a good man being ſecure of the favour of God, may, upon that account, reaſonably hope for greater happineſs after death, than other men: whereas a bad man, if he be ſober, and hath his ſenſes awaked to a ſerious conſideration of things, cannot but be afraid to die, and to be extremely anxious and ſolicitous about what will become of him in another world: for ſurely it would make the ſtouteſt man breathing afraid to venture upon death when he ſees hell beyond it. Poſſibly there may be ſome monſters of men, who have ſo far ſuppreſſed the ſenſe of Religion and ſtupified their own conſciences, as in a good meaſure to have conquered the fears of death and the conſequences of it: but this happens to very few, and at ſometimes only. So that if vice and wickedneſs do generally break the firmneſs of mens ſpirits, it follows, that nothing but Religion can generally give men courage againſt death. And this the Chriſtian Religion does in a moſt eminent manner, to thoſe that live according to it; our bleſſed Saviour having delivered us from the fear of death, by conquering death for us, and giving us aſſurance of the glorious rewards of another life. 2. Meekneſs, patience, humility, modeſty, and ſuch virtues of Chriſtianity, do not in reaſon tend to diſpirit men, and break their courage, but only to regulate it, and take away the fierceneſs and brutiſhneſs of it. This we ſee in experience, that men of the trueſt courage have many times the leaſt of pride and inſolence, of paſſion and fierceneſs. Thoſe who are better bred, are commonly of more gentle and civil diſpoſitions: but therefore they do not want true courage, though they have not the roughneſs and foolhardineſs of men of ruder breeding. So that in a true Chriſtian, courage and greatneſs of mind are very conſiſtent with meekneſs, patience, and humility. Not that all good men are very courageous: there is much of this in the natural temper of men, which Religion does not quite alter. But that which I am concerned to maintain is, that Chriſtianity is no hinderance to any man's courage, and that, *cæteris paribus*, ſuppoſing men of equal tempers, no man hath ſo much reaſon to be valiant, as he that hath a good conſcience; I do not mean a bluſtering, and boiſterous, and raſh courage, but a ſober, calm, and fixed valour. 2. I appeal to experience for the truth of this. Did ever greater courage and contempt of death appear in all ages, ſexes, and conditions of men than in the primitive Martyrs? Were any of the heathen Soldiers comparable to the *Chriſtian Legion* for reſolution and courage, even the Heathens themſelves being judges? The Religion of Mahomet ſeems to be contrived to inſpire men with fierceneſs and deſperateneſs of reſolution; and yet I do not find, but that generally where there hath been any equality in numbers, the Chriſtians have been ſuperior to them in valour, and given greater inſtances of reſolution and courage than the Turks have done. So that I wonder upon what grounds this objection hath been taken up againſt Chriſtianity, when there is nothing either in the nature of this Religion, or from the experience of the world, to give any tolerable countenance to it. And ſurely the beſt way to know what effect any Religion is likely to have upon the minds of men, is to conſider what effects it hath had in the conſtant experience of mankind." *See Archbiſhop Tillotſon's Sermon upon Matth.* xi. 6. *entitled the prejudices againſt Chriſtianity conſidered.* Vol. II. p. 411, 412. *fol. Edit. of his works, printed at London*, 1735. *See alſo* Vol. II. p. 61. *& ſeq. of Mr. Bayle's Theological works epitomized, by R. Boulton*, where it is ſhewn how much true greatneſs of mind is promoted by Chriſtianity.

were formerly; and conſequently that the love of Liberty is not ſo ſtrong and operative in mankind, as it uſed to be in ancient times: but yet I am

Some indeed from too literal an interpretation of Matth. v. 39.——*reſiſt not evil: but whoſoever ſhall ſmite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other alſo*, have not ſcrupled to aſſert, that no Chriſtian, according to his own principles, ought to bear arms; but this ſeems abſurd to the laſt degree: for ſelf-preſervation is the firſt law of nature; and he that gave us our being, certainly gave us a right to defend it. Mr. Bayle however, in his *Continuation des penſees diverſees*, Tom. II. p. 598. is of opinion that a Society or Commonwealth compoſed of true Chriſtians only, but ſurrounded on every ſide by infidel nations, or worldly Chriſtians, ſuch as are now, and have been long the nations, amongſt which Chriſtianity is publicly eſtabliſhed, would not be able to maintain itſelf. "True Chriſtians, ſays he, would conſider themſelves only as travellers and pilgrims upon earth, aiming only at Heaven, their own country. . . . They would not diſcontinue their prayers and works of charity to procure a worldly advantage, even by lawful means; *having food and raiment they would be content*, 1. Tim. vi. 8. and far from giving themſelves any trouble to enrich their children, they would think they left them a ſufficient inheritance, if they only taught them to deſpiſe worldly riches, and to *live ſoberly, righteouſly, and godly*, Tit. ii. 11. If you will ſeriouſly reflect upon this, you will find, that a nation wholly compoſed of ſuch people, would ſoon be ſubdued, if a formidable enemy ſhould endeavour to conquer it: for they could not be ſupplied either with good ſoldiers, or money enough to ſupport the expences of a war. Such Chriſtians would not be fit for battle: for being uſed only to patience, meekneſs, long-ſuffering, mortification, prayer, and the contemplation of heavenly things, they would be like ſheep amongſt wolves, if they were ſent to the borders of their country to reſiſt an army compoſed of old experienced officers and ſoldiers. . . . . Add to this, that the Commanders and Leaders of theſe good men being themſelves pious Chriſtians, would be too ſcrupulous to make uſe of a thouſand tricks and artifices, without which it would be impoſſible to repel a ſkilful enemy." Mr. Bayle has ſeveral other reflections upon this ſubject, which need not be tranſcribed here; becauſe a later author has adopted them, and given them a new turn. *See an Enquiry into the origin of Virtue, and the uſefulneſs of Chriſtianity in war, by the Author of the Fable of the Bees. See alſo an account of that performance, and a ſhort anſwer to it in the Preſent State of the Republic of Letters, for February*, 1732, Vol. IX. Art. viii. p. 93. from whence it is hoped the Reader will excuſe the following extract. "Let us now (ſays the author of that performance) examine his thoughts concerning the uſefulneſs of Chriſtianity in war.

And here the Doctor thinks Chriſtianity not only entirely uſeleſs, but inconſiſtent with warfare, and that it is impoſſible to be a good Chriſtian and a good Soldier. He ſays that *a peaceful diſpoſition and humility are not qualities more promiſing in the day of battle, than a contrite heart and a broken Spirit are preparatives for fighting; that the Doctrine of Chriſt does not teach men to fight, any more than it does to paint; and that if Repentance was preached amongſt military men, Soldiers would be in danger of being ſpoiled by it, and rendered unfit for their buſineſs.* It muſt be confeſſed indeed that the Doctrine of Chriſt does not teach men to fight, and that there is nothing contained in the Goſpel that can have the leaſt tendency to promote or juſtify war or diſcord, foreign or domeſtic, public or private; and therefore if all Princes, as well as their Subjects, would regulate their conduct by its precepts, there would be neither rebellions nor wars in Chriſtendom. But alas! the paſſions of mankind will always be too ſtrong for Reaſon and Religion too: pride and ambition will carry on Subjects to rebel againſt their lawful Princes, and Princes themſelves to injure and oppreſs their neighbours. And whenever ſuch a caſe happens, I don't ſee any thing in Chriſtianity that forbids a truly virtuous and Chriſtian Prince to make uſe of his Subject's aſſiſtance, or the Subjects themſelves to give him ſuch aſſiſtance, in order to vindicate his juſt rights againſt a foreign invaſion or domeſtic rebellion.

The

am inclined to believe, that the overgrown power of the Roman Empire contributed ſtill more to this; for it was ſo great that it conquered and extinguiſhed all other Republics and free States.

How-

The Chriſtian Religion is ſo far from being an enemy to the juſt rights and privileges of Princes, and the proper means of defending them, that it has greatly ſecured them by enforcing ſubmiſſion and obedience to the higher powers, and requiring the allegiance of Subjects out of conſcience and duty. Thus the primitive Chriſtians obeyed the Roman Emperors though Heathens, and ſerved them in their wars with zeal and fidelity. That a Chriſtian therefore may be a good Soldier, we may venture to affirm: but how far a good Chriſtian is bound to ſerve his Prince in a war that is manifeſtly unjuſt, as likewiſe how far every Subject is bound to enquire whether the war he is engaged in be ſo or not, are queſtions I ſhall not undertake to determine at this time.

I can by no means agree with the doctor, when he ſays, *that preaching repentance to Soldiers would render them unfit for their buſineſs, and that a contrite heart and a broken Spirit*, that is, an humble and thorough ſenſe of ſorrow for paſt offences, *are unpromiſing preparatives for fighting*. For as he allows that all men are born with a natural fear of an inviſible cauſe, and of death; whatever removes or leſſens that fear, muſt inſpire courage and bravery. Now let us examine a little the different behaviour that may be reaſonably expected from two Soldiers at the approach of an enemy; the one of whom I will ſuppoſe to be a pious ſincere Chriſtian, the other a nominal one only, or elſe an unbeliever. The conſcience of the firſt bears him witneſs, that he has always endeavoured to obey the will of God, and been heartily ſorry for whatever he has done amiſs; he conſiders that he is now doing his duty in ſerving his Prince, and therefore if he happens to fall in battle is fully perſuaded, that he ſhall be immediately admitted into a much more happy ſtate than ever he enjoyed in this world. Theſe conſiderations will give him a perfect calm of mind, will inſpire him with intrepidity and courage, and carry him even above the fears of death. As for the other, if he be a nominal Chriſtian only, that is, one who though he has lived in a Chriſtian country, yet has gratified all his paſſions without the leaſt regard to the precepts of Chriſtianity: as ſoon as the enemy draws nigh, guilt and remorſe, which always produce fear, will ſurround him: ſo that not only the ſight of death itſelf, but likewiſe the dread of what may follow will help to increaſe his terrors. But if he be an unbeliever, that is, one who never had any thoughts about Religion in this world, and has no expectation in another; ſuch a one muſt neceſſarily be a coward, and terrified at the near approach of danger, becauſe he believes death puts a final period to his Being as well as to all his hopes and expectations. From hence therefore it may be concluded, in oppoſition to what our Author affirms, that the beſt Chriſtian will always make the beſt Soldier; becauſe being free from guilt he will be the leſs terrified at the approach of danger; and being well aſſured of happineſs after death, he will always be ready to meet it without fear or trembling. But he ſays further, that *a peaceable diſpoſition and humility are unpromiſing qualities in the day of battle*, and thinks forgiving injuries, loving our enemies, &c. inconſiſtent with the character of a Soldier. But to this it may be eaſily replied that pride, inſolence, noiſe, and bullying, have never yet been thought marks of true courage; but on the contrary, it has always been obſerved that perſons of a modeſt, quiet and peaceable behaviour, have, when tried, generally ſhewn the trueſt bravery. Nor can I ſee any good reaſon why a pious and ſincere Chriſtian, who is of a meek, forgiving and benevolent temper, and in private life ready to pardon all injuries done him by others, may not diſtinguiſh himſelf by his gallantry in the day of battle, and be ſignalized for his bravery in defence of his King and Country."

As to Mr. Bayle's reflections mentioned above, Mr. Bernard, Profeſſor of Philoſophy and Mathematics, and Paſtor of the Walloon Church at Leyden, made ſeveral obſervations upon them, (*ſee Rep. des Lett. Mars*, 1705) and firſt refers him to ſome Sermons preached by Dr. Tillotſon and Dr. Sharp, who give quite a different notion of Chriſtianity from what Mr. Bayle had of it, and ſhew that no Religion is more capable

However that may be, it is certain, that when the Roman Empire was broke up and diſſolved, very few of thoſe States ever joined together

curing the happineſs not only of private men, but even of whole Societies. In the next place he ſhews, that if a Society of true Chriſtians could not ſubſiſt, being ſurrounded by infidel nations or worldly Chriſtians, the ſame objection would hold good againſt any Chriſtian family which ſhould live in a country where the precepts of the Goſpel were not duly practiſed. Such a family could not long ſubſiſt, it would ſoon be ſtripped of all that it had, and reduced to the utmoſt poverty: ſo that, according to Mr. Bayle, Chriſtianity leaves a man deſtitute of all means to defend himſelf againſt injuſtice and oppreſſion. Thirdly, if fraud, violence, avarice, ambition, and all ſorts of vice be abſolutely neceſſary, ſays he, to maintain civil ſociety amongſt men, of what uſe can Virtue be? Where is the providence or wiſdom of God? Does not this principle tend to ruin the diſtinction of moral good and evil, and even to raiſe a throne for vice upon the ruins of virtue, and conſequently to overthrow the doctrine of the being of a God? Fourthly, thoſe paſſages which ſeem to contain too rigorous precepts muſt be underſtood in a milder and more limited ſenſe. For inſtance, when Chriſt ſays whoever ſhall ſmite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other alſo, the beſt Divines tell us we muſt not take this paſſage in the exact literal ſenſe, becauſe Chriſt himſelf did not mean it ſo; for when he was ſtruck himſelf, he reproved the perſon who ſtruck him. John xviii. 22. 23." Mr. Bayle made a large reply to theſe obſervations, (See *Rep. aux. Queſt. d'un Provincial*, Tom. IV. p. 380.) and maintained that all we can infer from the text in St. Matthew above quoted, and from our Saviour's conduct is, that when were ceive an injury, we may modeſtly repreſent to the perſon who affronts us, the wrong he does us; but not that we are at liberty to return ſtroke for ſtroke, or apply to a court of juſtice till we receive ſuch ſatisfaction as the cuſtom of what is called the *point of honour* requires according to the world. If that had been Chriſt's meaning he would have uſed other words, thoſe which he has made uſe of cannot admit of ſuch a conſtruction by any rules either of grammar or analogy. What would infidels ſay, if they were told that when Chriſt would leave every one of us the liberty of defending himſelf, he expreſſed his meaning in ſuch words as ſignified quite the contrary; eſpecially if we conſider that the paſſage quoted is preceded immediately by theſe words, *Ye have heard that it hath been ſaid, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I ſay unto you, reſiſt not evil, but whoſoever, &c.?* We have here a poſitive declaration which lays a reſtraint upon the liberty allowed by the Jews of rendering evil for evil." Mr. Bernard replied at large and in a very ſatisfactory manner to all Mr. Bayle's arguments; but as the reply is too long to be inſerted here, the Reader is referred to the *Rep. des Lettres, Julliet* 1707. p. 69. *Aut.* p. 168. *Sept.* p. 286.——The celebrated Ferus and Eraſmus likewiſe, conſidering how many cruelties were committed in war, were of opinion that a good Chriſtian ought never to bear arms, as appears from the following paſſage in Grotius's Prolegomena to his Book *de jure Belli & Pacis.*——" Cujus immanitatis conſpectu multi homines minime mali eo venerunt, ut Chriſtiano, cujus diſciplina in omnibus hominibus diligendis præcipue conſiſtit, omnia arma interdicerent; ad quos accedere interdum videntur & Johannes Ferus & Eraſmus noſtras, viri pacis & Eccleſiaſticæ & civilis amantiſſimi." Others affirm that it is impoſſible to conduct an army without infringing the laws of Chriſtianity. See *the Note concerning Diſpenſations, Hiſt. Flor.* Book VII. Charles V. uſed to ſay, " that as he was a warrior he could not poſſibly be religious and conſcientious." The famous Marquis of Peſcayre in the wars of Lombardy likewiſe told the Legate who was afterwards Pope, with regard to the riotous exceſſes and licentiouſneſs of his Soldiers, " Mon Sennor Legado, no ay coſa mas difficultoſa a los que exercen la guerra, que con igual diſciplina ſervir en un miſmo tiempo a Mars y a Chriſto, porque el uſo de la guerra en eſta corruption de militia parece ſer todo contrario a la juſticia y Religion: i. e. My Lord Legate, nothing is more difficult for thoſe who follow a military life than to ſerve both Chriſt and Mars at the ſame time as they ought to

do

ther again, and recovered their freedom: though when it firſt began to increaſe and extend itſelf, the Romans in every corner of the World found

do: for the corruption which reigns in our armies is quite repugnant to juſtice and Religion. *Brantome capit. Etrang.* Tom. I. p. 132. "Such is the judgment, ſays a Critic upon this paſſage, that people form of war who are beſt acquainted with it:" and ſince "*unicuique in ſuâ arte credendum eſt, i. e. every one ought to be believed in his own profeſſion,*" we muſt conclude that an army conducted according to the laws of the Chriſtian Religion, is a Platonic Idea, an Utopia, a Philoſopher's Stone, which will never be found."

True it is however after all, that the Holy Scriptures confirm what the law of nature dictates: for they no where condemn juſt wars; on the contary God himſelf preſcribed to the Iſraelites how they ſhould behave when they waged war againſt their Enemies, Deut. xx. "When thou goeſt out to battle againſt thine enemies, and ſeeſt horſes and chariots and a people more than thou, be not afraid of them; for the Lord thy God is with thee, who brought the out of the land of Egypt; and it ſhall be that when ye are come nigh unto the battle that the Prieſt ſhall approach and ſay unto the people. Hear O Iſrael, you approach this day unto battle againſt your enemies; let not your hearts faint, fear not, neither tremble nor be terrified becauſe of them; for the Lord your God is he that goeth with you to fight for you againſt your enemies." And indeed in conſequence of this command, they not only might juſtly wage war againſt their enemies, but actually did. And many of the greateſt and beſt men under the Old Teſtament maintained long and bloody wars againſt thoſe who ſought their ruin. How often, in particular, was David obliged to fight againſt the Philiſtines, the Syrians, and Ammonites, who had grievouſly injured his Subjects? And what is more, knowing that Saul moſt earneſtly ſought his ruin, he took the ſureſt means to prevent it; for he gathered together a body of men to defend himſelf if he ſhould be attacked. After Abraham heard that his brother Lot was carried away priſoner, he immediately aſſembled his Servants to purſue his enemies, and overcame them, Gen. xiv. 19. And when Melchiſedec met him he did not reprimand him for attacking his enemies, but bleſſed him, on the contrary; "Bleſſed be Abraham of the moſt high (ſaid he) and bleſſed be the moſt high God who hath delivered thy enemies into thine own hand."——The new Teſtament likewiſe authorizes what is taught in the old upon this head; for we read in St. Luke's Goſpel that the Soldiers being come to John the Baptiſt, and aſking him *what they ſhould do*, he anſwered them, *do violence to no man, neither accuſe any falſly, but be content with your wages:* Luke iii. 14. He does not forbid them the uſe of arms, but orders them to behave with moderation, and be ſatisfied with their pay. It is related likewiſe in the Book of Acts x. 1. 2. that "there was in Cæſarea, a man called Cornelius, a Centurion, a devout perſon, and one that feared God with all his houſe, who gave much alms to the people, and prayed to God alway." And when he ſent for St. Peter, and enquired of him what he had to ſay unto him from God, the Apoſtle did not exhort him to forſake his profeſſion, but only to receive the doctrine of the Goſpel: from which it is evident that a good Chriſtian and a Soldier are things not inconſiſtent in the ſame perſon. This is evident alſo from the firſt verſes in the 13th Chapter of the Epiſtle to the Romans, where the Apoſtle declares, "that the higher powers are ordained of God; and that they are miniſters of God unto us for our good, and bear not the Sword in vain." He ſpeaks there indeed of puniſhing particular crimes; but it follows alſo that Princes and magiſtrates being eſtabliſhed by God for our good, and to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, ought much more to make uſe of the Sword for the welfare and protection of thoſe that are committed to their care, and be always ready to defend them from being oppreſſed by other powers. From all which it is manifeſt that juſt wars are no where condemned in the holy Scriptures, but on the contrary, permitted and approved.——But thoſe who condemn all wars without exception, and ſay they are expreſsly forbidden in the new T[illegible]rine of Jeſus Chriſt is a doctrine of peace, which is continually[illegible]ns; that

found numbers of Commonwealths not only ready-armed and confederated againſt them, but exceeding obſtinate in the defence of their liberties:

that we are ordered to forbear and forgive each other, and to put on *(as elect of God, holy and beloved) bowels of mercy, kindneſs, humbleneſs of mind, meekneſs and long-ſuffering*, Coloſſ. iii. 12. 13. that he commanded his followers to bear the greateſt injuries without thinking of avenging ourſelves, not to reſiſt evil, but to turn the left cheek when the right has been ſmitten, and when they are ſued at law for their coat to part with their cloak alſo, &c. Matth. v. 38. 39. 40. 41. that this is the true characteriſtic of Chriſtianity; and that wars are the very reverſe of all this, and therefore can never be lawful: ſuch people, I ſay, muſt conſider that theſe texts muſt not be taken in the exact literal ſenſe; for if they are, the greateſt inconveniencies and moſt direful evils muſt enſue from ſuch an interpretation. This is ſo apparent that one may venture to ſay that thoſe very perſons who cite them to ſupport their poſition would not obey them; and that if any one ſhould attempt to deprive them of their poſſeſſions, they would try by all means to preſerve them, and go to law for that purpoſe; though according to their own way of arguing, that is alſo forbidden in the Goſpel. Beſides, if they were to be taken in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, there would be no need of Magiſtrates; for their office would be uſeleſs, and no body could apply to them without ſin. Theſe texts then regard only diſputes betwixt man and man; and our Lord exhorts us not to be of an implacable Spirit: *not to avenge ourſelves, nor to give place to wrath*, Rom. xiii. 19.

In many caſes it by no means becomes private perſons to do either themſelves or others juſtice; and it was for this reaſon that our Saviour reprimanded St. Peter for drawing his Sword and ſmiting the high Prieſt's Servant in order to revenge his Maſter; ſince it was not his buſineſs to interfere in that affair, nor to oppoſe himſelf to the ſupreme Council of a whole nation. But when we are injured in our private property, we may lawfully have recourſe to the civil Magiſtrate, who is (as hath been already obſerved) *ordained of God for our good, and is a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil*, Rom. xiii. 19. Nay we may defend ourſelves, our poſſeſſions, and much more our lives againſt robbers and murderers: the laws of God and thoſe of nature give us this right; and therefore he that acts according to them deſerves no blame. From what has been ſaid, it is evident that the paſſages of Scripture before cited have no relation to juſt wars undertaken by Princes for the protection of their Subjects, but regard only the differences which happen betwixt man and man: and to interpret them in any other ſenſe muſt ſoon tend, if ſuch a doctrine ſhould once be received by any public Community, to the utter ſubverſion of all ſociety and the deſtruction of whole nations, which muſt inevitably become a prey to the firſt Invader. But it muſt be carefully remembered that what has been ſaid extends only to *juſt* wars, that nothing but abſolute neceſſity ſhould ever force a Prince to go to war, and that he ſhould by all means endeavour to avoid ſuch a neceſſity conſidering the dreadful conſequences which muſt certainly enſue.—Thoſe that deſire to ſee this topic more fully diſcuſſed pro and con, are referred to *a Sermon preached at Canterbury, Auguſt* 13, 1758, *by Mr. Foureſtier, upon Matth.* xxiv. 6. *Puffendorf's Law of Nature and Nations, with Barbeyrac's notes abridged by J. Spavan, M. A. printed at London* 1716, *Vol.* I. *Ch.* xiv. *entitled, Of Self-defence. Mr. Bayle's Reflections upon Comets:* and ſome Eſſays written by the *illuſtrious Paſſeran* (as Mr. Pope calls him) an Italian Count, and publiſhed in Engliſh by one Morgan (not T. Morgan the Author of the Moral Philoſopher about five and twenty years ago) wherein he *pretends* that a Chriſtian by his Religion has no right to reſiſt an enemy or tyrant, and that he cannot, conſiſtently with his own principles, concern himſelf as a Magiſtrate. This Morgan alſo publiſhed an atheiſtical treatiſe upon *Death*, which was ſeized upon at the Printer's and burnt by an order of the Privy Council. In this treatiſe upon *Death* all moral obligations and duties are denied; murder and adultery are ſaid to be crimes, not by nature, but by poſitive laws and inſtitutions; and it is pretty roundly affirmed that murderers and adulterers have no Power to fear but the civil Power and private revenge. The author further aſſerts that Heaven

liberties: which ſhews, that without a very uncommon degree of courage and virtue, they could not have ſubdued thoſe people. Of this I ſhall

Heaven and Hell are baniſhed out of the creation by Sir Iſaac Newton. In ſhort, I believe it is the wickedeſt ſpeculative pamphlet that ever was publiſhed; and perhaps it may be thought not a little blameable in referring any one to it. But it is fair to have the arguments on both ſides of a queſtion heard when it is neceſſary to be diſcuſſed, and as *truth* can never be overthrown, it muſt always triumph after its cauſe has been heard and the weakneſs of its adverſaries expoſed. Let this be a ſufficient apology for ſo long a treſpaſs upon the Reader's patience in this Note.

As to what Machiavel ſays about the Pagans ſeeking their happineſs from bodily ſtrength, and admiring ſuch accompliſhments rather than humiliation, ſelf-denial, contempt of this world, and other virtues of the mind; that is certainly a depravity and falſe taſte which has prevailed amongſt the bulk of mankind in all ages, though not to ſuch a degree under the Chriſtian diſpenſation as before. Of this, many Orators, Poets and Hiſtorians have been ſufficiently apprized: and yet in conformity to the palate of the Vulgar, they have generally extolled their Heroes more on account of their courage, ſtrength, and bodily accompliſhments, than for their real virtues and intellectual qualifications. Thus Iſocrates in his Oration to Philip, ſays that Hercules excelled all other men of former times ſtill more in wiſdom, juſtice, and philoſophy than he did in bodily ſtrength. *See the General Dictionary*, Vol. VI. p. 133, 134. The Orators, Poets, and Hiſtorians, however applauded him only for thoſe exploits which bodily ſtrength had enabled him to perform, and at the ſame time ſuffered the perfections of his mind to be buried in oblivion. This they did not only becauſe they themſelves were more ſtruck with ſplendid than with ſolid things, but becauſe they were perſuaded that their auditors and readers would be more delighted with the relation of battles than the deſcription of ſuch virtues as are exerciſed in times of peace. Horace has very well obſerved this in ſuppoſing that the Shades in the Elyſian fields liſtened favourably to the compoſitions of Sappho and Alcæus; but that they were *more* delighted with the latter, becauſe they were full of wars, State-revolutions, baniſhments, &c.

——— dura navis,
Dura fugæ mala, dura belli.
Utrumque ſacro digna ſilentio,
Mirantur Umbræ dicere: ſed *magis*
Pugnas, & exactos tyrannos
Denſum humeris bibit aure *vulgus*. Ode xiii. Lib. II.

It is to be further obſerved, that ſuch Subjects as tyrants expelled, monſters ſubdued, in a word, times of confuſion and ſlaughter, gave an Hiſtorian a better opportunity of diſplaying his genius and eloquence, than a Life or Series of years led in a uniform manner, and according to the rules of virtue.

An Author who has no great events to deſcribe, ſleeps over his work himſelf and makes his readers yawn; but a civil war, two or three conſpiracies, and as many battles, the ſame leaders ſometimes humbled, and ſometimes exalted, ſharpen his pen, warm his imagination, and always keep his readers in breath. But if he ſhould be commanded to write the hiſtory of a peaceable reign, or ſuch a one as was not checquered with variety, it is more than probable that he would bewail himſelf, as Caligula did, becauſe no grievous calamities happened in his time. "Queri etiam palam de conditione temporum ſuorum ſolebat, quod nullis calamitatibus publicis inſignirentur: Auguſti principatum clade Varianâ; Tiberii, ruinâ ſpectaculorum apud Fidenas memorablem factum; ſui oblivionem imminere proſperitate rerum. Atque identidem exercituum famem, peſtilentiam, incendia, hiatum aliquem terræ optabat." *Sueton. in Caligula.* Cap. xxxi. Deſolations and public Calamities are of advantage to an Hiſtorian, and add luſtre to his writings. If he be a good man, he pities the illuſtrious Veſtal who was buried alive, and abhors

ſhall give but one inſtance in the caſe of the Samnites; but it is a remarkable one. They were ſo ſtrong and reſolute (according to Livy)

the tyrant who cauſed her to ſuffer that cruel death only to make his reign more remarkble: *Plin.* Epiſt. ii. Lib. IV. but this melancholy event is at the ſame time of advantage to his pen, and an ornament to his writings. This work is a kind of Ship that never ſails better than in ſtorms; a tempeſt is a refreſhing gale to him; a dead calm is as unpropitious to him as to a real Ship; and when an Hiſtorian can begin as Tacitus does, "opus aggredior opimum caſibus, atrox prælliis, diſcors ſeditionibus, ipſâ etiam pace ſævum; quatuor Principes ferro interempti; tria bella civilia, plura externa, ac plerumque permixta." Hiſt. Lib. I. Cap. ii. he prejudices his readers in his favour, and is ſenſible he has made choice of a pleaſing Subject. But ſtill it ſhews a bad taſte to prefer the relation of warlike feats to an account of actions that are full of equity and goodneſs, and to admire a man's bodily ſtrength, and that boldneſs which enables him to ſubdue a bull or a wild boar more than that virtue which gives him the maſtery over his paſſions, and prompts him to eſtabliſh good and wholeſome laws amongſt his countrymen. This ſort of virtue, though it does not ſhine ſo much as the other, has nevertheleſs much more true grandeur in it; and thoſe qualities which Hiſtorians, Poets, and Orators have taken little or no notice of in their great men, are certainly worthy of higher admiration, than others which they have magnified to ſuch a degree. But they were forced to comply with the taſte of the Public. It may not be amiſs to add here what is ſaid to this purpoſe in the *Suite du Menagiana, p.* 285, *Dutch Edit.* viz. "that the antient Gauls held their Hercules in great veneration, chiefly becauſe he was very ſtrong and of *mighty ſtature*; and having declared, after they were converted to Chriſtianity, that it would be one of their greateſt troubles not to ſee his Statue any more; they were comforted by being told that the Chriſtians had a Saint who was ſix times *as tall and ſtrong* as Hercules; meaning the Statue of St. Chriſtopher, the Hercules of the Roman Catholics."

Upon the whole, Machiavel ſeems not ſo much to be blamed for what he has ſaid in this Chapter as many people have thought: for it is plain from what he ſays elſewhere in many places, that he does not here ſpeak of pure and undefiled Chriſtianity as it was delivered to us by its Divine Author; but degenerated, as it was in his time, into the moſt abominable degree of corruption and adulteration. The Romiſh Religion in that age was no more like true Chriſtianity, than a common Strumpet can be ſaid to be like a chaſte Matron: and as it is generally obſerved, that the beſt things when corrupted are apt to become the worſt, ſo it fared with the doctrine of Jeſus Chriſt; which from being the pureſt and moſt noble of all others that ever exiſted, was then polluted to ſuch a degree by the heads of it and other wicked men, that inſtead of anſwering the divine ends which it was deſigned to promote, it was perverted to the ſaddeſt purpoſes by vile interpretations of its generous and heavenly precepts, and the pitiful education of youth which a parcel of lazy, ignorant and *unchriſtian* Monks had introduced in conſequence of ſuch interpretations. When men ſpeak of vinegar, they do not mean wine in its pure and uncorrupted ſtate: and when Machiavel ſpeaks of the effects of the Romiſh Religion, it is evident from many other paſſages in his writings, that he does not deſign to reflect upon true and genuine Chriſtianity. On the contrary, he ſpeaks of that with the higheſt reſpect, and always recommends the practice of it. For inſtance, he ſays, Chap. xii. Book I. of theſe Diſcourſes, "that if Chriſtian Princes had taken care to preſerve their Religion in the purity it was delivered to them by its Author, it is certain Chriſtendom would have been much more happy and united than it is at preſent: but it is the ſureſt ſign of its declenſion, to ſee that thoſe who live neareſt the Church of Rome, which is the head of our Religion, have the leaſt devotion: for whoever will examine its firſt principles and compare them with the practice of theſe times, will find it no difficult matter to perſuade himſelf that either ſome dreadful ſcourge, or perhaps utter deſtruction is hanging over our heads." See the reſt of that Chapter: See alſo Chap. xi. and xiii. of the ſame Book. Many other ſtrokes there are of this kind in different parts of Machiavel's works: but let theſe ſuffice, to prevent further prolixity.

that

that though they had been defeated in numberleſs battles, their towns plundered, and their territories laid waſte; yet they made head againſt the Romans till the time of Papirius Curſor, the Conſul, and Son to the firſt Papirius; a period of forty-ſix years. But now that Country, which was formerly ſo populous and full of towns, and where the inhabitants were ſo brave and well diſciplined, that nothing but the Roman valour could have ſubdued them, is in a manner deſolate and uninhabited. But this may be eaſily accounted for, when we conſider that it was then free, and at preſent is in a ſtate of ſervitude: for all States that have the full enjoyment of Liberty make a ſurprizing progreſs, and are enabled to do very great things, as I ſaid before: becauſe the inhabitants muſt naturally increaſe very faſt, where matrimony becomes deſirable, by the conſideration that they ſhall not only be able to ſupport themſelves and their families, but that their children will inherit what they get without any fear of having it taken from them by force; and further, that thoſe children, inſtead of being born ſlaves, may become great men and governors of the State, if they behave themſeves virtuouſly. Wealth of all kinds, whether ſuch as reſults from Agriculture or Manufactures, likewiſe multiplies very faſt there: for every one cheerfully endeavours to enrich himſelf by ſome means or other, when he is aſſured he ſhall be ſuffered to enjoy the fruit of his labours in peace: ſo that men vie with each other in providing for the public, as well as their own particular intereſt, to the great advancement and emolument of both.

Very different is the condition of thoſe that do not live under a free Government; and the leſs liberty they have, the fewer of thoſe advantages will they experience which we have been ſpeaking of. But of all yokes, that of living in ſubjection to a Commonwealth is the heavieſt and moſt miſerable; for, in the firſt place, it generally endures the longeſt, and there is the leſs hope of ever being able to ſhake it off; and, in the next, it is the policy of all Republics to weaken and exhauſt other States that are dependent upon them, in order to ſtrengthen and invigorate their own: which is a maxim not practiſed by Princes, except they be Barbarians, depopulators of Provinces, and ſcourgers of mankind, like the eaſtern Tyrants, who endeavour to extinguiſh all civil order and Liberty. But a Prince of any benevolence or humanity, for the moſt part, loves and cheriſhes the people that are fallen under his dominion, in common with the reſt of his Subjects, and leaves them in quiet poſſeſſion of their former cuſtoms and privileges: ſo that if they cannot thrive and flouriſh like thoſe that are perfectly free, yet they do not abſolutely ſink into ruin, like others that are in downright ſlavery; I mean ſuch ſort of ſlavery as thoſe fall into, who become ſubject to a foreigner; for, concerning the ſervitude which is the

ſequence of being oppreſſed by one of their own Citizens, I have already ſpoken elſewhere [*h*].

Whoever then maturely conſiders the whole of what I have ſaid above, will not be ſurprized either at the power and ſtrength of the Samnites whilſt they continued free, or at their weakneſs and abject condition after they had loſt their liberty. Livy takes notice of this in the many paſſages of his Hiſtory; particularly, in his account of the war with Hannibal: where he tells us, that the Samnites being grievouſly harraſſed by a Roman Legion which then lay at Nola, ſent to ſupplicate the aſſiſtance of that Commander: and that their Deputies repreſented to him amongſt other things, "That though they had held the Romans at bay for the ſpace of an hundred years, with their own forces only, and commanded by their own Generals, and had often made head againſt two Conſular armies, under two Conſuls at the ſame time; yet they were then reduced to ſo low an ebb of fortune and ſpirits, that they could hardly defend themſelves againſt one Legion only that was quartered at Nola."

CHAP. III.

That Rome made itſelf ſtrong and powerful by deſtroying the States round about it, and incorporating ſtrangers with its own Citizens.

CRESCIT interea Roma, Albæ ruinis. In the mean time Rome eſtabliſhed itſelf upon the ruins of Alba, ſays Livy very juſtly. For thoſe that would aggrandize and extend a State, ſhould endeavour by all means to make it exceeding populous in the firſt place; ſince it will be impoſſible ever to accompliſh that purpoſe, without a vaſt number of men. Now this may be done two ways; that is, either by ſoft and gentle methods, or by force and violence. In the former caſe, you are to encourage Foreigners to ſettle in it, and to make their reſidence ſecure and comfortable; that ſo they may ſtay there with ſatisfaction: in the latter, you muſt ruin the neighbouring States, and compel the inhabitants of them to come and live with you: both which rules were ſo well obſerved by the Romans, that in the time of their Sixth King, they muſtered eighty thouſand men in their City, that were fit to carry arms [*i*]; imitating in this reſpect the practice of a ſkilful planter, who,

[*h*] See Book I. Chap. xvi. xvii. xviii. of theſe Diſcourſes. The *Prince*, Chap. viii. & *alibi paſſim*.

[*i*] We muſt reckon the forces of their neighbours, the Campanians, in this number, becauſe they were always accounted Roman citizens: accordingly, our author ſays in another

who, in order to ſtrengthen a tree, and enable it to thrive and bear plenty of good fruit, prunes off its firſt ſhoots, that the Sap, which otherwiſe would dilate itſelf in the branches, being confined wholly to the trunk, may exert itſelf in time with more vigour, and make the tree more flouriſhing and fruitful. That this policy is not only expedient, but abſolutely neceſſary to eſtabliſh and enlarge Dominion, plainly appears from the neglect of Athens and Sparta in this reſpect; which two Republics, though very warlike indeed, and happy in their Laws, could never arrive at that height of grandeur which Rome attained to; notwithſtanding Rome ſeems to have been in a more tumultuous ſtate, and not ſo well governed as they were. For which there can be no other reaſons than what have been juſt now aſſigned. For Rome ſtrengthened itſelf to ſuch a degree by purſuing theſe maxims, that it was able to ſend out armies conſiſting of two hundred and eighty thouſand effective men at one time: whereas, neither of the other could ever raiſe above twenty thouſand. This was not the effect of an advantageous ſituation (becauſe that of Rome was neither better nor more benign, than thoſe of Athens and Sparta) but to the difference of their conduct: for Lycurgus, the Founder of the Spartan Commonwealth, apprehending that the admiſſion and converſation of the new inhabitants would naturally tend to the corruption and diſſolution of his Laws, took all poſſible care to prevent his Citizens from having any manner of commerce with ſtrangers: for which purpoſe, he not only would not ſuffer intermarriages with Foreigners, or that they ſhould be admitted to the freedom of the City, or have any ſuch ſort of connexions or correſpondence with them as uſually draw men together, and unite them; but likewiſe cauſed the current money of that Commonwealth to be be made of Leather, that no body might be tempted to come thither to traffic or introduce any new kind of manufacture: ſo that it was not poſſible that City ſhould ever be very full of inhabitants.

Now, as natural and politic bodies may often be very fitly compared together, and it is impoſſible that a feeble trunk ſhould ſuſtain vaſt and ponderous branches: ſo it is equally impoſſible that a weak Commonwealth ſhould ever ſubdue another Commonwealth or Kingdom, that is much ſtronger or fuller of armed men than itſelf: or if it ſhould by any chance happen to ſubdue them, it muſt fare with it in a little while, as it does with a tree, the branches of which are too large and heavy for its trunk to ſupport, and conſequently muſt be torn from it by the leaſt blaſt of wind. This was actually the caſe of Sparta; though it had the good fortune to conquer all Greece: for, upon the rebellion of

another place, that when the Decemviri had diſguſted their fellow-citizens, they had nothing to hope from the Campanians, as they were reckoned the ſame with the Roman people.

the Thebans, all the reſt of the States revolted alſo, and left that Republic like a tree, ſtripped of its branches: a misfortune that never could happen to Rome, as its trunk was ſtrong enough to ſuſtain any weight. The ſtrict practice therefore of the aforeſaid rules, and ſome others that we ſhall mention hereafter, made the Romans ſo ſtrong and powerful: ſo that Livy's obſervation, *Creſcit interea Roma Albæ ruinis*, contains a great deal in a few words.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning the three ways which Republics have taken to extend their Dominion.

WHOEVER is converſant in ancient Hiſtory muſt have obſerved, that Republics have taken three methods to enlarge themſelves. One of which was formerly purſued by the Tuſcans, who entered into a confederacy with ſeveral Republics upon an equal bottom; that is, it was agreed amongſt them, that no one of them ſhould pretend to aſſume any degree of pre-eminence or authority over the reſt, and that they ſhould likewiſe admit ſuch ſtates as they conquered into the confederacy; as the Swiſs do at preſent, and the Achaians and Etolians did of old in Greece: and ſince the Romans had many wars with the Tuſcans, I ſhall be the more particular in what I have to ſay, concerning the conduct of that people, in order to explain the nature and tendency of this firſt method as clearly as I can.

Before the foundation of the Roman Empire in Italy, the Tuſcans were very powerful both by ſea and land; and though we have now no particular Hiſtory left of their tranſactions and exploits, yet there are ſome few traces and monuments of their grandeur ſtill remaining, and we know for certain, that they ſent a Colony to ſettle upon the coaſt of the *higher ſea*, the inhabitants whereof built the town of Adria, afterwards ſo famous, that it gave name to that Sea, which is called the *Adriatic* to this day. We likewiſe know, that their dominion extended from the Tiber to the foot of the Alps (a tract of territory which includes the greater part of Italy), though indeed they loſt that Country, which is now called Lombardy; two hundred years before the Romans had acquired any conſiderable degree of power: for it had been ſeized upon by the Gauls, who being either compelled by neceſſity, or allured by the deliciouſneſs of the fruits, but particularly of the wines which abounded there, invaded that part of Italy, under the conduct of Belloveſus, and having vanquiſhed and extirpated the natives, eſtabliſhed themſelves in thoſe parts, where they built

built many towns, and not only called the Province *Ciſalpine Gaul*, from their own name, but kept poſſeſſion of it till they were conquered by the Romans. The Tuſcans therefore proceeded in the method abovementioned, and enlarged their Dominion by acting jointly, and upon an equal footing with their Confederates, who were the people of twelve States, namely of Cluſium, Veii, Feſulæ, Aretinum, Volaterræ, and ſeven others, each of them having the ſame ſhare in the Government of the whole. They never were able, however, to extend their conqueſts beyond the boundaries of Italy, nor ever could ſubdue ſeveral parts of that, for reaſons which we ſhall mention below.

The ſecond way that has been taken by Republics to enlarge their Dominion, was likewiſe to enter into a League with others; but in ſuch a manner, that one Republic alone took upon itſelf to be the Principal of the Confederacy as well as the capital City, and to carry on all enterprizes in its own name: and this is what the Romans did. The third method was to make downright Subjects and not Allies of ſuch States as were conquered, as the Spartans and Athenians did. But of all theſe three ways, the laſt is certainly the worſt; as plainly appears from the fate of thoſe two Republics, which were ruined by conquering more than they were able to maintain poſſeſſion of: for it is ſo very difficult a matter to keep conquered States in Subjection by violence, eſpecially ſuch as have been uſed to Liberty before, that it is almoſt impoſſible to ſupport any ſort of command over them, without an exceeding ſtrong armed force: to raiſe which, it is abſolutely neceſſary to confederate with others, and to make uſe of all means to fill your State with inhabitants; but, as the two Republics juſt now mentioned neglected both theſe expedients, they never could make any laſting acquiſitions. The Roman Commonwealth, on the contrary, taking the ſecond method and diligently attending to one as well as the other of them, raiſed their Empire to a ſurprizing pitch of glory and grandeur: and as that Republic was the only one that ever did ſo; ſo it was the only one that ever arrived at that degree of power. For aſſociating equally in many things with ſeveral other States in Italy, it ſtill continued the Capital of them, and reſerved to itſelf the title and honour of commanding in chief: by which means it came to paſs, that thoſe Aſſociates became entirely ſubject to it before they were well aware, at the expence of their own blood and treaſure. For when they began to carry their arms out of Italy, and reduced Kingdoms into Provinces, dependent upon themſelves, the inhabitants of thoſe Provinces having being uſed to live under Kingly Government, did not much trouble themſelves about ſuch a change: and ſince they had Roman Governors, and were conquered by armies under Roman colours,

lours, and knew nothing of their Allies, they would acknowledge no other Sovereign but the Republic of Rome: ſo that its Italian Confederates finding themſelves ſurrounded on a ſudden, as it were by people who were all ſubject to the Romans, and therefore unable to contend with ſo powerful a head, at laſt perceived their error, when it was too late to remedy it: ſo great was the authority it had obtained amongſt foreign nations, and ſo formidable of itſelf from the vaſt number of its inhabitants and military ſtrength. It is true indeed, thoſe allies endeavoured to revenge themſelves by afterwards rebelling againſt the Romans: but, being ſubdued, they made their condition ſtill worſe by that: for inſtead of being treated any longer as Allies, they were reduced to mere Subjects.

This manner of proceeding was peculiar to the Romans, as I have ſaid before: but it ought to be purſued by every other Republic that would extend its Empire; ſince experience has ſufficiently proved it is the beſt. The next to that, is the method formerly taken by the Tuſcans, Achaians, and Etolians, and by the Swiſs at preſent: for though very great things cannot be done that way, yet it is attended with two conveniencies; the one, that it generally prevents wars, and the other, that if any acquiſition is made, it will be eaſy to maintain it. The reaſon that ſuch a Confederacy cannot effect any very great things, is that it conſiſts of members which are in a manner disjoined and placed at a diſtance from each other, ſo that their conſultations and reſolutions muſt be ſlow and tedious: beſides, they are not ſo eager to make conqueſts where the prize is to be divided amongſt many, as a ſingle Republic that is to enjoy the whole itſelf. It has likewiſe been obſerved, that Confederacies have their certain bounds, which are never exceeded; that is, when the Confederates amount to twelve or fourteen, they admit no more: for being then powerful enough, as they conceive, to defend themſelves againſt every one elſe, they never think of making any further acquiſitions; becauſe, in the firſt place, they are under no neceſſity of ſo doing; and, in the next, they will reap little or no advantage from it, as we have juſt now ſaid: and further, they would be reduced to the dilemma, either of admitting the conquered States into the Confederacy, which would create confuſion from their number; or to reduce them to Subjects, which being attended with great difficulty and ſmall profit, makes them indifferent about the matter, or rather averſe to it. When the Aſſociates therefore, are once become ſo numerous, and have fortified themſelves in ſuch a manner on every ſide, as to live in perfect ſecurity from all danger, they chiefly attend to two things: the firſt, is to take other people under their protection, for which they are paid certain ſums of money, and divide it amongſt themſelves, without any further trouble; and the next, to hire out their

their forces to ſuch States as have occaſion for them, as the Swiſs do at preſent, and the abovementioned people did in former times, according to Livy; who ſays, that at a conference betwixt Philip of Macedon and Titus Quintus Flaminius, Philip upbraided an Etolian Commander, who was likewiſe preſent, with the avarice and double-dealing of his countrymen, as people that were not aſhamed to confederate with one State, and to ſend aſſiſtance to another that was at war with it; ſo that it was no unuſual Sight to ſee their colours diſplayed in both armies at the ſame time.

We ſee then that this manner of confederating has always produced the ſame effects, and been attended with ſimilar conſequences. It appears likewiſe, that ſuch Republics as reduced their conqueſts to a ſtate of ſubjecton, were always debilitated by it themſelves to ſuch a degree, that they very ſeldom could make any further progreſs in extending their Dominion; and that if they afterwards met with any little ſucceſs of that kind, it was ſo far from being a laſting advantage to them, that it commonly occaſioned their ruin in a very ſhort time. If this manner of proceeding, therefore, is pernicious to Commonwealths that are powerful and warlike, it muſt be ſpeedy and utter deſtruction to thoſe that are not ſo; of which, we have lately ſeen many examples in Italy.

From all theſe conſiderations, the Roman method ſeems much the beſt, and it is wonderful that it was never taken by any people before them, nor has been imitated ſince: as for the other way of confederating, there is now no inſtance of it except amongſt the Swiſs, and in the Circle of Swabia. We might add by way of concluſion to this Chapter, that many other excellent rules and inſtitutions which the Romans obſerved in conducting their affairs, both at home and abroad, are not only not imitated in theſe days, but in a manner deſpiſed; ſome of them being looked upon as fictions and idle Stories, others as impoſſible, and others again, as either not ſuitable to the preſent times and circumſtances of the world, or as trifling and of no importance: and to this it is owing, that our poor Country of late has been a prey to every Invader. But, if it ſeems a matter of too much difficulty to tread in the ſteps of the Romans, ſurely the preſent race of Tuſcans are as capable as any other people whatſoever of imitating their forefathers: for though their Anceſtors indeed never equalled the Romans in extending their Dominion far abroad, for the reaſons which we have given above, yet they acquired as much authority in Italy, as could poſſibly be expected from their conduct and manner of proceeding; enjoying themſelves in profound peace and ſecurity for a long courſe of time, and in the higheſt reputation for their wiſdom, Religion, and power: which power was at firſt ſhaken by the Gauls, and afterwards ſo totally de-

ſtroyed by the Romans, that though it was very great about two thouſand years ago, there are but few or no traces of it left at preſent: which naturally leads me to conſider whence it comes to paſs, that the memory of ſuch things is ſo ſoon buried in oblivion.

CHAP. V.

That Deluges, Peſtilences, the change of Religion and Languages, and other accidents, in a manner extinguiſh the memory of many things.

IT might be objected, I think, to thoſe who ſay the world has exiſted from Eternity, that if it was ſo, we might reaſonably expect to have ſome records of things that happened much above five thouſand years ago; if we did not know that the remembrance of them muſt inevitably have periſhed from cauſes, part of which are owing to the nature of mankind, and part to the influence of Heaven. The oblivion occaſioned by mankind proceeds from the variation of Religion and language: for, upon the introduction of a new Religion, the firſt care of thoſe that endeavour to eſtabliſh it, is to aboliſh the old one, in order to give the greater reputation to their own: and when it happens that the propagators of the new one ſpeak a different language from thoſe that were of the perſuaſion that prevailed before, they ſo much the ſooner extinguiſh the memory of it. This may appear from conſidering the courſe taken by the Chriſtians with regard to Paganiſm: for they totally aboliſhed all the inſtitutions, ceremonies, and monuments of the Pagan Theology. It is true, they could not ſo utterly extinguiſh the memory of ſeveral actions performed by ſome great and illuſtrious men of that Religion, being forced to retain the uſe of the Latin Tongue, though much againſt their will; becauſe they were under a neceſſity of publiſhing the principles and Doctrine of their own in that language. But, if they could have wrote in another, we may be aſſured from the reſt of their proceedings, they would not have left the leaſt traces of any Hiſtory relating to them: for whoever reads the life and actions of St. Gregory, and other heads of the Chriſtian Religion, will ſee what a cruel perſecution they carried on againſt all Monuments of Antiquity, burning the works of Poets and Hiſtorians, defacing images and ſtatues, and demoliſhing every thing that might in any wiſe contribute to keep the memory of Paganiſm alive: ſo that if they had likewiſe introduced a new language at the ſame time, all footſteps of that people and their worſhip would have been entirely wiped out

out [k]. It is very probable therefore, that thoſe Pagans had treated others who went before them, in the ſame manner that they themſelves were ſerved in their turn by the Chriſtians: and as there have been two or three Revolutions of this kind, during the courſe of five or ſix thouſand years, it cannot ſeem ſtrange that the memory of things, which happened before that time, ſhould have now become utterly extinct, or ſo fabulous that no body regards it; as in fact it has fared with the Hiſtory of Diodorus Siculus, which though it pretends to give

[k] Montaigne ſays, Book II. Chap. xix. of his Eſſays, "That when the Chriſtian Religion began to gain authority with the Laws, zeal armed many againſt all ſorts of Pagan books, by which the learned ſuffered an exceeding great loſs; which I conceive did more prejudice to Letters, than all the flames kindled by the Barbarians. Of this, Cornelius Tacitus is a very good witneſs; for though the Emperor Tacitus, his Kinſman, had by expreſs order furniſhed all the Libraries in the world with his book, nevertheleſs, one entire copy could not eſcape the curious ſearch of thoſe who were deſirous to aboliſh it, only on account of five or ſix idle paſſages in it, which ſeemed to oppugn our Belief."

Petrus Alcyonius in *Medice Legato priore* beſtows a noble eulogy upon St. Gregory, here mentioned by Machiavel, but it ends thus. "Utinam incorruptam Græcæ linguæ integritatem ſervaſſet in tantâ rerum Silvâ & tam magnâ librorum vi; certe ſanctiſſimum illum Pontificem omni laude cumulatum judicarem..... ex illius maxime ſcriptis barbariem irrepſiſſe in Theologiam Latinam arbitror. Nam veteres noſtri interpretes, mediocris literaturæ & nullius fere judicii homines, cum animadverterent Theologum hunc frequenter uſurpare voces quaſdam novas, eaſque non ſatis apte fictas, neceſſe ſibi eſſe crediderunt illos latine reddere, atque hunc in modum ſordidâ barbarie eſt lingua latina infuſcata."

He ſays further, in the perſon of Cardinal de' Medici, "Audiebam etiam puer ex Demetrio Chalcondyla, Græcarum rerum peritiſſimo, ſacerdotes Græcos tantâ floruiſſe auctoritate apud Cæſares Byzantios, ut integrâ illorum gratiâ complura de veteribus Græcis poemata combuſſerint, in primiſque ea ubi amores, turpes luſus, & nequitiæ amantium continebantur; ita Menandri, Diphili, Appollodori, Philemonis, Alexis fabellas, & Sappûs, Erinnæ, Anacreontis, Mimnermi, Bionis, Alcmanis, Alcæi carmina intercidiſſe. Tum pro his ſubſtituta Naziazeni noſtri poemata, quæ etſi excitant animos noſtrorum hominum ad flagrantiorem religionis cultum, non tamen verborum Atticorum proprietatem & Græcæ linguæ elegantiam edocent. Turpiter quidem ſacerdotes iſti in veteres Græcos malevoli fuerunt; ſed integritatis, probitatis & religionis maximum dedêre teſtimonium." But Alcyonius is not a credible witneſs, with regard to the incident here related; nor is the teſtimony of Demetrius Chalcondylas much better.

E. Dacres has the following Note upon this paſſage. "This is all calumny: for we find not that any have preſerved the records of learning more than the Chriſtians, however much intermixed with Paganiſm. I take it, that thoſe memorials were loſt in the vaſt deluges of the Vandals, Goths and Hums, who themſelves being barbarous and ignorant, envyed others learning, and therefore deſtroyed all the regiſters of Antiquity they could find; which our author injuriouſly imputes to the Chriſtians; being that they, time out of minde have cauſed thoſe books to be taught the youth in their ſchooles: and we find that the moſt eſteemed Fathers of the Church were adorned with that learning, which they are taxed to have perſecuted; which ſerves alſo for the better underſtanding and illuſtrating of Theology, and affords good arguments many times to our Divines, for the conviction of the Gentiles, out of their own writers. Nor do I find there was any other reſtraint in thoſe ſtudies, than that men were adviſed to apply themſelves ſoberly thereunto, as not being ſtudies to dwell in, but tending rather to the ſervice of Theology."

an account of forty or fifty thouſand years, is looked upon (and juſtly I think) as nothing more than a heap of trumpery and lies.

As for other cauſes immediately owing to the influence of Heaven, which occaſion this oblivion of things, we may reckon thoſe that extinguiſh mankind, and ſweep away moſt of the inhabitants in ſome particular part of the world; ſuch as Peſtilence, Famine, and inundations; the laſt of which ſeems to be the moſt fatal, not only becauſe the calamity is uſually more general, but becauſe thoſe that eſcape its rage, are for the moſt part mountaineers and ignorant men, who having no knowledge of ancient times themſelves, cannot therefore be ſuppoſed to tranſmit any memorials of them to their deſcendents: and though ſome one ſhould chance to ſurvive, who may poſſibly be verſed in Antiquity; yet, it is moſt likely that he will ſuppreſs many things, and garble others in ſuch a manner, as would tend chiefly to make himſelf and his own family alone renowned to poſterity; leaving juſt as much upon record, as he thinks will ſerve that purpoſe and no more. That ſuch accidents have actually happened, there is no room to doubt; ſince it plainly appears, not only from the teſtimony of many Hiſtories, but from this very effect of them, and becauſe it is abſolutely impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe: for, as nature acts in the bodies of individuals, and cauſes a purgation, that tends to preſerve them, when there is too much ſuperfluous matter congeſted in any part; ſo likewiſe it happens in the great collective body of mankind, when either the ſeveral Provinces of the world are ſo full of inhabitants, that they can neither ſupport themſelves where they are, nor find room in any other place; or when the wickedneſs of mankind is arrived at the higheſt pitch it can attain to; for then it becomes abſolutely neceſſary that the earth ſhould be purged by one of theſe three ways, that ſo mankind being reduced in their numbers, and humbled under a ſenſe of their mortality may become more righteous and live with greater convenience. Theſe things being conſidered then, it is no wonder that Tuſcany, which, as we ſaid before, was ſo powerful in former times, ſo renowned for its virtue, manners, and Religion, and had a language and law of its own, being overwhelmed by the exceſſive power of the Romans, ſhould now retain no other mark of its ancient grandeur, than the name alone.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Concerning the conduct obſerved by the Romans in their Wars.

HAVING already ſhewn what means the Romans took to extend their Dominion, I ſhall now ſay ſomething concerning the rules they followed in the proſecution of their wars; and in this as well as all the reſt of their actions, we ſhall ſee how wiſely they deviated in many reſpects from the common practice of all other people, in order to pave their way to univerſal Empire. The end and deſign of all thoſe that make war either out of choice, or to ſpeak more properly, out of motives of ambition, is to get what they can and keep what they have got, in ſuch a manner as neither to endanger nor impoveriſh their own dominions; for which purpoſe, it is neceſſary in both caſes, to purſue all methods that can be taken, not only to ſave expences, but to enrich and benefit themſelves. Whoever then would accompliſh theſe ends muſt imitate the conduct of the Romans, with whom it was a general maxim to make their wars *ſhort and ſharp*, as the French ſay: for by taking the field early and with powerful armies, they very ſoon brought thoſe wars to a concluſion, in which they were engaged with the Latins, Samnites, and Tuſcans: and if we conſider all the reſt that happened from the foundation of Rome to the Siege of Veii, it will be found that ſome of them were ended in Six days, ſome in ten, and others in twenty at moſt. For no ſooner was war declared, but they led out their forces to ſeek the Enemy and bring them to an engagement: after which, if they gained the victory, as they generally did, they forced them to cede that part of their territory which lay upon their confines, to prevent the reſt being laid waſte; and this was either appropriated to their own particular uſe, or given to a Colony, which was ſettled there for the ſecurity of their own frontiers, to the great advantage of the Coloniſts, as well as of the Commonwealth, which was thereby enabled to keep a good garriſon in thoſe parts without any expence to itſelf. Nor could any method be taken more ſafe and beneficial than this; for whilſt the other State continued quiet, that garriſon was a ſufficient ſecurity from any ſudden invaſion; but if it offered to make any attempt upon their Colony, the Romans were preſently in the field again with a powerful army, and having cruſhed the enemy, made them ſubmit to ſtill heavier terms; thus by degrees continually increaſing their power and reputation abroad, and their ſtrength at home.

This

This method they ſtrictly obſerved till after they had made themſelves Maſters of Veii; after which they changed it in ſome meaſure, and gave pay to their Soldiers, as they began to be engaged in wars that laſted longer, which was unneceſſary before, becauſe their wars had always been of ſhort continuance.—Nevertheleſs, though they paid their forces from that time in order to ſupport a war the longer, and to carry their arms into more remote parts, where they were obliged to keep the field a great while, yet they never loſt ſight of their old maxim, but conſtantly put an end to a war as ſoon as ever the circumſtances of the time and place would admit of it, and always ſent Colonies into the countries which they had conquered: for, beſides the utility that naturally reſulted from the obſervation of this rule, they were likewiſe prompted to it by ambition; becauſe the two Conſuls continuing in office but one year, and neither of them commanding the army any longer than Six months, they both were deſirous to put an end to a war as ſoon as poſſible, in order to obtain the honour of a triumph: and as for Colonies, they were too ſenſible of the advantages they reaped from ſuch eſtabliſhments ever to forego them. Indeed they made ſome alteration in their method of diſtributing the ſpoil taken from an Enemy, in which they were not ſo liberal as they had been before; ſince in the firſt place it did not ſeem neceſſary after they had given their Soldiers certain pay, and in the next, the ſpoil increaſing conſiderably afterwards, they thought proper to conſign a good part of it to the uſe of the Commonwealth; that ſo they might not be obliged to lay any freſh taxes upon their own Subjects for the proſecution of any future enterprize: by which means they ſoon enriched the Public to a prodigious degree.

By a ſtrict adherence then to theſe two methods, viz. of diſtributing their Spoils, and of ſending out Colonies, the Romans grew rich by their wars, whereas other Princes and Republics, leſs wiſe, are impoveriſhed by them; nay the matter was carried ſo far at laſt, that no Conſul was allowed a triumph except he came home loaded with gold, ſilver, and other ſpoils for the uſe of the public Treaſury: and thus by likewiſe bringing their wars to a ſpeedy concluſion, either by forcing the enemy to an engagement as ſoon as poſſible, or by harraſſing their country with continual incurſions and devaſtations till they were obliged to ſue for peace upon any terms, this people became richer and more powerful every day.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

What proportion of land the Romans gave to every inhabitant of their Colonies.

IT is not an eaſy matter to know with any certainty how much land the Romans gave each Coloniſt; but it ſeems reaſonable to ſuppoſe that it was more or leſs according to the barrenneſs or fertility of the place. We may conclude however, that they were always very ſparing in this point, that ſo their Colonies might ſupport a great number of men and conſequently be well ſecured; and in the next place, as they themſelves lived very frugally and modeſtly at home, we can hardly imagine they would ſuffer their Subjects to wanton in riot and luxury abroad. Livy informs us that after they had taken Veii, they ſent a Colony thither, and gave each inhabitant a little more than three acres and a half of land [*l*]. They might conſider likewiſe that their wants would be better ſupplied by the improvement and cultivation of their land, than by the quantity of it. But we may ſuppoſe they had alſo Common fields to feed their Cattle, and woods to ſupply them with firing and other neceſſaries; without which no Colony could ſupport itſelf.

CHAP. VIII.

What are the reaſons that induce a people to abandon their own Country and force themſelves into that of others.

NOW we have ſpoken of the manner in which the Romans conducted their wars, and made ſome mention of the invaſion of Tuſcany by the Gauls, it may not perhaps appear foreign to our purpoſe, if we obſerve that there are two ſorts of war: one occaſioned by the ambition of Princes or Republics that invade others to enlarge their own Empire, as Alexander the Great and the Romans did; and theſe wars are very ruinous indeed, though they do not utterly extirpate the natives of conquered Provinces; ſince the Conqueror is generally content with reducing them to obedience only, often leaving them in poſſeſſion of their own laws and almoſt always of their eſtates and properties. The other ſort of war is when a whole people, man, woman, and child, are compelled to quit their own country either by famine or Sword, and

[*l*] Terna jugera & ſeptunces diviſerant.

go

go in ſearch of new habitations in another; not with a deſign merely to reduce it into Subjection to them, like the others juſt now mentioned, but firmly to eſtabliſh themſelves there, either by the entire deſtruction or extermination of the former inhabitants. Now this is always attended with much blood-ſhed, cruelty, and devaſtation, as may appear from what Salluſt tells us in the end of his Hiſtory of the Jugurthine war, when it was reported that the Gauls were upon their march to invade Italy. *Cum cæteris gentibus a populo Romano de imperio tantum fuiſſe dimicatum, cum Gallis de Singulorum hominum Salute. The Romans contended with other nations for glory and dominion only; but with the Gauls they fought to preſerve their own lives and their Country.* For when a Prince or Republic ſubdues another country, they think it ſufficient to rid themſelves of thoſe alone who bore rule over it before; but in irruptions of a whole people at once, the invaders find it neceſſary to extirpate the whole nation which they conquer, in order to ſupport themſelves upon the product of their lands.

Three wars of this dreadful kind the Romans ſuſtained; the firſt, when Rome was taken by the Gauls who had driven the Tuſcans out of Lombardy and ſettled there themſelves: and this invaſion Livy accounts for two ways; in the firſt place, from the deliciouſneſs of the Italian fruits and wines which tempted the Gauls, who had none ſuch at home, to come thither for them, as has been ſaid before: and in the next, their own country being grown ſo full of inhabitants that it could no longer ſupport them all, the leading men of that nation perceived it abſolutely neceſſary that ſome part of them ſhould leave it and endeavour to eſtabliſh themſelves elſewhere: which being accordingly reſolved upon, the people upon whom the lot fell to quit their native country chuſing Belloveſus and Sigoveſus, two of their Princes, to conduct them, the former penetrated into Italy, and making himſelf maſter of Lombardy, ſoon after fell upon the Romans: the latter forced his way into Spain. The ſecond war of this ſort that the Romans had upon their hands, happened to be with the ſame nation at the end of the firſt Punic war; and in this they killed above two hundred thouſand of them in a battle betwixt Piſa and Piombino: and the laſt was when the Cimbri and Germans poured themſelves into Italy; who after they had often routed the Roman armies, were totally conquered and driven back again by Marius [*m*]. Now if the Romans not only ſupported themſelves, but came off with great glory and reputation at laſt in all theſe three terrible wars, it is an indiſputable proof of their extraordinary valour and conſtancy in thoſe times: for afterwards, when

[*m*] It is ſaid that a town has been lately diſcovered in the faſtneſſes of the Alps, which has been inhabited by the deſcendents of this people ever ſince that time, who have ſtill preſerved their ancient language and manners.

they,

they began to degenerate, and had in ſome meaſure loſt their ancient virtue and courage, their dominions were over-run by the very ſame people, that is, by the Goths, Vandals, and others, who wreſted the Empire of the Weſt entirely out of their hands.

Theſe Emigrations are the effect of Neceſſity (as I ſaid before) and this Neceſſity is occaſioned by famine, or war, and diſtreſs at home, which obliges the people to ſeek new habitations; and when the number of thoſe that are thus forced abroad is great, their irruptions into other parts are exceeding fierce and bloody: for they always kill the natives, ſeize upon their lands, turn every thing upſide down, and give the Country a new name; as Moſes did, and the nations that over-ran the Roman Empire. Thus the names by which the ſeveral Provinces of Italy and other nations are now called, were given them by their ſeveral Conquerors: for Lombardy was formerly called Gallia Ciſalpina, and France Gallia Tranſalpina; which laſt now takes its name from the Franks who diſpoſſeſſed the Romans of it. So likewiſe Sclavonia was anciently called Illyria, Hungary Pannonia, England Britain; thus Moſes changed the name of that part of Syria, which he took poſſeſſion of, into Judea; and in this manner many other countries, which it would be tedious to enumerate, have had new names given them very different from their old ones. And ſince I have ſaid above that people are ſometimes driven out of their own country by war, and forced to ſeek new habitations, I ſhall give one example of it in the caſe of the Mauruſians, formerly a people of Syria, who, upon the approach of the Iſraelites under the conduct of Joſhua, not being able to oppoſe him, thought it better to ſave their lives by leaving their country, than to loſe both by waiting for his arrival: for which purpoſe, they marched away with their wives and children into Africa, where they ſettled themſelves after they had driven the inhabitants out of that part of the country, though they could not defend their own. Procopius, in his Hiſtory of the war which Beliſarius conducted againſt the Vandals who had got poſſeſſion of Africa, ſays that he himſelf had read Inſcriptions upon certain pillars in thoſe parts, that were formerly occupied by the Mauruſians, to this effect, *Theſe pillars were erected by us when we fled from the face of Joſhua the Robber, the Son of Nun* [*n*]: from whence the reaſon of their abandoning Syria plainly appears. Such multitudes therefore becoming deſperate, and urged forwards by extreme neceſſity are very formidable: and ſo great indeed is their fury, that it is not to be ſuſtained except by the moſt warlike and courageous nations.

[*n*] Ημεῖς ισμεν οι φυγοντες απο προσωπυ Ιησυ τυ ληςυ μιυ Ναυῆ. Nos fugimus a facie Jeſu latrotronis filii Navæ. *Procop. de bello Vandalico*, Lib. II. p. 258, Chap. x. *de Maurorum origine. Paris Edit.* 1662.

But when thoſe that are obliged to leave their country are few in number they are not ſo much to be dreaded, as the people of whom we have been ſpeaking; becauſe when they find they cannot ſucceed by downright force and violence, they are under a neceſſity of having recourſe to artifice and gentle means, in order to gain a ſettlement ſomewhere or other, and afterwards to ſupport themſelves by alliances and confederacies, like Æneas, Dido, the Maſſilians, and many others, who found means to maintain their ground in thoſe parts where they had got footing with the conſent and good will of the neighbouring States. The moſt numerous emigrations have been chiefly out of Scythia [o], a cold and barren climate, where the inhabitants were generally ſo numerous, and the Country ſo ſterile, that it was not able to ſuſtain them; ſo that multitudes of them having many reaſons to leave it, and none that could induce them to ſtay there, were in a manner compelled to ſeek more plentiful and comfortable habitations: and if there have been none of theſe inundations from thoſe parts during the courſe of theſe laſt five hundred years and upwards, I think it may be accounted for ſeveral ways [p]. In the firſt place, from the prodigious ſwarms of people, that iſſued out from thencein the declenſion of the Roman Empire, which muſt have drained and exhauſted them to the laſt degree; as there were above thirty emigrations at that time. In the next, Germany and Hungary, which likewiſe ſent out legions of theſe adventurers, are now cultivated and improved in ſuch a manner, that all the inhabitants live in plenty and ſatisfaction, and conſequently are under no temptation or neceſſity of removing into any other country: and in the laſt place, theſe two nations and the Poles, who alſo border upon the Scythians, being very warlike and inured to arms, make ſo ſtrong a bulwark againſt them, that there is no likelihood of their ever being able either to conquer, or even to force a paſſage through them: and indeed they have actually repelled many formidable invaſions from theſe Barbarians: it is not without reaſon therefore, if they ſometimes boaſt that it is owing to their valour, that Italy has been ſo long ſecured from ſuch irruptions, and that the Church of Rome is obliged to them for its very exiſtence [q].

CHAP.

[o] Now called Tartary.

[p] Since Machiavel's time, the Tartars have made terrible irruptions into China, and entirely ſubdued that Empire.

[q] For a further account of theſe emigrations, ſee Hiſt. Flor. Book I. at the beginning. Davila's Hiſtory of the Civil wars of France, at the beginning. Examen du Prince, Chap. XXI. Sir William Temple, in the firſt Chapter of his obſervations upon the united provinces of the Netherlands, aſſigns another reaſon why they have long ceaſed. "I have ſometimes thought (ſays he) how it ſhould have come to paſs that the infinite ſwarm of that vaſt northern hive, which ſo often ſhook the world like a great tempeſt, and overflow'd it like a torrent; changing names, and cuſtoms, and government, and language, and the very face of nature, wherever they ſeated themſelves; which upon record

CHAP. IX.

What often gives riſe to a war betwixt different Powers.

THE war betwixt the Romans and Samnites, after they had long been friends and confederates, was owing to a circumſtance which often proves the cauſe of war betwixt other States: and this circumſtance is occaſioned either by accident or deſign. The abovementioned quarrel was the effect of accident; for when the Samnites firſt made war upon the Sidicines, and afterwards upon the Campanians, they had no deſign to break with the Romans. But the Campanians being diſtreſſed, and having no other reſource, threw themſelves into the arms of the Romans, and ſubmitted to their government, contrary to the expectation both of the Romans and Samnites: after which, the Romans were forced to defend them as their own Subjects, and to engage in a war which they could not decline with honour. For though they did not think themſelves obliged to ſupport them before, when they were only in common amity with them, againſt the Samnites, who were

record of Story, under the name of Gauls, pierced into Greece and Italy, ſacking Rome, and beſieging the Capitol in Camillus's time; under that of the Cimbers, marched through France to the very confines of Italy, defended by Marius; under that of Hunns or Lombards, Viſigoths, Goths, and Vandals, conquered the whole force of the Roman Empire, ſacked Rome thrice in a ſmall compaſs of years, ſeated three Kingdoms in Spain and Africa, as well as Lombardy; and under that of Danes and Normans poſſeſſed themſelves of England, a great part of France, and even of Naples and Sicily: how (I ſay) theſe nations which ſeemed to ſpawn in every age, and at ſome intervals of time diſcharged their own native countries of ſo vaſt numbers, and with ſuch terror to the world, ſhould about ſeven or eight hundred years ago leave off the uſe of theſe furious expeditions, as if on a ſudden they ſhould have grown barren, or tame, or better contented with their own ill climates. But I ſuppoſe we owe this benefit wholly to the growth and progreſs of Chriſtianity in the North; by which, early and undiſtinguiſhed copulation, or multitude of wives, were reſtrained or abrogated. By the ſame means learning and civility got footing amongſt them in ſome degree, and encloſed certain circuits of thoſe vaſt regions, by the diſtinctions and bounds of Kingdoms, Principalities, or Commonalties. Men began to leave their wilder lives, ſpent without other cares or pleaſures than of food or of luſt, and betook themſelves to the eaſe and entertainment of Societies: with order and labour, riches began and trade followed; and theſe made way for luxury, and that for many diſeaſes or ill habits of body unknown to former and ſimpler ages, which began to ſhorten and weaken both life and procreation. Beſides, the diviſions and circles of dominion occaſioned wars betwixt the ſeveral nations though of the ſame faith; and thoſe of the Poles, Hungarians, and Muſcovites, with the Turks and Tartars made greater ſlaughters: and by theſe accidents, I ſuppoſe, the numbers of thoſe fertile broods have been leſſened, and their limits in a meaſure confined; and we have had thereby for ſo long together in theſe parts of the world the honour and liberty of drawing our own blood upon the quarrels of humour or avarice, ambition or pride, without the aſſiſtance or need of any barbarian nations to deſtroy us."

their allies, yet they thought it would be ſhameful not to protect them after they were become their Subjects; rightly judging that if they did not, it would diſcourage others who poſſibly might afterwards be inclinable to do the ſame and acknowledge their dominion; which would be acting contrary to the great end they always had in view of extending their glory and Empire. An accident of the ſame nature occaſioned the firſt Punic war: that is, the protection which the Romans gave to the people of Meſſina in Sicily: but the ſecond was owing to another cauſe. For Hannibal the Carthaginian General fell upon the Saguntines in Spain, a people in alliance with the Romans; not ſo much out of any particular enmity he had to that State, as to force the Romans to engage in its defence; that ſo he might have a fair pretence to quarrel with them and invade Italy. This method of exciting a war is very common with ſuch Princes and States as are deſirous to keep up ſome appearance, at leaſt, of honour and good faith: for when they want to make war upon another Prince with whom they have been long in friendſhip and alliance, they generally find ſome excuſe to fall upon one State or other that is dependent upon him, and not directly upon him himſelf; well knowing that by ſo doing, he will either be provoked to reſent it, and then a war enſues according to their wiſh; or if he is not, he muſt ſhew either great weakneſs or baſeneſs in not defending thoſe that are under his protection: in either of which caſes he muſt loſe his reputation, and greatly hurt himſelf.

We may obſerve therefore from what has been ſaid above, concerning the Campanians and Carthaginians, how wars are excited in ſuch caſes ſometimes by accident, ſometimes by deſign: and further, what remedy a State may have recourſe to that is not able to defend itſelf, and yet reſolved not to ſubmit to the enemy that invades it; which is to throw itſelf voluntarily into the arms of another that is powerful enough to afford it protection, as the Romans did to the Campanians, and Robert King of Naples to the Florentines; for though that Prince would not undertake to defend them againſt the incurſions of Caſtruccio Caſtracani, whilſt they were only upon the footing of common friendſhip with him, yet he took them under his protection when they ſubmitted to him as their Sovereign [r].

[r] This ſeems likely enough to be the caſe of the Dutch ſome time or other. Sir William Temple ſomewhere ſays, that when they were reduced almoſt to the brink of ruin by the French in the laſt century, they actually began to talk of putting themſelves, as a circle, under the protection of the Empire.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

That Money is not the Sinews of War, as it is commonly thought to be.

SINCE it is a much eaſier matter to begin a war than to end one, a Prince who has any deſign of that kind in hand, ought not only maturely to conſider his own ſtrength, and to regulate his conduct according to it; but alſo to take great care that he does not impoſe upon himſelf in making that eſtimate, as he certainly will do if he altogether depends either upon his coffers (be they ever ſo full) or the Situation of his dominions, or the affection of his Subjects; all which will ſignify nothing, if he has not a good and faithful army of his own. Theſe things indeed may increaſe his ſtrength, but none of them alone can make him ſtrong: for without a powerful body of troops, what can money do, of what account is an advantageous ſituation, or the affection of Subjects, who will quickly deſert him when they find he is not able to protect them? Every mountain, every Lake or Sea, is paſſable, and every Fortreſs (how impregnable ſoever it may be thought) is acceſſible where there are not proper forces to defend it: and as for plenty of money and treaſure, inſtead of ſecuring a State, it often expoſes it to great danger, and ſometimes proves the cauſe of its ruin, by tempting others to invade it: ſo that nothing can be more falſe and abſurd than the common ſaying, that *money is the ſinews of war.* Quintus Curtius has advanced this opinion, however, in the account which he gives of the war betwixt Antipater the Macedonian, and the King of Sparta; where he tells us that the latter was in ſo great want of money that he was forced to come to an engagement with the enemy upon ſuch unequal terms that he was utterly routed: whereas if he could have avoided fighting but a few days, he would have received news of Alexander's death, and might have gained a victory without ſtriking a ſtroke: but as he had no money, and was afraid his troops would deſert for want of pay, he was under a neceſſity of trying the fortune of a battle: from whence the abovementioned Author infers, *that money is the ſinews of war.* This Maxim, though founded neither upon truth nor reaſon, is nevertheleſs in ſuch general vogue at preſent, that ſeveral Princes (not very wiſe ones indeed) regulate their proceedings according to it; not conſidering that if money alone could ſupport and defend them againſt all enemies and dangers, Darius would not formerly have been conquered by Alexander, nor the Greeks by the Romans, nor Duke Charles [*f*] by the Swiſs a little while ago; nor would the Pope and

[*f*] Of Milan.

the

the Florentines have met with any difficulty in reducing Franciſco Maria, Nephew to Julius II. in the war of Urbino, which happened but the other day. Yet all the abovementioned Princes and States were fairly beaten by others who thought good troops and not money were the Sinews of war. Cræſus King of Lydia having entertained Solon, the Athenian Lawgiver, with many other ſplendid and magnificent ſights, at laſt took him to ſee his Treaſury, which was full of ſilver and gold; and aſking him "if he did not think him exceeding powerful," Solon anſwered, "he did not look upon him to be at all the more powerful upon that account, becauſe war was made with iron, and not with ſilver and gold; and if he ſhould be invaded by any one that had more of the former, he would ſoon be ſtripped of the latter." Every body likewiſe knows that when a vaſt inundation of the Gauls poured themſelves into Greece and other parts of Aſia, after the death of Alexander the Great, and ſent Ambaſſadors to conclude a treaty of agreement with the King of Macedon, that Prince was ſo imprudent to ſhew them the immenſe treaſures he was poſſeſſed of, in order to diſplay his great power, and to diſcourage them from attacking him: upon which, the Gauls were ſo impatient to enrich themſelves with thoſe ſpoils, that they declined any treaty with him, and immediately fell upon his dominions with ſuch fury, that what he had principally confided in for his ſecurity and defence, proved the chief cauſe of his ruin. We might alſo mention the more recent example of the Venetians, who having accumulated a vaſt quantity of money, found ſo little benefit from it when they had moſt occaſion for aſſiſtance, that being attacked not long ago by the Emperor and Lewis XII. of France, they preſently loſt all their dominions upon the Terra firma.

I ſay then, that good Soldiers, and not money (according to the vulgar opinion) are the Sinews of war: for money alone is not ſufficient to provide a good army; but a good army will always provide itſelf with money. If the Romans had been ſimple enough to depend upon money only in their wars, the treaſure of the whole world would not have ſufficed to carry them through their vaſt enterprizes abroad, and the difficulties they met with at home: but as they availed themſelves chiefly of iron, they were ſo far from wanting gold, that people who ſtood in awe of their arms, brought it in abundance to their own doors: and if the abovementioned King of Sparta was neceſſitated by ſcarcity of money to riſque a Battle, it was no more than what has happened to ſeveral other Commanders from different occaſions. For it has often chanced that an army has been ſo ſtraitened for proviſions, that it muſt either periſh by hunger or come to an engagement: in which caſe the latter reſolution has conſtantly been taken, as the moſt honourable, and in which a general may poſſibly be in ſome meaſure befriended by Fortune.

Again,

Again, it frequently happens that when a Commander has intelligence that the enemy is going to be reinforced, he muſt either engage them immediately, or wait till their ſuccours arrive, and then be obliged to fight them at a very great diſadvantage. Or laſtly, it might fare with him as it did with Aſdrubal, when he was ſurprized by Claudius Nero in the Country of the Piceni: in which circumſtances, he muſt either retreat and be ruined without any poſſibility of retrieve, or hazard a Battle as Aſdrubal did at all events, though with little probability of ſucceſs.

There are ſeveral occaſions we ſee then which may force a General to fight contrary to his deſire and intention; and if want of money ſometimes happens to be one, it is not reaſonable upon that account merely, to ſay that money alone is the ſinews of war, when ſo many other circumſtances and wants may reduce him to the ſame neceſſity. I muſt therefore repeat what I ſaid above, that money is not the ſinews of war, but good forces: it is a neceſſary addition to be ſure, but that is a neceſſity which ſuch forces will eaſily find means to ſurmount; for it is as impoſſible that good Soldiers ſhould want money, as that money only ſhould either make or procure good Soldiers. The truth of this is evident from a thouſand paſſages in Hiſtory, notwithſtanding ſome one may object perhaps, that Pericles encouraged the Athenians to engage in a war againſt the united forces of all Peloponeſus, by telling them they were ſo rich and powerful, they could not fail of ſucceſs. The Athenians accordingly liſtened to his advice: but though their arms proſpered for a while, they came off with the worſt at laſt, and found to their coſt that all their money and power was not a match for the valour and diſcipline of the Spartan Veterans. A remarkable paſſage in Livy might ſerve as a further proof of my poſition, if any was yet wanting: for propoſing it as a queſtion whether Alexander the Great would have been able to conquer the Romans if he had turned his arms upon Italy, he ſays, there are three things abſolutely neceſſary to carry on a war with vigour, good Soldiers, good Commanders, and good fortune; and then having conſidered which ſide was the more powerful in thoſe three points, he concludes his compariſon without ſaying ſo much as one word concerning money. It is probable that the Campanians of whom we ſpoke in the laſt chapter, computed their ſtrength by their riches, and not by the goodneſs of their troops, when at the ſolicitation of the Sidicines, they took up arms in their favour againſt the Samnites: for after they had ſo done they were twice routed, and at laſt, forced to ſubmit and become tributary to the Romans, in order to ſave themſelves from utter ruin and ſlavery.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

That it is imprudent to enter into an Alliance with a Prince, whoſe Reputation is greater than his Strength.

LIVY has well expreſſed the error of the Sidicines in truſting to the aſſiſtance of the Campanians, and that of the Campanians in thinking themſelves able to defend them, *Campani magis nomen in auxilium Sidicinorum*, ſays he, *quam vires ad præſidium attulerunt. The Campanians brought more reputation than ſtrength to the relief of the Sidicines.* From whence we may obſerve that Alliances contracted with Princes who are either at too great a diſtance, or too weak, or embarraſſed in their own affairs, are more honourable than ſafe to thoſe that confide in them. Of this we have an example in the caſe of the Florentines, when they were invaded in the year 1479 by the Pope and the King of Naples: for though they were at that time in alliance with the King of France, it was rather a credit than any material ſervice to them: and the very ſame that happened to the Florentines and Campanians, would happen to any other Italian State that ſhould truſt to the Emperor for ſuccour upon occaſion. The Campanians therefore were guilty of a great error, in thinking their ſtrength more conſiderable than it really was: but ſuch is the folly of mankind, that they often undertake to protect others, when they are not able to defend themſelves: as the Tarentines likewiſe did, who, when the Roman army had taken the field againſt the Samnites, ſent Ambaſſadors to acquaint the Roman General it was their pleaſure there ſhould be a peace betwixt the two States, and that they would turn their arms againſt which ſide ſoever ſhould refuſe their mediation. But that General laughing at the impertinence of the Embaſſy, commanded a charge to be ſounded immediately in the preſence of the Ambaſſadors, and led on his troops to engage the enemy; ſhewing them by deeds and not by words, what ſort of anſwer he thought they deſerved. Having now pointed out ſome errors which States fall into in defending others, I ſhall ſay ſomething in the next chapter, concerning the meaſures they ought to purſue for their own defence.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Whether, upon the expectation of a war, it is better to invade the Enemy, or to ſuſtain an Invaſion.

I Have heard it debated ſometimes amongſt able and experienced Commanders, whether (when one Prince has declared war againſt another, and they are both nearly equal in ſtrength) it is better for him that has received ſuch a declaration, to wait till he is attacked, or to be beforehand with the enemy and carry the war into his country. And indeed there is much to be ſaid in ſupport of both opinions. Thoſe that are for carrying the war into the Enemy's country, quote the advice which Cræſus gave Cyrus, when he arrived upon the confines of the Meſſagetæ with a deſign to make war upon them, and Thomyris their Queen ſent to let him know, "that if he pleaſed he might enter her dominions, and ſhe would be ready with her forces to receive him there: or if he did not like that, ſhe would advance to attack him where he then was." Upon which, a Council being called, Cræſus in oppoſition to all the reſt of the Counſellors, adviſed him to march directly againſt her; for if he ſhould defeat her at a diſtance from home, he muſt not even, in that caſe, hope to make himſelf Maſter of her kingdom, becauſe ſhe would have time to recruit her broken forces and make freſh head againſt him there: but if he beat her in her own territories, they muſt certainly fall into his hands; ſince he might purſue his victory in ſuch a manner as to prevent her from ever repairing the loſs. The Advocates on this ſide likewiſe alledge the counſel that Hannibal gave Antiochus, when that Prince had reſolved to engage in a war with the Romans, aſſuring him, that if they ever could be beaten it muſt be in Italy; becauſe there an Invader might avail himſelf of their own arms, their own money, and their own allies; but if he entered the liſts with them any where elſe, and ſuffered them to continue unmoleſted in Italy, he would leave them a ſource of ſupplies that would never fail them upon any occaſion whatſoever; and concluded with telling him, that he might ſooner diſpoſſeſs them of Rome itſelf, than of any other City, and of Italy more eaſily than any other Province in their Empire [*t*]. The conduct of Agathocles the Sicilian, is alſo inſtanced upon this occaſion, who being at war with the Carthaginians, and not able

[*t*] See this queſtion fully diſcuſſed in Paolo Paruta's Political Diſcourſes. Book I. Diſc. v.

to cope with them at home, tranſported an army into Africa, where he ſucceeded ſo well, that he forced them to ſue for peace: and laſtly, that of Scipio, who to ſave Italy, attacked the ſame people in their own country.

Thoſe that take the other ſide of the queſtion, maintain, on the contrary, that it is the beſt way to draw the enemy to a diſtance from his own dominions: in ſupport of which, they adduce the example of the Athenians, who were always victorious when the ſeat of war lay in their own country, but ſoon loſt their liberties after they removed it into Sicily. They likewiſe avail themſelves of the ſtory of Antæus the Egyptian, who being invaded by Hercules, King of Libya, was invincible whilſt he oppoſed him at home; but being drawn abroad by the artifice of his enemy, he loſt both his Kingdom and his life together. From hence aroſe the Fable of Antæus, who being born of the Earth, received freſh vigour from his mother every time he was thrown down in the conflict he had with Hercules; but the latter being aware of that at laſt, lifted him up from the ground, and ſqueezed him to death betwixt his arms. As to modern inſtances, ſay they, every one knows, that Ferdinand, King of Naples, who was eſteemed a very wiſe Prince, being informed about two years before he died, that Charles VIII. of France deſigned to invade his dominions, made all neceſſary diſpoſitions to receive him there: but falling ſick, he adviſed his Son Alphonſo upon his death-bed, to wait the arrival of the French in his own Kingdom, and not be tempted to let his forces go out of it upon any account whatſoever. The Son, however, paying no regard to this advice, ſent an army into Romagna, which being ruined there without ſtriking a ſtroke, his Kingdom fell a Sacrifice to the French.

But there are other arguments beſides theſe, which might be urged on each ſide. For, it may be ſaid in favour of the Invader, that he ſhews more reſolution than he that ſtays till he is attacked at home; which certainly muſt inſpire his forces with great confidence: that he deprives the enemy of many ſuccours and advantages, which he might otherwiſe make uſe of to his prejudice; for when his country is laid waſte, and his Subjects ſo plundered and harraſſed, that he cannot tell how to exact any freſh ſupplies from them in ſuch diſtreſs, all reſources are cut off, the Magazines exhauſted, and the fountain being dried up (as Hannibal ſaid) the ſtreams muſt of courſe ſoon fail in ſuch a manner, that he will not be able to ſupport the war for want of Proviſions: and laſtly, that the Invaders being in an enemy's country, and under a neceſſity of fighting for their daily ſuſtenance, that neceſſity, (if there were no other motives) will make them not only reſolute and courageous

but

but deſperate, as we have ſaid elſewhere. On the other hand it may be ſaid that he who is invaded has theſe advantages: in the firſt place, he has it in his power to diſtreſs the enemy greatly in point of proviſions, and many other things without which an army cannot ſubſiſt: in the next, he may often fruſtrate his deſigns by being ſo much better acquainted with the nature of the country: that he may likewiſe bring more forces into the field, as he will be able to collect all that he has into one body there if he pleaſes, though he could not tranſport them all into another country: and that if he ſhould chance to loſe a battle, he may ſoon repair the loſs and face his enemy again, as many of his troops will find means to eſcape to places of ſafety not far off, and other recruits may preſently be drawn together from the neighbouring towns: ſo that in this caſe you venture but part of your fortune, upon the whole of your force: whereas in the other, you hazard your whole fortune upon part of your Strength only. Some have ſuffered an enemy not only to advance two or three days march into their country, but to take ſeveral towns, that ſo when their army was weakened by leaving garriſons in them all, they might be engaged with more probability of ſucceſs.

But to ſpeak my own opinion of the matter, I think this diſtinction ought to be made. Your people are either warlike and well diſciplined, as the Romans were formerly and the Swiſs are at preſent: or they are otherwiſe, like the Carthaginians of old, and the French and Italians in theſe times. In the latter caſe endeavour by all means to keep an enemy at a diſtance: becauſe your ſtrength conſiſting chiefly in your revenues, and not in the confidence you have in your Subjects, whenever your revenues are interrupted or cut off, you are certainly undone: and nothing contributes more ſpeedily and effectually to this, than a war in your own country. In proof of this, we might produce the example of the Carthaginians, who were ſtrong enough to cope with the Romans whilſt their revenues continued entire and undiſturbed; but when they were attacked at home, they could not make head even againſt Agathocles. The Florentines likewiſe, though they could not ſecure themſelves againſt Caſtruccio Caſtracani, Lord of Lucca, when he carried the war into their country, by any other means than becoming ſubject to Robert, King of Naples; yet had courage enough after Caſtruccio was dead, to attack the Duke of Milan in his own dominions, with a deſign to have deprived him of them: ſo courageous were they when they made war abroad; and ſo puſillanimous when it was brought to their own doors. But if your country is in a good poſture of defence, and your people warlike and well armed, like the Romans in former times, and the Swiſs at this day, the nearer an enemy approaches, the harder he muſt find it to

ſubdue you: for in ſuch a caſe, you will be able to raiſe more forces to defend yourſelf, than you poſſibly could have done to invade others. The advice therefore which Hannibal gave Antiochus upon the like occaſion is not much to be regarded, as it proceeded from reſentment and ſelf-intereſt: for if the Romans had received three ſuch defeats in Gaul, and in ſo ſhort a time as they did from Hannibal in Italy, without doubt they would have been utterly ruined; ſince they could neither have availed themſelves of the remainder of their forces, nor had an opportunity of repairing their loſſes, nor of exerting their utmoſt ſtrength and reſources, as they did at home. For we do not find that they ever ſent out an army that conſiſted of above fifty thouſand men to conquer any State abroad; but when they were invaded by the Gauls after the concluſion of the firſt Punic war, the forces they raiſed amounted to eighteen hundred thouſand: nor could they have beaten the ſame people afterwards whilſt they remained in Lombardy, as they did when they had advanced into Tuſcany: becauſe they would not have been able to oppoſe them with the ſame force or the ſame advantages at ſuch a diſtance [*u*]. The Cimbri gave the Romans ſuch an overthrow in Germany, that they never could make head againſt them in that country afterwards: but when they penetrated into Italy where the Romans were enabled to employ their whole force againſt them, they were ſoon vanquiſhed and driven back again. The Swiſs may eaſily be conquered abroad, becauſe they cannot ſend an army of above thirty or forty thouſand men at moſt into a foreign country; but it is no eaſy matter to get the better of them at home, where they can aſſemble at leaſt an hundred thouſand effective men. I ſay again therefore, that a Prince whoſe country is in a good poſture of defence, and his ſubjects well armed and inured to war, ſhould always receive a powerful and dangerous enemy at home; and never ſtir out of his own dominions to meet or be beforehand with him: otherwiſe, let him endeavour by all means to keep him as far off as he poſſibly can. And thus by acting according to theſe circumſtances, he will be beſt able to defend himſelf in either caſe [*x*].

CHAP.

[*u*] See Chap. viii. of this book.

[*x*] "In the Expedition of the Emperor Charles V. into Provence (ſays a French Author) King Francis might have choſen either to go and meet him in Italy, or to wait for him in his own dominions; wherein, though he conſidered of how great advantage it was to keep his own territories clear from the troubles of war, to the end that his ſtrength being entire, he might continually ſend ſupplies of men and money as they were wanted; that the neceſſities of war require at every turn that the country muſt be ſpoiled and waſted, which cannot well be done upon one's own without diſguſting the country people, who do not ſo eaſily digeſt ſuch havock by their own friends as from an enemy, ſo that ſeditions and commotions might be kindled by thoſe means; that the licence of pillage and plunder (which are not to be tolerated at home) is a great eaſe to the ſufferings

CHAP. XIII.

That men more frequently advance themſelves by guile and artifice than by force.

IT very ſeldom or never happens that men of low condition advance themſelves to any conſiderable height of grandeur, without having recourſe either to fraud or violence; though others may ſucceed to it by donation, or right of inheritance. Nor do I know of any inſtance in

ſufferings of war; and that he who has no other proſpect of gain than his bare pay, will hardly be kept to his duty when he is but two ſteps from his wife and family: that he who lays the cloth is always at the charge of the feaſt: that there is more alacrity in attacking than defending: and that the ſhock of the loſs of a battle in our own bowels is ſo violent as to endanger the diſſolution of the whole body; there being no paſſion ſo contagious or that ſo eaſily gains ground as fear; and that the Citizens who ſhould hear the rattle of this tempeſt at their gates, and let in their Captains and Soldiers yet trembling and out of breath, would be likely enough in ſuch a combuſtion to precipitate themſelves upon ſome untoward reſolution: notwithſtanding all this, he choſe to recal the forces he had beyond the Mountains, and to wait for the enemy at home. For he might, on the other hand imagine, that being in his own dominions and amongſt his friends and Subjects, he could not fail of plenty of all manner of conveniencies: the rivers and paſſes, of which he was Maſter, would bring in proviſions and money without the trouble of convoy; that he ſhould find his Subjects the more affectionate to him the nearer their danger was; that having ſo many cities and barriers to ſecure him, it would be in his power to haſten or delay a battle as he thought fit; and if the latter pleaſed him, he might under covert and at his own eaſe, ſee his enemy founder and defeat himſelf with the difficulties he was certain to encounter in a hoſtile country, where war would be made upon him, before, behind, and on every ſide; and where, in caſe of a ſickneſs in his army, he would have no means to refreſh himſelf, or to enlarge his quarters, or to lodge his wounded men in ſafety; no money, no victuals, but what he muſt fight for; no leiſure to halt and take breath, no knowledge of the roads or country to ſecure him from ambuſhes or ſurprizes; and in caſe of loſing a battle, no poſſible means of ſaving the remains of his army. But there is much to be ſaid on both ſides." The ſame author after citing the examples abovementioned by Machiavel, of Hannibal, Scipio, the Athenians, and Agathocles the Syracuſan, as people who obſerved a different conduct, ſays, " but the obſervation is juſt, that events, eſpecially in war, for the moſt part depend upon fortune, who will not be governed by nor ſubmit to human prudence, and that we ourſelves argue raſhly and at a venture, becauſe both we ourſelves and our arguments have a great participation with the temerity of chance."——The King of Pruſſia however, who had neither ſuch a Militia in his own country as he thought ſufficient for his defence againſt ſo many powerful enemies as were meditating an invaſion of his dominions, nor any ſtrong fortreſſes, nor a country fortified by nature, ſeems to have acted wiſely (by the event) in carrying the war he is at preſent engaged in with ſo many different Powers, into the enemy's country, and preventing an invaſion of his own by invading them.——But after all, it is to be conſidered how apt armies are to periſh and moulder away when they are tranſported into another country, from the effects of different air, water and food; beſides the hardſhips they muſt ſuffer [redacted] want of ſhelter

in which violence alone has been ſufficient for that purpoſe; though many might be enumerated wherein guile only has effected it, as will plainly appear to any one that reads the lives of Philip of Macedon, Agathocles the Sicilian, and others like them, who raiſed themſelves from a private, or rather baſe and abject condition, to rule over great Kingdoms and Empires. Xenophon in the life of Cyrus ſhews the neceſſity of artifice; for the firſt expedition which that Prince is there ſuppoſed to make againſt the King of Armenia is full of wiles, and the ſucceſs of it entirely owing to fraud and cunning without any mixture of force. From whence one may reaſonably conclude that he thinks it neceſſary for a Prince who would effect great things, that he ſhould learn to deceive. Beſides which, he repreſents him as deceiving Cyaxares, King of Media, his Uncle by the mother's ſide, in many inſtances; and inſinuates that without ſo doing, he never could have attained to that height of greatneſs which he afterwards did [*y*]. In ſhort, I am

ſhelter in intemperate heat or cold; the ſurfeits and dyſenteries the men contract by the immoderate uſe of fruits (ſometimes unripe) which they every where find in Summer time upon their marches; dejection of ſpirit upon any attack of ſickneſs, and a ſort of honing or pining after their own country natural to all men, which the French call *la maladie du pais*, and are more ſubject to than perhaps any other nation in the world. All hiſtories, both ancient and modern, abound with inſtances of this kind; and if they did not, we have ſeen enow in our own times to convince us how many dangers and inconveniencies an army is expoſed to in a foreign country; eſpecially if it is once broken by the enemy. Let one ſuffice out of the eighth book of Davila's Hiſtory of the Civil wars of France; where that author ſpeaking of the defeat of a German army which he had marched into France in the year 1587 to the aſſiſtance of the Hugonots, ſays as follows, "The ſlaughter of the Germans was indeed very lamentable; for being ſeized with fevers, and weakened to ſuch a degree with the bloody flux, that they fell down in the highways and towns as they paſſed, they were knocked on the head without mercy by the country people. Amongſt numbers of others, eighteen of them that were left ſick at a poor cottage in Burgundy, were cruelly butchered, like common animals, by a woman who cut all their throats with a knife, in revenge for the loſſes ſhe had ſuſtained."

[*y*] Upon this paſſage Dacres ſays, "becauſe this whole chapter tends to ſhew how neceſſary guile is for a Prince's advantage, and it is again recommended by precept in Machiavel's treatiſe of *a Prince*, I cannot but take notice that here he is blameable. *Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoſte requirat?* is not meant *de dolo malo*, ſuppoſed by Machiavel in his *Prince*, Chap. xix. where he perſwades a Prince to uſe the Lyon's force and the Foxe's craſte. To bee able in all military ſtratagems and ſleights to circumvent an enemy is one of the moſt requiſite and notable parts in a commander; provided there be no breach of faith nor oath violated: for as Tully ſays, *eſt jus jurandum affirmatio religioſa: quod autem affirmare, quaſi Deo teſte, promiſeris, id tenendum eſt.* It is much unworthy of a Prince (ſays a worthy late author) to falſify his word either to an enemy or ſubject; and the more villanie is it to uſe covert fraud than open violence, becauſe the enemy lyes more open by giving credit to his faith; *& fraus diſtringit, non diſolvit, perjurium.* And with how much more ſolemnity Princes oaths are ordinarily taken, methinks ſo much the more ſinceritie ought they to carry with them, having drawn together many eyes and ears as witneſſes of their truth or falſhood. I ſhall conclude then with Tacitus in the fourth of his Annals. *Cæteris mortalibus in eo ſtant conſilia, quod*

I am firmly perſuaded that no man of mean condition ever arrived at any remarkable degree of power and dominion merely by open and downright force; but that many have by fraud alone; as Giovanni Galeazzo

quod ſibi conducere putant; principum diverſa ſors eſt, quibus præcipua rerum ad famam dirigenda." Let us hear honeſt Montaigne upon this matter. " As to this virtue of hypocriſy and diſſimulation, which is now ſo much in requeſt, (ſays he, Book II. Chap. xvii. of his Eſſays) I mortally hate it; and of all vices find none that ſhews ſo much baſeneſs and meanneſs of Spirit. 'Tis a cowardly and ſervile humour for a man to hide and diſguiſe himſelf under a vizard, and not dare to ſhew himſelf what he is. By this our followers are trained up to treachery; for being brought up to ſpeak what is not true, they make no conſcience of a lye. A generous heart ought not to give the lye to its own thoughts, but will make itſelf ſeen within, where all is good, or at leaſt humane. Ariſtotle reputes it the office of Magnanimity, openly and profeſſedly to love and hate, to judge and ſpeak with all freedom; and not to value the approbation or diſlike of others at the expence of truth. Apollonius ſaid it was for ſlaves to lie, and freemen to ſpeak truth. It is the chief and fundamental part of virtue; we muſt love it for its own ſake: he that ſpeaks the truth becauſe he is otherwiſe obliged ſo to do, and becauſe he ſerves, and that is not afraid to lie, when it ſignifies nothing to any body, is not ſufficiently true. My Soul naturally abominates lying, and hates the very thought of it: I have an inward baſhfulneſs and ſmart remorſe if ever a lie eſcapes me, as ſometimes it does, when I am ſurprized and hurried by occaſions that allow me no premeditation. A man muſt not always tell all, for that would be folly; but what a man ſays ſhould be what he thinks, otherwiſe it is knavery. I do not know what advantage men pretend to by eternally counterfeiting and diſſembling, except it is never to be believed, even when they ſpeak truth. This may paſs once or twice perhaps upon men; but to profeſs concealing their thoughts, and to boaſt, as ſome of our Princes have done, " that they would burn their ſhirts if they thought they knew their true intentions, (which was a ſaying of Metellus of Macedon) and that he who knows not how to diſſemble, knows not how to rule;" is giving warning to all who have any thing to do with them, that whatever they ſay is nothing but lies and deceit. *Quo quis verſutior & callidior eſt* (ſays Tully) *hoc inviſior & ſuſpectior, detractâ opinione probitatis.* It would be great ſimplicity in any one to confide either in the countenance or word of a man, that has put on a reſolution to be always another thing without than he is within, as Tiberius did: and I cannot conceive what intereſt ſuch can have in their converſation with men, ſeeing they produce nothing that is admitted for truth; whoever is diſloyal to truth, is the ſame to falſhood alſo.——Thoſe of our times, who have conſidered, in the eſtabliſhment of the Duty of a Prince, the welfare of his affairs only, and have preferred that to the care of his faith and conſcience, might ſay ſomething to a Prince, whoſe affairs Fortune had put into ſuch a poſture that he might for ever eſtabliſh them by only once breaking his word. But it will not go ſo: they often come again to the ſame market, they make more than one peace, and enter into more than one treaty in their lives. Gain tempts them to the firſt breach of faith, and almoſt always preſents itſelf, as in favour of all other evil actions: Sacrileges, murders, rebellions, and treaſons, are undertaken for ſome kind of advantage; but the firſt gain has ſuch conſequences as throw this Prince out of all correſpondence and negociation by this example of his perfidy. Soliman of the Ottoman race (a race not very careful in keeping their promiſes and articles) when his army made a deſcent on Otranto in my infancy, being informed that Mercurino de Gratinare and the inhabitants of Caſtro were detained priſoners, after having ſurrendered the place, contrary to the articles of capitulation with his forces, ſent an order to have them ſet at liberty, ſaying " that as he had other great enterprizes in hand in thoſe parts, this breach of faith, though it carried a ſhew of preſent utility, would afterwards bring him into diſrepute, and occaſion a diffidence in his word that might be of infinite prejudice to his affairs."

Galeazzo in particular, who by that means only deprived his Uncle Bernabo of the State of Milan [z]. Now if Princes are obliged to act in this manner in order to found or increaſe their Empire, Republics are under an equal neceſſity of doing the ſame, till they are become powerful enough to truſt to their ſtrength alone: and as Rome took all other means (either by good fortune or deſign) that were neceſſary to eſtabliſh its future grandeur; ſo it did not fail to avail itſelf of this alſo; nor was it poſſible to have proceeded more craftily than it did in taking the method we have mentioned before, namely, of cajoling the Latins and other States round about into ſuch a confederacy as inſenſibly made them its Subjects inſtead of Allies. For in the firſt place, it made uſe of their arms to conquer the reſt of the neighbouring people, and had the chief ſhare of honour by aſſuming the name of Principal in that confederacy: and having thus ſubdued ſome of them, it afterwards employed its own ſtrength, and the authority which it had thereby acquired to reduce all the others: for the Latins were not aware, that in fact they were no better than Slaves themſelves, till they had ſeen the Samnites twice defeated and forced to accept of terms by the Romans. Theſe Victories which gained the Romans great reputation amongſt the States that were further off and rather admired their valour than felt the weight of it, likewiſe excited the envy and jealouſy of thoſe that were nearer home and more immediately ſenſible of the effects of their arms, particularly the Latins: and ſo great was this apprehenſion, that not only the Latins themſelves, but the Colonies which the Romans had ſent into Latium, and the Campanians, who not long before had taken ſhelter under the protection of Rome, conſpired againſt the Romans. In conſequence of which, the Latins provoked them to a war, (in the manner which I have ſaid before is often practiſed upon thoſe occaſions) not by falling directly upon the Romans themſelves, but by ſupporting the Sidicines againſt the Samnites, who had made war upon them by permiſſion from the Romans. Nor was there any other reaſon for this conſpiracy, but becauſe the confederates began to be aware how much they had been impoſed upon under the ſpecious name of Allies: accordingly Livy makes Annius Setinus, a Latin Prætor, ſay in a ſpeech which he made in their Council, *Nam ſi etiam nunc ſub umbrâ æqui fœderis, ſervitutem pati poſſumus, quid obeſt quin proditis Sidicinis, non Romanorum Solum, ſed Samnitium dictis pareamus? For if we can even now endure ſervitude, under the pretence of an equal confederacy; might we not as well give up the Sidicines, and ſubmit not only to the Romans but to the Samnites alſo?*

[z] Theſe two Princes were of the houſe of Viſconti, and Dukes of Milan before the Sfozi's. See Hiſt. Flor.

We

We ſee then, that even the Romans, in the infancy of their State, availed themſelves of that artifice and deceit to extend their dominion, which every one muſt of neceſſity have recourſe to, that is ambitious of raiſing himſelf from a low eſtate to any conſiderable height of grandeur: and the more cunningly it is diſguiſed and concealed, the leſs diſhonourable it will ſeem, as appears from the example of that people.

CHAP. XIV.

That people are often miſtaken, who think to work upon the proud and arrogant by moderation and courteſy.

IT frequently happens that mildneſs and condeſcenſion, inſtead of being of any advantage, are of great diſſervice to people; eſpecially when thoſe that have conceived any prejudice againſt them, either out of envy or any other motive, are of a haughty and inſolent diſpoſition: of which we have a remarkable proof in what Livy tells us concerning the occaſion of the war betwixt the Romans and the Latins. For the Samnites complaining to the Romans that the Latins had invaded them, the Romans, being unwilling to exaſperate the latter ſtill more, did not offer to put a ſtop to their hoſtilities: which behaviour however was ſo far from ſoothing the jealouſy of the Latins, that it only ſerved to encourage them, and made them declare their enmity the ſooner, as appears from the ſame ſpeech of the abovementioned Annius Setinus, in which he further tells the Council. *Tentaſtis patientiam negando militem. Quis dubitat exarſiſſe eos? Pertulerunt tamen hunc dolorem. Exercitus nos parare adverſus Samnites fœderatos ſuos audierunt, nec moverunt ſe ab urbe. Unde hæc illis modeſtia, niſi a conſcientiâ virium & noſtrarum & ſuarum? You have already ſeen how much they will bear, by refuſing to ſupply them with your contingent of forces. There is no doubt but they were ſufficiently nettled at it; yet they ſwallowed the affront. They knew of our preparations againſt their allies the Samnites: yet they never ſtirred a foot to ſupport them. Whence proceeds this wonderful moderation think you, but from a conſciouſneſs of their own weakneſs and our ſtrength?* It appears plainly then, from this example, how much this moderation in the Romans increaſed the arrogance of the Latins.

A Prince therefore ought never to deſcend from his dignity; nor voluntarily to give up any point, (if he has a mind to ſupport his reputation) except when he either knows or thinks he is able to maintain it. For when one cannot give up any thing with a good grace and in an honourable manner, it is almoſt always better to ſuffer it to be extorted by force, than tamely ſubmit to the loſs, without any

ſtruggle to preſerve it; becauſe if he parts with it in that puſillanimous manner, he does it to prevent a war; in which the odds are great that his expectation is diſappointed, for thoſe to whom he has ſo meanly conceded it, perceiving his weakneſs and apprehenſions, will be ſo far from being ſatisfied with that, that they will conſtantly be making freſh demands, and grow bolder and more unreaſonable every time, as they ſee he is the leſs to be feared: beſides which, he will find his friends cooler and more backward in aſſiſting him, as they muſt naturally be induced to think he is either very weak or very pitiful and daſtardly. But if, on the contrary, he immediately begins to raiſe forces, and take all other neceſſary meaſures to face the enemy, as ſoon as he diſcovers his deſigns, they will not be ſo forward to attack him, even if they find him inferior to them: and thoſe friends will not only honour him for it, but come in with alacrity to his aſſiſtance, when they ſee him ſo reſolute in his defence, who would not have moved an inch, perhaps, to ſuccour him if he had been wanting to himſelf. This is to be underſtood however, when he has but one enemy to deal with: but if he ſhould chance to have ſeveral upon his hands at the ſame time, it will always be the beſt way to give up ſomething to ſome one of them; by which he may probably either make him his friend, even after war is commenced, or at leaſt detach him from the reſt of thoſe that are confederated againſt him.

CHAP. XV.

That weak States are generally doubtful in their reſolutions; and that ſlow determinations are always pernicious.

FROM theſe cauſes and beginnings of the war betwixt the Latins and the Romans, we may obſerve, that in all conſultations it is the beſt way to come to ſome ſpeedy reſolution in the matter deliberated upon, and to avoid ſuſpence and delay as much as poſſible. According to which maxim the Latins proceeded in the Council they held when they deſigned to revolt from the Romans. For the latter ſuſpecting their fidelity, and being deſirous, not only to ſatisfy themſelves, but to regain that people without coming to an open rupture, gave them to underſtand that they wiſhed they would ſend eight Deputies to Rome, as they wanted to conſult with them upon certain affairs of importance. In conſequence of this meſſage, the Latins being conſcious to themſelves, that they had done ſeveral things that muſt have diſguſted the Romans, preſently called a Council to conſider who ſhould be ſent to Rome, and what they ſhould ſay upon that occaſion, when they

they came thither. Whilſt the matter therefore was in debate, the aforementioned Prætor Annius Setinus told the Council, *Ad ſummam rerum noſtrarum pertinere arbitror, ut cogitetis magis, quid agendum nobis, quam quid loquendum ſit: facile enim erit explicatis conciliis, accommodare rebus verba: That he thought it highly concerned their welfare, to conſider what was to be done, rather than what was to be ſaid: for when once they were come to any reſolution, it would be an eaſy matter to accommodate their words to their actions:* a piece of advice that certainly has much truth and reaſon in it, and ought to be well remembered by all Princes and Commonwealths. For whilſt people are doubtful and uncertain what to do, they muſt likewiſe be at a loſs what to ſay for their conduct in ſuch caſes: but when they have determined how to act, there is no difficulty in the matter. This I thought fit to inculcate the more earneſtly, becauſe I myſelf have often known an irreſolute manner of proceeding, not only very prejudicial to the public affairs, but alſo very ſcandalous and diſgraceful to our own Commonwealth in particular: and indeed there will always be great doubts and uncertainty whenever things of a nice and delicate nature, and in which the utmoſt reſolution is required, come to be diſcuſſed by a Council compoſed of weak and puſillanimous members.

Delays and tardy deliberations are likewiſe no leſs prejudicial; eſpecially when a friend or Ally is to be ſuccoured: for they hurt one's ſelf, and do no body elſe any good. Such deliberations proceed from the want either of courage or ſtrength, or the malevolence of ſome of the Counſellors, who, in order to gratify their own private paſſions, chuſe rather to ruin the State, than not accompliſh ſome favourite end: for which purpoſe, they not only oppoſe and thwart the neceſſary meaſures that are propoſed, but uſe all other means to embarraſs and defeat them: whereas good Citizens never endeavour to traverſe ſuch deliberations, eſpecially in affairs where diſpatch is requiſite, even though the cry of the populace ſhould be againſt them. After the death of Hieronymus, the Tyrant of Syracuſe, a ſharp war being carried on betwixt the Romans and Carthaginians, the Syracuſans were divided amongſt themſelves, whether they ſhould take part with the former or the latter: and theſe diviſions grew to ſuch a height, that all public buſineſs was at a ſtand, and nothing could be determined upon; till Apollonides, one of the principal Citizens, repreſented to them in a grave and weighty ſpeech upon the occaſion, that though neither thoſe that were inclined to adhere to the Romans, nor thoſe that thought it better to ſide with the Carthaginians, were to be blamed; yet, their ſlow and irreſolute manner of proceeding in coming to ſome determination was very im[illegible], and would certainly be the ruin of their State [illegible] would come

to a reſolution, which ſide ſoever they took, ſome good or other might be expected from it. Indeed Livy could not have given us a more remarkable document of the evils that attend ſuch a tardy and undetermined manner of deliberating; which he likewiſe confirms by the example of the Latins, whoſe aſſiſtance being demanded by the Lavinians againſt the Romans, was ſo long deferred by their tedious deliberations, whether they ſhould grant them any or not, that at laſt when they had reſolved upon it, and their ſuccours were juſt got out of the gates of the City, they received news that their Confederates were routed: which gave Milonius their Prætor occaſion to ſay, *It is well if the Romans do not make us pay dear for this ſhort march.* For if they could ſpeedily have reſolved either to aſſiſt the Lavinians, or not to aſſiſt them; in the latter caſe, they would not have drawn upon themſelves the reſentment of the Romans; and in the former, their Allies might probably have been victorious: but, as they could not determine to do either, they were ſure to ſmart for it, which ſide ſoever got the better, as indeed they did.

If the Florentines had duly conſidered this matter, they would not have ſuffered ſo much as they did when Charles XII. of France marched into Italy, againſt Lewis Sforza, Duke of Milan; for, when he had partly reſolved upon that Expedition, he would have entered into a Treaty with the Florentine Ambaſſadors, who were then at his Court: the terms of which were, that provided their Republic would ſtand neuter in that quarrel, he would take them into his protection, and ſupport them againſt all enemies. For the ratification of this Treaty a month was allowed: but that being imprudently deferred, by the management of ſome who favoured the Duke's intereſts, till the King had ſucceeded in his deſigns, and the Florentines then offering to ratify it, his majeſty ſhewed no regard to them, as he ſaw it proceeded from fear, and not from any good will or friendſhip to him: a delay that coſt the Florentines a very large ſum of money, and brought them almoſt to the brink of ruin; as the ſame manner of proceeding did afterwards upon another occaſion. This behaviour was ſo much the more weak and dangerous, as it was of no ſervice to the Duke, who, if he had got the better of the French, would have handled them in a ſtill rougher manner than the King did. Now, though I have ſaid ſomething in a former diſcourſe, concerning the evils that are incident to Commonwealths from ſuch ſlow and irreſolute deliberations; yet as freſh matter occurred, I thought it might not be amiſs to make this addition to it; eſpecially as it is a Subject that ought to be well conſidered by ſuch Republics as that of Florence [*a*].

[*a*] Compare theſe two laſt Chapters with Chap. xxxviii. Book I.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

How much our Military Diſcipline in theſe times differs from that of the Ancients.

THE moſt important battle the Romans ever fought with any other nation, was that in which they defeated the Latins, in the Conſulſhip of Manlius Torquatus and Decius: for as it is certain, that the Latins loſt their liberty by that overthrow; ſo the Romans muſt inevitably have become ſubject to them, if they had not gained the victory. Livy himſelf was of this opinion: for he tells us, that the two armies were equal in diſcipline, valour, reſolution, and numbers; and that the only difference betwixt them was, that the Romans had the more determined and courageous Generals. In this battle, there were two circumſtances very remarkable; of which there was no example before, and but very few ſince: for one of the Conſuls ſacrificed himſelf, in order to keep his Soldiers firm in their obedience and diſcipline; and the other put his own Son to death for diſobeying his orders [*b*]. The equality which Livy ſays was betwixt theſe two armies, was occaſioned by the Soldiers in both having long ſerved together under the ſame colours, ſpeaking the ſame tongue, obſerving the ſame diſcipline, and fighting with the ſame arms: for, in their order of battle they both followed one method, and there was no difference in the titles of their reſpective officers, or the names by which the ſeveral diviſions of their armies were called. Since both ſides therefore were thus equal in courage and ſtrength, there was a neceſſity for the exertion of ſome great and extraordinary quality on one ſide, in order to inſpire the Soldiers with ſuch a degree of firmneſs and obſtinacy, as might give it a ſuperiority over the other; to which kind of obſtinacy, a victory is generally owing: for whilſt that laſts they will never turn their backs. And as it was ſo neceſſary to encourage and keep up this reſolution in the breaſts of the Romans, to a pitch beyond that of the Latins, it happened partly through chance, and partly through the bravery and rigour of the Conſuls, that Torquatus put his ſon to death, and Decius ſacrificed himſelf.

To give us a clearer notion of the equality betwixt theſe two armies, Livy deſcribes the order which the Romans obſerved in drawing up their forces, and in time of battle: but as he has done it at large, I ſhall only ſelect what ſeems moſt remarkable; and which, if it had

[*b*] See Livy, Lib. VIII. Chap. vii. viii. ix. x.

been

been imitated by the Generals of theſe times, would have prevented much confuſion and many diſorders in their armies and engagements. According to him, there were three grand Diviſions or Lines in their Armies; the firſt conſiſted of *Haſtati* or *Pikemen*; the ſecond, of the *Principes*; and the third, of the *Triarii*; each of which had its cavalry. When they ſet their Battle in array, they placed the Haſtati in the firſt line, the Principes in the ſecond, behind the Haſtati, and the Triarii in the third. On the right and left of each of theſe lines, was poſted a body of Horſe; which from their form and ſtation were called *Alæ*, becauſe they reſembled *Wings*. The Haſtati, or firſt line, were drawn up very cloſe together, the better to ſuſtain the firſt ſhock of the enemy. The ſecond line, conſiſting of the Principes, who were not to engage ſo immediately, but rather to ſupport the front line if it was broken or gave way, was not drawn up ſo cloſe, but had a ſmall interval betwixt every man, that ſo it might receive the Haſtati into thoſe ſpaces without being put into diſorder, if they ſhould chance to be ſo hard preſſed by the enemy that they muſt give ground. The Triarii, or third line, were drawn up with ſtill larger intervals betwixt the men, in order to receive the two other lines into them upon occaſion. Being formed in this manner, the Haſtati began the attack, and if they were repulſed, they retired into the void ſpaces left for them by the Principes, and jointly renewed the battle; but if the ſecond line thus filled up, likewiſe happened to be thrown into confuſion, the men fell back into the intervals amongſt the Triarii, and they all advanced together once more to the fight. But as this was their laſt effort (becauſe there was no other ſupport or reſerve left) if they chanced to be worſted again, the battle was loſt. And, as matters were thought to be in a deſperate ſituation, whenever the Triarii came to be engaged, the Proverb *res reducta eſt ad Triarios*, took its riſe from hence, i. e. *the laſt ſtake is upon the board*, or, *we are reduced to the utmoſt extremity* [*c*].

Now, as the Generals of our times have utterly laid aſide all other parts of ancient military diſcipline, this method of drawing up armies is at preſent likewiſe altogether neglected, and become obſolete; though indeed it is an excellent one, and worthy of the ſtricteſt attention: for a body of forces that is formed in this manner, may ſuſtain three vigorous attacks, and muſt be beaten three different times before the day is loſt: whereas, another that can ſtand but one ſhock (which is the caſe of all Chriſtian armies at this day) is liable to be ſoon routed; ſince every little diſorder, or any common degree of impetuoſity in the firſt onſet, is ſufficient to gain a victory over it. The reaſon that our armies

[*c*] See the *Art of War*, Book III. in the beginning.

cannot

cannot rally and return to the charge ſo often as the Roman troops uſed to do, is becauſe the method of receiving one line into another is now entirely loſt; for, according to the preſent method of ranging an army in order of battle, the Generals form their lines cloſe upon the back of each other, and extend them to ſo great a length, that they cannot poſſibly be of any conſiderable depth, which muſt make them very weak: or, if they draw them up deeper, after the manner of the Romans, in order to ſtrengthen them, yet, if the firſt line is broken, it cannot be received into the ſecond, and conſequently when it falls back upon it, muſt occaſion great confuſion and diſorder; in which caſe, the firſt line can neither retreat, nor the ſecond advance, if it ſhould be neceſſary: ſo that the firſt recoiling upon the ſecond, and both upon the third, they become ſo embarraſſed and entangled one amongſt another, that the whole army muſt preſently be ruined. At the battle of Ravenna, where Monſieur de Foix, the French General, was killed, and which was very well fought (conſidering the diſcipline of the times) the French and Spaniſh armies were drawn up in the manner juſt now deſcribed; that is, they both had their lines extended to a great length, and cloſe together: ſo that they could not be very deep, nor make any more than one front to the enemy. And this they always do in large plains, like thoſe about Ravenna: for, as they are ſenſible of the diſorder they muſt fall into, if they ſhould be obliged to retreat, by one line falling back upon another, they endeavour to avoid that danger as much as poſſible, by making a large front: but when the country is full of encloſures, and there is not room enough for that; if they ſhould happen to fall into confuſion, they know of no remedy for it. In the ſame manner, they march through an enemy's country, whether it be to plunder, or forage, or upon any other occaſion. Thus, at the battle of St. Regolo, betwixt the Florentines and the Piſans, in the war which was occaſioned by the defection of the latter from the former, upon the arrival of Charles VIII. in Italy, the defeat of the Florentines was entirely owing to their own Cavalry, which, being poſted in the front, was firſt charged by the enemy, and happening to be broke, fell back upon the Infantry, and threw them into ſuch diſorder, that they all ran away together: and I have often heard Criaco del Borgo, an old Officer in the Florentine Infantry, ſay, that he had never ſeen them defeated, but when they had been firſt diſordered by their own Horſe. The Swiſs, who excel all other nations at preſent in the art of war, always take particular care, when they ſerve in the French armies, to be poſted in the flanks, that ſo their friend's Cavalry, if it ſhould chance to be hard preſſed, may not recoil upon them.

Now

Now though theſe things ſeem not only very eaſy to be underſtood, but alſo to be put in practice; yet there is not ſo much as one General in our times, that has hitherto endeavoured either to revive the ancient diſcipline, or correct the modern: and, notwithſtanding they have ſometimes drawn up their armies in three lines, the firſt of which, they call the *Van-guard*; the ſecond, the *Main-battle*; and the third, the *Rear-guard*; yet it has been for no other purpoſe, but for the greater conveniency of encamping: but when they come to action, they almoſt always employ them all three together in one attack, as I ſaid before. And ſince many, to excuſe their ignorance, pretend that there are ſeveral articles in the ancient military diſcipline, which the uſe of artillery will not allow them to practice in theſe times, I ſhall diſcuſs that point in the next chapter, and ſhew what weight there is in ſuch allegations.

CHAP. XVII.

What account is to be made of Artillery at preſent: and whether the opinion which the Generality have conceived of it is juſtly founded.

WHEN I conſider how many field battles the Romans fought, I cannot help reflecting at the ſame time, upon ſome notions ſupported by the generality, that if there had been artillery in thoſe times, the Romans could not have over-run Provinces, made ſo many people tributary, nor have performed ſeveral other great exploits ſo eaſily as they did; that ſince it came into uſe, men have not ſhewn themſelves ſo bold and intrepid as they did formerly; and laſtly, that armies are now likewiſe much more backward in coming to a cloſe engagement, and cannot poſſibly obſerve the ancient diſcipline: ſo that it ſeems as if the whole buſineſs of war would in time be diſpatched by artillery only. As I apprehend therefore, that it may not be foreign to our purpoſe, to examine whether theſe opinions are founded upon reaſon, or not; whether the uſe of artillery has added to, or diminiſhed the ſtrength of armies; and whether it has given Generals more or leſs opportunities of diſtinguiſhing their courage. I ſhall begin with the firſt article, viz. that the Roman arms could not have made ſo great a progreſs, if the uſe of artillery had then been known.

In anſwer to this, I ſay, that war is either offenſive or defenſive: ſo that we muſt examine in the firſt place, in which of theſe two kinds of war artillery is the moſt effectual: and though indeed there is much to be urged on both ſides; yet, I am of opinion, that it does much more miſchief to thoſe that act upon the defenſive, than the offenſive.

For

For the former are generally beſieged, either in ſome town or fortified camp: if it be in a town, it muſt either be in a ſmall one (like moſt fortreſſes) or a large one. In the former caſe, the beſieged are undone: for ſuch is the force of artillery, that it will beat down the thickeſt wall in a few days: ſo that, if thoſe within have neither any place of ſecurity to retire to, nor room to throw up ditches or ramparts to defend themſelves, the enemy of courſe muſt enter the breach. Nor will their artillery ſave them: for it is now received as a general maxim, that when a breach is furiouſly ſtormed by a great number of men at once, it cannot be long defended by artillery. The aſſaults of the Ultramontanes, in particular, are ſo fierce, that it is not poſſible to ſuſtain them: whereas thoſe of the Italians, who lead up their men by few at a time, and in detached parties, are eaſily repelled: but this may more properly be called *Skirmiſhing*, than any thing elſe, and thoſe that approach a breach in ſo cool a manner, where there is any artillery planted, are all ſure to be knocked on the head; becauſe, in this caſe, it muſt do great execution: whilſt others who ruſh impetuouſly into the breach in great numbers at the ſame time, and puſh each other forwards, are ſure to ſucceed in ſpite of the artillery, except there are any ditches, or other works within to impede them: for though ſome of them muſt be killed, there will be enough left to carry the place. The truth of this has been ſufficiently experienced at the ſiege of many towns, which the Ultramontanes have taken in Italy, particularly at that of Breſcia: for that town having revolted from the French to the Venetians, and the Citadel only holding out for them, the Venetians, in order to ſecure themſelves from any ſallies that might be made from thence, fortified the ſtreet that leads from the Citadel down into the town, planting as many cannon as they poſſibly could, both in the front and flanks, and every other part of it where there was any room or convenience; but Monſieur de Foix made ſo little account of them, when he arrived there with a body of horſe, to relieve the Citadel, that he ordered his men to diſmount, and puſhing through this ſtreet, preſently made himſelf maſter of the whole town, without ſuſtaining any conſiderable loſs. So that thoſe who are to defend a ſmall town after a breach is made, and have neither any place of ſecurity to retire into, nor ditches or ramparts to obſtruct the enemy, but are reduced to depend upon their artillery alone, muſt ſoon be obliged to ſurrender.

If the town to be defended is a large one, and the beſieged have all the conveniences juſt now mentioned to truſt to, artillery will ſtill be of much more ſervice to the beſiegers than to them. For, in the firſt place, if you expect to do any material execution, your Guns muſt be planted upon ſome eminence, that is elevated above the level of the

town; otherwiſe, any little breaſt-work which the enemy may throw up will be ſufficient to cover them from your fire: ſo that being forced to mount your cannon, perhaps upon platforms, at the top of the walls, or ſome other ſuch elevated place, you muſt labour under two difficulties; in the firſt place, you cannot make uſe of ſuch heavy peices as the enemy may, becauſe the ſpace there will be too ſtrait to manage them, as they ought to be managed: and in the next, if that was poſſible to be done, yet you could not make parapets there ſtrong enough to ſecure them: which the beſiegers may eaſily do, as they are upon a plain field, and have both room and materials ſufficient for both thoſe purpoſes. It is hardly poſſible therefore, for the beſieged to keep their cannon upon ſuch an elevation, if the enemy has many and heavy pieces on his ſide; and, if they plant them on a flat, they will be of little or no ſervice, as I ſhewed before: ſo that after all, the place muſt be maintained as in former times, chiefly by dint of ſmall arms and the courage of the Soldier. Now, though ſmall arms are of ſome ſervice to the beſieged, yet, not of ſo much as to balance the miſchief done by the enemy's artillery, which batter down their walls into the ditches in ſuch a manner, that when the aſſault is given, the beſieged ſuffer more now-a-days, than they did formerly in ſieges; for their walls being levelled, and their ditches filled up, they are no longer any ſecurity to them, as they were before the uſe of cannon was known: and therefore, as I ſaid above, artillery is of much greater ſervice to thoſe that beſiege towns, than to thoſe that are beſieged.

As to the third caſe, that is, when you are not in any town, but in an encampment which you have ſtrongly fortified, in order to avoid fighting an enemy, except you can do it with great advantage; I affirm, that even in that ſituation, you have no better means to ſecure you from being forced to an engagement, than the ancients had; and that ſometimes you will find yourſelf in worſe circumſtances there than they ever did; which is owing to the uſe of artillery. For, if a numerous army ſhould attack you with any advantage of ground (which probably ſome neighbouring eminence may give them) or come upon you before you have finiſhed your entrenchments, and ſufficiently covered yourſelf, they will preſently diſlodge you, and oblige you to fight them whether you would or not: as it happened to the Spaniards at the battle of Ravenna, who having fortified themſelves upon the banks of the Ronco, in ſome works which they had not raiſed high enough, and being fired upon by the French from a hill above them, were forced to march out of their entrenchments and come to action. But ſuppoſing (as it muſt often happen) that the place which you have made choice of for your encampment ſhould command the whole country round about it, and that you have fortified yourſelf in ſuch a manner there, that the enemy, upon reconnoitring your camp, does not think

proper

proper to attack it; they will then have recourſe to ſuch methods of annoyance as were practiſed of old, when an army was ſo poſted, that it could not otherwiſe be forced to decamp: that is, they will ſcour the adjacent country, take and plunder your towns, and cut off your convoys, till at laſt you will be under a neceſſity of diſlodging and coming to a battle, in which (as I ſhall ſhew preſently) the uſe of artillery is of no great importance. So that conſidering what has been ſaid, and that the wars which the Romans had carried on were almoſt always of the offenſive kind; it will appear that they would have had ſtill greater advantages, and their conqueſts been more rapid and conſiderable, if the uſe of artillery had been common in their time.

With regard to the ſecond allegation, that men have not the ſame opportunity of diſtinguiſhing their courage, that they had before great guns were invented; I anſwer, that it is very true, they have not, and that the danger is much greater, where they make their aſſault in ſmall parties, when they have walls to ſcale, or ſome other attack of that kind to carry on, and inſtead of ruſhing on all together with fury and reſolution, advance, as it were, one by one, in a cold and fearful manner. It is likewiſe true, that the Generals and other Officers of armies are more expoſed to danger at preſent, than they were in former times, as they may be killed by a Cannon ball at a great diſtance, and would not be ever the ſafer if they were in the very rear, and ſurrounded by the braveſt of their men. No remarkable loſſes however, or very few indeed, of either kind have been ſuſtained of late, even in ſieges: for it has not been much in faſhion to attempt a Scalade upon well fortified towns, nor to make feeble aſſaults, but to proceed by way of blockade, as formerly: and, in thoſe few towns that have been taken by ſtorm, the danger was not greater than in former times; for in thoſe days, the beſieged in all towns had their machines and engines of war, which (though perhaps they might not occaſion ſo much terror) did no leſs execution. As to the danger which Generals and other Officers are expoſed to, it may be anſwered, that fewer Commanders were killed during the twenty-four years which the laſt wars in Italy continued, than in any ten years war, in the time of the Romans: for except Count Lodovico della Mirandola, (who was killed at Ferrara when the Venetians invaded that State not long ago) and the Duke of Nemours (who was killed at Cirignuola) there was not one General Officer ſlain by a cannon ball: for Monſieur de Foix died by the ſword, at the battle of Ravenna. So that if particular men do not ſhew ſo much valour at preſent as in former times, it is not owing to the uſe of artillery, but to bad diſcipline and the weakneſs of our armies: for where there is no courage in the whole, it cannot be expected in any individual.

As to the third allegation, that armies cannot eaſily now be brought to a cloſe engagement, and that the deciſión of battles will probably in time be left to the artillery; I anſwer, that this is altogether falſe, and will always be adjudged ſo by thoſe who ſhall think fit to revive the ancient military diſcipline and manner of fighting: for he that would make a good army, ſhould accuſtom his ſoldiers either in real or ſham fights, to advance ſo near the enemy, that they may not only make uſe of their ſhort weapons, but cloſe in and grapple with them: and in ſuch caſes to depend much more upon his Infantry than his Cavalry, for reaſons that ſhall be given in the next Chapter. Whoever purſues this method, will have but little to fear from artillery; for, by thus cloſing with the enemy, the Infantry will find it much eaſier to avoid the fire of their artillery, than to ſuſtain the weight of Elephants, Chariots armed with Scythes, and other ſuch inventions, now laid aſide, which the Roman Infantry had to encounter, and yet always found ſome means to elude their force: and certainly they would more readily have found means to eſcape the fire of great Guns, becauſe the danger from them is ſooner over, than it was from Elephants and armed chariots, the miſchief occaſioned by the latter, continuing as long as the battle laſted, but the execution done by the former being chiefly over before the action begins; which danger, nevertheleſs the Infantry may in a good meaſure eſcape, either by taking the advantage of ſome ſort of cover from the nature of the country, or by falling flat upon their bellies during the fire. This precaution however, as experience hath fully ſhewn, is not altogether neceſſary, eſpecially againſt very heavy cannon: for it is almoſt impoſſible not to point them either too high or too low; in one of which caſes, the balls will fly over you, and in the other, they will not reach you: and after the battle is once begun, it is evident that neither heavy pieces nor light ones can do you any damage: for, if they are placed in the front of the enemy's army, they muſt of courſe fall into your hands; if in the rear, it muſt hurt themſelves more than you; and if upon either of their flanks, it can gall you but little before you come at it by moving either to the right or left. This is clear from the example of the Swiſs at Novara, in the year 1513, who boldly marched up to the French camp, which was very ſtrongly fortified, not only with artillery, but deep entrenchments, and took it ſword in hand, notwithſtanding theſe impediments, though they had no Cavalry, nor ſo much as one piece of cannon of any ſort themſelves.

Another reaſon that may be given for the inſignificance of artillery, is, that it muſt be ſecured either by a wall, or a rampart, or a ditch, or ſomething of that kind, if you expect any ſervice from it; otherwiſe it will either fall into the enemy's hands, or be of no uſe: as it happens in field battles,

battles, where it is guarded only by men. In the flanks they cannot be employed to any great purpoſe, except the ſame method is followed that the ancients obſerved in managing their engines of war, which were placed out of the ranks, that they might not occaſion any diſorder amongſt their own forces; and whenever thoſe that defended them were attacked and hard preſſed, either by Cavalry or otherwiſe, they drew them off and retired with them into the main body of the army. He that does not manage artillery in this manner, does not underſtand the nature of it, and puts his confidence in what may otherwiſe moſt probably deceive him. The Turk indeed obtained two or three victories over the Sophy of Perſia and the Sultan of Egypt, by the aſſiſtance of artillery: but that was owing to the confuſion into which their Cavalry were thrown by the thunder of ſuch unuſual exploſions, rather than to any great execution it did. To conclude therefore, I ſay, that artillery may be of uſe in an army, where the Soldiers are brave and diſciplined in the ancient manner: but if they are not, it will be of little or no ſervice againſt a reſolute and courageous enemy [*d*].

CHAP. XVIII.

Whether in conformity to the authority of the Romans, and the example of ancient military diſcipline, one ought to make more account of Infantry than Cavalry.

IT may be clearly demonſtrated by many proofs and examples, that the Romans gave the preference to their Infantry, and depended much more upon them than their Cavalry, in all enterprizes and expeditions. In the battle betwixt them and the Latins, near the Lake of Regillum, their troops beginning to give way, the Roman General ordered his Cavalry to diſmount, and renew the fight on foot; after which, they recovered their ground, and got the day: from whence it appears, that they put more confidence in their men when they were on foot, than on horſeback. The ſame expedient was made uſe of upon many other occaſions, when they were reduced to extremities; and they always found their account in it. It is to no purpoſe in this caſe to object the opinion of Hannibal at the battle of Cannæ; who finding the Conſuls had ordered their Cavalry to diſmount, ſaid in a taunting manner, *Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites*, i. e. *They might as well have delivered them up to me tied and bound:* for though, without doubt, he was a General of conſummate experience, yet the

[*d*] See the *Art of War*, Book III. & paſſim.

opinion

opinion of any one man ought not to be ſet in competition with the conſtant judgment and practice of ſo many able Commanders, as were bred under the Roman Republic, eſpecially when very ſtrong arguments, excluſive of ſuch an authority, may be adduced to ſupport one, and refute the other. Men on foot may eaſily march through places where horſe cannot come: they keep their ranks better, and are ſoon rallied if they happen to be thrown into diſorder: whereas it is a very difficult matter to make horſes keep their ranks, and almoſt impoſſible to rally them, when they are once broken. Beſides, ſome horſes, like ſome men, being dull and heavy, and others fiery and high ſpirited: it may happen that a coward may be mounted upon an unruly horſe, and a brave fellow upon a jade: in either of which caſes, confuſion muſt naturally enſue. A body of Infantry well diſciplined and drawn up, will ſoon break a ſquadron of Cavalry: but the ſame number of Cavalry will find it a hard matter to break a body of Infantry: the truth of which aſſertion is confirmed, not only by many facts and examples, both of ancient and modern date, but by the authority of all thoſe that have written upon military affairs, and the government of States, who tell us, that all wars at firſt were carried on by horſemen, becauſe the art of drawing up foot was not known; but after that was found out, it was ſoon ſeen how much the latter were to be preferred to the former. Cavalry however, are very neceſſary in an army, to ſcour the roads, to reconnoitre the country, to make incurſions, to plunder or forage, to face the enemy's horſe, and to purſue them when they fly: but the main ſtrength and vigour of an army certainly conſiſts in its Infantry, and therefore they are moſt to be truſted to. Amongſt the many fatal errors then, by which the Italian Princes have made their country a ſlave to foreigners, none have contributed more to it, than their neglecting to train up good bands of Infantry, and applying all their care and attention to their Cavalry: and this has been wholly owing to the knavery of the Commanders and the ſtupidity of the Princes. For during theſe laſt twenty-five years the Italian Soldiery have been entirely in the hands of Commanders, who not having a foot of land in the world, are no better than Adventurers or Soldiers of fortune; and conſequently make it a trade to hire themſelves and the Soldiers that follow their banners, to ſuch as have not ſenſe enough to keep any forces of their own. But as they thought there would be no occaſion for a large body of foot, which could neither be often employed, nor long maintained in pay, and that a ſmall one would not anſwer their end, they reſolved to make uſe of horſe only; imagining that two or three hundred Cuiraſſiers would give them ſufficient reputation, and not be too many to be paid by thoſe that hired them. To keep up their credit therefore, and to make themſelves neceſſary, it has been their conſtant endeavour to

diſparage

diſparage the uſe of Infantry, and to recommend that of Cavalry: in which they have ſucceeded ſo well, that in the largeſt armies there is but a very ſmall proportion of foot. To this error, and ſome others (but to this chiefly) it is owing, that the Italian Soldiery are now become ſo weak and contemptible, that their country has not only been over-run, but grievouſly plundered and laid waſte by every Ultramontane in his turn.

But to ſhew more fully the error of preferring the uſe of Cavalry to that of Infantry, I ſhall produce another example from the practice of the Romans, which happened at the ſiege of Sora: for a party of horſe ſallying out of the town to attack their camp, a Roman Colonel advanced to repulſe them at the head of another party; but the Commanders on both ſides being killed at the firſt onſet, and the fight ſtill continuing after they were ſlain, the Romans diſmounted in order to attack the enemy with more advantage, which forced them to do the ſame, to defend themſelves more effectually, though they were at laſt driven back again into the town. Nothing, I think, can be a ſtronger proof than this, that Infantry was in greater eſteem amongſt them than Cavalry: for though indeed, their Generals had ſometimes cauſed their horſemen to diſmount upon other occaſions, yet that was to ſupport their Infantry, when it was hard preſſed or overpowered: but, in this caſe they did not diſmount to ſuccour their own Infantry, for they had none there, nor to engage another body of the enemy's foot: but fighting on horſeback againſt another party of horſe, they thought if they could not deal with them that way, they ſhould eaſily be able to manage them the other. I conclude therefore, that it is hardly poſſible to break a well-diſciplined body of foot, except they are oppoſed by another that is better. Craſſus and Mark Anthony, two Roman Generals, over-run the Kingdom of Parthia for many days together, with a ſmall number of horſe, but a good army of foot; though the Parthians had a vaſt army of horſe to oppoſe them: Craſſus, indeed, and part of his forces were ſlain; but Anthony came off with great honour. Nevertheleſs, it was clearly ſeen in that diſtreſsful expedition, that Infantry are much more ſerviceable than Cavalry: for though they were in a plain open country, where there were very few mountains, and ſtill fewer rivers, to ſupply them with neceſſary cover and other conveniencies, at a great diſtance from the ſea-coaſt, and without any hopes of relief; yet, Anthony conducted himſelf and his forces ſo well (to the great admiration of the Parthians themſelves) that their army of horſe, though ſo numerous, never durſt attack him: as to Craſſus, whoever reads the hiſtory of that war, will find that he was rather trepanned by the falſehood than overcome by the gallantry of the enemy, who would not venture to attack him in all his diſtreſſes, till they had firſt reduced.

reduced him and his army to extreme want and miſery by hovering about him at a diſtance, and cutting off, inſtead of furniſhing them, with all manner of proviſions, as they had promiſed him.

But why ſhould we go ſo far back for proofs of the ſuperiority of Infantry, when we may have ſo many nearer home, and of more recent date? Nine thouſand Swiſs (as I ſaid in the laſt Chapter) attacked an army of ten thouſand horſe, and as many foot, encamped at Novara, and beat them without the aſſiſtance either of Cavalry or Artillery: for the horſe could not come at them to do them any harm; and as to the foot they made light of them, becauſe they were moſtly Gaſcons and very ill diſciplined. ' Since which, twenty-ſix thouſand Swiſs had the courage to march into the Milaneſe after Francis I. the French King, whoſe army conſiſted of twenty thouſand horſe and forty thouſand foot, with an hundred pieces of cannon: and if they did not beat the French, as they had done at Novara, yet they fought them bravely for two whole days together; and at laſt, after they were defeated, brought off above one half of their army ſafe. Marcus Attilius Regulus formerly oppoſed his Infantry, not only to the enemy's horſe, but to their Elephants: and though indeed the ſucceſs did not anſwer his expectation, yet it is a proof how much confidence he put in them, and that he thought them equal to any undertaking: I ſay again therefore, that a well diſciplined body of Infantry cannot be broken, but by another that is ſtill better: and that to attempt it is only ſo much labour loſt. In the time of Philip Viſconti Duke of Milan, about ſixteen thouſand Swiſs marched into Lombardy; againſt whom the Duke ſent his General Carmignuola with a thouſand horſe and ſome Infantry. That Commander being unacquainted with their manner of fighting, took it for granted that his horſe would break them at the firſt attack: but finding they ſtood firm and impenetrable in their ranks, and having loſt a great many of his men, he was forced to retreat. However, as he was an able officer, and fertile in expedients to remedy any ſudden misfortune, after he had received a freſh ſupply of forces, he went in purſuit of the enemy again; and coming up with them, he cauſed his Gens d' armes to diſmount, and placing them in the front of his Infantry, he fell upon the Swiſs and preſently defeated them: for his Cuiraſſiers being then on foot, and armed at all points, eaſily broke into their ranks and made ſuch a ſlaughter of them, without receiving any damage themſelves, that none of them eſcaped, except ſuch as Carmignuola, out of his humanity, thought fit to ſpare. Many, I am certain, are perſuaded in their own judgment that foot are more uſeful than horſe: yet ſuch is the infelicity of the preſent times, that neither the authority of ancient or modern examples, nor the conviction of their error, is ſufficient to make our Princes correct their miſtakes and prevail upon them to acknowledge that in order to reſtore

reſtore the credit of their Soldiery, it is neceſſary to revive the ancient diſcipline, to keep troops of their own, to encourage them, to put life and vigour into them, and to make them reſpectable; that ſo they in their turn may likewiſe reflect honour and reputation upon their Maſters. But ſince they deviate from theſe Rules, and the others abovementioned; what little acquiſitions they happen to make, contribute rather to the prejudice and diminution, than aggrandizement of their States, as I ſhall ſhew preſently [e].

CHAP. XIX.

That acquiſitions made by Republics which are ill governed, and contrary to the Model of the Romans, contribute to their ruin, inſtead of their exaltation.

TO theſe ill grounded opinions, confirmed by the abſurd practice of our corrupted times, it is owing that Princes never think of reforming their errors and reviving the ancient military diſcipline. Who could ever have perſuaded an Italian thirty years ago, that nine or ten thouſand well diſciplined foot durſt attack ten thouſand horſe and as many foot in an open plain, and were able to beat them, as they actually did at Novara; an inſtance which I have quoted more than once before? For though Hiſtory abounds with ſuch examples, yet they either meet with no credit at all; or if any body ſeems to believe them, they never fail to object, however, that the armour now made uſe of is ſo much better than that of the ancients, that one ſquadron of our Gens d'arms would make an impreſſion not only upon a body of foot, but even upon a rock. With ſuch ſimple excuſes they deceive themſelves and impoſe upon their own judgment; though they muſt know that Lucullus with a ſmall army of Infantry, routed one of an hundred and fifty thouſand horſe under the command of Tigranes, in which there was a great number of Cuiraſſiers armed exactly in the ſame manner that ours are at preſent. The weakneſs of theſe opinions therefore, we have ſeen fully proved at the expence of other nations alſo, as appears from this example in particular: and ſince what is related in Hiſtory concerning the excellency of Infantry holds good, one ought to give no leſs credit to what is recorded to the advantage of ſeveral other ancient Inſtitutions that we have recommended: in which caſe, both Princes and Republics would find themſelves expoſed to fewer dangers, better able to ſuſtain any enemy, and not have the mortification of ſeeing their forces ſo fre-

[e] See the *Art of War*, Book II.

quently obliged to run away as they now do. As to thoſe eſpecially that are at the head of a Commonwealth, they would find it much more eaſy to accompliſh their purpoſes, whether they deſign to extend their dominion, or only to maintain what they already poſſeſs, and be convinced that to fill their country full of inhabitants, to make allies and confederates rather than abſolute ſlaves of the people they conquer, to eſtabliſh Colonies for the ſecurity of what they have acquired, to convert the ſpoils of an enemy into funds for the uſe of the State, to annoy them with incurſions and field battles, and not embarraſs themſelves with Sieges, to make the Public rich, and private men poor, and to employ all their care and attention to keep up good military diſcipline in full force, are the beſt ways to aggrandize a Republic and enlarge its Empire. But if theſe methods are not approved by ſome, let them remember however, that any other will prove their ruin: for which reaſon, they ought to curb their ambition, and (inſtead of endeavouring to extend their dominion) to turn their thoughts only upon regulating their laws and interior polity in ſuch a manner as may beſt enable them to defend themſelves and what they have already got, like ſeveral free States in Germany, which, by ſo doing, have lived happily and undiſturbed for a long courſe of years.

Nevertheleſs (as I have ſaid elſewhere, in diſcourſing upon the different conduct that is to be obſerved in order to enlarge dominion, from that which is neceſſary only to ſecure what has been acquired before) it is impoſſible that any Republic ſhould continue long quiet and enjoy its liberty and dominions, how ſmall ſoever, in tranquillity: for though it ſhould not moleſt others, it will nevertheleſs be moleſted by them: and by being thus provoked, it will not only become deſirous, but lie under a neceſſity of revenging itſelf and reducing its neighbours: but if it ſhould be ſo fortunate as not to have any foreign enemies, it will be ſure to fall into factions and diviſions at home, as it always happens in ſuch Governments. That the free States in Germany have continued ſo long in peace and liberty, is owing to ſome peculiar circumſtances in that country which are not to be found in any other, and without which they could not ſubſiſt in that manner. That part of Germany which I now ſpeak of was formerly ſubject to the Romans, like France and Spain: but when the Roman State was upon the decline, and the title of *Empire* transferred to Germany, ſome of the moſt powerful Cities in that Province taking advantage either of the puſillanimity or diſtreſs of the Emperors, ſhook off their yoke, and others became in a manner abſolutely free, on condition of paying only a ſmall annual tribute: ſo that all the States which were immediately ſubject to the Emperors and no other Prince, by degrees recovered their liberty. It happened about the ſame time that ſeveral Corporations dependent upon the Duke of

of Auſtria, as Fribourg [*f*], the Swiſs, and ſome others, revolted from him, and having re-eſtabliſhed their freedom, became ſo ſtrong and powerful in a while, that they not only defended themſelves effectually againſt his utmoſt endeavours to reduce them to obedience, but grew formidable to all their neighbours; and theſe are now called the Swiſs Cantons. Germany then is divided betwixt the Emperor, the Swiſs, the Princes or Electors, and certain little Republics called the *Free States* [*g*]: and the reaſon that theſe few wars, and thoſe of ſhort continuance, happen betwixt States ſo differently conſtituted, is the reſpect that they all pay to the Emperor, who, though his power is not very great, has ſo much reputation and authority amongſt them, that whenever any quarrel ariſes betwixt them, he interpoſes as a Mediator, and ſoon puts an end to it. The ſharpeſt and longeſt wars in that Country have been betwixt the Swiſs and the Dukes of Auſtria: and though the Title of Emperor has been in the Houſe of Auſtria for many years, they never could get the better of the Swiſs, nor could any quarrel be ever decided betwixt them but by the ſword: for the other States of Germany did not furniſh the Emperors with any aſſiſtance in thoſe wars, becauſe the Free Cities rather favoured the Swiſs who were friends to liberty like themſelves; and as to the Princes, ſome of them were ſo poor that they could not, and others ſo jealous of the Imperial power that they would not contribute to make it ſtill greater.

Theſe Communities therefore, live quietly and unmoleſted in poſſeſſion of their own little territories, as they have no occaſion to deſire thoſe of others, whilſt they are all kept at peace by the authority of the Emperor: and what makes them united at home is the apprehenſion they are under of ſo near an enemy, who would not fail to take the opportunity of any diviſions that might happen amongſt them, to reduce them into ſubjection to him, and deprive them of their liberties. But if Germany was not thus balanced, ſome of theſe States would be under a neceſſity of endeavouring to enlarge their dominions, and conſequently there muſt ſoon be an end of their tranquillity: and as no other Country is circumſtanced in the ſame manner, no other Republics can enjoy the ſame freedom; and therefore thoſe that find it neceſſary to extend their territory at the expence of their neighbours, muſt either have re-

[*f*] The original ſays, *Filiborge*, *Philipſbourg*, but that muſt be a miſtake of the Author.

[*g*] The *Imperial Cities*, or *Hans-towns*. The former are Sovereign States, and ſend their Deputies or Repreſentatives to the General Diets or Parliaments of the Empire. The latter are alſo Sovereign States, not differing from the Imperial Cities at preſent, but were about two hundred years ago allied or confederated for their mutual defence and the protection of their trade, and at firſt conſiſted only of the great Sea port towns on the German Ocean or the Baltic Sea, and near the mouths of their great rivers: but afterwards they took many inland Cities into their alliance, monopolized moſt of the trade in Europe, and were a formidable maritime Power.

courſe to Leagues and Confederacies, or proceed as the Romans did of old: whoever takes any other courſe, inſtead of aggrandizing his Country, will certainly ruin it. For new conqueſts are dangerous and prejudicial a thouſand ways; as a State may eaſily enlarge its dominions without increaſing its ſtrength; in which caſe ruin muſt inevitably enſue: and this happens when the expence of an Enterprize exceeds the profit that reſults from it, even though it is ſucceſsful. Thus the Venetians were much weaker when they became poſſeſſed of Lombardy; and the Florentines after they had conquered all Tuſcany, than when the former were content with the dominion of the Adriatic, and the latter with a territory that did not exceed ſix miles any way in extent [*b*]; and this was owing to their ambition of making acquiſitions, and not knowing how to maintain them: for which they were the more inexcuſable as they had the example of the Romans immediately before their eyes, and might have imitated them in the method which that people obſerved upon ſuch occaſions, if they had not wiſdom enough to ſtrike it out themſelves as the Romans did. Beſides, ſuch acquiſitions ſometimes do great miſchief even to well governed Commonwealths; for inſtance, when the State conquered is voluptuous and effeminate, and the conquerors catch the infection by their communication with its inhabitants; as it happened to the Romans firſt, and afterwards to Hannibal's troops, when they had made themſelves Maſters of Capua; for if that City had lain ſo far off that the Soldiers could not have been ſoon reclaimed, or if the Roman State had been in any degree corrupted, without doubt that conqueſt would have proved the deſtruction of their Republic, as we may venture to affirm from what Livy ſays, *Jam tunc minime ſalubris militari diſciplinæ Capua, inſtrumentum omnium voluptatum, delinitos militum animos avertit a memoriâ patriæ: Capua, at that time the nurſery of all ſoft pleaſures, ſo relaxed the military diſcipline, and debauched the minds of the Soldiers, that they totally forgot their love and duty to their own Country.* And indeed ſuch Cities or Provinces ſufficiently revenge themſelves upon thoſe that conquer them, without blows or effuſion of blood: for as the corruption ſpreads, and at laſt becomes general, it enervates them to ſuch a degree that they muſt in the end become a prey to any one that attacks them; as Juvenal well remarks in one of his Satires, when he is ſpeaking of the change of manners in Rome, the luxury and many other vices which their conqueſts had introduced there in the room of that temperance, frugality, and other excellent virtues, for which they had been ſo remarkable before.

[*b*] Suppoſing Florence to be the center of it at that time.

Sævior

Sævior armis
Luxuria incubuit victumque ulciſcitur orbem.

What arms could ne'er effect, dire Luxury
Has done at laſt, t' avenge the conquer'd world.
SAT. VI. 291, 292.

If then ſuch an acquiſition had almoſt effected the ruin of the Romans, notwithſtanding their great wiſdom and virtue; what muſt become of thoſe States that are weak and corrupt; and beſides their other errors and ill conduct, (which I have mentioned above) employ either mercenary or auxiliary troops, the folly and danger of which I ſhall make the Subject of the next Chapter?

CHAP. XX.

How dangerous it is for any Prince or Republic to employ either Auxiliary or Mercenary forces.

IF I had not diſcuſſed this point at large in another part of my works, I ſhould have dwelt longer upon it in this place than I deſign to do at preſent [*i*]. But as I have met with a moſt remarkable inſtance in Livy how dangerous it is to employ Auxiliaries, I cannot paſs it over without ſome notice. By *Auxiliaries*, I mean ſuch troops as one State ſends to the ſuccour of another, under Officers of its own, and in its own pay.

That Hiſtorian informs us, that after the Romans had defeated the Samnites in two battles at different places, with ſome forces which they ſent to the relief of the Capuans, and thereby put an end to the war betwixt thoſe two people, they left two Legions in the territory of Capua to ſecure it from any further danger or apprehenſion of the enemy, after the reſt of their forces had returned to Rome. But thoſe Legions ſinking into indolence and faſcinated by effeminate delights, began not only to lay aſide all remembrance of their own Country and the reverence they owed to the Senate, but to think of ſetting up for themſelves, and ſeizing upon ſo fine a Country which they had defended againſt all enemies at their own peril, and which they thought the inhabitants no longer worthy to enjoy, ſince they were not able to defend it themſelves. This conſpiracy however being timely diſcovered by the Roman Go-

[*i*] See Chap. xii. xiii. xiv. of the *Prince*, Pol. Diſc. Book I. Chap. xxi. xliii. and the *Art of War*, Book I.

vernment,

vernment, was ſoon ſuppreſſed, as we ſhall relate more fully when we come to diſcourſe of Conſpiracies.

I ſay again therefore, that of all troops Auxiliaries are the moſt dangerous and unſerviceable; becauſe neither the Soldiers nor the Officers receiving any pay from you, but from the Prince or State by whom they are ſent, like the Legions that were left at Capua, they have little or no regard either to your intereſt or authority: and as ſoon as the war is over, if it ends ſucceſsfully, they often plunder thoſe that employ them, with as little ceremony as they did thoſe whom they were ſent to fight againſt: which is owing ſometimes to their own avarice or ambition, and ſometimes to that of their Maſters. The Romans had no deſign to violate the league they were in with the Capuans: but their Soldiers imagining it would be a very eaſy matter to ſeize upon that State themſelves, actually determined upon it. I could cite many other inſtances of this kind, but let one more ſuffice, namely that of the Regini [*k*], who were not only plundered and diſpoſſeſſed of their territories, but murdered by a Legion which the Romans had ſent to defend them. A Prince then upon occaſion had better have recourſe to any other expedient than Auxiliaries, eſpecially when he is to depend chiefly upon them for his ſecurity: for any terms that he can obtain from an enemy, how hard ſoever, will be leſs prejudicial to him than ſuch ſuccours. Indeed if we either read the Hiſtory of former times, or conſider the preſent with due attention, we ſhall find a thouſand inſtances wherein they have proved fatal, for one in which they ever did any ſervice to thoſe that employed them. An ambitious Prince or Commonwealth therefore cannot be furniſhed with a fairer opportunity of making themſelves maſters of another State, than by being ſollicited to ſend ſuch troops to its aſſiſtance: for he that is ſo indiſcreet as to call in Auxiliaries not only for his own defence, but to conquer others, endeavours to make acquiſitions which he cannot keep any longer than they pleaſe to let him; becauſe they can eaſily take them away from him again whenever they have a mind. But ſo blind is the ambition of ſome men, that if they can but gratify their preſent appetites, they never think of the inconveniencies that muſt probably ſoon enſue: whereas if they would reflect upon the inſtances which we have quoted from ancient Hiſtory to confirm this point as well as ſome others inſiſted upon in theſe Diſcourſes, they would be convinced that the more generoſity Princes or Republics ſhew to their neighbours, and the leſs inclination to injure or diſtreſs them, the more ready they will be to

[*k*] The inhabitants of Rhegium, now called Reggio, a town in Calabria almoſt oppoſite to Meſſina. There is another town of the ſame name in Lombardy belonging to the Duke of Modena.

throw

throw themſelves into their arms, as we ſhall prove in the next Chapter, from the example of the Capuans.

CHAP. XXI.

The firſt Prætor the Romans ever ſent abroad, was to Capua, four hundred years after they firſt began to make war.

WE have already ſhewn at large how different the methods which the Romans took to enlarge their Empire, were from thoſe that are now purſued for the ſame purpoſe; and how they ſuffered thoſe States which they did not utterly deſtroy, to enjoy their former liberty, and to live under their own laws; even ſuch as were not joined with them as Confederates, but had ſubmitted to be their Subjects; and that without any other mark of their dominion over them than ſome few conditions, upon the obſervation of which, they were protected in their ancient rights and privileges. This method they followed till they carried their arms into foreign countries, and began to reduce the States and Kingdoms which they conquered into Provinces ſubject to their Empire; as may plainly appear from the example of the firſt Prætor they ever ſent to any place (which was to Capua) not out of any ambitious deſign, but becauſe it was ſollicited by the Capuans, who had fallen out amongſt themſelves, and were deſirous to have ſome Roman Citizen of authority to compoſe their quarrels and reduce them to good order again. This example was ſoon followed by the inhabitants of Antium, who being in the like circumſtances, voluntarily ſubmitted to receive a Roman Magiſtrate for the ſame purpoſes: upon which new method of acquiring dominion Livy ſays, *Quod jam non ſolum arma, ſed jura Romana pollebant: that the Romans now began to extend their Empire not only by the valour of their arms, but by the reputation of their Laws.* We ſee therefore how much this manner of proceeding contributed to aggrandize their State: for Republics, in particular, that have been uſed to live in freedom, and under the government of their own Countrymen, ſubmit with more ſatisfaction to Maſters that are at a diſtance from them (though upon terms that may have ſomewhat hard in them) than to others that are nearer at hand, and would, they think, be continually upbraiding them with their dependence. There is likewiſe another advantage reſulting from this: for as in this caſe the Sovereign employs Miniſters of his own immediate appointment in the adminiſtration of juſtice, whatever ſentence may be given either in civil or capital cauſes, cannot excite any odium againſt the Supreme power; which therefore exempts it from the calumnies and reproaches that muſt often

of

of courſe be occaſioned by thoſe ſentences, whether they be juſt or unjuſt. The truth of this may plainly appear not only from ſeveral paſſages in ancient Hiſtory, but from an occurrence which lately happened in Italy. Every one knows that as often as the French made themſelves maſters of Genoa (which has been ſeveral times), the King of France always uſed to ſend ſomebody thither to govern it in his name: but at preſent he ſuffers it (rather out of neceſſity than choice) to be governed by a Genoeſe, elected by his fellow Citizens: and without doubt, whoever conſiders which of theſe two ways beſt ſecures their obedience to the King, and is moſt agreeable to the inhabitants, muſt needs determine in favour of the latter. Beſides, the leſs inclined you ſeem to diſtreſs men, the leſs apprehenſion they will have of your depriving them of their liberties; and the more humane and gentle you ſhew yourſelf to them, the more cheerfully they will throw themſelves into your arms. To this lenity and moderation it was owing that the Capuans deſired the Romans to ſend them a Prætor: but if the latter had ſhewn the leaſt inclination to intermeddle in their affairs, or officiouſly endeavoured to obtrude ſuch a Magiſtrate upon them, they would preſently have taken alarm and driven him back again.

But what occaſion have we to go ſo far as Rome or Capua for examples of this kind; when we have enow in Tuſcany? It is well known that Piſtoia long ago voluntarily put itſelf under the protection of the Florentines; and at the ſame time what a bitter enmity ſubſiſted betwixt the Florentines and the Piſans, the Luccheſe, and the Sieneſe; which diverſity of diſpoſition did not proceed from the little value the Piſtoians ſet upon their liberty in compariſon of the others, but to the different behaviour of the Florentines, who treated the former like brothers, and the latter like enemies: upon which account, the Piſtoians willingly ſubmitted to their dominion; whilſt the others have always taken every poſſible method to defend themſelves againſt them: but if the Florentines, inſtead of exaſperating their neighbours by harſh uſage, had behaved in a gentle and friendly manner to them, they would certainly have been Maſters of all Tuſcany at this time. It is not my intention however to infer from what has been here ſaid, that one ought never to proceed with rigour and force of arms upon ſuch occaſions: but that they ſhould be reſerved for the laſt expedient, when all other means have failed.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

That men often err in the judgment they form concerning things of great importance.

HOW apt mankind are to err in their judgment, is well known to thoſe that have been much converſant in Councils; which if not conducted by wiſe and able men, are often deceived and impoſed upon: and as ſuch men have always many enemies in corrupt Commonwealths (eſpecially in time of peace), who oppoſe them either out of envy or ambition, that advice is moſt commonly followed, which is either falſely thought good, by an error of judgment common enough to a majority, or given by ſelf-intereſted men, who have more regard to popularity, than the good of the Public. But when the pernicious effects of theſe counſels come to be diſcovered in adverſe and troubleſome times, danger and diſtreſs make it neceſſary to comply with ſuch meaſures as were recommended, but rejected and diſcountenanced in the calm and ſunſhine of proſperity; as I ſhall ſhew more at large in another place. Several events likewiſe happen, in judging of which, men of ſmall experience in affairs may eaſily be deceived; as they are frequently attended with ſuch circumſtances and probability of ſucceſs, as may induce them to perſuade themſelves, that the things which they fondly hope for, will actually come to paſs. This is fully verified by the advice which Numicius, the Prætor, gave the Latins, after they had been defeated by the Romans; and by what was generally believed not many years ago, when Francis I. King of France invaded Milan, and the Swiſs defended it againſt him.

After the death of Lewis XII. Francis of Angoulême ſucceeded to the Crown, and being deſirous to recover poſſeſſion of Milan (which the Swiſs had made themſelves maſters of a few years before, by the aſſiſtance of Pope Julius II.) endeavoured to make ſome friends in Italy, to facilitate the accompliſhment of his deſigns: for which purpoſe, beſides the Venetians (whom King Lewis had ſecured before) he endeavoured to gain over Leo X. and the Florentines to his intereſts; imagining he ſhould then meet with little or no impediment in that enterprize; eſpecially as the Spaniſh forces were at that time employed in Lombardy, and thoſe of the Emperor at Verona. The Pope, however, was not to be prevailed upon to comply with his ſollicitations; being perſuaded by his Council (as it is ſaid) that if he ſtood neuter, he might greatly advantage himſelf by it: that it was not for the intereſt of the Church, to throw any more weight into the ſcale, either of the

French or the Swiſs: that in order to reſtore the liberty of Italy, it was neceſſary to rid himſelf of them both; that ſince he was not able to cope with either of them, much leſs with both, as things then ſtood, he ought to ſit ſtill till one of them had utterly ruined the other, and then to call in the aſſiſtance of his allies, and fall upon the Conqueror: that he could not have a fairer opportunity than the preſent, ſince both their armies were in the field, and his Holineſs's forces were in ſuch order and readineſs, that he might immediately ſend them to the confines of Lombardy to watch their motions, under a pretence of guarding his own territories, but in reality to wait there till they had come to a battle, which (conſidering the bravery of the troops on both ſides) it was reaſonable to ſuppoſe would be a very bloody one, and muſt leave even the Victor in ſuch a weak condition, that his Holineſs might ſoon cruſh him, and with great reputation to himſelf, become not only maſter of Lombardy, but Arbiter of all Italy. But the event ſhewed the futility of this counſel: for the Swiſs being defeated at laſt, after a long and obſtinate engagement, the forces of the Pope and the King of Spain, were ſo far from daring to attack the French, that they had determined to run away; but even that would not have ſaved them, if either the humanity, or coldneſs of the French King had not inclined him to reſt contented with that victory, and to come to an accommodation with the Pope. This advice, therefore, though plauſible enough indeed at firſt ſight, will appear ſimple and abſurd upon a nearer examination: for, it ſeldom happens, that he who gains a victory loſes many men; thoſe that he does loſe being killed in battle, not in flight: and in the heat of the fight, when armies are cloſe engaged, many cannot fall, becauſe ſuch conflicts are generally ſoon over; and, if they ever chance to laſt ſo long, that great numbers are ſlain, even on the ſide of thoſe that get the day, yet ſuch is the advantage that reſults from the reputation of a victory, and the terror which it inſpires, that it more than balances the loſs they ſuſtain by the death of their Soldiers.

Whoever then ſhall think fit to attack ſuch an army, upon a ſuppoſition that it muſt be much weakened, will find himſelf egregiouſly miſtaken, unleſs his ſtrength be ſuch, that he was able to have engaged it, even before it had ſuſtained any loſs at all: for, in that caſe, indeed, he may have a chance to gain a victory, as well as to be defeated, if he be a man of conduct and abilities, and is befriended by fortune. But an army that has been already fluſhed with victory, will ſtill have the advantage; as may appear from the example of the Latins, when they had been beaten by the Romans: for Numicius their Prætor, ſoon after the battle was over, run all up and down the country, exhorting them to fall upon the Romans again, now they were ſo much reduced by the late engagement, and had gained nothing but the name of a victory, having

having in all other reſpects ſuffered as much as themſelves; and aſſuring his countrymen, that any new attack, how feeble ſoever, would certainly ruin them. In conſequence of which, they raiſed another army, and attacked the Romans a ſecond time: but they ſoon paid dear for their credulity; for they were utterly routed with great loſs, and treated in ſuch a manner as all thoſe deſerve that liſten to ſuch fooliſh advice.

CHAP. XXIII.

That the Romans always avoided taking a middle courſe, when they had occaſion to paſs Judgment upon any of their Subjects.

JAM Latio is ſtatus erat rerum, ſays Livy, *ut neque pacem neque bellum pati poſſent. The Latins were now reduced to ſuch a condition that they could neither make war, nor accept of peace.* A condition indeed, of all others, the moſt miſerable; but ſuch a one as every Prince or Commonwealth muſt of neceſſity labour under, that can neither ſubmit to unreaſonable terms of accommodation on one hand, nor carry on a war on the other, without either delivering themſelves up as a prey to auxiliaries, or being utterly ruined by the enemy. To this wretched alternative, they are reduced by evil counſels, and coming to a reſolution before they have duly conſidered their own ſtrength, as we have ſaid before: which conſideration, if properly attended to, would prevent them from falling into ſuch diſtreſs as the Latins did, who made peace with the Romans, when they ought to have carried on the war, and declared war againſt them, when they ſhould have continued in peace; ſo that the friendſhip and enmity of the Romans were equally prejudicial to them. The Latins then being reduced to the laſt extremity by Manlius Torquatus, were afterwards totally ſubdued by Camillus, who obliged them to ſurrender at diſcretion to the Romans, and not only put garriſons into all their towns, but took hoſtages from them: after which he returned to Rome, and reported to the Senate, that all Latium was in ſubjection to them: and as the judgment of the Senate upon this occaſion, was very remarkable, and worthy of being imitated by other Princes in the like circumſtances, I ſhall here quote the words which Livy puts into the mouth of Camillus, when he made his report: from whence we may further obſerve, what methods the Romans purſued in extending their dominion, and that in their determinations they always avoided a middle way, and had recourſe to extremes: for the nature of government makes it neceſſary to keep Subjects upon ſuch a footing, and under ſuch reſtrictions, that they may either

either have no deſire, or at leaſt no power to injure or inſult it. And this may be effected either by abſolutely depriving them of all means to hurt you, or by treating them with ſuch lenity and tenderneſs, that they cannot wiſh to change their condition. There is no middle courſe that can be followed with ſecurity: and therefore, Camillus having propoſed the choice of theſe two expedients to the conſideration of the Senate, that wiſe body acted according to them both, as the circumſtances of the different towns in Latium required. His advice was as follows. "Dii immortales ita vos potentes hujus conſilii fecerunt, ut ſit Latium, an non ſit, in veſtrâ manu poſuerint. Itaque pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos attinet, parare in perpetuum, vel ſæviendo, vel ignoſcendo poteſtis. Vultis crudeliter conſulere in deditos victoſque? Licet delere omne Latium. Vultis exemplo majorum augere rem Romanam, victos in civitatem accipiendo? Materia creſcendi per ſummam gloriam ſuppeditat. Certe id firmiſſimum imperium eſt, quo obedientes guadent. Illorum igitur animos, dum expectatione ſtupent, ſeu pœnâ, ſeu beneficio præoccupari oportet: i. e. The Gods have now put it in your power to determine whether the Latins ſhall be any longer a people or not. It is in your own option effectually to ſecure yourſelves from any further apprehenſions of that enemy, either by pardoning or puniſhing them. If you have a mind to proceed with rigour againſt a people that are vanquiſhed, and have ſubmitted to you, they lie at your mercy, and you may totally extinguiſh the very name of them if you pleaſe; but, if you rather chuſe to enlarge your Empire by ſhewing clemency, and making the conquered your Subjects and friends, as your Anceſtors uſed to do, you have a noble opportunity of imitating their example with great glory and advantage to yourſelves: for that Dominion is built upon the ſureſt foundation, under which the Subjects live ſecurely and contented. It is abſolutely neceſſary therefore, to take either one courſe or the other; and immediately too, whilſt their minds are yet fluctuating betwixt hope and fear, and the uncertainty of their doom prevents them from taking any deſperate reſolution." The Senate, after ſome deliberation, determined to follow this advice, and having made a particular enquiry into the behaviour of every town in Latium, they ſpared ſome, and puniſhed others: the inhabitants of thoſe that were ſpared, were made free Citizens of Rome, and had ſeveral other privileges, favours, and immunities granted them, which effectually ſecured their fidelity and affection; but as to the others, ſome of them were totally demoliſhed, ſome had Colonies ſent to ſettle amongſt them, and others brought priſoners to Rome; ſo that they were diſperſed in ſuch a manner, that they were for ever incapacitated to give the Romans any more trouble or diſturbance.

This

This was the method which the Romans always took upon ſuch occaſions; and certainly it is worthy of being imitated by all other ſtates. The Florentines ſhould have acted thus in the year 1502, when Arezzo and all the Vale of Chiana rebelled againſt them; for if they had, they might not only have firmly eſtabliſhed their dominion over them, but likewiſe have made Florence a great and flouriſhing State, and taken ſuch lands from the rebels as that City ſtood in need of, for the ſubſiſtence of its own inhabitants. But they ſimply took the middle way betwixt the extremes of rigour and clemency, which is always a dangerous one in ſuch caſes: for, though they baniſhed ſome of the inhabitants, and put others to death, and degraded every man that was in office or authority, yet they left the City entire and untouched: and when any body adviſed them to demoliſh it, thoſe who pretended to be the wiſeſt amongſt them, made anſwer, that it would be a diſgrace to their own Republic, and look as if they were ſo weak, they could not keep it: which is one of thoſe arguments that ſeem to have ſome reaſon in them, but in reality have none at all. For by the ſame rule, a Prince muſt not hang any villain, though ever ſo notorious, becauſe it would be a ſhame to have it thought he had not power enough to bridle one raſcal, without putting him to death. But thoſe that are of this opinion ought to conſider, that when either particular men, or a whole City offend a State, that State is under an abſolute neceſſity of deſtroying them for its own preſervation, and to deter others from following their example: and as to any reflections which ſuch a manner of proceeding may happen to occaſion, it is ſufficient to ſay, that it will be more for the reputation of a State to puniſh delinquents with diſcretion, than to ſpare them at its own peril: and that a Government which does not do that ſo effectually, that they can never hurt it afterwards, will always be thought a weak and pitiful one.

How properly the Romans acted upon ſuch occaſions, may likewiſe appear from the example of the Privernates: from which we may obſerve, in the firſt place, that people who are conquered, ſhould either be treated with great lenity and indulgence, or totally cut off, as I ſaid before; and in the next, what a powerful impreſſion generoſity, frankneſs, and ſpeaking truth, make upon the minds of wiſe and good men. The Roman Senate, as Livy informs us, was aſſembled to conſider in what manner they ſhould treat the Privernates, who had rebelled againſt them, but were then reduced to obedience by force of arms: but the people of Privernum having ſent ſeveral of their Citizens to make their ſubmiſſion, and implore pardon, one of them being introduced to the Senate, was aſked, "Quam pœnam meritos Privernates cenſeret? what ſort of puniſhment he thought his fellow-Citizens deſerved?" *made anſwer*, "Eam quam merentur qui ſe libertate dignos cenſent: ſuch

as

thinks fit to cut off ſome, to ſeparate others, and diſperſe many more in ſuch a manner, that they can never aſſemble again to do him any miſchief: for though he ſhould ſtrip them of their properties, *Spoliatis arma ſuperſunt, they will ſtill find arms:* and if he diſarms them once, *furor arma miniſtrat, revenge will ſoon furniſh them with other weapons:* if he puts the Chiefs to death, others will ſoon ſpring up in their room, like Hydra's heads: if he builds Fortreſſes, they may ſerve his turn, perhaps, in time of peace, and prompt him to oppreſs his Subjects with leſs reſerve: but ſhould a war break out, they will do him no ſervice; for when they are aſſaulted by his own people, and a foreign enemy at the ſame time, it is impoſſible they ſhould hold out againſt them both. If then they were ſo inſignificant in former times, ſurely they muſt be much more ſo ſince the invention of Artillery, againſt the fury of which no Fortreſs can long defend itſelf, where the beſieged have neither room to caſt up new works within, when the old ones are battered down, nor any other place to retire into, as we have ſhewn elſewhere [*l*].

But to enter into a further diſcuſſion of this matter. Let us ſuppoſe that a prince wants to govern his own people with a high hand; or that either a Prince or a Republic ſhould think of keeping a State which they had taken from an enemy, in ſtrict ſubjection, by building Fortreſſes in it. As to a Prince, who wants to keep his Subjects in awe, I ſay, that inſtead of anſwering that end, they will be of great prejudice to him, for the reaſons abovementioned; becauſe they will embolden him to oppreſs them, and that oppreſſion will prove his ruin, as it will exaſperate them to ſuch a degree, that the Fortreſſes which are the principal cauſe of it, cannot poſſibly protect him againſt their rage. A good and wiſe Prince therefore, who would not lay either himſelf or his poſterity under any temptation to abuſe their Subjects, and become Tyrants, will never build Fortreſſes amongſt them, but depend altogether upon their fidelity and affection, which are a much better ſecurity. Count Franciſco Sforza, though accounted a wiſe man, it is true, built a Citadel at Milan, after he became Duke of that place; but in that he did not ſhew much wiſdom, as the conſequence fully proved; for it afterwards was of great prejudice, inſtead of any ſervice to his Succeſſors, who thinking themſelves ſecure there, and at liberty to commit any ſort of violence upon their Subjects with impunity, gave themſelves up to all manner of oppreſſion and licentiouſneſs, till they became ſo odious to every one, that they were preſently driven out of their dominions by the firſt enemy that invaded them. So that the Citadel

[*l*] See the *Prince*, Chap. xx. and the *Art of War*, Book VII. and Paola Paruta's *Political Diſcourſes*, Book II. Diſc. viii.

did

did them but little good in time of war; and in time of peace it did them much harm; becauſe, if it had never been built, and they had been weak enough to have treated their Subjects with more aſperity than they ſhould have done, they would ſoon have been made ſenſible of their error, and might have deſiſted from it in time: in which caſe, they would have been able to make a more vigorous reſiſtance againſt the French, whilſt their Subjects were yet well affected to them, though they had had no Citadel to truſt to, than they did after they had forfeited the affection of the people, notwithſtanding they were poſſeſſed of that Fortreſs. In ſhort, nothing is more precarious than the aſſiſtance that is expected from ſuch places; as they may be loſt, either by the venality of the Governor, or taken by ſtorm, or forced to ſurrender by famine.

But if a Prince is in hopes of recovering a City or State that has been loſt, whilſt ſome Citadel or Fortreſs only ſtill holds out for him, he will find himſelf deceived, except he has a good army, and is able to engage thoſe that have taken it from him: in which caſe, he may make himſelf maſter of it again, even if he has no Fortreſs there; and much ſooner too than if he had; as the inhabitants will be more inclined to favour him, than if he had abuſed and oppreſſed them without mercy, out of a vain confidence in that ſecurity. Experience indeed, has clearly evinced that the Caſtle at Milan never was of the leaſt ſervice, either to the Sforza's or the French, in time of diſtreſs: but on the contrary, that it proved the ruin of them both; as it made them neglect the more ſafe and honourable means of defending themſelves. Guidobaldo, Duke of Urbino, the moſt renowned Soldier of his time, was driven out of his territories by Cæſar Borgia; but happening to recover them ſoon after, he ordered all the Fortreſſes in that State to be demoliſhed, becauſe he thought them rather prejudicial to him than otherwiſe: for, as he was beloved by his Subjects, he did not care to diſguſt them; and from his enemies, he found by experience, they could not ſecure him without a good army in the field. Pope Julius II. having taken Bologna from the Bentivogli, built a Citadel there, and put a Governor into it, who oppreſſed the people to ſuch a degree, that they ſoon rebelled, and forced him out of it: ſo that it was ſo far from doing him any good, that it was the occaſion of his loſing that place, which he might eaſily have kept, if there had been no Citadel there, and he had treated the people in a different manner. Niccolò da Caſtello, father of the Vitelli, who had been deprived of his dominions for a while, preſently cauſed two Fortreſſes to be pulled down, which Pope Sixtus IV. had built there, after he got poſſeſſion of his Country again; as he put more confidence in the love of his people, than in Caſtles and ſtrong holds. But we have a more recent and remarkable

example of the inſignificance, or rather the miſchief of building Fortreſſes, and the neceſſity of demoliſhing them, which happened at Genoa, in the year 1507: for when that City rebelled againſt Lewis XII. King of France, who was then poſſeſſed of it, he came thither in perſon with a powerful army, to reduce it to obedience; which he did, and afterwards built the ſtrongeſt Citadel there, that is known at preſent: for, being ſituated upon the point of a rock cloſe to the ſea, it commanded not only the harbour, but the whole City, and was looked upon as impregnable. But afterwards, in the year 1512, when the French were driven out of Italy, and the Citadel of Genoa alone held out for them, the Genoeſe without troubling themſelves about the Citadel, revolted again, and choſe Octavian Fregoſa for their Governor, who laid cloſe ſiege to it on every ſide, and cut off all manner of proviſions and other neceſſaries in ſuch a manner, that at the end of ſixteen months, it was forced to ſurrender to him: after which (as it is generally ſaid) he was adviſed by many to keep it for his own ſecurity upon any emergency; but he very wiſely pulled it down, and choſe rather to rely upon his own goodneſs, and the affection of his fellow-Citizens; in conſequence of which reſolution, he has ſupported himſelf in the Government of Genoa ever ſince: and, though a thouſand men were ſufficient before to have turned it upſide down, it has, ſince that time, bravely defended itſelf, againſt an enemy that made an attempt upon it, with an army of ten thouſand. Hence we ſee, that Octavian fared not the worſe for demoliſhing the Caſtle, nor the King of France the better for building it; for when he marched into Italy with a good army, he ſoon recovered Genoa, though he had not the Citadel then to truſt to; but when he was not able to bring an army into the field, he could not keep the town, though he was poſſeſſed of the Citadel: ſo that as the King had been at a vaſt expence in building it, the loſs of it was a great diſgrace to him; whereas Fregoſa, on the contrary, not only gained much reputation by taking, but great advantage by demoliſhing it.

It is now time to ſay ſomething (as we propoſed) concerning Republics that build Fortreſſes not in their own Country, but in places which they have conquered: the inutility of which (if the example of the French and Genoeſe juſt now mentioned be not thought ſufficient) may be fully ſhewn from that of the Florentines with regard to Piſa; where they had built Fortreſſes to keep the Citizens in Subjection, not conſidering that the Piſans had always been their declared enemies, that they had been uſed to live in freedom, that they looked upon rebellion as the only means they had left of recovering their liberties; and conſequently that if they had a mind to prevent it, they ought either to have made them their friends and fellow-Citizens, or utterly to have extirpated

pated them. For it was plainly ſeen how little theſe ſtrong places anſwered their expectations, upon the arrival of Charles VIII. in Italy, to whom they were preſently ſurrendered, either through the corruption or puſillanimity of the Governors; ſo that if they had never been built at all, the Florentines could not have truſted to them only for the preſervation of Piſa; nor could the King of France have otherwiſe deprived them of it: for the methods they had taken to keep poſſeſſion of it before, would moſt probably have been ſufficient to ſecure it at that time; at leaſt they could not have been attended with worſe conſequences.

I conclude then, that it is dangerous to build Fortreſſes in order to keep one's own Country in ſubjection; and that they are of no ſervice in maintaining poſſeſſion of others that are conquered; as may plainly appear from the practice and example of the Romans, who inſtead of erecting Fortreſſes in their new acquiſitions, generally demoliſhed ſuch as they found there. If it be objected that Tarentum in ancient times, and Breſcia not long ago, were recovered by means of Fortreſſes, after the people had rebelled againſt their Governors and ſeized upon thoſe places: I anſwer, that Fabius Maximus was ſoon after ſent to the relief of the Citadel at Tarentum (which ſtill adhered to the Romans) with an army ſufficient to have reduced the town, even if there had been no Citadel there: and if there had not, he certainly would have found other means of doing it. It appears then how little ſervice was expected from the Citadel, by their ſending ſo great a man as Fabius with a Conſular army to recover Tarentum: and that he would have taken it without any ſuch aſſiſtance, is manifeſt from the example of Capua, which that army retook alſo, though there was no Citadel there to befriend them. With regard to Breſcia, I ſay it very ſeldom happens (though it did indeed in that rebellion) that a Fortreſs which continues firm to you after the town has rebelled, has a good army near at hand to ſuccour it, as the French then had: for Monſieur de Foix the King's General, who then lay with his forces at Bologna, being informed that Breſcia was loſt, immediately marched thither, and arriving there in three days, recovered it by the help of the Caſtle. It was not wholly owing to the Citadel therefore that Breſcia was re-taken, but to the vicinity and expedition of Monſieur de Foix and his army: ſo that the authority of this example is not ſufficient to balance that of the others which have been before adduced: for we have ſeen numbers of Fortreſſes taken and retaken in the wars that have lately happened, not only in Lombardy and Romagna, but in the Kingdom of Naples, and every other part of Italy, in the ſame manner that other towns and States have been.

But as to building ſtrong places to defend yourſelf againſt foreign enemies, they are alſo unneceſſary if you have a good army; and if you have not, they are of no ſervice at all: for a good army will be a ſufficient ſecurity without any Fortreſs; but a Fortreſs without ſuch an army, will ſignify nothing [*m*]. The truth of this may be confirmed by the practice and conduct of thoſe people that have been moſt remarkable for their wiſdom and policy, particularly of the Romans and Spartans; the former of whom never built any Fortreſſes; and the latter truſting to their own valour alone, carried the matter ſo high, that they would not even ſuffer their Capital to be walled about, much leſs did they think of erecting ſtrong holds any where elſe. Accordingly a Spartan being aſked one day by an Athenian, "whether he did not think the walls of Athens very fine and ſtrong." "I ſhould much approve of them, ſaid he, if the City was inhabited by women only." A State however that has a good army, may reap ſome little advantage from a Fort or two near the Sea, if any part of its dominions lie upon the coaſt, as they may keep off an enemy perhaps till its own forces can be got together: though they are not altogether neceſſary even in that caſe. But when it has not a good army, Fortreſſes upon the Sea-coaſt or Frontiers, are either prejudicial, or at leaſt unſerviceable: prejudicial, becauſe they are eaſily taken, and once loſt may be turned againſt you; or if they be ſo ſtrong that the enemy cannot make themſelves Maſters of them, they may leave them behind; and then what ſervice can they do? For when a good army, that is not vigorouſly oppoſed by another as good or better than itſelf, happens to enter into an enemy's country, it pays no regard to the Towns and Fortreſſes which it leaves upon its back, as we ſee from many inſtances in ancient Hiſtory, and from the example of Franciſco Maria not long ago, who left ten Cities behind him that belonged to the enemy, and boldly marched on to beſiege Urbino, without giving himſelf the leaſt trouble about them.

A Prince therefore who has a good army will have no occaſion for Fortreſſes; and he that has not, ought not to build any: let it be his chief care to fortify the place of his reſidence as ſtrongly as he can, to put a good garriſon into it, to keep his ſubjects in good humour and well affected to him; that ſo they may defend him againſt any attack, till he can either obtain honourable terms from the enemy, or receive relief from others: all other means being too expenſive in time of peace, and ineffectual in war. So that conſidering what has been ſaid, it will appear that the Romans, who acted wiſely in all other reſpects,

[*m*] There cannnot be a ſtronger proof of this than in what happened to the States General in the laſt Century, when ſo many of their ſtrong towns were taken in a very ſhort time, which had formerly been ſo redoubtable when ſupported by good armies under the command of Prince Maurice.

ſhewed

ſhewed no leſs wiſdom in their proceedings with the Latins, when they deſpiſed Fortreſſes, and had recourſe to more prudent and generous methods of ſecuring themſelves.

CHAP. XXV.

That it is imprudent to attack a people who are divided amongſt themſelves, in expectation of conquering them merely upon that account.

THE animoſities betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians began at laſt to run ſo high at Rome, that the Veientes and Hetruſci thought they had a fair opportunity of utterly extinguiſhing that Republic. Having raiſed an army therefore, and made an incurſion into the Roman territories, the Senate ſent out another to oppoſe them under the command of Cneius Manlius and Marcus Fabius, who encamping very near the enemy, were ſo inſulted with all manner of taunts and contumelies and abuſive language, that the Roman Soldiers forgetting all private quarrels and hatred amongſt themſelves, heartily united together, and coming to an engagement with the enemy entirely defeated them. From hence we may obſerve how apt we are to err in the judgment we form of things (as hath been ſaid before [*n*]) and how often we are diſappointed in obtaining our ends, by the very means whereby we propoſed to accompliſh them. The Veientes fully expected to have conquered the Romans when they found them ſo diſunited: in conſequence of which opinion, they ventured upon a war with them, which united one ſide and ruined the other: for as peace and idleneſs are, generally ſpeaking, the cauſes of faction and diſcord in Commonwealths; ſo war and apprehenſion of danger moſt commonly unite them again [*o*]: and therefore if the Veientes had rightly conſidered the matter, the more they ſaw the Romans embittered againſt each other, the more cautious they ſhould have been in engaging in a war with them, and taken very different methods to effect their ruin. They might have pretended a friendſhip to them, and offered their mediation to compoſe all differences betwixt the contending factions before they came to an open rupture:

[*n*] See Chap. xxii. of this Book.

[*o*] Has not this been ſometimes the caſe of other nations with regard to *Kingdoms* as well as Republics? and have not the Britons (under good Princes) conſtantly united againſt any Invader, how much ſoever they were divided before, either by the vile ſuggeſtions of ſelf-intereſted men to poiſon their honeſt minds, or imaginary conceits of real danger? Though it muſt be allowed, (and indeed who can blame any free and reaſonable people for it?) that they have upon occaſion invited foreigners to aſſiſt them in defence of their laws, liberties, properties, and Religion, *pro aris & focis*, againſt Tyrants and oppreſſors.

but

but when they had ſeen them once heartily engaged together, they ſhould have given ſome aſſiſtance to the weaker ſide, in order to keep the flame alive till it conſumed them both: but that aſſiſtance ſhould not have been too conſiderable, leſt it might have occaſioned a ſuſpicion that they had a deſign to cruſh one ſide as well as the other, and reduce them equally into ſubjection to themſelves: for when ſuch a part is well conducted, it almoſt always anſwers the purpoſes of thoſe that act it. To this conduct it was owing that Piſtoia fell into the hands of the Florentines, as we have ſhewn elſewhere: for the Citizens there being divided into two parties, the Florentines threw weight ſometimes into the Scale of one, and ſometimes into that of the other, (but in ſuch a manner as to keep them in a ſort of equipoiſe) till both grew ſo weary of that factious ſort of life, that they mutually agreed to throw themſelves into the arms of the Florentines: who likewiſe made themſelves Maſters of Siena by the ſame arts, which would never otherwiſe have become ſubject to them; I mean by fomenting the factions which raged there, and privately ſending them feeble ſuccours in their turns as they were wanted: for if they had done it to any great degree, or in an open manner, it would have excited a jealouſy of their deſigns and united both ſides againſt them. I might likewiſe here add the example of Philip Viſconti, Duke of Milan, who engaged in ſeveral wars with the Florentines, in hopes of ſubduing them on account of the inteſtine diviſions that reigned in their City: but finding himſelf diſappointed at laſt in that expectation, he ſaid, "the follies of the Florentines had coſt him above two millions of gold to no purpoſe [p]." The Veientes therefore and the Hetruſci (as I ſaid before) were guilty of a great and fatal error in their calculation; as thoſe will always be who build upon the ſame bottom, and purſue the ſame methods to reduce any State into ſubjection to them.

CHAP. XXVI.

That contemptuous and reproachful language, inſtead of doing a man any good, only ſerves to provoke others and make himſelf more hated.

IT is a great ſign of wiſdom in any man to refrain from threatening and injurious language; becauſe inſtead of doing an enemy any harm, one of them puts him more upon his guard, and the other ſtill adds to his rage, and makes him more active in ſeeking revenge. Of this we have juſt given an example in the behaviour of the Veientes, who be-

[p] An immenſe ſum at that time of day, when the new world was not diſcovered.

ſides

fides the enmity which is uſually incident to people that are at war together, could not forbear treating the Romans with particular marks of contempt and reproach; a thing which ought not to be ſuffered by any prudent commander: becauſe there is nothing that exaſperates an enemy ſo much, or excites him more furiouſly to revenge; nothing that does him ſo little real damage, or yourſelf ſo little good; as the miſchief generally falls upon your own head.

To confirm this, I ſhall bring a remarkable proof from an event that happened in Aſia. Gabades the Perſian, having laid ſiege to Amida for a conſiderable time, and growing weary of it at laſt, as he made little or no progreſs, reſolved to raiſe it: but whilſt he was decamping, the Garriſon exulting at his diſgrace got up to the top of the walls and inſulted him and his Soldiers in the moſt provoking terms, calling them cowards, poltroons, and all manner of opprobrious names: at which Gabades was ſo nettled that he changed his reſolution, and began the ſiege afreſh with ſo much vigour and reſentment that he took the town in a few days after, and delivered it up to the mercy of his Soldiers: The ſame thing happened to the Veientes, who, as I ſaid before, not being content with making war upon the Romans in the common way, could not forbear going up to their very entrenchments to affront and abuſe them in a particular manner: the conſequence of which, was that the Soldiers who were but little inclined to fight before, grew ſo outrageous that they compelled their Generals to give them battle, in which the Veientes were totally routed, and ſuffered the puniſhment they had ſo juſtly deſerved.

All wiſe Generals and Governors of States ſhould ſtudiouſly endeavour therefore to prevent the people under their command from either reviling or reproaching each other, or even an enemy: for with regard to an enemy, ſuch conſequences muſt naturally enſue as have been juſt now related; and ſtill worſe in reſpect to themſelves, if not anticipated by ſuch precautions as have always been uſed by prudent men. The legions which were left by the Romans for the ſecurity of Capua, having formed a deſign to make themſelves Maſters of that State (as I ſhall ſhew more at large in another place) grew ſeditious and mutinied: but being reduced to reaſon by Valerius Corvinus, amongſt other methods which he took to quiet them, he ſtrictly enjoined every one upon the ſevereſt penalties, never to upbraid any of thoſe Soldiers with their paſt behaviour. Tiberius Gracchus having a body of Slaves in his army (whom the Romans were obliged to employ in their wars with Hannibal for want of other men) forbade all the reſt of his Soldiers on pain of death, to reproach any of them on account of their former ſervitude: ſo dangerous did the Romans think it to ſuffer any ſort of exprobration or triumphing over the infirmities and failings of others; as they well

well knew nothing could be more provoking than ſuch taunts, whether ſpoken in earneſt or in jeſt, eſpecially if there ſhould be any truth in them. Tacitus therefore ſays very juſtly, *facetiæ aſperæ, quando nimium ex vero traxêre, acrem ſui memoriam relinquunt: When Jokes border too near upon truth, they leave ſtings behind them* [q].

CHAP. XXVII.

That wiſe Princes and well-governed Republics ought to be contented with victory: ſince others that graſp at more, are often loſers by it.

OPPROBRIOUS and reproachful language to an enemy, is commonly owing to the inſolence of thoſe who have either gained a victory or make themſelves ſure of one; which hopes, though often vain and ill grounded, occaſion errors both in their words and actions: for when once they get poſſeſſion of the underſtanding, they tranſport men beyond the bounds of reaſon, and frequently make them loſe the opportunity of obtaining a certain good, by flattering themſelves with the expectation of ſomething better which is precarious and uncertain. Now ſince this is a matter that is worthy of ſerious conſideration, as men are ſometimes miſled by ſuch fallacious hopes, to the great prejudice of their affairs, it may not be amiſs, I think, to illuſtrate what I have here advanced, by ſome inſtances both from ancient and modern Hiſtory, which ſeem more proper for that purpoſe, than reaſoning and argumentation. After Hannibal had defeated the Romans at the battle of Cannæ, he ſent Meſſengers to Carthage with the news of his victory, and to deſire ſupplies: upon which, the Senate deliberating what was to be done, Hanno, an old and experienced man, adviſed them to make a prudent uſe of their victory and come to an accommodation with the Romans, as they might do, now they had beat them, upon more

[q] "At Sieges and elſewhere (ſays Montaigne, Book I. Chap. xlvii. of his Eſſays) where occaſion draws us near to the enemy, we willingly ſuffer our men to brave, inſult and affront them with all ſorts of injurious language; and not without ſome colour of reaſon: for it is of no little conſequence to take from them all hopes of mercy and compoſition, by repreſenting to them, that there is no favour to be expected from an enemy they have ſo incenſed, nor any other remedy left but a victory. And yet Vitellius (or rather the Lieutenants who commanded in his abſence) found themſelves deceived in this point: for in an engagement with Otho's army, whoſe Soldiers were unaccuſtomed to war, and effeminated with the delights of the City, he ſo nettled them at laſt with injurious language and reproaching them with cowardice and the regret they felt at leaving their miſtreſſes and ſoft entertainments behind them at Rome, that he inſpired them with a reſentment which no exhortations could produce, and drew thoſe upon his back himſelf, whom their own Commanders could not puſh upon him before. And indeed, when reproaches touch to the quick, it may well be expected that he who went but coolly to work in behalf of his Prince, will proceed with another temper when the quarrel is his own."

honourable

honourable and advantageous terms than they could expect if they ſhould chance to be beaten themſelves: and conſidering they had ſhewn the Romans they were able to cope with them, they ſhould not be tempted, he ſaid, to run the riſque of loſing what they had got, by the hopes of gaining ſomething more. This advice, however, was not liſtened to, though the expedience of it was afterwards acknowledged when it was too late.

Alexander the Great, having conquered all the Eaſt except the Republic of Tyre, (a powerful and opulent City in thoſe times, and ſituated, like Venice, upon the Sea) the Tyrians conſidering his power ſent Ambaſſadors to inform him, they were ready to ſubmit to him and become his good and faithful ſubjects, provided they might be excuſed from admitting either him or any of his forces into their City. But Alexander diſdaining to be ſhut out of that City, when all the reſt in thoſe parts had thrown open their gates to receive him, would not hearken to any ſuch conditions, and having diſmiſſed the Ambaſſadors, immediately laid ſiege to the town; which being ſurrounded with water, and very well furniſhed with all ſorts of proviſions and ammunition that were neceſſary for its defence, made ſo vigorous a reſiſtance, that at the end of four months, he found that enterprize would coſt him more time, and add leſs to his glory than any other of his conqueſts had done: ſo that he reſolved to grant the conditions upon which they themſelves had offered to ſubmit to him at firſt. But the Tyrians elated with ſucceſs, were then grown ſo inſolent that they not only rejected all terms, but hanged the perſon whom he had ſent to offer them; at which he was ſo incenſed that he proſecuted the Siege with ſuch vigour and application, that he took the place ſoon after, and having entirely demoliſhed it, put moſt of the inhabitants to the Sword, and made Slaves of the reſt.

In the year 1512, a Spaniſh army marched into Tuſcany, to reeſtabliſh the Medici at Florence, and to lay the people under contribution there. This was undertaken at the inſtigation of ſome Citizens in Florence, who had promiſed, that as ſoon as the Spaniards arrived in their territories, they would take up arms in their favour: but when they had reached the plains near that city, and not only perceived that no body appeared to join them there, but found themſelves in great want of proviſions, they endeavoured to accommodate matters with the Florentines in an amicable way: upon which the latter behaved in ſo diſdainful a manner, that they loſt Prato by it, and all its dependencies.

A Prince therefore who is attacked by an enemy that is much more powerful than himſelf, cannot be guilty of a greater error, than refuſing terms of accommodation, eſpecially if they are offered him: for they can never be ſo hard, but he will either find ſome ſort of advantage in

them, or perhaps eſcape utter deſtruction. The Tyrians then ought to have accepted the conditions which Alexander at firſt refuſed to grant them, but afterwards would have complied with; ſince it would have been ſufficient honour for them to have obliged ſo great a Conqueror by dint of arms to acquieſce in their demands. The Florentines likewiſe ſhould have been content, and looked upon it as a ſort of victory, that the Spaniards would have taken up with moderate terms; as they knew the deſign of that expedition was utterly to change the conſtitution of Florence, to break its connections with France, and lay it under contribution. If the Spaniards had ſucceeded in the two laſt points, and the Florentines been ſecure of the firſt (that is of preſerving their State) the latter might in ſome meaſure have gloried in that, at leaſt been ſatisfied, and not given themſelves much trouble about the other two, ſo long as their Government continued entire and unchanged: nay if they had been almoſt ſure of obtaining a complete victory, they ſhould not have wholly abandoned themſelves to the mercy of Fortune, by venturing their laſt ſtake; which is a thing that no wiſe man will ever do, except he is compelled to it by downright neceſſity.

After Hannibal had carried on a war for ſixteen years together in Italy, with great reputation to himſelf, he was recalled by the Carthaginians to defend their own country, where he found the armies under Syphax and Aſdrubal entirely defeated, the Kingdom of Numidia loſt, the Carthaginians cooped up within their own walls, and deſtitute of all hope but what they placed in him. Perceiving therefore that his country was reduced to its laſt ſtake, he was determined not to hazard that till he had tried all other means: upon which account, he was not aſhamed to ſue for peace, as he knew that was the only remedy left. But that being refuſed, he reſolved to fight the Romans, (though with very little proſpect of ſucceſs) that ſo if he could not gain a victory, he might at leaſt have the ſatisfaction of ending his days with honour. Now if ſo able a Commander as Hannibal at the head of an army yet entire, endeavoured by all means to obtain peace, before he would run the riſque of a battle, becauſe he ſaw his country would be utterly ruined if he loſt it; ought not his conduct to be a pattern to others of leſs experience and abilities? But men who can neither keep their hopes within the bounds of reaſon, nor make a due eſtimate of their own ſtrength, muſt of neceſſity be led into errors that will prove fatal to them in the end.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

That Princes and Republics ought to puniſh ſuch as have injured either a whole people, or any particular perſon.

WE have a remarkable example how far men may be tranſported by their reſentment, in what happened to the Romans when they ſent the three Fabii Ambaſſadors to the Gauls, who had marched into Tuſcany and laid ſiege to Cluſium. For the Cluſians having ſollicited the aid of the Romans, the latter diſpatched theſe Ambaſſadors to require the Gauls, in the name of the Roman Republic, to withdraw their forces out of Tuſcany: but the Fabii having delivered their Embaſſy more like Soldiers than Orators, and ſeeing the Gauls and Tuſcans juſt going to engage, put themſelves at the head of the latter, and fought againſt the enemy, who was ſo provoked at this behaviour, that they turned their enmity from the Tuſcans upon the Romans. But what ſtill added to their reſentment, was, that after they had complained of this uſage to the Roman Senate, and demanded that the Fabii ſhould be delivered up to them by way of ſatisfaction for it, they were ſo far from either delivering them up or puniſhing them in any other manner, that at the next election of Magiſtrates, they made them Tribunes with Conſular power. The Gauls therefore ſeeing them honoured and advanced, inſtead of being puniſhed, took it as a wilful affront, and were ſo enraged at it, that they immediately marched to Rome, and not only took, but ſacked the whole City, except the Capitol: all which the Romans brought upon themſelves, by rewarding their Ambaſſadors, when they ought to have diſcountenanced them for violating the law of nations.

It behoves all Princes and Republics therefore to be very cautious how they offend either a whole people, or any private perſon in the like manner: for in caſe a man is grievouſly injured, either by a whole Community, or by any individual, and meets with no redreſs when he complains of it; if he lives in a Commonwealth he will certainly endeavour to revenge himſelf, though it ſhould ruin the State: or if he lives under a Prince, and has the leaſt ſpark of generoſity in him, he will never reſt till he thinks he has righted himſelf, though he be ſure to ſuffer the ſevereſt puniſhment for it. A remarkable proof of this we have in the caſe of Philip of Macedon, (father of Alexander the Great) in whoſe Court there was a handſome young Nobleman, named Pauſanias, who was ardently importuned by Attalus, (one of Philip's chief favourites) to ſubmit to his luſt: but the youth conſtantly refuſing it, he determined to force him, ſince other means were in vain. For this

purpoſe, having made a great entertainment, to which Pauſanias and many others of the Nobility were invited, he took an opportunity when they had all drank pretty freely, of having him carried by violence into another apartment, where he not only gratified his own brutal deſires upon him, but ſuffered ſeveral others to do the ſame: at which he was ſo outragiouſly provoked, that he complained of it frequently to Philip in the moſt bitter terms; who, though he always promiſed to bring the other to juſtice for the enormity he had been guilty of, was ſo far from performing it, that he made him Governor of a Province. Pauſanias therefore ſeeing him exalted in this manner, inſtead of being puniſhed, grew cooler with regard to Attalus who had injured him, and turned all his rage upon Philip who had refuſed him juſtice: in revenge for which, he took an opportunity of ſtabbing him one morning, upon a rejoicing day, as he was going to the Temple, attended by his Son, and Son-in-law, to celebrate the marriage of his daughter with Alexander of Epirus. An Example which much reſembles that juſt now quoted from the Roman Hiſtory, and deſerves to be carefully attended to by all Princes; who ought never to make ſo little account of any man that has had one injury after another heaped upon him, as to think he will not ſome time or other endeavour to revenge himſelf, though it coſt him ever ſo dear.

CHAP. XXIX.

That Fortune throws a miſt before people's eyes, when She would not have them obſtruct her deſigns.

WHOEVER attentively conſiders the courſe of human affairs, may ſee, that many accidents and misfortunes happen to mankind, againſt which Heaven will not ſuffer us to make any ſort of proviſion: and as there were many inſtances of this amongſt the Romans, who were ſo much diſtinguiſhed for their piety, valour, diſcipline, and good conduct; it is no wonder if ſuch things happen more frequently amongſt people that are much leſs eminent for their virtues. Now ſince it may be neceſſary here to ſhew what influence Heaven has over the affairs of this world, I ſhall take ſome notice of a remarkable paſſage in Livy, where he ſays, that Heaven, in order to make the Romans ſenſible of its power for ſome great purpoſe, firſt made the Fabii fall into that error when they went Ambaſſadors to the Gauls, which excited the latter to make war upon Rome, and afterwards would not ſuffer the Romans to perform any thing worthy of their former valour, to extricate themſelves out of that war; but had incited them to baniſh Camillus to Ardea; who

who was the only man that could effectually have oppoſed ſuch an enemy: that when the Gauls were upon their march towards Rome, they did not create a Dictator to make head againſt them, as they had often done before, when they were invaded by the Volſci and others: that they were ſo careleſs in the choice of their men, and ſo tardy in raiſing and furniſhing them with arms, that they hardly had time to face the enemy with what force they could muſter, upon the banks of the Allia, about ten miles from Rome; where the Tribunes encamped without their uſual precaution of making choice of an advantageous ſituation, or ſurrounding it with entrenchments or paliſades, or having recourſe to any other means proper upon ſuch an occaſion, either human or Divine: that when they drew up in order of battle, their lines were thin and weak, and that neither the Officers nor private men behaved themſelves like Romans: ſo that the battle was neither obſtinate nor bloody; for being routed at the firſt onſet, the greater part of their army fled to Veii, and the reſt to Rome, where they retired into the Capitol, even before they had ſeen their wives and children; upon which, ſome of the Senators (without making any proviſion for the defence of the City, or ſo much as ſhutting the Gates) ran away, and others took ſhelter likewiſe in the Capitol. However they ſhewed ſome ſigns of good order and diſcipline in preparing for the defence of that place: for they turned out all the uſeleſs people, got together what proviſions they could to ſupport the Siege, and ſent moſt of the old men, women, and children into the neighbouring towns, leaving the reſt to the mercy of the enemy: ſo that if any one ſhould conſider the great exploits which the Romans had performed before, and compare them with their behaviour upon this occaſion, he could hardly believe that they were the ſame people. Livy therefore having given an account of this event, ſays, *adeo obcæcat animos fortuna, cum vim ſuam ingruentem refringi non vult: to ſuch a degree does fortune blind the underſtandings of men, when ſhe has not a mind to be diſturbed in her career.* Which is a very juſt reflection indeed [r].

The Proſperity or Adverſity therefore, which ſo remarkably diſtinguiſh the lives of particular men, is not to be wholly imputed either to their own merit or demerit; ſince we often ſee ſome hurried on to deſtruction, and others puſhed up to the higheſt pitch of worldly greatneſs by the impulſe of their deſtiny; Heaven diſpoſing things in ſuch a manner as to favour one man with opportunities of exerting his abilities, whilſt it denies them to another. Thus when it is pleaſed to exalt a man to great proſperity, it makes choice of ſuch a one as knows how to avail

[r] See the *Reflections upon Fortune and Prudence*, prefixed to the *Life of Caſtruccio Caſtracani* in the firſt Volume.

himſelf

himſelf of thoſe occaſions and opportunities: on the contrary, when ſome remarkable ruin is to be effected, ſuch men are pitched upon as muſt naturally contribute to further and promote it; and if any one dares to oppoſe it, he is either taken off by death, or otherwiſe incapacitated to do it with any ſucceſs. It plainly appears from the paſſage in Livy juſt mentioned, that Fortune, in order to aggrandize the Roman Republic, thought proper to humble it in the firſt place, but not to reduce it to utter ruin, as we ſhall ſhew more particularly in the beginning of the next book: for which purpoſe ſhe ſuffer'd the Romans to baniſh Camillus, but not to put him to death; and the City to be taken, but not the Capitol; preventing them from uſing any proper meaſures to defend the one, but leaving them ſenſe enough to ſecure the other: and that Rome might be taken, ſhe cauſed the greater part of the army that was routed upon the banks of the Allia, to fly to Veii, by which the City was left deſtitute of ſufficient defence. This however paved a way for the recovery of it; as many of the forces had retired to Veii near Ardea where Camillus then was, (a General of great abilities, whoſe reputation had never been ſtained with the ignominy of a defeat) who put himſelf at the head of them, and drove the enemy from Rome. I might bring ſeveral other inſtances of more modern date to confirm the truth of what I have laid down: but as this is ſufficient, they are altogether unneceſſary, and therefore I ſhall poſtpone them. To conclude, it appears from all Hiſtory, that men may ſecond their fortune, but cannot reſiſt it; and follow the order of her deſigns, but not defeat them. However, they ought never to abandon themſelves to deſpair, becauſe they cannot fathom her deſigns: for as her ways are dark and intricate, there is always room left for hope; and whilſt there is hope, they ſhould not be wanting to themſelves in any change or viciſſitude of their affairs.

CHAP. XXX.

Princes and Republics that are truly magnanimous and powerful, never make Leagues and Alliances by dint of money; their friendſhip and protection being courted by others on account of their valour, reputation, and Power.

THOUGH the Romans had ſome expectation of Relief from Camillus, and their forces at Veii, when they were beſieged in the Capitol by the Gauls; yet, being diſtreſſed by famine, they were at laſt obliged to capitulate, and agreed to pay a certain ſum of money for their ranſom. But whilſt they were weighing the money that was

to

to be paid upon that occaſion, Camillus fell upon the enemy with the forces under his command, and drove them away from Rome. Such was the will of Fortune, ſays Livy, *Ut Romani auro redempti non viverent, that the Romans might not owe their redemption to money.* And it is a very remarkable thing, that in the whole progreſs of their affairs, as well as upon this occaſion, they never made themſelves maſters of any State, nor procured a peace by dint of money, but by their own valour and conduct: which is a circumſtance that I believe no other Republic in the world could ever boaſt of.

Amongſt other marks which ſerve to diſcover the ſtrength or weakneſs of a State, it muſt be obſerved upon what terms it is with its neighbours; for if they put themſelves under its protection, and pay handſomely for it, it is a ſign that it is ſtrong and powerful: but, if they draw ſums of money from it (though they may poſſibly be inferior States) it is a certain ſign of its weakneſs. Whoever reads the Roman Hiſtory, will find that the Maſſilians, the Edui, the Rhodians, as well as Hiero of Syracuſe, Eumenes, and Maſſiniſſa, who all lived near the confines of the Roman Empire, were tributaries to that Republic, and furniſhed it with money in its occaſions, merely for the ſake of protection. But it is otherwiſe in weak States, as we may ſee particularly with regard to Florence, which formerly, when it was in its moſt flouriſhing condition, paid ſtipends to moſt of the little Governments in Romagna, beſides the Perugians, Caſtellans, and many other neighbouring States: which would not have been the caſe of the Florentines, had they been powerful and well armed: for then all their neighbours would have paid them tribute for their protection, and have purchaſed their friendſhip inſtead of ſelling their own. But the Florentines, indeed, are not the only people that have been forced to do this; for the Venetians, and even the King of France (though ſo great a King) are tributaries to the Swiſs, and the King of England: all which proceeds from having diſarmed and weakened their own people, in order to oppreſs them at their pleaſure, and to avoid an imaginary, rather than a real danger, inſtead of making ſuch proviſions for their ſecurity, as would effectually have made both themſelves and their Subjects powerful and happy for ever. This ſhameful manner of proceeding may indeed procure a little temporary quiet perhaps; but in the end, muſt of courſe be attended with troubles, and loſſes, and inevitable ruin. It would be tedious to recount how often the Florentines, Venetians, and French, have bought off their wars, and ſubmitted to ſuch ignominious terms as the Romans could never be induced to think of but once: nor would it be leſs diſagreeable to relate how many towns the Florentines and Venetians have purchaſed with money; which have proved



the

the occaſion of great miſchiefs afterwards, and ſhewn, that what is got with gold, cannot be kept without iron [*f*].

The Romans, on the contrary, diſdained theſe mean arts of acquiring dominion, and owed the maintenance of their conqueſts only to their arms: from which manner of proceeding they never deviated whilſt they continued free; but when they fell under the yoke of Emperors, and thoſe Emperors grew bad, and preferred eaſe and indolence to glory and military toil, that brave people began likewiſe to degenerate, and uſed to ward off the attacks of the Parthians, Germans, and other nations by pecuniary means, which ſoon proved the deſtruction of their Empire. This evil was occaſioned by diſarming the people, and the neglect of military diſcipline, which is always attended with a ſtill greater misfortune; namely, that the nearer an enemy approaches, the more he diſcovers your weakneſs; for, whoever is guilty of theſe errors, muſt be obliged to oppreſs his Subjects, by extorting money from them, to hire other people to keep an enemy at a diſtance; that is, he muſt give ſtipends and penſions to all the neighbouring States. Hence it comes to paſs, that the utmoſt a State is able to do in ſuch circumſtances, is to make ſome feeble reſiſtance upon the confines; but when an enemy has once paſſed them, all is over and it is ruined without remedy. Such Governors therefore ſeem not to be aware, that this method of proceeding is contrary not only to all good policy, but the common practice of mankind: for when a man is going to battle, he takes more care to guard the heart and vital parts, than his hands and feet; becauſe, a wound in the latter may probably not be mortal, but in the others it is certain death: now theſe Governors fortify the extremities of their States, and neglect the heart. How fatal ſuch a conduct has often been to the Florentines, every one knows: for, whenever an enemy has paſſed their confines, and advanced towards the Capital, he has met with no further reſiſtance. The ſame happened to the Venetians not many years ago; and if their City had not been ſurrounded with water, it muſt infallibly have been deſtroyed. With regard to France, this has not often been the caſe there indeed; becauſe it is ſo powerful a Kingdom, and has but few enemies that are ſuperior to it: nevertheleſs, when the Engliſh invaded it, in the year 1513, the French were in great conſternation; and the King, as well as every body elſe was of opinion, that the loſs of one battle, would be the loſs

[*f*] Here indeed both the Italian copies, which the Tranſlator makes uſe of, ſay, *e come le coſe che ſi acquiſtano con l' oro, non ſi ſanno difendere col ferro*: but he ſtrongly ſuſpects that there is an omiſſion of the particle *che* in this paſſage, and that the latter part of it ought to run thus, *non ſi ſanno difendere* the *col ferro*, and has taken the liberty of tranſlating it accordingly, in contradiction to all other verſions. Otherwiſe, it is apprehended, it would not be conſiſtent either with truth, or what goes before and follows it, or indeed with what Machiavel aſſerts in many other places.

of

of France. Very different was the caſe of the Romans. The nearer an enemy approached their City, the ſtronger he found them: for after they had been three times routed, and loſt ſo many brave officers and Soldiers in their wars with Hannibal in Italy, they were ſtill able not only to ſtand their ground againſt the enemy, but to ſubdue him at laſt: all which was owing to their having fortified the heart of their country ſo well, that there was no occaſion to be in much pain about the extremities: for the vitals of their State were their own Citizens, the Latins, the neighbouring people that were confederated with them, and their Colonies, from which they had ſuch continual ſupplies as enabled them to conquer the whole world, and to keep it in obedience. The truth of this may appear from what Hanno ſaid to the Ambaſſadors that were ſent to Carthage with news of the victory at Cannæ: who, having given an account of Hannibal's great exploits in Italy, were aſked by Hanno, *Whether any of the Roman Cities, or Confederates, or Colonies, had either ſued to him for peace, or revolted from the Romans:* but being anſwered in the negative, he replied, *the war then is juſt as freſh as it was at firſt.*

It is plain therefore, from what I have ſaid in this Chapter, and in many other places, that the Republics of theſe times act in a very different manner from what the Romans did: in conſequence of which, we daily ſee ſuch ſurprizing acquiſitions made by ſome people, and no leſs wonderful loſſes ſuſtained by others: for where men have but little valour and conduct, fortune will have an opportunity of exerting her influence ſo much the more: and as ſhe is changeable, Republics and other States likewiſe muſt and always will fluctuate, till ſome great Spirit ſhall ariſe to reſtore the ancient diſcipline, reſtrain her caprice, and prevent her from giving ſuch hourly proofs of her wantonneſs and power.

CHAP. XXXI.

That it is dangerous to put confidence in Exiles.

IT may not be amiſs, perhaps, to ſay ſomething here, concerning the danger of truſting to thoſe that have been baniſhed their own country; ſince it is a matter of great importance to thoſe that govern States, and often have to do with ſuch people. Of this, Livy introduces the following remarkable example in his Hiſtory, though ſomething foreign to the purpoſe he is treating of. When Alexander the Great marched with his forces into Aſia, Alexander of Epirus, his near relation, invaded Italy at the inſtigation of ſome Lucanian Exiles, who perſuaded him

that he might make himſelf maſter of all that Province by their aſſiſtance. But when he arrived there, inſtead of giving him any aſſiſtance as they had engaged to do, they perfidiouſly killed him, upon a promiſe of being reſtored to their country, if they would deliver it from the enemy.

We may obſerve therefore, how little confidence is to be repoſed in the fidelity and promiſes of Exiles; as to their fidelity, you may aſſure yourſelf that whenever they have an opportunity of returning to their own country without your aſſiſtance, they will certainly abandon you, and make their peace at home; notwithſtanding the moſt ſacred engagements to the contrary: and with regard to the promiſes of ſucceſs which they feed you with, theſe people naturally growing weary of exile, and impatient to return to their families, are prompted not only to believe many ſtories that are falſe, but to invent others to impoſe upon you: ſo that if you build upon ſuch a foundation, you either throw away a great deal of money to no purpoſe, or utterly ruin yourſelf at laſt. To the example above quoted, let me add that of Themiſtocles the Athenian, who having rebelled againſt his country, fled into Aſia to Darius, whom he flattered with ſuch magnificent hopes, that he prevailed upon him to invade Greece; but, afterwards finding he was not able to perform the promiſes he had made that Prince, he poiſoned himſelf, either out of Shame, or mortification, or fear of puniſhment. Now, if a man poſſeſſed of ſuch eminent virtue and abilities as Themiſtocles confeſſedly was, could be guilty of ſuch an error, and promiſe much more than he could fulfil; we may well expect that thoſe of much inferior merit and power will naturally be hurried away by their prejudices and paſſions, to deceive others as well as themſelves [t].

Princes therefore ought to be very cautious how they engage in any undertaking, at the encouragement of an Exile; becauſe ſuch enterprizes are generally attended either with very great loſs or diſgrace: and ſince it ſeldom happens, that towns are taken by treachery or private intelligence with the Townſmen; I ſhall ſhew in the next Chapter by what means the Romans uſed to reduce them.

[t] The conduct of Zopyrus, a Nobleman of Perſia, might here likewiſe be inſtanced, (if further examples were wanting) who, according to Juſtin, after his Sovereign Darius had long beſieged Babylon to no purpoſe, cut off his own noſe and ears, and fled to the Babylonians, pretending it was done by the order of Darius: upon which the Babylonians, moved with compaſſion and deteſtation at the barbarity of the fact, not only gave credit to his report, but made him their General. Not long after, however, he took an opportunity of betraying the confidence they had ſimply repoſed in him, and delivered up the City to the Enemy. The ſame Hiſtorian tells us, that Darius was ſo aſtoniſhed at his loyalty, that he ſaid, "he had rather ſee Zopyrus whole again than take twenty ſuch Cities as Babylon."

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXII.

Concerning the ſeveral methods by which the Romans made themſelves maſters of Towns.

THE Romans being a martial people, conſidered war in all lights, and always proceeded in ſuch a manner, with regard to their expences and all other particulars in their military operations, as might tend moſt effectually to command ſucceſs. In conſequence of this, they ſeldom laid ſiege to a place, if it was poſſible to avoid it; becauſe they thought it not only a very expenſive way of making war, but attended with ſo many other inconveniencies, as would much over-balance the advantage that might reſult from the reduction of a town in that manner: upon which account, as they judged it better and more profitable to have recourſe to any other means, there are but very few inſtances of regular ſieges in the whole courſe of their wars. The methods therefore, by which they made themſelves maſters of ſuch places, were either by ſtorm, or accepting their ſubmiſſion upon terms. When they took a town by ſtorm, it was either ſword in hand, or by ſome other violent method in which art had likewiſe ſome ſhare. In the firſt caſe, they did not batter the walls, but ſurrounded them with their whole army (which they called *Aggredi urbem coronâ*) and carried on the attack in all parts at the ſame time: ſo that they often ſucceeded in the firſt aſſault; as Scipio did at new Carthage in Spain. But if they failed in that attempt, they either began to batter the walls with rams, and other ſuch warlike engines, or to undermine them and force a paſſage into the town that way (as they did into Veii) or built wooden towers that they might fight upon a level with thoſe on the walls; or threw up Cavaliers [*u*] againſt them, to command the town. When the beſieged were ſurrounded and aſſaulted on all ſides from without, they certainly were in the greateſt danger, and had the feweſt reſources to depend upon: for as it was neceſſary to defend every part at the ſame time, they ſeldom could have men enow for that purpoſe; much leſs others to relieve them: but if they had, thoſe men could not all be equally ſtout and reſolute; ſo that if an impreſſion was made in any part, the whole was loſt; and therefore ſuch places, as I ſaid before, were often taken at the firſt aſſault. If that miſcarried however,

[*u*] The Original, ſays *argini di terra apoggiati alle mura di fuora*, i. e. *banks of earth againſt the outſide of the walls*, now called *Cavaliers*, which are mounts of earth, with a platform on the top, and a parapet to cover the cannon planted upon it, cut with embraſures to fire through.

they ſeldom or never renewed it, or kept their army any longer in a poſture that muſt neceſſarily expoſe it to great danger: for as it was extended over ſo large a compaſs of ground, the ranks muſt of courſe be very thin, and not able to oppoſe the enemy, if they ſhould chance to make a ſally: beſides, the Soldiers would be apt to grow weary of ſuch a ſtation, and conſequently mutinous; for which reaſon, that method was never tried but once, and then too on a ſudden, and with the utmoſt vigour. When a breach was made in the walls, the beſieged endeavoured to remedy it with entrenchments and ramparts thrown up within, as they do at preſent: and from the effect of mining they uſed to defend themſelves by countermines, in which they either oppoſed the enemy ſword in hand, or threw caſks full of feathers and ſuch like combuſtibles ſet on fire, into their works; the ſmoke and ſtink of which, would not ſuffer them to continue long there. As to wooden towers, they endeavoured to deſtroy them by fire; and when the beſiegers began to throw up Cavaliers againſt the outſide of the wall, thoſe in the town made holes in the bottom, through which they drew the earth they were made of into the inſide; ſo that they could never be raiſed to a ſufficient height to do them any harm, as the foundations were conſtantly giving way.

But ſince theſe methods of attacking a place cannot be long continued, the beſiegers muſt reſolve upon one of theſe two things; i. e. either to raiſe their camp and proſecute the war in ſome other manner (as Scipio did, who having made a ſudden but fruitleſs aſſault upon Utica in Africa, immediately marched away from thence, in order to force the Carthaginian army to an engagement) or to form a regular ſiege as the Romans did at Veii, Capua, Carthage, and Jeruſalem, and ſome other Cities which they took in that manner.

As to taking a place by means of a private correſpondence with ſome of the Citizens (as the Romans took Palæopolis) that method of proceeding, though often tried by the Romans and other people, was ſeldom attended with ſucceſs; becauſe in ſuch an undertaking many impediments muſt intervene, and the leaſt is ſufficient to defeat it. For in the firſt place, conſpiracies are generally diſcovered before they are ripe for execution, either through the perfidy of ſome accomplice, or the difficulties that occur in conducting them; becauſe you muſt be concerned with ſuch perſons as may be enemies under the diſguiſe of friends, and who otherwiſe are reſtrained from having any intercourſe with you, except upon ſome rare and plauſible occaſion. But let us ſuppoſe the deſign ſhould not be diſcovered, till it is upon the point of being executed; many diſappointments and obſtructions may ſtill happen: ſome of the conſpirators, perhaps, may aſſemble too ſoon, and others too late; in either of which caſes, they are undone: ſome dark rumour,

mour, ſome unexpected alarm, (like that of the geeſe which ſaved the Capitol at Rome) nay the leaſt miſtake or moſt trifling change either in the plan, or manner of executing it, is more than enough to overſet the whole. To theſe contingencies we might add the darkneſs of the night (a time when theſe things are generally brought to a criſis), the terror with which it inſpires guilty minds, the blunders men are liable to fall into, who are not intimately acquainted with the nature and ſituation of the particular places that are to be the ſcenes of action (as many of the conſpirators cannot be), and the diſmay that naturally preſents itſelf to people concerned in ſuch perilous enterprizes; all which circumſtances greatly contribute to confound, and embarraſs, and diſcourage them to ſuch a degree, that the moſt inſignificant accident or ſhadow of danger throws them into diſorder and ſuſpicions that commonly end in their deſtruction [x]. No man was ever bolder or more fortunate in theſe clandeſtine and nocturnal practices than Aratus the Sicyonian; though he was no leſs cautious and circumſpect in the field, and in open day light: which would tempt one to think that this was rather owing to ſome peculiar and innate diſpoſition in him, than to any good opinion that ſound reaſon and judgment can form of ſuch enterprizes. This manner of proceeding therefore, when often tried, may ſometimes by chance prove ſucceſsful; but I will venture to affirm in general, that it can ſeldom be conducted to the point of execution, and ſtill more rarely will anſwer the intended purpoſe.

The laſt method by which the Romans got poſſeſſion of towns, was by treaty; that is, when the inhabitants, either voluntarily ſubmitted to them, or were reduced to accept of terms: the firſt was generally owing either to ſome urgent neceſſity or danger which hung over their heads, and obliged them to ſeek protection from others; (as the Capuans did) or to a deſire of living under a happier Government, as they ſaw others did who had thrown themſelves into their arms, particularly the Rhodians, and Maſſilians, and ſome other people that have been mentioned before. But when people are compelled to accept of terms, it commonly proceeds either from the uſual conſequences of a long ſiege, or being harraſſed with continual incurſions and devaſtations, and otherwiſe diſtreſſed; to avoid which, they think it more eligible to ſubmit to the enemy. This method was more generally practiſed by the Romans than any other, during the courſe of four hundred and fifty years, in which they never ceaſed to harraſs their neighbours in every manner that was poſſible to deviſe, till they were forced to ſubmit to ſome conditions or other, and acknowledge their ſuperiority: a method which they chiefly depended upon, after they had tried all

[x] See Chap. vi. of the next book.

others,

others, and rejected them, either as dangerous or unſerviceable; conſidering that ſieges were tedious and expenſive, aſſaults doubtful and perilous; the ſucceſs of private correſpondencies uncertain; and that a victory in the field often determined the fate of a whole Kingdom in one day, when the reduction of a City that was obſtinately defended, ſometimes could not be effected in ſeveral years.

CHAP. XXXIII.

That the Romans upon any Expedition gave the Commanders of their Armies free and diſcretionary Commiſſions.

WHOEVER would improve himſelf by reading Livy's Hiſtory, ſhould attentively conſider the whole ſcope and tendency, as well as the particular conduct obſerved by the Romans in all their actions and deſigns. It may not be amiſs then, to ſay ſomething of the authority with which they veſted their Conſuls, Dictators, and other Commanders of their forces, when they ſent them upon any expedition; which indeed was ſo great, that the Senate reſerved no other power to itſelf than that of confirming a peace, or declaring war; leaving all other operations entirely to the conduct and diſcretion of the General, who was at liberty either to fight the enemy, or to decline an engagement; to lay ſiege to a town, or to let it alone, juſt as he thought fit. This is obvious from many examples, particularly from what happened in an expedition againſt the Tuſcans, when Fabius the Conſul had defeated them near Sutrium. For after the battle was over, that General having determined to march through the Ciminian foreſt into Tuſcany, was ſo far from conſulting the Senate about it, that he did not give them the leaſt notice of his deſign; though the war was to be tranſported into another country, and likely to be attended with much danger and hazard. In ſupport of this, I might alledge the ſteps taken by the Roman Senate upon that occaſion: for having received an account of the victory he had gained, and apprehending he might be inclined to purſue his advantage, and puſh through that foreſt into the enemy's territories, they ſent an expreſs to diſſuade him from it: but their advice arrived too late; for before he received it he had routed the Tuſcans a ſecond time, and over-run all their country: ſo that, inſtead of preventing that expedition, the meſſengers returned with the news of a victory.

Now if this manner of proceeding be duly conſidered, it will be found very wiſe and expedient: for if the Senate was to have been conſulted upon every particular occaſion, it would have damped the vigour and activity of theGenerals, and made them leſs vigilant in their

their enterprizes; ſince they muſt have thought the honour of a victory would not have redounded ſo much to them as to the Senate, under whoſe immediate inſtructions they had acted. Beſides, the Senate in that caſe muſt ſometimes have given very improper orders: for though the Senators were all men of great experience in military affairs, yet as they were not upon the ſpot themſelves, they could not know many particular circumſtances that it was neceſſary to be acquainted with, in order to gain or improve an advantage; and conſequently muſt be guilty of numberleſs errors: for which reaſon they left their Generals to act according to their own diſcretion, that ſo they might be the more effectually incited to exert their utmoſt abilities, when they knew no body elſe was to ſhare with them in the glory. This I thought fit to obſerve, becauſe I ſee how differently the Commonwealths in theſe times (eſpecially the Venetians and Florentines) act upon ſuch occaſions: for if a battery (for inſtance) is to be raiſed againſt a town that is beſieged, the Senate muſt be conſulted about it in the firſt place, and give their orders how it is to be managed. A manner of proceeding indeed, that is of a piece with the reſt of their conduct; which all together has reduced them to the pitiful condition they are now in.

The END of the SECOND BOOK.

POLI-

POLITICAL

DISCOURSES

UPON THE FIRST DECAD OF

LIVY.

By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence.

BOOK III.

POLITICAL

DISCOURSES

UPON THE FIRST DECAD OF

LIVY.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

That no State or Religious Eſtabliſhment can ſubſiſt long, except it is frequently reduced to its firſt Principles.

EVERY thing in this World is ſubject to diſſolution. Thoſe bodies that finiſh the courſe appointed them by Heaven, are ſuch as obſerve ſo regular an order, that they either undergo no change at all, or if they do, it is ſuch only as tends rather to their preſervation than their deſtruction. With regard to mixed bodies, as Republics and Religious Orders, I ſay, that ſuch changes are ſalutiferous as reduce them to their firſt principles: and therefore thoſe are the beſt conſtituted and continue the longeſt, which either have eſtabliſhments and inſtitutions of their own, by the application of which they may be reduced to that condition; or eaſily fall, by accident as it were, into ſome courſe that tends to ſuch a renovation: for it is a moſt evident truth, that no Body can long ſubſiſt without it. The fundamentals of all Religions, Republics, and Kingdoms, muſt have had ſomething good and wholeſome in them at firſt, to which they owed their origin and progreſs: but as that virtue is liable to be corrupted in time, the body muſt of neceſſity languiſh and die, except ſomething happens to reſtore its efficacy.

Thus, Phyſicians (ſpeaking of the human body) ſay, *quotidie aggregatur aliquid, quod quandoque indiget curatione, it daily contracts ſome impurity which muſt be purged off in time.*

This reduction then is effected in Republics, either by ſome external accident, or interior virtue. In the firſt caſe accordingly, we have ſeen how it was owing to Fortune that Rome was taken by the Gauls; that ſo it might be reſtored to its ancient vigour by reſuming new life and virtue, and by the revival of Religion and Juſtice, which had begun to decay. This plainly appears from Livy, who tells us that when the Romans led out their army againſt the Gauls and created Tribunes with Conſular power, they obſerved no religious rite or ceremony upon that occaſion, as they uſed to do before; and that inſtead of puniſhing the Fabii, who had violated the law of nations by fighting againſt the Gauls, they loaded them with honours and rewards: from whence we may reaſonably ſuppoſe, that the Inſtitutions upon which Romulus and other wiſe Princes had founded that State were falling into a degree of contempt and neglect that was inconſiſtent with the preſervation of its liberties [*a*]. Such an accident therefore as befel them from the Gauls was highly requiſite at that juncture to revive their ancient diſcipline and inſtitutions; and to ſhew the people how neceſſary it was, not only to maintain Religion and Juſtice in full force, but to reverence virtuous and worthy Citizens, and to ſhew a greater regard to their merit than to any private conſideration whatſoever. All which actually came to paſs: for as ſoon as they had recovered the City, they immediately applied themſelves to revive all the ancient rites and inſtitutions of their Religion, chaſtiſed the Fabii for their delinquency, and laying aſide all envy and contentions amongſt themſelves, not only vied with each other in ſhewing all manner of reſpect to the virtue and goodneſs of Camillus, but committed the management of the whole State to him alone.

It is neceſſary then, as I ſaid before, that all States ſhould often be reformed, either by ſuch accidents or by ſome interior power: the latter of which muſt ariſe either from laws that may frequently call the individuals to account; or from the authority of ſome great and good man amongſt them, whoſe example and virtuous actions may have the ſame effect. The laws that were made to reduce the Roman Republic to its firſt principles, were ſuch as created Tribunes and Cenſors; and ſome others that were enacted to curb inſolence and ambition: but ſuch inſtitutions muſt be kept up in full force and vigour by ſome virtuous and ſpirited man, who will maintain them againſt powerful tranſgreſſors, and ſee them duly put in execution. The moſt ſtriking examples

[*a*] See Book II. Chap. xxviii. xxix.

of

of this ſort before the taking of Rome by the Gauls, were the execution of the Sons of Brutus, the puniſhment of the Decemviri, and the death of Spurius Melius: and afterwards, that of Manlius Capitolinus, the Son of Manlius Torquatus, the proſecution carried on by Papirius Curſor againſt Fabius his General of the Horſe, and the accuſation of the Scipio's; which being extraordinary acts of ſeverity were much noticed when they happened, and ſerved to remind other Citizens of their duty: but as they grew more rare, the people began to degenerate again into corruption and licentiouſneſs in ſuch a manner, that examples of this kind could not be made without much danger and tumult. It is neceſſary therefore that ſuch events ſhould happen once in ten years at leaſt, to awaken the remembrance of former puniſhments, and to ſtrike a terror into the people: otherwiſe they will ſoon begin to forget and deſpiſe the laws, and delinquents multiply ſo faſt, that it will be very difficult if not impoſſible to bring them to juſtice, without expoſing a State to great perils and troubles. For this reaſon, thoſe that governed Florence from the year 1433 to the year 1494, reformed the State every five years; without which it could hardly have been held together: and in theſe reformations they were particularly careful to revive that dread of puniſhment, which they had at firſt excited in the breaſts of the Citizens, when they took the Government into their hands, by doing ſtrict juſtice, and calling all offenders to a ſevere account: but as the Remembrance of theſe puniſhments began to wear away, the people alſo began to grow bold and inſolent again, and not only ſaid but did what they pleaſed; againſt which no remedy was found ſo efficacious as reducing the State to its firſt principles.

Such a reduction is likewiſe owing ſometimes to the virtue of one man alone, without the co-operation of any law to enforce it: for ſo great is the authority of ſuch an example, that all good men are ready to follow it, and thoſe that are bad are aſhamed to do otherwiſe. The moſt remarkable examples of this kind in Rome were thoſe of Horatius Cocles, Scævola, Fabricius, the two Decii, Regulus Attilius, and ſome others, whoſe rare and uncommon virtue wrought the ſame effects there that any law or inſtitution could have done. If then either ſome ſuch executions as we have mentioned, or ſome ſuch particular example of virtue had happened every ten years in Rome, that State would never have become corrupt: but as they both grew ſcarce in time, corruption began to grow ſo general, that after the time of Marcus Regulus, there were very few or no ſuch examples: for though indeed thoſe of the two Cato's may here be objected, who afterwards ſprung up in Rome, yet it was at ſuch a diſtance of time from the abovementioned, and there was ſo long an interval betwixt one and the other of them, that they ſtood ſingle in their virtue and could do no manner of good;

good; eſpecially the younger, who finding the Republic almoſt totally corrupted, likewiſe found all his endeavours to reform it ineffectual. So much for Republican Governments.

With regard to Religious Eſtabliſhments, it will plainly appear how neceſſary reformations are in thoſe alſo from the example of our own, which would have been utterly ruined if it had not been reduced to its firſt principles by St. Francis and St. Dominic, who by their voluntary poverty and imitation of Chriſt, revived true religion in the minds of men, when it was almoſt effaced, and would ſoon have been wholly obliterated by the wickedneſs of Prelates and Popes: for as they lived in extreme poverty, and were very diligent in hearing Confeſſions and preaching, they gained ſuch an influence over the people by renewing theſe inſtitutions, that they began to be convinced it was their duty not to ſpeak evil of their Superiors, how bad ſoever; but to obey them, and to leave the chaſtiſement of their crimes to God: whereas the others muſt of neceſſity lead very wicked lives, ſince they feared not that vengeance which they ſeldom or never heard of and did not believe. This reduction then has been, and ſtill is the preſervation of our Religion [*b*].

Monarchies have likewiſe occaſion ſometimes for ſuch renovations and reduction to their firſt principles, in order to re-eſtabliſh the authority of their fundamental laws: and we ſee what good effects they have had in the Kingdom of France, which lives in ſtricter obedience to ſuch inſtitutions than any other that we know of. The Parliaments indeed, and eſpecially that of Paris, are the maintainers and conſervators of thoſe laws and inſtitutions, which are always revived and put in execution, when it is neceſſary to proceed againſt any Prince in that Kingdom, or to oppoſe the King's Edicts: and they have hitherto preſerved their liberties by putting the laws duly in execution againſt great offenders [*c*]. Whereas if ſuch delinquents were ſuffered to eſcape with impunity, they would ſoon encreaſe ſo faſt, that it would be impoſſible to reform the State without great danger and diſturbance, and perhaps the utter diſſolution of it.

I conclude then that nothing is more neceſſary either in a Republic, or a Religious Eſtabliſhment, or a Monarchy, than a frequent reformation of the abuſes that have crept into them, by reducing them to their firſt principles, in order to reſtore their original vigour and reputation: and this muſt be done either by good laws, or the virtue of particular men, (which will have the ſame effect) without being obliged for it to exterior force. For though that proves the beſt remedy ſometimes (as

[*b*] See the *Eſtimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times*, Vol. II. Sect. 4. where this poſition is more fully illuſtrated.

[*c*] The State of France is much altered in this reſpect ſince Machiavel's time: the Parliaments now having very little authority in compariſon of what they had formerly.

the

the Romans experienced when their City was taken by the Gauls) yet it is ſo dangerous a one that it is by no means to be deſired. But to ſhew how much the actions of particular men contributed to the grandeur and eſtabliſhment of the Roman Republic, and what other good effects they wrought, I ſhall confine myſelf chiefly to that ſubject in this my third and laſt book of Diſcourſes upon the firſt Decad of Livy's Hiſtory: and though ſome of the Kings indeed performed great and remarkable exploits, yet as Hiſtory has related them at large, I ſhall omit all mention of them here, except in ſuch things as they did for their own private emolument, and begin with Brutus, the Father of the Roman liberties.

CHAP. II.

That it is the part of a wiſe man to ſeem a fool upon occaſion.

NO man ever acted more wiſely, or deſerved greater praiſe than Junius Brutus when he pretended to be a fool: and though Livy aſſigns but one reaſon for his ſo doing, namely, that he might live quietly and preſerve his eſtate; yet when we thoroughly conſider his manner of proceeding, it ſeems probable that he put on that diſguiſe that he might likewiſe be taken leſs notice of, and deliver his Country from the yoke of Kings, whenever a convenient opportunity of expelling them ſhould preſent itſelf. That this was his intention may appear in the firſt place, from the interpretation he put upon the Oracle of Apollo, when he fell down, as it were by accident, and kiſſed the ground, out of a perſuaſion that the Gods approved of his deſigns [*d*]:

[*d*] Delphos ad maxime inclytum in terris oraculum mittere ſtatuit; neque reſponſa ſortium ulli ali committere auſus, duos filios in Græciam miſit. Titus & Aruns profecti; comes his additus L. Junius Brutus, Tarquiniâ ſorore regis natus; juvenis longe alius ingenio quam cujus ſimulationem induerat. Is quum primores civitatis, in quibus fratrem ſuum, ab avunculo interfectum audiſſet; neque in animo ſuo quicquam regi timendum, neque in fortunâ concupiſcendum relinquere ſtatuit: contemptu tutus eſſe, ubi in jure parum præſidii eſſet. Ergo ex induſtriâ factus ad imitationem ſtultitiæ, quum ſe ſuaque prædæ eſſe regi ſineret, *Bruti* quoque haud abnuit cognomen; ut ſub ejus obtentu cognominis, liberator ille populi Romani animus, latens aperiretur tempore ſuo. Is tum ab Tarquiniis ductus Delphos, ludibrium verius quam comes, aureum baculum incluſum corneo cavato ad id baculo tuliſſe donum Apollini dicitur, per ambages effigiem ingenii ſui. Quo poſtquam ventum eſt, perfectis patris mandatis, cupido inceſſit animos juvenum ſciſcitandi: *ad quem eorum regnum Romanum eſſet venturum:* ex infimo ſpecu vocem redditam ferunt, *Imperium ſummum Romæ habebit, qui veſtrûm primus, o juvenes, oſculum matri tulerit.* Tarquinii, ut Sextus, qui Romæ relictus fuerat, ignarus reſponſi, experſque imperii eſſet, rem ſummâ ope taceri jubent: ipſi inter ſe, uter prior quum Romam rediſſet, matri oſculum daret, ſorte permittunt. Brutus aliò ratus ſpectare Pythicam vocem, velut ſi prolapſus cecidiſſet, terram oſculo contigit; ſcilicet quod ea communis mater omnium mortalium eſſet, *Liv. Lib.* I. *Cap.* lvi.

and

and in the next, from his pulling the dagger out of Lucretia's body after ſhe had killed herſelf, and obliging her father, huſband, and many others of her relations and friends who were aſſembled upon that occaſion, to take an oath that they would no longer ſuffer any King to reign in Rome.

This example may ſerve to warn thoſe that are diſcontented under the government of a Prince, to conſider their own ſtrength; and if they find they are able to cope with him, it is the ſafeſt and moſt honourable way to declare themſelves his enemies, and to make open war upon him: but if they are too weak for that, they muſt court his favour, and endeavour by all means to ingratiate themſelves with him, eſpecially by an obſequious attention to his will, and ſeeming to be delighted at every thing that pleaſes him: by which conduct they may not only live ſecure from all danger, but partake in the good fortune of their Prince, and procure an opportunity of accompliſhing their private deſigns. Some indeed are of opinion that ſuch men ought neither to live ſo near a Prince, as to be buried in his ruin, if he ſhould fall; nor ſo far off as not to be able to advantage themſelves by it. And this certainly would be the beſt courſe if it could be followed, but as I think that is hardly poſſible [*e*], it ſeems neceſſary to have recourſe to one or other of the two juſt now mentioned, and either to alienate one's ſelf totally from him, or endeavour to ſecure his favour: for whoever does otherwiſe, eſpecially if he be a man of any eminence, muſt live in continual danger. It is not ſufficient to ſay, *I expect nothing, I want neither honour nor preferment, I only deſire to live quietly and unmoleſted without meddling in any thing:* for ſuch declarations meet with little credit, and men of diſtinguiſhed qualities, though void of ambition, cannot live in obſcurity and repoſe, be they ever ſo deſirous of it; becauſe no body believes them to be in earneſt: ſo that although they ſhould really chuſe retirement themſelves, other people will not let them continue in it. It is neceſſary therefore ſometimes to act the fool, as Brutus did [*f*]: and

[*e*] And yet Lepidus did ſo, as Tacitus tells us, *Annal.* IV. *C.* xx. "Hunc ego Lepidum, (ſays he) temporibus illis, gravem & ſapientem virum fuiſſe comperio. Nam pleraque ab ſævis adulationibus aliorum in melius flexit: neque tamen temperamenti egebat, cum æquabili auctoritate & gratiâ apud Tiberium viguerit. Unde dubitare cogor, fato & ſorte naſcendi, ut cætera, ita principum inclinatio in hos, offenſio in illos; an ſit aliquid in noſtris conſiliis, liceatque inter abruptam contumaciam, & deforme obſequium, pergere iter ambitione ac periculis vacuum."—

[*f*] We find David doing the ſame, long before Brutus, at the court of Achiſh: when "he changed his behaviour and feigned himſelf mad, and ſcrabbled on the doors of the gates, and let the ſpittle fall down upon his beard." 1 *Sam.* xxi. 13.

Inſipiens eſto cum tempus poſtulat aut res,
Stultitiam ſimulare loco prudentia ſumma eſt.

are therefore no bad maxims.

that

that is ſufficiently done by flattering, and fawning, and doing, and ſaying every thing that can gratify a Prince, how diſagreeable ſoever it may be to a man's own private judgment and inclination. But ſince we have given due honour to the wiſdom of Brutus, in making uſe of ſuch means to recover the Liberty of his Country; let us now ſay ſomething of the ſevere meaſures he took to preſerve it.

CHAP. III.

That in order to preſerve Liberty when newly recovered, it is neceſſary to put ſuch men as the Sons of Brutus to death.

THE rigour with which Brutus proceeded in maintaining the Liberties of Rome after he had recovered them, was no leſs neceſſary than ſerviceable: but ſurely it muſt be a very rare, if not an unparallelled ſight, to ſee a Father ſit in judgment upon his own Sons, and not only condemn them to death, but be preſent at their execution [*g*]. Thoſe however that are converſant in ancient Hiſtory, well know that in any change of Government, either from Liberty to Slavery, or from Slavery to Liberty, it is neceſſary that ſome of thoſe that are enemies to the ruling eſtabliſhment ſhould be puniſhed in an exemplary manner: for whoever converts a free State into a Tyranny, and does not cut off ſuch men as Brutus; or a tyrannical Government into a Free State, and does not rid himſelf of ſuch men as his Sons, will not be able to ſupport himſelf long. But ſince this matter has already been largely diſcuſſed in another place, I refer to what is there ſaid upon it [*h*], and ſhall add only one example which happened lately, and in our own Country.

Pietro Soderini having reſtored the liberties of Florence, was of opinion, that by patience and clemency he ſhould be able to mollify the minds of ſome, who, like the Sons of Brutus, were impatient under the new Government [*i*]. But in this he found himſelf much miſtaken, and was ſo much the more to be blamed, as he was a very wiſe man, and not only ſaw the neceſſity of proceeding with rigour, but that the behaviour and ambition of thoſe that oppoſed him, would furniſh him

[*g*] Conſules in ſedem proceſſêre ſuam, miſſique Lictores ad ſumendum ſupplicium nudatos virgis cædunt, ſecurique feriunt: cum inter omne tempus pater, vultuſque, et os ejus, ſpectaculo eſſet, eminente animo patrio inter publicæ pœnæ miniſterium. Liv. lib. II. cap. 5.

[*h*] See *the Prince*, Chap. v. vii. viii. & *paſſim*. *See alſo* Chap. vii. of this Book. and Book I. Chap. xvi.

[*i*] Compare this with Chap. xxxiii. Book I. of theſe Diſcourſes.

with a ſufficient handle to cut them off; and yet he could never prevail upon himſelf to do it: for beſides the hope which he entertained of extinguiſhing their malevolence by his lenity, moderation, and generoſity, he thought (as he often declared to his acquaintance) that in order to depreſs his adverſaries effectually, he ſhould be obliged to aſſume an extraordinary degree of authority, which would be a breach not only of the laws, but of that civil equality which he himſelf had ſo ſtrenuouſly endeavoured to re-eſtabliſh; and that though he ſhould not make an ill uſe of it, it would yet alarm the people in ſuch a manner, that after he was dead they would never make another Gonfalonier for life; which he thought was abſolutely neceſſary. Now though theſe conſiderations were wiſe and good in themſelves, yet it is not proper at any time to let an evil grow too predominant, in hopes of doing good in the end; eſpecially when that evil moſt likely will prevent ſuch a deſign. He ought rather to have perſuaded himſelf, that if he lived and maintained his ground, he ſhould be able to convince the world, that what he had done was for the ſake of the Public, and not out of private ambition or ſelf-intereſt; and to have made ſuch proviſions, that no ſucceeding Gonfalonier ſhould have it in his power to do evil by the ſame meaſures that he had taken to do good. But he was miſtaken in his account, and forgot that ſuch enmities are neither to be extinguiſhed by time, nor appeaſed by generoſity: an error that was attended with the loſs of his authority, reputation, and the liberties of his Country; all which might have been prevented, if he had followed the example of Brutus. Now if it is no eaſy matter to preſerve a free Government, it is no leſs difficult to maintain one that is abſolute, as I ſhall ſhew in the next Chapter.

CHAP. IV.

That a Prince can never be ſafe in a State, whilſt thoſe are alive whom he has deprived of it.

THE death of Tarquinius Priſcus, occaſioned by the Sons of Ancus, and that of Servius Tullus by Tarquinius Superbus, may ſerve to ſhew how dangerous a thing it is to deprive a Prince of his State, and ſuffer him to live afterwards, though you heap ever ſo many favours upon him. Tarquinius Priſcus thinking his right to the Kingdom indiſputable, as it was given him by the people, and confirmed by the Senate, ſimply imagined that the Sons of Ancus could not be diſſatisfied with him, ſince he had been choſen by the general voice of the Romans to reign over them: and Servius Tullus found himſelf deceived at laſt, after

after he had endeavoured to ſooth the reſentment of Tarquin's Sons by all manner of favours and benefactions. From the firſt example therefore, a Prince may learn that he can never be ſafe upon his throne, whilſt thoſe are alive whom he has diſpoſſeſſed of it: and from the ſecond, that a former injury is never to be cancelled by any ſubſequent obligations; eſpecially if the obligation is not equivalent to the injury.

Without doubt it was very weak in Servius Tullus, to imagine that the Sons of Tarquin would be contented with being his Sons-in-law, when they ought to have been his Sovereigns: for ſo general is the thirſt of dominion in mankind, that it is not only common to thoſe that have a right to rule, but to thoſe that have none; as we may ſee in the inſtance of Tullia, daughter to Servius and wife to Tarquinius Superbus; who was ſo enflamed with this paſſion, that not contented with being a King's daughter, ſhe longed to be a Queen, and laying aſide all filial tenderneſs and affection, incited her huſband to murder her father, and uſurp his Kingdom. But if Tarquinius Priſcus and Servius Tullus had taken care to ſecure themſelves againſt thoſe whom they had ſupplanted, neither of them would have loſt either his life or his Kingdom. Tarquinius Superbus indeed was afterwards expelled, becauſe he could not keep within the bounds obſerved by his predeceſſors, as ſhall be ſhewn in the next Chapter.

CHAP. V.

How a King may loſe his Kingdom though it be hereditary.

SErvius Tullus dying without heirs, Tarquinius Superbus, who had cauſed him to be killed, ſecurely poſſeſſed himſelf of his Kingdom, without encountering any of thoſe difficulties or dangers which his predeceſſors had to ſtruggle with: and though the manner by which he became poſſeſſed of it was odious and irregular, yet if he had kept himſelf within the ſame bounds that the former Kings had done, and not provoked the people and the Senate, his deportment would have been borne with, and he might have ſupported himſelf in the government. The reaſon of his expulſion then, was not that his Son Sextus had raviſhed Lucretia, but becauſe he had violated the laws of the Kingdom, and governed like a Tyrant; having wholly deprived the Senate of their authority, which he took upon himſelf, and cauſed all public buſineſs, which uſed to be tranſacted openly and in their preſence, to be carried on privately in his Palace, to the great diſguſt and diſſatisfaction of every one: ſo that he ſoon deprived the Romans of the liberty they had enjoyed under their former Kings. Nor was he

content with making the Senate his enemies, but likewiſe excited the hatred of the common people, by forcing them to do the baſeſt ſort of work, and wear their lives away in vile and mechanic occupations, very different from the employments they had been accuſtomed to in the days of his predeceſſors. The Romans therefore, thus groaning under his pride and cruelty, were ſufficiently diſpoſed to rebel as ſoon as they had a convenient opportunity; and though the rape of Lucretia had never happened, any other freſh inſtance of oppreſſion would have produced the ſame effect. But if Tarquin had acted like the other Kings, and ſhewn due reverence to the laws of his country, Brutus and Collatinus would have applied directly to him, and not to the people, for juſtice upon his Son, when he had committed that crime. From hence Princes may learn this leſſon, that whenever they begin to trangreſs the laws, and deſpiſe the cuſtoms which their ſubjects have been long uſed to, that moment they likewiſe begin to loſe their power and authority: and if ever they ſhould become ſo wiſe after they have loſt their government, as to perceive how eaſy a matter it is for a prudent and good Prince to maintain himſelf in his State, ſuch a diſcovery muſt ſtill add to the bitterneſs of their loſs, and be a more exquiſite puiſhment than any one elſe could inflict upon them; ſince it is a matter of much leſs difficulty to gain the affections of good men, than of bad, and ſafer to obſerve laws than to trample upon them.

Whoever then would learn to do this, needs not be at any great pains about it, as he has nothing elſe to do but to look into the lives of good Princes, ſuch as Timoleon the Corinthian, Aratus the Sicyonian, and ſome others; where he will find that both the Governors and the governed lived in ſuch mutual ſatisfaction and ſecurity, that he cannot help being deſirous to imitate their conduct, eſpecially when he ſees how little difficulty there is in it: for when people live under a good Prince, they neither wiſh for nor would ſuffer any change of government; as may appear from the example of the Corinthians and Sicyonians with regard to the two great men abovementioned, whom they obliged to reign over them as long as they lived, though they often attempted to lay down their authority, and retire to a private condition. Now ſince in this and the two preceding Chapters we have taken ſome notice of the diſaffection and hatred which bad Princes excite in their Subjects, of the conſpiracy in which the Sons of Brutus engaged againſt their country, and of the murder of Tarquinius Priſcus and Servius Tullus, it may not be amiſs to diſcourſe more largely of Conſpiracies in the next Chapter, as it is a Subject that deſerves to be well conſidered both by Princes and private men.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of Conſpiracies.

SINCE Conſpiracies are of ſuch dangerous conſequence both to Princes and private perſons, I thought it neceſſary to ſay ſomething concerning the nature and tendency of them in this place, eſpecially as many more Princes have loſt both their dominions and their lives that way, than by open war: for few people are able to make open war; but it is in every body's power to conſpire againſt them. On the other hand, a private man cannot engage in any enterprize that is ſubject to more difficulties and dangers: which is the reaſon that very few conſpiracies have ſucceeded. That Princes therefore may learn how to guard againſt theſe dangers, and private perſons be cautious of embarking in them, I ſhall enlarge upon this Subject, and omit no circumſtance that may ſeem neceſſary for the inſtruction either of one or the other.

The maxim which Tacitus puts into the mouth of a Roman Senator is indeed a golden one, viz. "That he admired the times that were paſt, but conformed to the preſent; and though he could not help wiſhing for good Princes, he would bear with thoſe that were bad [*k*]:" and they that do otherwiſe often ruin both themſelves and their country. If we conſider then in the firſt place, againſt whom men generally form Conſpiracies, we ſhall find that it is either againſt their Prince or their country: and to theſe two ſorts I ſhall confine myſelf at preſent, becauſe I have ſaid enough elſewhere concerning thoſe that relate to delivering up a town to an enemy, and others of that kind [*l*]. Let us begin then with thoſe that are formed againſt a Prince, and enquire into the cauſes of them, which indeed are many and various: but there is one more frequent and of greater importance than any of the reſt, and that is the general diſaffection of the people. For when a Prince has excited ſuch a hatred againſt him, it is no wonder that ſome of them who have been the moſt grievouſly injured and oppreſſed ſhould meditate revenge: and to this they will be the more effectually animated by the univerſal diſcontent which they obſerve amongſt their fellow Subjects [*m*].

A Prince therefore ought above all things to take care not to incur the general hatred of his people; (and how he is to do that I have ſhewn in another place) [*n*] for then he will have the leſs to apprehend.

[*k*] See *the Prince*, Chap. iii. Note 12.
[*l*] See Book II. Chap. xxxii. of theſe Diſcourſes.
[*m*] See *the Prince*, Chap. xix.
[*n*] See *the Prince*, Chap. xv. xvi. xvii. xix. xx. & *alibi*.

from being guilty of any particular act of oppreſſion or violence: in the firſt place, becauſe few men carry their reſentment ſo high, as to run any great riſque to revenge themſelves; and in the next, if they were ſo diſpoſed, and had an opportunity of doing it, they would be reſtrained by the general affection which they ſaw the reſt of the people bore to their Prince. As to the violence which Princes commit upon their Subjects, it affects either their eſtate, or their life, or their honour: in matters of blood it is much more dangerous to threaten, than to put them to death: for in one caſe, a Prince expoſes himſelf to a thouſand perils; but in the other, he runs little or no riſque at all: becauſe when a man is once dead, he can no longer think of revenge, and thoſe that are alive will ſoon forget him: whereas a man that is threatened, and finds that he muſt either kill or be killed, is the moſt dangerous enemy a Prince can have, as I ſhall ſhew more particularly hereafter. Next to a man's life, his honour and eſtate lie neareſt his heart, and nothing affects him ſo much as an attack upon either of them: upon which account, it behoves Princes to be very careful not to aggrieve their Subjects in thoſe points: for it is neither poſſible to ſtrip any one ſo bare that he cannot find a knife to revenge himſelf; nor to diſhonour and debaſe him to ſuch a degree, as totally to extinguiſh every ſpark of courage and reſentment in his breaſt. In regard to honour, no outrage or affront touches a man ſo ſenſibly as thoſe that are offered to his wife or daughter, or other female acquaintance or relation; and next to that, we may reckon the contempt of his own perſon: the latter of which provoked Pauſanias to aſſaſſinate Philip of Macedon, and many other Subjects to ſerve their Princes in the ſame manner: and in our own times, the former excited Julio Belanti to conſpire againſt Pandolpho, Lord of Siena (which he would not otherwiſe have done) who had given him his daughter to wife, and afterwards took her away from him again, as we ſhall relate in another place. The chief reaſon that induced the Pazzi to conſpire againſt the Medici at Florence, was the loſs of Giovanni Borromei's inheritance, which he was deprived of by the award of the Medici [o]: but there is another motive, and a very powerful one too, which often engages men to conſpire againſt their Prince, and that is the deſire of delivering their country from Slavery, when he has deprived them of their liberties. This it was that ſpirited up Brutus and Caſſius to plunge their daggers into the heart of Julius Cæſar, and occaſioned the conſpiracies againſt Phalaris, Dionyſius, and many others who had enſlaved their country: and indeed it is not poſſible for Tyrants to ſkreen themſelves from ſuch dangers, any other way than by abdication. But as they very rarely can be prevailed upon

[o] See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book VIII. at the beginning.

to

to conſent to that, they generally come to miſerable ends: hence the Poet truly ſays,

> Ad generum Cereris ſine cæde & ſanguine pauci
> Deſcendunt Reges, & ſiccâ morte Tyranni.
>
> Juv. Sat. X. v. 112.

> To Pluto's dreary realms moſt Tyrants go
> Beſmear'd with blood, and full of wounds and woe.

The dangers which occur in Conſpiracies are ſo many and various (as I ſaid before) that there is great hazard not only in conducting and executing them, but even after the execution; becauſe many perſons muſt be privy to them: for where one man only is concerned, it cannot ſo properly be called a conſpiracy, as a reſolution to kill his Prince: in which caſe he is free from the firſt danger that attends all Conſpiracies; that is, he cannot be betrayed before the time of execution, becauſe he has not truſted any one elſe with the ſecret. Such a reſolution as this may be formed by any ſort of perſon whatſoever, high or low, rich or poor, friend or enemy: for every man has an opportunity one time or other, of coming near his Prince; and he that can do that may eaſily take his revenge, if he has been injured. Pauſanias (of whom we have had occaſion to ſpeak before) killed Philip of Macedon as he was going to the Temple in the midſt of his guards, with his Son on his right hand, and his Son-in-law on the left. But as he was a Nobleman, and familiar with his Prince, we ſhall quote two other examples of meaner quality: the firſt is of a poor miſerable Spaniard, who ſtabbed Ferdinand King of Spain into the throat: and though indeed the wound was not mortal; yet it ſhewed that he had both reſolution and opportunity ſufficient to have killed him: the next is of a Turkiſh Dervis, who drew a dagger upon Bajazet, father of the preſent Sultan, with which he ſtruck at him, but miſſed his blow. From theſe inſtances, and many others of the ſame kind, which it would be tedious to enumerate, we may conclude that there are many perſons who wiſh to take the ſame revenge upon Princes that have injured them, (as there is no dangen in wiſhing) though few have courage to attempt it: for ſince hardly any one that ventures to ſtrike ſuch a blow, eſcapes being cut to pieces upon the ſpot, it deters people from embarking in an undertaking wherein they are almoſt ſure to periſh. So much for the reſolution and attempts of a ſingle perſon: let us now proceed to Conſpiracies, in which more are concerned.

We find in Hiſtory that Conſpiracies are always formed and conducted either by great men, or ſuch as are intimate with their Prince: no other

ſort

ſort of men can think of conſpiring, except they be fools; becauſe private people, and ſuch as have not the opportunity of frequent acceſs to him, muſt want all thoſe means and conveniencies that are neceſſary for the execution of ſuch deſigns. In the firſt place, they cannot meet with others that will be faithful to them; as they have nothing to give them, nor is it in their power to buoy them up with ſuch hopes and promiſes as generally make men ready and willing to expoſe themſelves to great dangers, when it is well known they are not able to fulfil them: ſo that when the ſecret is communicated to three or four perſons, ſome one of them betrays the reſt, and they are all ruined. But, ſuppoſing they ſhould not be betrayed; yet they muſt have ſo many obſtacles and impediments to encounter when they come to the point of execution (not having free acceſs to their Prince) that it is not poſſible they ſhould ſucceed: for, if great men, and ſuch as meet with a ready admiſſion into his preſence, find many ſuch difficulties as we ſhall mention below, it may reaſonably be expected, that thoſe of meaner condition muſt find infinitely more and greater. Such men therefore, when they are not abſolutely reduced to deſpair by the certainty of loſing either their lives or their eſtates, may be outragiouſly provoked at their Prince indeed; but conſidering they are too weak to revenge themſelves, they generally vent their rage in libels and curſes, and leave it to men who have greater abilities and fairer opportunities to avenge their cauſe: for if any one is hardy enough to attempt it himſelf, without waiting for ſuch aſſiſtance, it may truly be ſaid of him, that his courage is greater than his prudence.

All Conſpiracies therefore have been formed by great men and favourites of Princes; of whom, as many have been encouraged to it by being too much careſſed, as thoſe that have been provoked to it by ſuffering the ſevereſt injuries: as we might ſhew at large from the ingratitude of Perennius to Commodus, Plautianus to Severus, and Sejanus to Tiberius, who had all been advanced to ſuch honours, authority, and riches, by their reſpective maſters, that they wanted nothing but the title of Emperors: and as they aſpired to that alſo, they engaged in conſpiracies againſt their Princes, and all met with the fate they juſtly deſerved. That indeed, which was formed not long ago by Giacopo Appiano againſt Pietro Gambacorti, Lord of Piſa, was more ſucceſsful: for, though Appiano had been brought up, careſſed, and preferred to great eminence by him, he depoſed his benefactor, and ſeized upon the Government. Another attempt of this kind happened in our own times, when Coppola conſpired againſt Ferdinand, King of Arragon, who had heaped ſo many favours upon him, and exalted him to ſuch a degree of power, that he ſeemed to be King himſelf in every thing elſe but the name; but not content with that, he loſt his life by graſping

ing

ing at the crown. Now if ſucceſs may reaſonably be expected in any plot that is carried on by great men againſt Princes, that ſurely is moſt likely to ſucceed, which is conducted by thoſe whoſe authority is almoſt equal to that of the Prince himſelf, and who have all the opportunities and conveniencies they can wiſh for: but the ſame eagerneſs to become Sovereigns, which dazzles them in forming ſuch projects, likewiſe blinds them when they come to put them in execution: for, if they could conduct them with prudence and coolneſs, it would be impoſſible they ſhould miſcarry.

A Prince therefore, who would preſerve himſelf from ſuch dangers, ſhould be more upon his guard againſt thoſe whom he has honoured with very great favours and authority, than thoſe whom he has injured, though ever ſo grievouſly: as the former have many opportunities of hurting him, but the latter can have few or none; and their motives are equal; for the deſire of reigning is at leaſt as ſtrong as that of revenge. He ought never to give ſuch a degree of power to any favourite, as to make no difference betwixt that and his own; but to leave an interval, as it were, and ſomething more to be wiſhed for; leſt, if he ſhould not be content with what he had, he ſhould aſpire immediately to the crown; otherwiſe he muſt be greatly befriended by fortune, if he does not meet with the ſame fate which the Princes did whom we have juſt now mentioned. But to reſume the order of our diſcourſe. ——As thoſe that engage in Conſpiracies muſt be great men, and have free acceſs to their Prince, I ſhall ſay ſomething of the event of ſuch undertakings, and the cauſes or circumſtances that contribute either to their ſucceſs or miſcarriage. And ſince they are always attended with great danger, both before, and after, as well as in the article of execution, (as I have already ſaid) very few of them ſucceed; it being almoſt impoſſible that ſomething ſhould not happen, in one or other of thoſe three periods, that muſt render them abortive.——To begin with the firſt and moſt important. The Conſpirators muſt be very lucky as well as artful, if their deſign is not diſcovered whilſt it is carrying on: as it eaſily may be, either by the information of ſome, or the ſuſpicion and conjectures of others. Now ſuch diſcoveries are owing either to the want of fidelity or caution in the accomplices: the former of which may eaſily be accounted for; becauſe ſuch deſigns are never communicated but to ſuch as you either have ſo much confidence in, that you think they will cheerfully run the riſque of their lives for your ſake, or are diſaffected to their Prince: and though ſuch a degree of fidelity may be found perhaps in one or two perſons, yet when the ſecret comes to be imparted to numbers, it is impoſſible they ſhould all prove true to you: for great indeed muſt be their affection, if the proſpect of ſuch dangers, and the fear of death is not more powerful in them. Be-

ſides men are often deceived in the friendſhip which they think others have for them: nor can they be ſure of it, except they have ſufficiently tried them before; and experiments of this kind would certainly be very hazardous: for though you may have had ſome proofs of their fidelity in other things of truſt and importance, you are not upon that account to depend upon their fidelity in theſe matters, becauſe they are attended with infinitely more danger and terror. But if you build your hopes upon their diſaffection to their Prince; in this likewiſe you are liable to be fatally miſtaken: for as ſoon as you have opened your deſigns to ſuch people, you give them an opportunity of obtaining his favour; and then ſurely their diſcontent muſt either be very great, or your influence over them exceeding powerful, if they continue any longer ſteddy to you. Hence it is, that ſo many conſpiracies have been diſcovered and nipped in the very bud; and that when any one has been kept private a conſiderable time, it has been looked upon as next to a miracle; eſpecially where many were concerned in it; as there were in that of Piſo againſt Nero, and lately in that of the Pazzi againſt Lorenzo, and Giuliano de' Medici at Florence; to which, above fifty perſons were privy, and yet it was not diſcovered till it came to be put in execution.

It likewiſe happens, that conſpiracies are ſometimes diſcovered from want of proper caution and diſcretion in the Conſpirators; that is, when any of them either chances to talk of their deſigns with ſo little reſerve, that they are overheard by a ſervant or other perſon; as it happened to the ſons of Brutus, whoſe negotiations with Tarquin's Ambaſſadors were brought to light in that manner; or when they lightly diſcloſe them to ſome careleſs perſon whom they love; as Dymnus did, who having joined in a conſpiracy with Philotas againſt Alexander the Great, inadvertently blabbed it out to Nicomachus, a boy whom he was fond of, who preſently carried it to Cebalinus his brother, and Cebalinus to the King.

As to diſcoveries that ariſe from ſuſpicions and conjectures, we have an inſtance in the Piſonian conſpiracy againſt Nero: for Scevinus, one of the Conſpirators, having made his will the day before Nero was to have been diſpatched, ordered Melichus his freedman, to whet an old ruſty dagger, which he had, made all his ſlaves free, diſtributed ſums of money amongſt them, and cauſed ſeveral bandages and pledgets for wounds to be got in readineſs: from all which preparations, Melichius ſuſpecting that ſomething extraordinary was in hand, went and informed Nero of it, who cauſed Scevinus to be immediately apprehended, and then ſecured Natales, another of the Conſpirators, with whom he had been ſeen talking in private for a long time together the day before: and as they did not agree when they were examined, in the account which they gave of that converſation, they were forced at laſt to diſcover

ver the whole, by which all thoſe that had any ſhare in it were utterly ruined. It is impoſſible therefore to prevent diſcoveries being occaſioned, either by want of fidelity, or of prudence, and caution, whenever the accomplices exceed the number of three or four: and if more than one of thoſe ſhould be taken up on ſuſpicion, and examined, the whole muſt come out, ſince they cannot poſſibly agree in the ſame ſtory: one man indeed, if he is a perſon of great reſolution, may perhaps conceal his aſſociates; but if they likewiſe have not as much courage as himſelf, they will be apt to betray themſelves by flight: for if their courage ſhould fail (whether it is in him that is taken up, or in them that are ſtill at liberty) the conſpiracy muſt infallibly be diſcovered. There is indeed a very rare and uncommon example of fidelity to each other amongſt thoſe that conſpired againſt Hieronymus, King of Syracuſe: for though, according to Livy, one of them, named Theodorus, was apprehended, and put to the torture, he reſolutely concealed the names of his accomplices, and accuſed ſome of the King's friends: whilſt the other Conſpirators for their parts had ſuch confidence in the courage and conſtancy of Theodorus, that not ſo much as one of them either fled out of the City, or betrayed the leaſt ſign of fear.——Such are the dangers that occur in forming a conſpiracy and conducting it to execution: and as there are dangers, there are alſo ſome ways of guarding againſt them.

The firſt, the ſafeſt, and perhaps, the only one, is not to give your accomplices time to diſcover you: for which purpoſe, they ſhould not be made privy to your deſign till it is upon the very point of execution: thoſe that obſerve this rule will at leaſt eſcape the dangers that muſt otherwiſe happen whilſt the plot is carrying on, and very often the reſt: for indeed, one may venture to ſay, that all the conſpiracies that have been thus conducted, have ſucceeded; and that it is in any wiſe man's power to act in the ſame manner. Let two or three examples ſuffice. Nelematus not being able to bear with the tyranny of Ariſtotimus, King of Epirus, any longer, aſſembled ſeveral of his relations and friends in his own houſe, and exhorting them to deliver their country, ſome of them deſired time to conſider of it, and make neceſſary preparations for ſuch an undertaking: upon which, he ordered his ſervants to lock the doors, and proteſted that if they would not take an oath to proceed directly to execution, he would deliver them all up priſoners to Ariſtotimus: being terrified therefore, with theſe menaces, they all took the oath, and following him out of the houſe, immediately fell upon the Tyrant, and happily recovered their liberties by the conduct of Nelematus. The next is of one of the Magi, who had got poſſeſſion of the Kingdom of Perſia by artifice; but the cheat being diſcovered by Ortanus, a Nobleman of that Kingdom, he privately con-

ferred with ſix other great men, and conjured them to aſſiſt him in endeavouring to kill the Uſurper, and ſet their country free: ſome of them however ſeeming rather ſcrupulous about the matter, and deſiring further time to think of it, Darius (one of the ſix whom he had called together) got up and ſaid, "Either reſolve to do it inſtantly, or I will inform againſt you all;" which had ſuch an effect upon them, that without any further delay or heſitation, they unanimouſly determined to concur with him, and ſucceeded in the enterprize. The method which the Etolians took to rid themſelves of Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, was not unlike the two examples juſt quoted: for they ſent Alexamenes, one of their Citizens, with thirty horſe and two hundred foot, as auxiliaries; but communicated the ſecret to Alexamenes alone, whoſe commands they ordered all the reſt to obey without exception, on penalty of perpetual exile. Alexamenes accordingly marched to Sparta; and not communicating his commiſſion to any one till he had an opportunity of executing it, ſoon found means to diſpatch the Tyrant. In this manner all the perſons abovementioned eſcaped the dangers that uſually occur, in bringing conſpiracies to maturity; as others may likewiſe do by following their ſteps, which is in every one's power, as I ſhall ſhew from the example of Piſo alone (amongſt many others) whom I have mentioned before. Piſo was a man of great diſtinction, and in ſuch confidence with Nero, that the latter went frequently to dine and ſup with him in his gardens: he therefore, as a great man, might eaſily have introduced ſome of his friends into the gardens whilſt Nero was there: but ſuch only as he knew to be men of reſolution, and fit for an undertaking of that kind: after which, he might ſuddenly have communicated to them his deſign of aſſaſſinating the Emperor immediately, and prevailed upon them to aſſiſt in the affair, when they had not time to demur, and the opportunity was ſo fair, that it was impoſſible it ſhould miſcarry. And if we conſider other conſpiracies, we ſhall find that there have not been many which might not have been ſucceſsfully conducted to execution in ſome ſuch a manner; but as few men are ſufficiently converſant either in Hiſtory, or the affairs of the world, they often are guilty of great errors; eſpecially in undertakings of ſo extraordinary a nature as thoſe we are ſpeaking of.

A plot then ſhould never be communicated to any, except when it becomes abſolutely neceſſary, and is ripe for execution: and if it does become abſolutely neceſſary, it ſhould be communicated to one man only, who has either ſufficiently convinced you of his fidelity by many repeated trials, or has had as much provocation to conſpire as yourſelf: for it is an eaſier matter to find one man that will be faithful to you than a number, and conſequently there muſt be leſs danger of being diſcovered. Beſides, if he ſhould betray you, you will even in that caſe

have

have a better chance to ſave yourſelf, than when more are concerned: for I have heard wiſe men ſay, you may truſt one perſon alone with any ſecret, if you are not drawn in to write ſomething with your own hand which may afterwards be produced in evidence againſt you: and that ought moſt carefully to be avoided; becauſe then the poſitive denial of one man, will have as much weight as the affirmation of another: but if your own hand-writing appears againſt you, you are undone; for there can be no ſtronger teſtimony of your guilt. Plautianus having formed a deſign to kill the Emperor Severus and his Son Antoninus, communicated the affair to Saturninus, one of the Tribunes; who inſtead of concurring with him, was reſolved to diſcover it to the Emperor: but as he was afraid that when he came to make good his charge, Plautianus would meet with more credit than himſelf, he deſired to have the particulars of the matter in writing to conſider of; that ſo there might be no doubt concerning the truth of his information. Plautianus therefore, blinded by ambition, raſhly gave him the particulars he demanded in his own hand writing, which afterwards ſerved to convict him [p]: whereas, without that proof and ſome other circumſtances to confirm it, he would have baffled the Tribune, as he boldly and poſitively aſſerted his innocence: from whence it appears that there is ſome ſecurity againſt the accuſation of one perſon only, when a man cannot be convicted by his own writing, or ſome other ſtrong and circumſtantial proofs; which he ought to guard againſt with particular care. In the Piſonian conſpiracy a woman was concerned whoſe name was Epicharis, and who had been one of Nero's miſtreſſes. This woman finding it neceſſary to draw a certain Captain of Nero's guards into the plot, acquainted him with the affair, but concealed the names of the conſpirators: ſo that although the Captain betrayed her, and informed Nero of the deſign, ſhe denied it with ſuch firmneſs that the Emperor was confounded, and ſhe eſcaped with impunity. Whoever then imparts a ſecret of this kind to one man alone, and that too by word of mouth only, has but two things to apprehend: the firſt is, that he may voluntarily inform againſt him; and the next, that he may do it after he has been taken up himſelf, either upon ſome ſuſpicion or diſcovery of his own actions, and forced to accuſe him by torture: in both which caſes he may in ſome meaſure defend himſelf: for in one, he may pretend that it is owing to private malice in the informer; and in the other, he may alledge that the accuſation is falſe and extorted by the extremity of pain. It is the beſt way however either not to truſt any body at all with ſuch a deſign, till it is ready for execution, but to imitate the example of ſome whom we have mentioned above; or, if it

[p] In this manner Catiline likewiſe was convicted.

ſhould

ſhould become abſolutely neceſſary to do ſo before that time, not to diſcloſe it to more than one, if it be poſſible to avoid it: for if there be ſome danger even in that, there is certainly much more in making many privy to it. Such is the conduct generally obſerved (as nearly as time and circumſtances will admit) by thoſe who find that if they do not kill their Prince he will certainly kill them: in which caſe, the neceſſity is ſo urgent that they have nothing to do but to provide immediately for their own ſafety: and theſe ſudden reſolutions are commonly ſucceſsful, as may appear from the two following examples.

The perſons in whom the Emperor Commodus put moſt confidence were Letus and Electus, two Captains of the Prætorian bands, and Marcia, his favourite Miſtreſs. But as they ſometimes took the liberty of repreſenting to him how much he debaſed both himſelf and his authority by his ſcandalous courſe of life, he reſolved to put them to death: in conſequence of which, he wrote down their names, and thoſe of ſome others whom he deſigned to have diſpatched the next night, upon a piece of paper, which he laid under his pillow: but going out of his apartment to bathe, a boy whom he was fond of happening to be left behind, took up the pillow, and finding the paper, carried it into another room, where he was met by Marcia, who took it out of his hand and read it. Upon which, ſhe immediately ſent for Letus and Electus, and acquainting them with the danger they were all in, they killed him that very evening. The next inſtance, relates to Antoninus Caracalla; who being in Meſopotamia with his army, had appointed Macrinus his Lieutenant there; a man more converſant in civil intrigues than military affairs. And as the Emperor, like all bad Princes, was conſcious of his own demerits, and ſuſpected that ſome conſpiracy was forming againſt him, he wrote to his friend Maternianus at Rome, deſiring him to conſult the Aſtrologers about it, and to let him know what they ſaid. In anſwer to which, Maternianus ſent him word that he had obeyed his orders, and that the Aſtrologers ſaid Macrinus aſpired to the Empire: but as the letter fell into the hands of Macrinus inſtead of the Emperor, the Lieutenant finding he muſt either kill his Maſter, before he could receive any other letters from Rome, or be killed himſelf, ordered Martialis, a Centurion who was firmly attached to his intereſts, (and whoſe brother Caracalla had put to death but a few days before) to diſpatch him; which he accordingly did without any difficulty or oppoſition. We ſee then, that when the neceſſity is ſo preſſing that it allows no time for deliberation, it has the ſame effect in a manner with the method taken by Nelematus to get rid of the Tyrant of Epirus: we likewiſe ſee the truth of what I laid down in the beginning of this diſcourſe, viz. that threats are more prejudicial to Princes, and occaſion more dangerous conſpiracies, than the actual commiſſion of violence:

lence: upon which account, a Prince ought ſtudiouſly to avoid making uſe of them; and either to careſs thoſe whom he ſuſpects, and make them his friends by kind and beneficent meaſures; or to ſecure himſelf againſt them ſome other way; but never to reduce them to ſuch a deſperate condition, that they muſt either kill him or be killed themſelves.

As to the dangers which attend the execution of a plot, they ariſe either from ſome ſudden change in the plan and order of it, or want of courage in thoſe that are to ſtrike the finiſhing ſtroke, or ſome blunder, or laſtly, from doing things by halves, and leaving ſome of thoſe alive, who were marked out for ſlaughter. For with regard to the firſt caſe, there is nothing that occaſions ſo much confuſion and perplexity amongſt conſpirators, as an unforeſeen change in the firſt eſtabliſhed plan and order of executing a conſpiracy: and if theſe ſudden alterations are prejudicial at any time, they muſt be particularly ſo in military operations, but more eſpecially in ſuch enterprizes as we are now ſpeaking of: for in caſes of this nature, nothing is more neceſſary than that every man ſhould know the part he is to act; that ſo he may thoroughly prepare himſelf for it: becauſe when men have once duly ſettled theſe matters with themſelves and dwelt upon them ſome time, and determined to proceed accordingly, they muſt of neceſſity be embarraſſed to ſuch a degree upon any variation of orders when the moment of execution draws nigh, that every thing will be turned upſide down, and all their deſigns entirely defeated: ſo that it is much better to proceed according to the plan firſt eſtabliſhed, though it may be attended with ſome inconveniencies, than to run into more and greater by reverſing it; as you muſt do of courſe when the neceſſity is urgent, and the time for action cloſe at hand; but when there is time ſufficient to alter your meaſures, and lay a new ſcheme, you may change them as you think proper. The Conſpiracy in which the Pazzi engaged againſt Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici at Florence, is freſh in every one's memory. According to the firſt deſign they were to be invited to dine with the Cardinal of St. George, and there to be aſſaſſinated. In this plot, every man had his particular part aſſigned him; ſome were appointed to kill them, ſome to ſeize upon the Palace, and others to ſcour the ſtreets, and excite the people to take up arms for the recovery of their liberties. But whilſt the Pazzi, the Medici, and the Cardinal were at their devotions in the Cathedral one day, the Conſpirators received intelligence that Giuliano could not dine with the Cardinal at the time appointed: upon which, they aſſembled together and reſolved to kill them in the Church. But this entirely diſconcerted the order of their plan; for Giovanni Battiſta da Monteſecco, who was to have been one of the perſons that were to ſtab the Medici, peremptorily refuſed to do it in the Church: ſo that they were forced to employ others in the execution;

who

who not having time to compoſe themſelves ſufficiently for the commiſſion of ſuch a deed, were guilty of ſo many blunders, that they all periſhed in it.

Want of courage in the time of execution proceeds either from reverence to the perſon that is to be diſpatched, or baſeneſs and puſillanimity in the Conſpirators: for the preſence and Majeſty of ſome Princes inſpire the beholders with a ſort of reverential awe and veneration, which ſometimes either damp the reſolution or mollify the reſentment of their enemies. When Marius was taken by the Minturnians, a Slave was ſent to put him to death in priſon: but when the wretch came to execute his commiſſion, he was ſtruck with the preſence of ſo great a man, and the remembrance of his actions, in ſuch a manner, that his heart failed him, and he had not the courage to kill him. Now if the preſence of a man in priſon, in diſtreſs and miſery, had ſuch an effect; that of a Prince attended by his Courtiers, in full power, and all the pomp of Royalty, muſt certainly ſtrike an awe into the boldeſt and ſoften the hardeſt heart. A conſpiracy being formed againſt Sitalcis King of Thrace, a day was fixed for the execution: but when the accomplices met at the place where he then reſided, not one of them offering to move, they all returned without making any attempt, blaming and laying the fault upon each other, without being able to aſſign any reaſon for not having executed their deſign. The ſame thing happened to them ſeveral times afterwards: ſo that the Conſpiracy being diſcovered at laſt, they were all put to death, after they had had ſo many opportunities of killing their Prince. Alphonſo Duke of Ferrara had two brothers who conſpired againſt him, and were joined by one Giannes, a Prieſt and ſinging man in the Duke's Chapel: and though this man had often brought the Duke into their company at their own requeſt, and given them an opportunity of aſſaſſinating him, as they deſigned, yet neither of them having the heart to attempt it, they were diſcovered, and puniſhed as they juſtly deſerved. Now this irreſolution in Conſpirators ariſes either from the reverence with which the preſence of a Prince inſpires them, or from his courteſy and affability which takes off the edge of their revenge. But the blunders and miſcarriages which often happen in the execution of conſpiracies are owing either to raſhneſs or terror, both which blind the underſtanding and occaſion ſuch a hurry and trepidation of Spirit, that they make men both ſay and do things which they ought not to do. Livy, ſpeaking of Alexamenes the Etolian, who delivered his country from the Tyranny of Nabis the Spartan, ſays that when he had opened his deſign to his Soldiers, and was juſt going to put it in execution, *collegit & ipſe animum, confuſum tantæ cogitatione rei, he collected his Spirits together, which had been in ſome meaſure diſconcerted, by reflecting upon the execution of ſo great a deſign:*

deſign: and indeed it is almoſt impoſſible that any one, though ever ſo reſolute and accuſtomed to bloodſhed, ſhould be altogether calm and unmoved upon ſuch occaſions. It is neceſſary therefore in undertakings of this kind to make uſe of men that have been ſufficiently hardened and tried before, and to truſt no others, how courageous ſoever they may be accounted: for no man can anſwer even for his own reſolution, if he has not thoroughly proved it before; as the confuſion he muſt naturally be in at ſuch a time may either make him drop the dagger out of his hand, or ſay ſomething which may have the ſame effect. Lucilla, Siſter to Commodus, having ſpirited up Quintianus to kill her brother, he waited for him as he came to the Amphitheatre, and ſtepping up towards him with a drawn dagger in his hand, told him *the Senate had ſent him that:* upon which, he was immediately ſeized before he could get near enough to ſtab him. Antonio da Volterra being fixed upon to kill Lorenzo de' Medici, cried out, as he advanced towards him, *Hah Traitor!* which proved the preſervation of Lorenzo, and the ruin of the Conſpiracy.

If then the event of conſpiracies is very precarious when they are directed againſt one man only, it muſt of neceſſity be much more ſo, when they are directed againſt two; indeed in ſuch a caſe it would be folly to entertain the leaſt expectation of ſucceſs: for to execute ſuch a thing in two different places at the ſame time is next to impoſſible: and if it is attempted at different times, one attempt will defeat the other; ſo that conſpiring againſt one Prince is a doubtful, dangerous, and imprudent undertaking; but to conſpire againſt two at the ſame time, muſt either be downright folly or madneſs; and was it not out of the great opinion I have of the Author, I could not believe what Herodian ſays of Plautianus, when he tells us that he ordered one ſingle Centurion, whoſe name was Saturninus, to aſſaſſinate both Severus and Antoninus, though they lived in different places: for it ſeems ſo ſtrange a thing, and ſo inconſiſtent with reaſon and common ſenſe, that nothing but the authority of ſo noble an Hiſtorian could ever perſuade me to give any credit to it. In a Conſpiracy that was formed by ſome young Athenians againſt the two Tyrants Diocles and Hippias, the former was killed; but the latter eſcaped and revenged his death. Chiones and Leonides, two of Plato's diſciples, conſpired againſt Clearchus and Satirus, Tyrants of Heraclea, and diſpatched Clearchus, but Satirus ſaved himſelf, and puniſhed the Conſpirators: and the Pazzi, whom we have ſo often mentioned, killed Giuliano de' Medici only. A man therefore ought carefully to avoid engaging in a conſpiracy againſt more than one ſuch perſon at the ſame time; otherwiſe he will neither do himſelf, nor his friends, nor his country, any ſervice, but rather much prejudice; for thoſe that eſcape will afterwards become more tyrannical and inſup-

portable, as it happened after the abovementioned conſpiracies at Florence, Athens, and Heraclea. The ſucceſs indeed of that conſpiracy in which Pelopidas engaged to ſet the Thebans free, was wonderful, becauſe he had all manner of difficulties and dangers to encounter; and yet he ſurmounted them all: for inſtead of two Tyrants, he had ten to deal with; he was ſo far from being a favourite, or having free acceſs to them, that he was in baniſhment: nevertheleſs he found means not only to get admiſſion into Thebes, but to kill the Tyrants, and reſtore the liberties of his country: but this could not have been effected without the aſſiſtance and co-operation of Charon, one of the Tyrant's Counſellors, who let him into the City and furniſhed him with an opportunity of executing his deſigns. It would be very dangerous however for any man to build upon the ſucceſs of this conſpiracy; which indeed was almoſt miraculous, and is mentioned by all writers that ſpeak of it, as not only a rare, but almoſt unexampled event.

Conſpiracies are likewiſe ſometimes defeated when they are juſt upon the point of execution, by ſome groundleſs ſuſpicion, or unexpected accident. The very morning that Brutus and the other Conſpirators were to aſſaſſinate Julius Cæſar, it happened that the latter had a long converſation with Popilius Lenas, one of their accomplices; which being obſerved by the reſt, they ſuſpected he had diſcovered their deſign to Cæſar: upon which, they determined not to wait till Cæſar came into the Senate, but to kill him immediately: and they would actually have done it, if they had not found they had no reaſon for ſuch a ſuſpicion, when they perceived there was no alteration in his countenance after the converſation was ended. Such ſuſcipions then ought to be well weighed and conſidered; eſpecially as they are very common: for when a man who knows himſelf guilty ſees people talking together, he naturally imagines they are talking of him; and ſometimes a word or two overheard by chance (though ſpoken with a very different intention) preſently throws him into an alarm; as he thinks they allude to his affair: the uſual conſequence of which is, that he either diſcovers it by running away, or defeats it by too precipitate an execution; eſpecially if he has many accomplices.

As to accidents, they are ſo various, and often ſo ſudden and unexpected, that no certain rule can be laid down how to prevent them. Let it ſuffice then to give an inſtance of one only, and to warn men to guard againſt them as well as they can. Julio Belanti of Siena (whom we have mentioned before) was ſo provoked at Pandolpho, who had firſt given him his daughter in marriage, and then taken her away from him again, that he reſolved to murder him: and as Pandolpho went every day by his door to ſee one of his relations that was ſick, the other having got a parcel of armed men together at his own houſe for

that

that purpoſe, placed one of them to watch at a window and give him notice when Pandolpho came by. However, as it happened, when Pandolpho drew near the houſe, and the man had given Julio notice of it, he met an acquaintance who ſtopped him: but ſome of his attendants going forwards and hearing a great buſtle and noiſe in the houſe, diſcovered the deſign: ſo that Pandolpho eſcaped, and Julio and his accomplices were forced to fly their country: all which was owing to accident. But as accidents are often ſudden and unexpected, as well as various, no particular remedy can be preſcribed: all that a man can do, is to conſider what is moſt likely to happen, and to make the beſt proviſion againſt it that lies in his power.

It now remains only to ſay ſomething of what is to be apprehended after a Conſpiracy has actually been carried into execution: and in that caſe indeed there is little or nothing to be feared, except ſomebody is left alive that may probably revenge the death of the Prince who has been killed; as his brothers, ſons, or others who have a right to ſucceed him in the Government. Now this is generally owing either to want of proper care in the Conſpirators, or to ſome one or other of the reaſons which we have already given: as it happened in the Caſe of Giovanni Lampognano and his accomplices; who having killed the Duke of Milan, left his Son and two brothers alive, who afterwards revenged his death [q]: and indeed there is ſomething to be ſaid in favour of Conſpirators in ſuch caſes; as it is not always in their power to prevent it: but when it proceeds from their own imprudence or want of due care, there is no excuſe to be made for them. Some of the inhabitants of Forli who had killed Count Girolamo, their Lord, afterwards ſecured his Counteſs Catharina and two of his children: but not thinking themſelves ſecure, except they could get poſſeſſion of the Caſtle, which the Governor refuſed to deliver up, the Counteſs told them, that if they would let her go to him there, ſhe would make him ſurrender immediately; and that ſhe would leave her children with them as hoſtages for the performance of her promiſe: upon which, they ſuffered her to go. But as ſoon as ſhe was ſafe in the Caſtle, ſhe got upon the walls, and not only reproached them moſt bitterly with the murder of her huſband, but threatened to take the ſevereſt revenge that lay in her power: and to convince them that ſhe was not to be reſtrained from it by any affection to her children, ſhe ſo far forgot the modeſty of her Sex, that ſhe pulled up her cloths, and told them ſhe was ſtill young enough to have more: ſo that the Conſpirators perceiving their error when it was too late, and not knowing what other courſe to take, were forced to leave their country and ſpend the reſt of their lives in exile [r].

[q] See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book VII. towards the end.
[r] See the ſame Hiſtory, towards the end of Book VIII.

But of all the dangers that may happen after the execution of a plot, that which is moſt to be dreaded and moſt difficult to eſcape, is when the Prince that is killed was much beloved by his Subjects: for then it is impoſſible for the Conſpirators to ſave themſelves: as may appear from the death of Julius Cæſar, which was ſoon revenged by the Roman people, becauſe they adored his memory: for the Conſpirators being driven out of the City and ſcattered about the world, ſome of them periſhed in one manner, and ſome in another.

Conſpiracies againſt a Republican Government are not attended with ſo much danger to the accomplices as thoſe againſt Princes: for in forming them the riſque is not ſo great, in the point of execution it is but equal, and after that there is none at all. In forming them the danger is not ſo great, becauſe any ſubject may aſpire to the Government, and lay his ſchemes without communicating them to any body elſe: after which, if they are not fruſtrated by ſome new law, he muſt ſucceed in them; and if they are, he has nothing to do but to wait for another opportunity and to take different meaſures. This however is to be underſtood only of a Republic that is become in ſome degree corrupt: for in one that is not ſo, there can be no hopes of ſucceſs in ſuch deſigns; as there is nothing either to occaſion or encourage them: and therefore no particular man will harbour any thoughts of that kind. But in thoſe that are corrupt, there are many ways and means by which a Subject may aſpire to Sovereignty without expoſing himſelf to any great danger: for in the firſt place, all Republics are not only more tardy and phlegmatic in their operations than Princes, but likewiſe more free from ſuſpicion, and conſequently not ſo much upon their guard: and in the next, they ſhew more tenderneſs and reſpect to their great men, which makes them bolder and more enterprizing. Every body that has read the Hiſtory of Catiline's conſpiracy written by Salluſt, muſt remember that Catiline not only continued in Rome after the conſpiracy was diſcovered, but came into the Senate, and inſulted both the Senators and the Conſul: and that after he had left the City and was at the head of an army, Lentulus and the reſt of the Conſpirators would not have been taken up, if the ſtrongeſt proofs of their guilt had not appeared from Letters in their own hand-writing: ſuch was the lenity with which that Commonwealth treated its Subjects. Hanno, a Citizen of very great power and authority in Carthage, deſigning to make himſelf Sovereign over it, invited the whole Senate to a great entertainment which he had made to celebrate the marriage of his daughter, with an intention to poiſon them all and to ſeize upon the Government: and though his deſign was diſcovered, the Senate did not think fit to inflict any puniſhment upon him; but contented themſelves, with making a Law only to reſtrain the expences of ſuch feaſts for the future:

which

which ſhews what regard they had for Citizens of his diſtinction. It is true the execution of a Conſpiracy againſt the liberty of one's country, is attended with many great difficulties and dangers: becauſe it ſeldom happens that a perſon who conſpires againſt ſuch numbers of people, has ſtrength enough to inſure ſucceſs; ſince it is not every one that has an army at command, as Julius Cæſar, Agathocles, Cleomenes, and ſome others had; by the aſſiſtance of which, they preſently enſlaved their country, without either difficulty or danger. But others who have no army to ſupport them, and yet aſpire to Sovereignty, muſt either have recourſe to artifice, or call in foreign aſſiſtance: of the former caſe, we have an inſtance in the conduct of Piſiſtratus the Athenian, who having made himſelf very popular by the victory which he had gained over the Megarians, appeared in public one day all over blood, and pretended, he had been wounded and otherwiſe abuſed by ſome of the Nobility, out of the envy they bore him; upon which account, he deſired a guard might be allowed him for the ſecurity of his perſon; which being granted, he availed himſelf of it in ſuch a manner, that he ſoon became abſolute. Pandolpho Petrucci, at his return to Siena with ſome others who had been baniſhed from thence, was made Captain of the palace-guards, a poſt which was thought to be of ſo little conſequence that ſeveral had refuſed it: nevertheleſs, he acquired ſuch a degree of authority and reputation in a while, by the command which he had over thoſe guards, that at laſt he ſeized upon the Government. Many others likewiſe, by ſuch like arts, have ſucceeded in the ſame manner, without expoſing themſelves to much danger. But thoſe who have endeavoured to overturn the conſtitution of the country, either by dint of their own ſtrength, or calling in foreign aſſiſtance, have ſucceeded accordingly as they were befriended by fortune. Catiline periſhed in the attempt: Hanno, having failed in his deſign to poiſon the Senate, armed ſeveral thouſands of his partizans, but they were all killed as well as their Chief. Some of the principal Citizens of Thebes who had conſpired againſt their Country, called in a Spartan army to their aid, and made themſelves Tyrants over it; ſo that if we examine the event of all the Conſpiracies which men have engaged in againſt their Country, we ſhall find that few or none have been cruſhed whilſt they were forming; but that the ſucceſs or miſcarriage of them all has wholly depended upon the execution; which being once over, the Conſpirators are ſubject to no other dangers than thoſe that are naturally incident to a tyrannical government: againſt which, there are no other means to ſecure one's ſelf, but what have been already mentioned.

This is all that I have to ſay of Conſpiracies: and if I have ſpoken of thoſe only that are executed by the ſword, without taking any notice of ſuch as are attempted by poiſon, it is becauſe they

ducted in the ſame manner, and have the ſame event. It is true indeed, that poiſoning is attended with more danger, and more uncertain than the other method: becauſe very few people have an opportunity of doing it, and therefore they muſt employ others that have; which makes it very hazardous. Beſides, the doſe may not prove mortal; as it happened not to be in the attempt upon Commodus, who throwing the poiſon up again, which the Conſpirators had given him, they were forced after all to ſtrangle him. There is nothing therefore which Princes ought to dread ſo much as Conſpiracies; ſince they generally loſe either their life or their reputation by them: for if a Conſpiracy ſucceeds, they are killed; but if they diſcover it, and put the Conſpirators to death, it is often looked upon as a trick of ſtate, and a contrivance in the Prince, to gratify either his avarice or his cruelty, with the blood or eſtates of his Subjects. I cannot conclude this diſcourſe, however, without adviſing all Princes and Republics, upon the diſcovery of a Conſpiracy againſt them, carefully to examine into the nature of it, and to compare the ſtrength of the Conſpirators with their own, before they proceed to puniſh them: and if they find them many and powerful, not to take any notice of the matter, till they are ſufficiently able to cruſh them [*f*]: otherwiſe, they muſt inevitably be ruined themſelves. They ſhould therefore have recourſe to diſſimulation upon ſuch occaſions; leſt the Conſpirators, when they find themſelves diſcovered, ſhould grow deſperate, and proceed directly to execution. The Romans having left two legions at Capua to defend it againſt the Samnites, the Commanders of thoſe forces formed a deſign to make themſelves maſters of that place [*t*], which being diſcovered by the Romans, they ordered Rutilius, one of the Conſuls, to take proper care to prevent it. The Conſul therefore, in order to lull them into ſecurity, gave out that the Senate intended to keep them there a conſiderable time: which report being credited, they thought they had no occaſion to be over haſty in the execution of their deſign, but might wait till they had a proper time and opportunity; ſo that they continued quiet till they perceived the Conſul was going to ſeparate them: upon which, they began to ſuſpect his intention, and finding they had no more time to loſe, they immediately ſeized upon the Government. An example very ſuitable to our purpoſe: for, on one hand, we ſee hereby how tardy men are in ſuch affairs whilſt they think themſelves ſecure, and have time enough to put them in execution: and on the other, how active and vigorous when the neceſſity is urgent. Nor can either a Prince or a Republic that is deſirous to conceal their knowledge of a Conſpiracy,

[*f*] As the King of Portugal did lately.
[*t*] See Book II. Chap. xx. of theſe Diſcourſes.

act

act more prudently, than in artfully giving the Conſpirators reaſon to expect they ſhall have a fair opportunity of executing their deſigns at ſome certain time afterwards: that ſo whilſt they are waiting for it, he may have leiſure to provide for his ſafety; and thoſe that have acted otherwiſe, have only haſtened their own ruin, as the Duke of Athens, and Gulielmo de' Pazzi did. For the Duke having ſeized upon the Government of Florence, and being informed that a Conſpiracy was hatching againſt him, immediately cauſed one of the Conſpirators to be apprehended, without making any enquiry into the nature of it; upon which, the reſt preſently took arms, and drove him out of the City [u]. Much like this was the conduct of Gulielmo de' Pazzi, who being Commiſſary for the Florentines in the Vale of Chiana, about the year 1501, and hearing that ſome perſons of Arezzo were conſpiring in favour of the Vitelli, to take that town from the Florentines, he went thither himſelf in all haſte, and inſtead of conſidering the ſtrength of the Conſpirators, and comparing it with his own, or taking other proper meaſures to ſuppreſs them, he followed the advice of his ſon, who was Biſhop of that place, and ordered one of them to be taken up; which ſo alarmed the others, that they inſtantly roſe upon him, and not only made him priſoner, but entirely ſhook off the yoke of the Florentines. But when Conſpiracies are weak and in their infancy, they may, and ought to be ſuppreſſed as ſoon as poſſible: for it would be ſimple in that caſe to follow the examples either of the Duke of Athens, or Dion of Syracuſe; though indeed they acted very different parts upon ſuch an occaſion: for the former cauſed one of the Citizens of Florence to be put to death, who had acquainted him with a Conſpiracy that was carrying on againſt him; to ſhew that he had more confidence in the affection of the Florentines than to believe any ſuch thing: and the latter, in order to diſcover ſome perſons whom he ſuſpected of conſpiring againſt him, gave Calippus, one of his confidants, a commiſſion to join them, under a pretence of ſecret diſaffection and diſguſt. But both theſe artifices proved of fatal conſequence to thoſe that made uſe of them: for one not only deterred people from diſcovering any Conſpiracy, but encouraged them to conſpire: and the other made Dion the head of a conſpiracy againſt himſelf, which ended in his ruin. For Calippus perceiving he might act with ſecurity under that commiſſion, availed himſelf of it in ſuch a manner, that he killed his maſter, and made himſelf King of Syracuſe.

[u] See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book II.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

How it comes to paſs that in changes of States from liberty to ſervitude, and from ſervitude to liberty, ſome are effected without violence or bloodſhed; and others are attended with both.

IT may ſeem ſtrange, perhaps, to many, that in revolutions of State, a free Government ſhould be changed into a Tyranny, and *vice verſâ*, a Tyranny into a free Government, ſometimes without any violence or bloodſhed: and at others, with great ſlaughter and diſturbance: of which we have many inſtances in Hiſtory. Thus when the Roman conſtitution was altered from a Regal to a Conſular Government, no body was either baniſhed or otherwiſe moleſted but the Tarquins. This however may eaſily be accounted for, if we conſider that when a State has been acquired by violence, many muſt have been injured by it, and of conſequence will endeavour to revenge themſelves upon the authors of their ſufferings, whenever any ſuch change happens: from whence much bloodſhed and tumult muſt naturally enſue. But when a Government has been eſtabliſhed by the general conſent of the people, and they afterwards think proper to diſſolve it, they have no occaſion to diſturb or uſe violence to any one elſe, but thoſe whom they have placed at the head of it. Accordingly when the Tarquins were expelled Rome, and the Medici deprived of their authority at Florence in the year 1414, no other perſon whatſoever was injured by it. Such changes therefore are not attended with much danger: but thoſe that are effected by people who have been hurt and deprived of either their power or their properties by the uſurpation of their late Governors, and muſt conſequently be full of revenge, are always very terrible indeed. Hiſtory abounds with examples of this ſort; to which I ſhall therefore refer the reader.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

That whoever would change the form of a Government, ſhould duly conſider the manners and diſpoſition of the people.

I Have already ſhewn elſewhere, that a bad Citizen cannot do much harm in a State that is not corrupted [x], a poſition, which (beſides the arguments there made uſe of to prove it) is fully confirmed by the examples of Spurius Caſſius and Manlius Capitolinus: the former of whom being an ambitious man, and endeavouring to make himſelf popular at Rome, by favouring the Plebeians in the ſale of ſome lands which the Romans had taken from the Hernici, the Senate began to penetrate into his deſigns, and alarmed the people to ſuch a degree, that after he had harangued them one day, and made them an offer of the money, for which the corn was ſold that had lately been imported from Sicily, they poſitively refuſed to accept of it, becauſe they looked upon it as the price of their liberties: whereas, if the people had been corrupt, they would not have refuſed the bribe, but have ſold their country, and made themſelves ſlaves. But the example of Manlius Capitolinus is ſtill more remarkable: from which we may ſee how ſoon the remembrance of all his excellent qualities, and the many great ſervices he had done his country, was extinguiſhed by his inordinate deſire of power, and the envy he bore to Camillus, who ſtood higher in the favour of the people: for being blinded by his ambition, and not content with a private condition, he endeavoured to form a party, and to raiſe tumults at Rome, in oppoſition to the Senate, and the authority of the laws; without conſidering the diſpoſition of his fellow-citizens, and how unfit they were to receive ſuch impreſſions at that time. We may likewiſe ſee from hence, what a degree of perfection there was in the conſtitution of that State, and how much virtue and integrity in the individuals: for when he was accuſed, not ſo much as one of the Nobility offered to defend him, though they had always moſt ſtrenuouſly ſupported each other before, nor did any, even of his own relations, appear in his behalf: and notwithſtanding, it had always been cuſtomary for a man's friends and kinſmen to appear in mourning at thoſe times, and to ſhew all other ſigns of grief and dejection, in order to excite compaſſion, there was not the leaſt ſhew of any ſuch thing. Nay, the Tribunes of the people, who conſtantly uſed to favour the cauſe of

[x] See Book I. of theſe Diſcourſes, Chap. [illegible] *paſſim.*

thoſe whom they thought friends to the public, eſpecially if they were perſecuted by the Nobility, joined heartily with the latter in this caſe againſt one whom they looked upon as a common enemy to them both: and as to the people, though at all times ready enough to ſupport their own rights, and to thwart the Nobility, yet they had no ſmall regard for Manlius; but when the Tribunes cited him to appear before them, and referred his cauſe to their judgment, they condemned him to die without the leaſt conſideration of his former merits. This example then is a moſt evident proof of the rigid and uncorrupted virtue which at that time was to be found in all the different ranks of people in the Roman Commonwealth: for though Manlius was a man of very eminent worth, and had done both his country and many private perſons great and particular ſervices, yet not ſo much as one of his fellow-citizens appeared in his favour, when he was arraigned as a Criminal: for, as the love of their country was more powerful in them than any other conſideration, and they were more affected by the preſent danger, than the memory of his paſt actions, they choſe rather to ſecure their liberties by putting him to death, than to expoſe them to any hazard by ſaving his life: *hunc exitum habuit vir, niſi in liberâ civitate natus eſſet, memorabilis:* ſays Livy, *ſuch was the fate of a man, who would have made himſelf illuſtrious, if he had not been born in a free State.*

We may therefore obſerve, in the firſt place, that whoever affects power and authority, muſt take a very different courſe to obtain it in a corrupt State, from that which is to be followed in one that is not ſo: and in the next, that men ought to conſider the temper of the times, and conform to them in all their undertakings, but eſpecially in great deſigns: for thoſe that oppoſe the current of the times, either through indiſcretion, or natural inclination, are generally unfortunate, and meet with very different ſucceſs in their enterprizes, from what others experience who accommodate themſelves to it. If Manlius had been born in the days of Marius and Sylla, when the Romans had been long corrupt, and were become capable of receiving any impreſſion that ambition ſhould think fit to ſtamp upon them, he would certainly have ſucceeded in the ſame manner that they did, and ſome others who afterwards aſpired to abſolute dominion: and on the contrary, if Marius and Sylla had lived in the times of Manlius, they would as certainly have been cruſhed in their very firſt attempts to overturn the liberties of their country. For one man indeed, may lay the foundation of corruption, and in ſome meaſure debauch the principles and manners of his fellow-citizens; but he ſeldom lives long enough to corrupt them all to ſuch a degree as to reap the fruit of his labours himſelf. And indeed, if he ſhould happen to live long enough for that purpoſe, it would

would be in a manner impoſſible for him to ſucceed in his deſigns: for ſuch is the natural impatience of mankind, eſpecially in projects which they are paſſionately bent upon, that they either cannot long forbear attempting to put them in execution, or take wrong meaſures to obtain their end: ſo that either through want of patience, or judgment, they commonly proceed to execution at an improper time, and conſequently muſt be ruined.

A man therefore cannot well overturn the conſtitution of his country and make himſelf Lord over it, except he finds the people thoroughly infected by a corruption that has been introduced by degrees, and eſtabliſhed by length of time in ſuch a manner, that every thing is fallen into a ſtate of confuſion and diſorder; which muſt of neceſſity happen, if the virtue of the people is not frequently revived, either by the example of great and good men, or a reformation of abuſes by new and wholeſom laws, which may reduce the State to its firſt principles, as I have ſhewn in another place [*y*]. Manlius then would have been a great and illuſtrious man, if he had been born in a corrupt State: for whoever is deſirous either to reſtore liberty, or to ſet up an abſolute Government, ought maturely to weigh the diſpoſition and principles of the people he has to deal with; from whence he may be able to form a probable conjecture of the ſucceſs he is likely to meet with in ſuch an undertaking: becauſe it is no leſs difficult and dangerous a matter to attempt the reſtitution of liberty, when the people are diſpoſed to be ſlaves, than to endeavour to enſlave them, when they are diſpoſed to be free: and ſince I have ſaid above, that men ought always to conſider the quality of the times, and to act according to them in all their deſigns, I ſhall enlarge a little more upon that ſubject in the next Chapter.

CHAP. IX.

That in order to ſecure ſucceſs in great deſigns, a man muſt accommodate himſelf to the times.

I HAVE often had reaſon to think that the good or bad ſucceſs of moſt men's undertakings has depended chiefly upon their conforming or not conforming themſelves to the nature of the times they lived in. Some men are hot and impetuous, others cold and phlegmatic in the proſecution of their deſigns, which is the cauſe that they often miſcarry in them, eſpecially when they have no regard to moderation, either in one caſe or the

[*y*] See Chap. i. of this Book.

other, but leave the middle way, and fall into extremes. That man however is moſt likely to ſucceed, whoſe temper is ſuited to the times, and who acts according to ſuch a diſpoſition [y]. Every one knows with what caution and circumſpection Fabius Maximus proceeded, when he commanded the Roman armies, and how different his coldneſs and delays were from the ancient ardour and intrepidity of that people: and yet his undertakings were crowned with ſucceſs, becauſe ſuch a conduct was ſuitable to the times. For Hannibal being a young ſpirited General, and elated with the reputation of two great victories, which had drained the Roman Commonwealth of its beſt ſoldiers, and thrown it into the utmoſt conſternation, it was very fortunate for them that they had, on the contrary, an old and cautious commander, whoſe warineſs and delays kept the enemy at bay, and abated the ardour of their courage: nor could Fabius have lived in any times, that would have been better adapted to his own genius and diſpoſition: ſo that every thing concurred to make him fortunate. And that this cold and tardy manner of acting was really the effect of his natural diſpoſition, and not a matter of choice and prudent deliberation, plainly appears from his oppoſing Scipio with all his might, when that General was intent upon tranſporting an army into Africa, in order to put a ſpeedy end to the war with the Carthaginians; ſo that if his advice had not been over-ruled, Hannibal might have continued in Italy, as Fabius was ſtill for adhering to his old maxims, and the dictates of his own diſpoſition, and deſirous rather to remove preſent difficulties and dangers than to run into new ones; not perceiving that when the times and circumſtances of things were changed, it was neceſſary likewiſe to vary the manner of carrying on the war. If then, Fabius had been King of Rome at that time, it is very probable he would have been unſucceſsful in the further proſecution of it; becauſe he neither could nor would have accommodated his meaſures to the exigency of the times: but happening to be born in a Commonwealth, where there were many great Commanders, and of different diſpoſitions and abilities; as he was thought to be the moſt proper man to protract and ſuſtain the war at one time; ſo when the circumſtances of it were changed, Scipio was pitched upon as the likelieſt to bring it to a ſpeedy and happy concluſion at another.

Hence it comes to paſs, that Republican Governments have more reſources in times of diſtreſs, and flouriſh longer than Monarchies: becauſe they can better accommodate themſelves to the neceſſities of

[y] Cornelius Nepos, in the Life of Alcibiades, ſays, in commendation of that great man, that amongſt the reſt of his virtues, he was *affabilis, blandus, temporibus callidiſſimè inſerviens.*

different

different times, from the variety of Genius's which they produce, than a Prince can poſſibly do. For a Prince having been long accuſtomed to act according to one particular manner, cannot tell how to alter it when the times change, and it becomes abſolutely neceſſary to vary his meaſures. Pietro Soderini, of whom we have ſpoken before, was remarkable for his lenity and moderation in all things; and both he and his country proſpered exceedingly, whilſt ſuch a conduct was ſuitable to the times; but when it afterwards became neceſſary to proceed with rigour and aſperity, and he could not prevail upon himſelf to do that, both he and his country were ruined by his patience and clemency. Pope Julius II. acted with violence and impetuoſity in every thing: and as the times required ſuch a conduct, he ſucceeded in all his undertakings: but if they had altered, and another ſort of conduct had become neceſſary, he muſt inevitably have been ruined, becauſe he could not have conformed himſelf to them. Now the reaſon why men cannot do that, is, in the firſt place, becauſe they cannot run counter to their own natural inclinations and deſires: and in the next, becauſe when a man has practiſed one method of acting a long while, and always ſucceeded in it, he cannot be perſuaded to try any other: from whence it comes to paſs, that we often ſee ſuch a variety of fortune in one perſon: for, if the wind changes, and he does not ſuit his ſails to it, how can he expect a good voyage [*a*]? It is the ſame with regard to

[*a*] "An cum videam navem ſecundis ventis curſum tenentem ſuum (ſays Tully, *Orat. pro. Plancio. cap.* xxxix.) ſi non ea eum petat portum, quem ego aliquando probavi, ſed alium non minus tutum atque tranquillum, cum tempeſtate pugnem periculoſè potius, quam illi ſalute præſertim propoſitâ, obtemperem & paream? neque enim inconſtantis puto ſententiam, tanquam aliquod navigium atque curſum, ex reipublicæ tempeſtate moderari." See alſo *Epiſt.* ix. *Lib.* II. *ad familiares.* But Cicero was ſometimes ſeverely bantered for this time-ſerving diſpoſition: for Macrobius tells us, Lib. II. Cap. iii. that Laberius having acted a part himſelf in one of his mimic pieces, Julius Cæſar preſented him with a ring, and gave him leave to retire. Accordingly when he went to reſume his place amongſt the Knights, he could find no room: upon which Cicero ſeeing him perplexed, ſaid, "*recepiſſem te niſi anguſtè ſederem, I am crowded myſelf, or elſe I would have made room from you.*" "*Mirum, replied the other, ſi anguſtè ſedes, qui ſoles duabus ſellis ſedere,* it is ſtrange that you ſhould be crowded, who uſe to ſit upon *two Seats.*" Cicero killed two birds with one ſtone: he laughed at Laberius and the great number of newly created Senators, which had been much augmented by Cæſar; *ſimul & illum reſpuens & in novum Senatum jocatus, cujus numerum Cæſar ſupra fas auxerat, ſays the ſame author.* But the anſwer accuſed him of trimming, that is of not being a true friend either to Cæſar or Pompey, *Cicero male audiebat, tanquam nec Pompeio certus amicus, nec Cæſari, ſed utriuſque adulator . . . . . ex probata levitate Ciceroni . . . . . objiciens tanto viro lubricam fidem.* Lib. VII. Cap. iii. See alſo *Seneca. Controvers.* 18. —— But it might be obſerved here that Macrobius has confounded the Seats of the Knights with thoſe of the Senators, imagining that the Senators us'd to ſit upon what were called the *fourteen benches*; in which he is miſtaken, "*Quod Cicero dixit* NISI ANGUSTE SEDEREM, quod ſcomma fuit in *Cæſarem, qui in Senatum paſſim tam multos admiſit, ut eos quatuordecim gradus capere non*

to Republics, which are often ruined by not altering their meaſures according to the times, as I have ſhewn at large elſewhere; but in this they are very ſlow, becauſe it is a difficult matter to change their former laws and inſtitutions, and cannot be effected except by ſome event that affects the whole Commonwealth: for one man alone cannot do it. Now ſince we have had occaſion to make mention of Fabius Maximus, who kept Hannibal ſo long at bay, I ſhall enquire in the next Chapter, whether or not it is poſſible for one General to prevent another from bringing him to an engagement, if he be determined to do it at any rate.

CHAP. X.

That a General cannot avoid a battle, when the Enemy is reſolved to fight him upon any terms.

CAIUS Sulpitius Dictator, adverſus Gallos bellum trahebat, nolens ſe fortunæ committere adverſus hoſtem, quem tempus, deteriorem indies, & locus alienus facerent. Caius Sulpitius, the Dictator, in the war with the Gauls, reſolved not to run any riſque in engaging the enemy, when he ſaw that time alone, and the inconveniencies they ſuffered in a ſtrange country, was daily diminiſhing their numbers, ſays Livy. As the greater part of mankind are apt to be miſled by an error of a particular nature, they cannot be too often admoniſhed, I think, to be upon their guard againſt it. Upon which account, although I have already obſerved, more than once, how much the practice of the moderns differs from that of the ancients, eſpecially in things of the greateſt importance, yet I do not think it altogether ſuperfluous, to add ſomething more to what I have ſaid before upon that topic; particularly, as our military diſcipline at preſent is ſo different from thoſe maxims and inſtitutions which were in the greateſt vogue and eſteem with the ancients, that few or no traces of them are left. The reaſon of this, I take to be, that both Princes and Republics have now left the care of theſe things to other people, and ſtay at home themſelves to keep out of the way of danger: and if at any time a Prince happens to head his forces himſelf, no great matter is to be expected from him; becauſe he takes that command upon himſelf, more out of pomp and oſtentation, than

non poſſunt. Macrob. Saturnal. Lib. VII. Cap. iii. This had been the Seat of the Knights ever ſince the Law of Roſcius Otho:

Sic libitum vano qui nos diſtinxit Othoni. Juv. *Sat.* III. v. 159.

The whole character and conduct of Laberius, as related by Macrobius in the places above quoted, are highly worth reading. But this by the bye.

upon

upon any other laudable account. Such Princes, however, are not liable to commit ſo many errors as Republics; becauſe they keep the command in their own hands, and ſometimes are perſonally in the field with their armies: whereas Republics, and eſpecially the Italian States, not being acquainted with the nature of military operations, are obliged to truſt ſolely to the conduct of others; though, at the ſame time, in order to keep up their authority, they pretend to adviſe and direct, by which manner of proceeding they muſt of courſe be led into more and greater errors than if they were preſent with their forces themſelves; ſome of which errors I have pointed out before, but ſhall here take notice of one that is of very great importance indeed.

When any of theſe pitiful Princes or Commonwealths ſend out an army, the wiſeſt orders they think they can give their general, is, not to hazard an engagement upon any account, if it be poſſible to avoid it: in which they think themſelves as wiſe as Fabius, who ſaved the Roman State by ſuch precaution; not knowing that a commiſſion of that kind can ſeldom be attended with any good conſequence, and often muſt be of great prejudice to themſelves. For they may take this for granted, that a General who is in the field cannot avoid a battle, if the enemy is determined to force him to it at all events: ſo that ſuch a Commiſſion is no better than giving him orders to fight the enemy when they pleaſe, but not when he ſees a proper opportunity himſelf. There are two ways, I know, of endeavouring to avoid an engagement in ſuch a caſe; and thoſe are, either by keeping at the diſtance of fifty or ſixty miles from the enemy, and ſending out ſcouts to give you timely notice if they ſhould offer to advance; that ſo you may retreat as faſt as you can [*b*]: or elſe, by ſhutting yourſelf up in ſome ſtrong town.

[*b*] "Several very warlike nations in their wars, ſays Montaigne, Book I. Chap. xiii. *of his Eſſays*, have found their chief advantage in a retreat, and done the enemy more miſchief by turning their backs to them than their faces: of which method the Turks retain ſomething to this day. Socrates (in Plato) rallies Laches, who had defined fortitude to be nothing more or leſs than ſtanding firm in the ranks to face the enemy: *What*, ſays he, *would it be cowardice to beat the enemy by giving ground?* At the ſame time he quotes that paſſage in Homer to him, where he commends Æneas for his ſkill in retreating. And as Laches, upon further conſideration, owns this was the practice of the Scythians, and in general of all Cavalry, he urges another proof from the conduct of the Lacedæmonian Infantry, (the moſt obſtinate of all others in maintaining their ground) who at the battle of Platea, not being able to break into the Perſian Phalanx, thought fit to fall back; that ſo the enemy ſuppoſing them to be flying, might break and diſunite that firm body, when they were purſuing; by which means the Lacedæmonians obtained a Victory. As for the Scythians, it is ſaid of them, that when Darius ſet out upon his Expedition to ſubdue them, he ſent to reproach their King with cowardice, for always retiring before him: to which the King made anſwer, "that he did not do ſo out of fear of him, or any other man living; but that it was the cuſtom in his country, where there were neither tilled fields, nor town, nor houſe to defend, or for the enemy to make any

town. But in either caſe, you muſt ſuſtain much damage; for in one, you muſt leave your whole country to the mercy of the enemy: and certainly a Prince of any courage or generoſity, would ſooner chuſe to venture a battle, than expoſe his Subjects in ſo cruel and ſhameful a manner. And in the other, your ruin is inevitable: for if you retire with your forces into a town, you will be blocked up there by the enemy, and reduced either to ſurrender at laſt, or to periſh by famine: ſo that, whichſoever of theſe ways you take to decline an engagement, you will find it a very bad one. It is right, indeed, to keep yourſelf cloſe intrenched in a ſtrong ſituation, as Fabius Maximus did, when you have ſo good an army, that the enemy dares not venture to attack you there; but Fabius could not ſo properly be ſaid to avoid an engagement, as to defer it till he could fight the enemy with advantage. For if Hannibal had advanced to attack him, the other, inſtead of retreating, would have fought him there: but Hannibal was too wiſe to riſque an engagement in ſuch circumſtances. So that Hannibal declined a battle as well as Fabius: but if either of them had been determined to fight at any rate, the other could not poſſibly have avoided it, except either by one or other of the methods juſt now mentioned, or by abſolutely running away.

The truth of what I have ſaid, is obvious from a thouſand examples; particularly from that of Philip of Macedon, the father of Perſeus, in the war wherein he was engaged with the Romans. For, when they invaded his dominions, he reſolved not to come to any engagement with them, if he could help it: upon which account, he encamped with his army upon the top of a hill, where he fortified himſelf in ſuch a manner, that he thought the enemy would not venture to attack him. But he was miſtaken in that; for they not only attacked him, but drove him out of his entrenchments, and forced him to ſave himſelf by flight: which yet he could not have done, if the country had not been ſo rough, that the Romans could not purſue him much further. Being convinced therefore, by this trial, that he could no longer truſt to the advantage of any ſituation in the field, and unwilling to ſhut himſelf up in a town, he reſolved to take the other method, and to keep at a conſiderable diſtance from them; for which purpoſe, when the Romans entered one Province, he always retreated into another. But finding his affairs grow worſe and worſe every day, and that there was no proſpect of putting an end to the war by ſuch a manner of proceeding, though his Subjects were harraſſed and diſtreſſed to the laſt

any advantage of. But that if he had ſo voracious an appetite, he might come and view their antient place of Sepulture, and there he ſhould have his belly full." *See Herodotus*, Lib. IV.

degree,

degree, ſometimes by one army, and ſometimes by the other, he took a reſolution to try the fortune of a battle.

It is prudent then to decline an engagement, when you are in the ſame circumſtances that Fabius and Sulpitius were: that is, either when you have ſo good an army that an enemy dares not venture to attack you in your entrenchments; or when he has not yet got much footing in your country, and finds ſuch inconveniencies and difficulties in ſupporting his troops there, that they muſt daily diminiſh and moulder away; but in any other caſe, there is no ſuch thing as avoiding an engagement without great diſhonour and prejudice to yourſelf. For to run away as Philip did, is as bad as being routed; and much more diſgraceful; becauſe, in that caſe, you give no proof of your courage: and though he indeed ſaved himſelf by flight, another perſon may not have the ſame good fortune perhaps, who is not equally favoured in his retreat by the nature of the country. Every body muſt allow, that Hannibal was a very able and experienced General: and therefore, if he had found it would have been for his advantage to ſpin out the war with Scipio in Africa, he certainly would have done it; and perhaps (as he was a great Commander, and had a very good army) in the ſame method that Fabius had followed in Italy; but ſince he did not, we may take it for granted he had very good reaſons for acting otherwiſe. For a General who is at the head of an army, and finds he cannot keep it long together, either for want of pay or other ſupplies, muſt be ſtark mad if he does not hazard a battle, before his troops begin to diſband and dwindle away of themſelves: becauſe, if he does not, he is ſure to be ruined; but if he does, he has ſome chance to beat the enemy. Beſides, if the chance be ever ſo ſmall, a General ought always to have a particular regard to his reputation: and ſurely it is much leſs diſgraceful to be overcome in battle, after a brave reſiſtance, than to be ruined by doing nothing: upon which account, we may conclude, that Hannibal was by downright neceſſity forced to act as he did. On the other hand, if he had been inclined to prolong the war by avoiding an engagement, and Scipio durſt not have ventured to attack him in his ſtrong places, the latter would not have ſuffered any inconvenience from that: for he had defeated Syphax before, and had got ſuch foothold in Africa, that he could have ſupported himſelf there with as little difficulty as in Italy. But this was not the caſe with Hannibal, when he had Fabius upon his hands; nor with the Gauls when they were engaged with Sulpitius. Much leſs can thoſe avoid an engagement who attempt an invaſion: for as ſoon as ever they ſet their foot in an enemy's country, they muſt come to an action, if the enemy oppoſes them upon the confines; but if they are ſuffered to lay ſiege to any place, they will find the neceſſity of ſo doing ſtill greater: as is happened to

Charles Duke of Bourbon not long ago; who was attacked and routed by the Swiſs, whilſt he lay before Morat, a town in Switzerland: and to the French army which had inveſted Novara, and was likewiſe defeated by the ſame people.

CHAP. XI.

Though a perſon who has many enemies to deal with at the ſame time, may be inferior to them all together; yet if he can ſuſtain their firſt ſhock, he commonly gets the better of them.

GREAT was the power of the Tribunes at Rome; and indeed it was neceſſary it ſhould be ſo, as I have ſaid more than once before: ſince the ambition of the Nobility could not have been ſufficiently controuled without it, and conſequently muſt have corrupted that Commonwealth much ſooner than it did. But as nothing is perfect, and every advantage is attended with ſome inconvenience which at laſt occaſions diſorders that require new laws and proviſions to remedy them: ſo the Tribunes in time grew ſo inſolent, and their authority ſo great, that not only the Nobility but the whole Commonwealth were alarmed at it; and it certainly would either have totally ſwallowed up, or greatly endangered the liberties of that State, if Appius Claudius had not hit upon an expedient to prevent it. For as there was always one or other of the Tribunes, who either had a real regard for the good of his country, or was liable to be corrupted, or prevailed upon by threats, ſome means were found to work upon him in ſuch a manner as to make him oppoſe the reſt of them, whenever they endeavoured to act contrary to the inclination of the Senate. From this manner of proceeding, which ſerved in ſome meaſure to moderate the overgrown power of the Tribunes, and was for a long time of great ſervice to the Roman Republic, we may obſerve, that though ſeveral other States ſhould join againſt one alone which is not by any means ſo ſtrong as themſelves whilſt they are united; yet more is to be expected from that one State, than from all the others put together. For to omit numberleſs inſtances in which one Chief has the advantage over many, he may always find ways and means to diſunite ſuch a confederacy, and greatly reduce its ſtrength.

To confirm this, we have no occaſion to look back into ancient Hiſtory for examples; ſince our own times will furniſh us with ſufficient. In the year 1484, all Italy confederated againſt the Venetians; and though they were ſtripped of all their territories and could not ſend any army into the field, yet they found means to corrupt Lewis Sforza, Duke of Milan, and detached him from the League in ſuch a manner, that they

they not only recovered what they had loſt, but had a good part of the Duchy of Ferrara ceded to them: ſo that notwithſtanding they had loſt all they had in the war, they were great gainers by the peace. Not many years ago all Chriſtendom ſeemed to have combined againſt France; but before the end of the war the Spaniards deſerted the Confederacy, which forced the reſt of the Allies to come to an accommodation with the French. From hence we may ſee that when ſeveral Princes or States unite together againſt one ſingle Prince or Republic, if that ſingle Prince or State be ſtrong enough to ſuſtain the firſt ſhock and protract the war, he will certainly prevail againſt them at laſt. But if he is not able to do that, the danger is great indeed, as the Venetians found to their coſt in the year 1508: for if they could have held the French at bay till they had gained over ſome of the Confederates, they might have warded off the blow: but not having ſtrength enough to do that, they were reduced to the brink of ruin. The Pope, it is plain, from what happened afterwards might eaſily have been taken off: for both he and the Spaniards were reconciled to them and became their friends, as ſoon as they had recovered what they had loſt to them before; and both of them would willingly have joined with the Venetians to defend the State of Lombardy againſt the French, in order to prevent the latter from becoming too powerful in Italy. The Venetians then ought to have given up ſome part of their acquiſitions, to preſerve the reſt: which indeed would have been acting a very wiſe part, if it had been done before the war began; that ſo it might not appear to be extorted by neceſſity: for after the war was once commenced, it muſt have looked mean and pitiful, and perhaps would have done them little or no ſervice. But before that war broke out, there were few people at Venice that foreſaw the danger which hung over their heads, ſtill fewer that knew how to provide againſt it, and no body at all that was able to point out any remedy when it fell upon them. To recapitulate the contents of this Diſcourſe, I ſay, that as the Roman Senate found means to preſerve the liberties of their country againſt the ambitious attempts of the Tribunes, chiefly from the number of thoſe Magiſtrates; ſo any Prince or State that is attacked by a Confederacy, may likewiſe be enabled to ſupport themſelves againſt it, if they can but hold out for a while till they have had the addreſs to detach ſome of the Confederates from the reſt [c].

[c] His preſent Majeſty of Pruſſia bids fair, it is thought, to be an inſtance of this.

CHAP. XII.

A wiſe General ought to lay his own army under a neceſſity of fighting: but never to reduce an Enemy to ſuch circumſtances.

MANY and glorious actions have been the effect of neceſſity, as I have ſhewn in another place [*d*]: inſomuch that ſome Philoſophers have affirmed, that neither the tongue nor the hand (thoſe two noble organs which were given to mankind to diſtinguiſh and exalt themſelves above all other creatures) could ever have done ſuch aſtoniſhing things, if neceſſity had not impelled them to it. Some of the moſt renowned Commanders in former times therefore, well knowing the weight of neceſſity, and with what a degree of obſtinacy and reſolution it inſpires an army, always endeavoured to lay their own Soldiers under a neceſſity of fighting: whilſt, on the contrary, they never reduced an enemy to ſuch circumſtances; but rather opened a way for their eſcape, when they became deſperate; though they uſed all means to deprive their own troops of the like opportunities. Whoever then would animate either a garriſon in a town that is beſieged to make a brave defence, or an army in the field to behave themſelves like men, muſt above all things endeavour to convince them of the neceſſity of ſo doing: and on the other hand, a wiſe Commander, before he ſits down before a town, will be able to form a pretty good judgment whether he ſhall meet with much difficulty or not in reducing the place, by conſidering the degree of neceſſity under which the beſieged lie of making an obſtinate defence: for if that is great, their reſolution will be proportionable to it; if otherwiſe, there will be ſo much the leſs difficulty in the matter. Hence it comes to paſs, that towns which have revolted are much harder to be reduced than they were to be taken at firſt: for as they had not been guilty of any offence before, they had no puniſhment to fear, and conſequently made no great difficulty of ſurrendering to a ſuperior force: but when they have rebelled, and know they deſerve to be chaſtized, they will endeavour to defend themſelves to the laſt man. Such a degree of obſtinacy is likewiſe owing to the natural hatred which ſometimes ſubſiſts betwixt neighbouring States: and this proceeds from ambition on one ſide, and jealouſy on the other; eſpecially betwixt Princes and Commonwealths; of which we have many examples in Tuſcany, where theſe mutual ſuſpicions put both parties upon their guard, and make them obſtinate in defending themſelves.

[*d*] See the Art of War, Book IV. at the end.

So

So that if we compare the towns which lie near Florence, with thoſe that are nearer Venice, we ſhall have no occaſion to wonder (as many do) that the Florentines have ſpent more and gained leſs in their wars than the Venetians; ſince the latter did not meet with ſo vigorous an oppoſition from the places they attacked, as the former did: becauſe thoſe that lay near Venice having been uſed to live under Princes and accuſtomed to ſervitude, were ſo far from being averſe to any change of Maſters, that it was a thing they often wiſhed for: ſo that though the States which lay near the Venetians were ſtronger and more powerful, than thoſe that bordered upon the Florentines, yet they were reduced with more eaſe than the latter, becauſe they had not been accuſtomed to liberty, and therefore did not make ſo obſtinate a defence.

When a General therefore lays ſiege to any place, he ought to make uſe of all his addreſs to convince the beſieged they are not under any neceſſity of defending themſelves to the laſt extremity: for which purpoſe, he ſhould promiſe them pardon if they have offended; that ſo they may not be reduced to deſpair by the apprehenſion of puniſhment: or if they are afraid of loſing their liberties, he ſhould aſſure them he has no deſign of infringing them, or of doing them the leaſt injury of any kind whatſoever; and that he has no further intention than to reſtrain the ambition of ſome few particular men amongſt them. Such a method of proceeding often facilitates the reduction of a town: and though theſe pretences are eaſily ſeen through by men of ſagacity and penetration; yet they generally impoſe upon the vulgar; who being deſirous of preſent eaſe and quiet, are not aware of the hook that is concealed under ſuch promiſes, and conſequently are often gulled either out of their lives or liberties that way: as it happened to the Florentines not long ago, and to Craſſus and his army of old. For though that General was convinced himſelf there was no confidence to be put in the Parthians, and that they made him fair promiſes, only to ſooth his Soldiers in ſuch a manner that they might not think themſelves in deſperate circumſtances, and under a neceſſity of being ſtrictly upon their guard; yet his men were ſo blinded with the offers of peace, that not being able to make them ſee the danger they were in, both he and his army were cut off.——The Samnites, at the inſtigation of ſome few of their countrymen, who had more ambition than the reſt, made an incurſion into the territories of ſome people who were in alliance with the Romans, and plundered all the country in contempt of the treaties that ſubſiſted betwixt them: but repenting of what they had done, they afterwards ſent Ambaſſadors not only to aſk pardon of the Romans, but to aſſure them they would likewiſe make ample reſtitution, and deliver up the Authors of thoſe hoſtilities into their hands. This ſubmiſſion however, being rejected at Rome, and the Ambaſſadors

dors returning without any hopes of pardon, Claudius Pontius their General, in order to animate his men to behave valiantly, repreſented to them in an harangue for that purpoſe, that ſince the Romans would accept of no ſatisfaction, but were determined to make war upon them, though they for their own parts had offered to accommodate matters in an amicable manner, they were under an abſolute neceſſity of taking up arms for their own defence; *Juſtum eſt bellum* (ſaid he) *quibus neceſſarium; & pia arma quibus nulla niſi in armis ſpes eſt: a war is always juſt when neceſſary; and it is a man's duty to take up arms when there is no other way left to preſerve himſelf*; upon which neceſſity alone he founded his hopes of victory. But that we may have no occaſion to ſay any thing more upon this ſubject another time, I ſhall here add ſome other examples from the Roman Hiſtory which ſeem worthy of notice. In a war with the Veientes, Caius Manilius being at the head of the Roman army, which lay encamped not far from the enemy; the latter found means to force ſome part of his entrenchments: upon which, Manilius haſted with a body of troops to ſuccour his camp, and ſhut up all the avenues to it in ſo effectual a manner that he thought it impoſſible for the enemy to make their eſcape. But the Veientes ſeeing they were thus encloſed on every ſide, exerted themſelves with ſuch fury that they killed Manilius, and would have deſtroyed his whole army, if one of the Tribunes had not wiſely opened them a way for their retreat. Hence we ſee that whilſt the Veientes were under a neceſſity of fighting, they fought deſperately: but as ſoon as they had an opportunity of retreating, they choſe rather to do that than fight any longer. The Volſci and Æqui having invaded the Roman territories, two Conſuls were ſent at the head of two different armies to oppoſe them; and ſurprizing the enemy in their camp, they encloſed them in ſuch a manner there, that Vettius Mettius their General, finding they muſt either fight their way through, or all be cut to pieces, bravely called out to his Soldiers, *Ite mecum, non murus, non vallum; armati armatis obſtant; virtute pares, quæ ultimum ac maximum telum eſt, neceſſitate ſuperiores eſtis: follow me, there is neither wall, nor rampart in the way; you have arms in your hands, as well as they; your courage is equal; and in point of neceſſity, which is the ſharpeſt and beſt weapon, you are ſuperior:* in which paſſage, it is remarkable that Livy calls Neceſſity *the ſharpeſt and beſt weapon.*—Camillus, the wiſeſt General Rome ever had, having entered Veii by Storm, commanded his Soldiers with a loud voice to ſpare every man that laid down his arms: and this he did to facilitate the total reduction of that town, which otherwiſe, perhaps, might have been a matter of great difficulty after all, if he had laid the garriſon under a neceſſity of defending themſelves to the laſt extremity. But as they were encouraged by theſe orders to lay down their arms,

arms, the town was taken without much bloodſhed; and many other Generals have ſince made uſe of the ſame expedient [e].

CHAP. XIII.

Whether a good General and a bad army, or a good army and a bad General, are moſt to be depended upon.

WHEN Coriolanus was baniſhed from Rome, he retired to the Volſci; and having raiſed an army amongſt them, marched back to Rome at the head of it, in order to revenge himſelf upon his fellow-citizens: but being prevailed upon by the tears and entreaties of his Mother, rather than any conſideration of the Roman arms, he deſiſted from the enterprize. From this event, ſays Livy, it plainly appeared that the Romans were more indebted to the excellency of their Generals than the valour of their Soldiers, for the aggrandizement of their Commonwealth: for though they had always been uſed to beat the Volſci before; yet they were not able to cope with them, after they had got Coriolanus at the head of their forces.

Now though Livy ſeems to be of this opinion, yet we ſee from many other paſſages in his Hiſtory, that the bravery of the Soldiers alone often did very great things, and that they ſometimes ſtood more firm, and fought with greater reſolution after their General was killed than they had done before: as it happened in the army which the Romans had in Spain under the command of the two Scipio's, in which, the Soldiers behaved ſo well after the death of thoſe Generals, that they not only defended themſelves, but ſubdued the enemy, and maintained poſſeſſion of the whole Province for the Romans. So that upon enquiry, we ſhall find ſome inſtances in which the valour of the Soldiers alone gained a victory; and others, wherein the conduct of the Commander only had the ſame effect: from whence we may conclude, that if either one or the other of them is able to effect great things of themſelves, nothing can ſtand before them when united.

But if it ſhould be aſked, whether a good army with a bad General, or a good General with a bad army is moſt to be dreaded; it may be anſwered, that in Cæſar's opinion, no great account is to be made either of one or the other. For when he marched into Spain againſt Afranius

[e] See a further diſcuſſion of this matter, *Book* I. *Chap.* xlvii. *of Montaigne's Eſſays*: *and Book* VII. *of the Art of War*. There is much good ſenſe without doubt in the old ſaying, *make a golden bridge for a flying enemy*. See alſo *Book* II. *Chap.* xvii. *of theſe Diſcourſes*.

and

and Petreius, who were at the head of a good army, he ſeemed to deſpiſe the enemy, *quia ibat ad exercitum ſine duce, becauſe he was going to fight an army without a General,* hinting at the weakneſs of thoſe two Commanders. On the contrary, when he led his forces into Theſſaly againſt Pompey, he ſaid, *Vado ad ducem ſine exercitu, I am now going to fight a General without an army.* It may likewiſe be demanded, whether it is eaſier for a good General to make a good army; or for a good army to make a good General? But this queſtion I think is preſently anſwered: for certainly many able Soldiers in an army may ſooner diſcipline and inſtruct one man how to do his duty, than one man can form and diſcipline, and model a whole army. When Lucullus was ſent againſt Mithridates, he was totally inexperienced in military affairs: but as he had a very good army and many excellent officers under him, they ſoon made him an able General. The Romans not having free men enow to recruit their armies, were forced to arm a number of Slaves, and gave the command of them to Sempronius Gracchus, who diſciplined them in ſuch a manner, that in a very ſhort time they became good Soldiers. Pelopidas and Epaminondas (as I have ſhewn elſewhere) having delivered their countrymen the Thebans from the yoke of Sparta, ſoon made ſuch Soldiers of the very peaſants, that they not only ſupported a war againſt the Spartans, but totally ſubdued them at laſt [*f*]: from which we ſee there are examples on both ſides, and that it is either in the power of a good army to make a good General, or of a good General to make a good army. The beſt army in the world however will be apt to grow inſolent and mutinous, if it has not an able General to curb and reſtrain the licentiouſneſs of the Soldiers; as the Macedonian troops did after the death of Alexander the Great, and the Roman Veterans in the time of their civil wars. So that I think a good General who has time to arm and diſcipline a body of new raiſed men in a proper manner, is much more to be depended upon than an inſolent army, even of Veterans, which has made a ſudden and tumultuary choice of ſome officer to command it. Thoſe Generals therefore are certainly worthy of the higheſt praiſe and admiration who have gained victories with a parcel of raw men haſtily got together, whom they themſelves have diſciplined and made good Soldiers before they led them on to battle. For indeed this is a taſk that is doubly arduous, and requires ſuch rare abilities that if it had fallen to the lot of many, who yet have made a great figure in the world, perhaps they would not have been ſo much admired and extolled.

[*f*] See Book I. Chap. xxi. and Book I. of the *Art of War.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

That new inventions and ſudden cries ſometimes have ſtrange effects in battle.

OF what importance a ſudden rumour, or unuſual ſpectacle, or chance word may be in time of battle (amongſt many other inſtances) we have a remarkable one in an engagement betwixt the Romans and the Volſci, where Quintius the Roman General obſerving one wing of his army was beginning to give way, called out aloud to the Soldiers *to ſtand their ground, for the other wing had beat the enemy*; an artifice which ſo animated his own men, and ſtruck ſuch a terror into the other army, that he got the day by it. Now if ſuch things have a great effect in a well diſciplined army, certainly they muſt have a much greater in one that is ill diſciplined and apt to be thrown into diſorder by every little accident: for a proof of which, let me relate an event that happened in our own times. Not many years ago the City of Perugia was divided into two factions, the Oddi and the Baglioni; the latter of whom prevailing, the former were baniſhed. But having raiſed ſome forces and conducted them with great privacy to a place near Perugia, they were let into the town one night by ſome of their friends there, and got as far as the main ſquare without being diſcovered. But as the Streets in that City were barricadoed with ſtrong chains, the Oddi had a man at the head of their forces with an iron maul to break the links of the chains, and make way for the horſe: by which means they had penetrated as far as the main ſquare, as I juſt now ſaid, and had only one chain to break which ſecured the paſſage into it. But a ſudden alarm being raiſed when they came thither, the man who was to break that chain was ſo preſſed upon by the Soldiers behind him, that not having room to manage the maul, he called out to them, *keep back, keep back*; which cry paſſing from one to another, thoſe in the rear began to run away, and were ſoon followed by all the reſt in ſuch confuſion that the deſign was totally defeated. From hence we may obſerve that good order and diſcipline are neceſſary in an army, not only to prevent confuſion in time of battle, but to ſecure it from being thrown into diſorder and conſternation by accidents: for undiſciplined forces, beſides their other imperfections, are particularly apt to be terrified by any ſudden rumour or unuſual noiſe or cry. A good General therefore ought to appoint officers on purpoſe to carry his orders to every part of his army, and to lay a ſtrict injunction upon his Soldiers to ſhew no manner of regard, nor ſo much as to liſten to any order or report

but what they have from thoſe Officers; who muſt be charged to deliver his commands word for word as they receive them from his own mouth: the want of which precaution has often occaſioned very great confuſion in an army.

As to ſtrange and ſudden appearances, a General ought to introduce ſome ſuch thing in the heat of thebattle if poſſible, to encourage his own men, and diſmay the enemy: for nothing contributes more to the gaining of a victory. An inſtance of which we have in the conduct of Sulpitius the Roman Dictator, who, when he was preparing to engage the Gauls, cauſed all the ſuttlers and ſervants that followed his camp to be armed and mounted upon the mules and other beaſts that uſed to carry the baggage, with colours and other marks of diſtinction to make them look like a large body of horſe; and having poſted them behind a hill, he ordered them to make their appearance upon a proper ſignal when the battle began to grow hot: which being executed accordingly, ſtruck ſuch a terror into the Gauls that they loſt the day [g]. A wiſe General therefore is to ſtudy theſe two points with attention: in the firſt place to intimidate the enemy by ſome ſuch ſtratagem as this; and in the next, to make due proviſion to diſcover and defeat any thing of the ſame kind that may be practiſed againſt him; as an Indian King ſerved Semiramis, who perceiving he had a great many Elephants in his army, cauſed a number of Camels to be loaded with the Skins of buffaloes and other beaſts, and to be covered in ſuch a manner as to look like Elephants, which She ordered to advance againſt the Enemy to fright them if it was poſſible: but the King diſcovered the trick, and not only prevented the deſigned effect, but turned it to her own prejudice. Mamercus being appointed Dictator in a war wherein the Romans were engaged with the Fidenates, they ordered a number of men to ſally out of the town with fire at the end of their lances whilſt they were fighting near the walls, in hopes that the novelty of the ſight would have made the Romans break their ranks.

With regard to ſuch ſtratagems, we may obſerve, that when they have ſomething ſolid and efficacious to ſupport them, they may be made uſe of with advantage; becauſe the futility of the whole is not ſo ſoon diſcovered: but that when they are formidable rather in appearance than reality, it is better either to let them alone, or to play them off at ſuch a diſtance that their weak ſide may not ſo eaſily be found out; as Sulpitius did with his Mulateers. For if they are weak and ineffectual at the bottom, that will preſently be perceived if

[g] See the 4th and 5th Books of *the Art of War*. Let any one figure to himſelf with what terror and diſmay the ſight of men fighting on horſeback, and the exploſion of great guns muſt affect the poor American Indians when they were firſt introduced amongſt them by the Spaniards.

you

you come near the enemy, and may do you more harm than good; as the ſham Elephants did to Semiramis, and the blazing lances to the Fidenates: which laſt indeed cauſed ſome little diſorder in the Roman army at firſt; but the Dictator coming up and reproaching his troops with puſillanimity, aſked them if they were not aſhamed to be ſmoaked away like flies, encouraging them at the ſame time to return to the charge like men, and *burn the enemy with their own fires, ſince they could not make them their friends by generous treatment; Suis flammis delete Fidenas, quas veſtris beneficiis placare non potuiſtis:* upon which they rallied, and utterly defeated the enemy in Spite of their fires.

CHAP. XV.

That more than one Commander in chief over an army do more harm than good.

AFTER the Fidenates had rebelled againſt the Romans, and deſtroyed a Colony which they had ſent to ſettle amongſt them, the Romans created four Tribunes with Conſular power to chaſtiſe them for their inſolence. One of theſe Tribunes was to ſtay at home to take care of the City; the other three were ſent againſt the Fidenates and Veientes: but not agreeing amongſt themſelves, they neither gained much honour in that expedition, nor did the Republic ſuffer any material loſs by it; as the default of the Generals was in ſome meaſure balanced by the valour of their Soldiers. The Romans therefore, in order to remedy the diſorders which had been occaſioned by a diverſity of Commanders, immediately created a Dictator: that ſo when the power was in the hands of one man alone, he might act with more vigour and ſteddineſs.

Hence we may obſerve how inconvenient, and indeed how prejudicial it is to have ſeveral Commanders in chief, either in an army or a town that is beſieged: and Livy very juſtly ſays, *Tres Tribuni, poteſtate conſulari, documento fuere, quam plurium imperium bello inutile eſſet: tendendo ad ſua quiſque conſilia, cum alii aliud videretur, aperuerunt ad occaſionem locum hoſti: The conduct of theſe three Tribunes with Conſular power plainly ſhewed how imprudent a thing it is to give the command of an army to ſeveral perſons; ſince one of them took one courſe and another another, according to the diverſity of their opinions; by which they gave the enemy an advantage over them.* Now though this inſtance may ſeem ſufficient to prove the truth of what I have laid down, I will add two more, one of ancient, the other of modern date, for a further confirmation of it. In the year 1500, Lewis XII. King of France,

having retaken Milan, ſent his forces to reduce Piſa and to reſtore it to the Florentines: in which enterprize they were commanded by two Florentine Commiſſaries, Giovanni Battiſta Ridolfi, and Luca degli Albizi. But as the former of them was a man of great reputation and much older than the other, Luca left the management of every thing entirely to him: and though he did not openly and directly oppoſe him in any of his meaſures, yet he plainly ſhewed his diſapprobation of them, ſometimes by a ſullen ſilence, and ſometimes by carping and laughing at them behind his back; ſo that he was ſo far from aſſiſting his Collegue either in Council or any other way, that he did not give himſelf the leaſt trouble or concern about the matter. But Ridolfi being ſoon after obliged to return to Florence upon ſome occaſion or other, and the ſole command devolving upon Albizi, he exerted himſelf with great ſpirit, prudence and activity, and ſhewed that he was Maſter of many other extraordinary qualifications, which he had ſuffered to lie dormant whilſt the command was divided betwixt him and Ridolfi. The other inſtance is out of Livy, who ſpeaking of the Expedition in which Quintius and Agrippa commanded the Roman army againſt the Æqui, ſays that Agrippa deſired that Quintius might have the ſole management of that war committed to him, becauſe, *Saluberrimum ad adminiſtrationem magnarum rerum eſt, ſummam imperii apud unum eſſe; in the adminiſtration of great affairs, it is of the utmoſt importance to lodge the ſupreme power in one perſon only.* But Princes and Republics act in a very different manner at preſent; and ſend ſeveral Generals or Commiſſaries to command one army; which often creates infinite confuſion, and has been the ruin of many French and Italian armies in our times. We may venture to conclude then, that it is much better to commit the execution of any enterprize to one man alone of common abilities, than to two of the moſt able men you can find, with equal authority [*b*].

[*b*] Ουκ αγαθη πολυκοιρανιη εις κοιρανος εστω, ſays Homer.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

That men of eminent virtue and merit are employed in time of danger and diſtreſs: but in peaceable and proſperous times, men of the greateſt riches and alliances are preferred.

IT always was, and always will be the fate of able and virtuous men, to be neglected and laid aſide in peaceable times, eſpecially in a Commonwealth: for the reputation which they have acquired by their virtue, excites ſuch a degree of envy in others, that they endeavour not only to equal, but to exalt themſelves above them in other reſpects at leaſt. Thucydides tells us accordingly, that the Athenians having got the better in the Peloponeſian war, not only humbled the pride of Sparta, but kept all Greece in awe, and became ſo powerful, that they formed a deſign of making themſelves maſters of Sicily. When the matter came to be deliberated upon, Alcibiades and ſome other Citizens promoted it with all their might; not ſo much out of any regard to the public good, as to gratify their own private intereſt and ambition, hoping they ſhould be employed as Chiefs in that expedition. But Nicias, a man of the greateſt reputation in Athens, oppoſed it with no leſs vehemence: and the principal argument he made uſe of in one of his harangues, to convince the people that he had the good of the public alone at heart, and no private view or intereſt of his own to ſerve, was, that by diſſuading them from ſuch an enterprize, he rather prejudiced himſelf than otherwiſe; becauſe he very well knew, that whilſt they continued in peace, many other of his fellow Citizens would be put over his head; but that if war ſhould break out, he muſt of neceſſity be preferred to them all. Indeed it is a common foible in all Republics to neglect men of the greateſt abilities and qualifications in times of quiet and ſecurity: but it is very imprudent, becauſe it is ſure to raiſe their indignation, when they not only ſee themſelves overlooked and deſpiſed, but baſe and unworthy men preferred; which has been the ruin of many Republics: for great men, who are treated in this manner, and know that is owing to the tranquillity of the times, will naturally endeavour to diſturb the waters, and embroil their country in wars, which muſt of courſe be of great prejudice to it, and perhaps may end in its deſtruction.

Conſidering therefore with myſelf ſometimes, how this evil might be prevented in a Commonwealth. I think there are but two ways of doing it: one of which is, by keeping the Citizens poor, or at leaſt from growing too rich; that ſo they may not have it in their power to advance

CHAP. XII.

A wiſe General ought to lay his own army under a neceſſity of fighting: but never to reduce an Enemy to ſuch circumſtances.

MANY and glorious actions have been the effect of neceſſity, as I have ſhewn in another place [d]: inſomuch that ſome Philoſophers have affirmed, that neither the tongue nor the hand (thoſe two noble organs which were given to mankind to diſtinguiſh and exalt themſelves above all other creatures) could ever have done ſuch aſtoniſhing things, if neceſſity had not impelled them to it. Some of the moſt renowned Commanders in former times therefore, well knowing the weight of neceſſity, and with what a degree of obſtinacy and reſolution it inſpires an army, always endeavoured to lay their own Soldiers under a neceſſity of fighting: whilſt, on the contrary, they never reduced an enemy to ſuch circumſtances; but rather opened a way for their eſcape, when they became deſperate; though they uſed all means to deprive their own troops of the like opportunities. Whoever then would animate either a garriſon in a town that is beſieged to make a brave defence, or an army in the field to behave themſelves like men, muſt above all things endeavour to convince them of the neceſſity of ſo doing: and on the other hand, a wiſe Commander, before he ſits down before a town, will be able to form a pretty good judgment whether he ſhall meet with much difficulty or not in reducing the place, by conſidering the degree of neceſſity under which the beſieged lie of making an obſtinate defence: for if that is great, their reſolution will be proportionable to it; if otherwiſe, there will be ſo much the leſs difficulty in the matter. Hence it comes to paſs, that towns which have revolted are much harder to be reduced than they were to be taken at firſt: for as they had not been guilty of any offence before, they had no puniſhment to fear, and conſequently made no great difficulty of ſurrendering to a ſuperior force: but when they have rebelled, and know they deſerve to be chaſtized, they will endeavour to defend themſelves to the laſt man. Such a degree of obſtinacy is likewiſe owing to the natural hatred which ſometimes ſubſiſts betwixt neighbouring States: and this proceeds from ambition on one ſide, and jealouſy on the other; eſpecially betwixt Princes and Commonwealths; of which we have many examples in Tuſcany, where theſe mutual ſuſpicions put both parties upon their guard, and make them obſtinate in defending themſelves.

[d] See the Art of War, Book IV. at the end.

So

So that if we compare the towns which lie near Florence, with thoſe that are nearer Venice, we ſhall have no occaſion to wonder (as many do) that the Florentines have ſpent more and gained leſs in their wars than the Venetians; ſince the latter did not meet with ſo vigorous an oppoſition from the places they attacked, as the former did: becauſe thoſe that lay near Venice having been uſed to live under Princes and accuſtomed to ſervitude, were ſo far from being averſe to any change of Maſters, that it was a thing they often wiſhed for: ſo that though the States which lay near the Venetians were ſtronger and more powerful, than thoſe that bordered upon the Florentines, yet they were reduced with more eaſe than the latter, becauſe they had not been accuſtomed to liberty, and therefore did not make ſo obſtinate a defence.

When a General therefore lays ſiege to any place, he ought to make uſe of all his addreſs to convince the beſieged they are not under any neceſſity of defending themſelves to the laſt extremity: for which purpoſe, he ſhould promiſe them pardon if they have offended; that ſo they may not be reduced to deſpair by the apprehenſion of puniſhment: or if they are afraid of loſing their liberties, he ſhould aſſure them he has no deſign of infringing them, or of doing them the leaſt injury of any kind whatſoever; and that he has no further intention than to reſtrain the ambition of ſome few particular men amongſt them. Such a method of proceeding often facilitates the reduction of a town: and though theſe pretences are eaſily ſeen through by men of ſagacity and penetration; yet they generally impoſe upon the vulgar; who being deſirous of preſent eaſe and quiet, are not aware of the hook that is concealed under ſuch promiſes, and conſequently are often gulled either out of their lives or liberties that way: as it happened to the Florentines not long ago, and to Craſſus and his army of old. For though that General was convinced himſelf there was no confidence to be put in the Parthians, and that they made him fair promiſes, only to ſooth his Soldiers in ſuch a manner that they might not think themſelves in deſperate circumſtances, and under a neceſſity of being ſtrictly upon their guard; yet his men were ſo blinded with the offers of peace, that not being able to make them ſee the danger they were in, both he and his army were cut off.——The Samnites, at the inſtigation of ſome few of their countrymen, who had more ambition than the reſt, made an incurſion into the territories of ſome people who were in alliance with the Romans, and plundered all the country in contempt of the treaties that ſubſiſted betwixt them: but repenting of what they had done, they afterwards ſent Ambaſſadors not only to aſk pardon of the Romans, but to aſſure them they would likewiſe make ample reſtitution, and deliver up the Authors of thoſe hoſtilities into their hands. This ſubmiſſion however, being rejected at Rome, and the Ambaſſadors

indiſcrete a manner. Now if the reſentment that is always excited by ſuch uſage could produce theſe effects in the breaſt of a Roman, and at a time when that Republic was yet incorrupt, it may well be expected to operate more powerfully in perſons who live in a Commonwealth that is leſs virtuous, and have not ſo much regard to the good of the public as the gratification of their own paſſions. But as it is impoſſible to preſcribe any certain remedy for ſuch evils, it is likewiſe impoſſible that any Commonwealth ſhould be perpetual; ſince every one is liable to a thouſand unexpected accidents which may occaſion its ruin.

CHAP. XVIII.

That nothing ſhews the abilities of a General ſo much, as to penetrate into the deſigns of the Enemy.

EPAMINONDAS the Theban uſed to ſay that nothing was more neceſſary or of greater ſervice to a General than to penetrate into the deſigns of the enemy: and ſince that is generally a difficult matter, he certainly is worthy of much praiſe who ſucceeds in it. For if the very actions of an enemy, and thoſe too which fall under our immediate notice and obſervation are often myſterious and hard to be accounted for, certainly it muſt be much more difficult to diſcover their ſecret deſigns and reſolutions. It has frequently happened, when an engagement has laſted till night, that the conquering army has thought itſelf defeated, and that which has had the worſt of it, has looked upon itſelf as victorious: an error that ſometimes proves fatal to thoſe that fall into it; as it did to Brutus and Caſſius, who were ruined by a miſtake of this kind. For the wing which Brutus commanded having routed the forces he was engaged with, Caſſius, on the contrary, thought it had been defeated, and killed himſelf in deſpair. At the battle of St. Cecilia in Lombardy which happened not long ago betwixt the French and the Swiſs, night coming on, a body of Swiſs, which remained entire and unbroken, thought they had got the day, not knowing that the reſt of their army was routed and diſperſed: ſo that inſtead of retreating in the dark, as they might have done, they continued upon the field of battle till the next morning; at which time they were charged again and cut to pieces. The Pope's army and that of the King of Spain had like to have been ruined alſo by this miſtake: for upon a falſe report that the Swiſs had gained a victory, they paſſed the Po, and advanced ſo far that they very narrowly eſcaped falling into the hands of the French before they were undeceived. An error of the ſame kind happened in the camps of the Romans and the Æqui: for

Sempronius

Sempronius the Roman Conſul being ſent with an army againſt the Enemy, and forcing them to an engagement which continued till night with various ſucceſs on each ſide, when it began to grow dark, and both armies had ſuſtained conſiderable loſs in the battle, neither of them returned to their camp, but drew off to the neighbouring hills, where they thought they ſhould be more ſecure. The Roman army was divided into two parts; one of which had followed the Conſul; the other Tempanius, a Centurion, to whoſe valour and conduct it was owing that the Romans had not been entirely routed that day. But in the morning, the Conſul hearing no more of the enemy, retreated towards Rome; as the Æqui likewiſe did towards their own country: for each ſide thinking they had loſt the day, marched away, and left their camps to the mercy of the enemy. It happened however, that Tempanius, who was likewiſe going to retreat with the reſt of the Roman army, had intelligence from ſome of the Æqui who were wounded and afterwards taken priſoners, that their Generals had quitted the field and left the camp which they had poſſeſſed there: upon which, he in the firſt place returned to the Roman camp, and having ſecured that, immediately plundered the enemy's, and returned victorious to Rome: an advantage which was gained merely by his having received information of the enemy's miſtake, before they knew any thing of that into which the Romans had fallen themſelves.

Hence we ſee it ſometimes happens that two oppoſite armies may be in the ſame error, and preſſed by the ſame neceſſity; and that that will come off with the advantage at laſt, which is firſt acquainted with the diſtreſs of the other. To confirm this, I ſhall add another example which happened not long ago in our own country. In the year 1498, when the Florentines had entered the territories of Piſa with a powerful army, and laid cloſe ſiege to that City, the Venetians having taken it under their protection, and ſeeing no other method to ſave it, reſolved to make a diverſion by invading ſome other part of the Florentine dominions: for which purpoſe, they ſent a large body of forces into the vale of Lamona, and not only ſeized upon Marradi, but laid ſiege to the Fortreſs of Caſtiglione, which ſtands upon a hill above it. The Florentines being alarmed at this, determined to ſuccour the fortreſs; but in ſuch a manner as not to weaken their army before Piſa: and therefore having made new levies both of horſe and foot, they ſent them towards that place under the command of Jacopo d'Appiano, Lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio da Marciano. But upon the arrival of theſe forces near Caſtiglione, the Venetians raiſed the ſiege, and retreated into the town: ſo that the two armies lying cloſe together for ſeveral days, both ſuffered greatly for want of proviſions and other neceſſaries; and as neither of them durſt come to an engagement, nor was

aware of the other's diſtreſs, it happened that they both reſolved to quit their ſituation the ſame morning; the Venetians deſigning to retreat towards Berzighella and Faenza, and the Florentines towards Caſaglia and Mugello. When the morning came, and each ſide had begun to ſend away their baggage, a poor old woman who lived in Marradi, happening to come into the Florentine camp to ſee ſome relations ſhe had there, informed them that the Venetians were marching off: upon which, the Florentine Generals taking courage, immediately purſued them with all their forces, and wrote word to Florence that they had not only obliged the enemy to quit Marradi, but had actually beat them, and put an end to the war. This victory then (if it may be ſo called) was wholly owing to chance; for if the Venetians had happened to have known that the Florentines were in motion, before the latter were aware of their decamping, the conſequence would certainly have been the ſame with regard to them, and the Florentines muſt have come off with diſadvantage.

CHAP. XIX.

Whether rigour, or clemency and gentle means, have a greater effect upon the multitude.

AT a time when the Roman Republic was miſerably divided by inteſtine diſcords betwixt the Patricians and the Plebeians, yet as they were likewiſe engaged in wars abroad, they ſent out two armies under the command of Quintius and Appius Claudius. Appius behaving himſelf with great rigour and auſterity in his command, was ſo ill obeyed by his Soldiers that he was forced to quit his province with as much diſgrace, as if he had been driven out of it by the enemy: whilſt Quintius on the contrary, being of a benign and affable diſpoſition, was ſo well ſerved by the Soldiery, that he ſucceeded in all his enterprizes. Hence it appears, that the command over a multitude is much better ſupported by gentle and benevolent meaſures, than by rigorous and ſevere puniſhments. But many others are of a different opinion, and eſpecially Tacitus, who ſays, *in multitudine regendâ plus pœna quam obſequium valet: it is an eaſier matter to rule a multitude with a high hand, than by gentleneſs and clemency.*

Conſidering therefore with myſelf, how theſe two opinions may be reconciled, I ſay, that the people to be governed are either in ſome meaſure your equals and fellow Citizens, or ſuch as are abſolutely ſubject to you. In the firſt caſe, you cannot ſecurely treat them with that ſeverity which Tacitus ſeems to recommend: and therefore, as the Roman

Roman people had an equal ſhare with the Patricians in the adminiſtration of the Government, they were not to be treated in an inſolent and cruel manner, by perſons who had but a temporary command over them. Accordingly, we ſee that thoſe Roman Generals who careſſed their Soldiers, and were beloved by them, always performed greater exploits than others who uſed them harſhly, and made themſelves hated and feared by them; except they happened to be men of extraordinary worth indeed, like Manlius Torquatus. But whoever governs people that are abſolutely ſubject to him (for of ſuch Tacitus ſpeaks) muſt of neceſſity have recourſe to rigour and ſeverity, inſtead of mildneſs and humanity; in order to prevent them from rebelling and trampling upon him. This however, ought to be practiſed with due moderation, and in ſuch a manner as not to excite public hatred, which is always of great prejudice to Rulers. Now the way to avoid that, is not to make too free with the properties of your Subjects: for as to their blood, few Rulers are deſirous of ſhedding it, except it is either to poſſeſs themſelves of ſomebody's eſtate, or upon ſome ſuch extraordinary occaſion as ſeldom happens, and which they are neceſſarily obliged to comply with. In the former caſe, indeed, when they are governed by avarice; as they muſt naturally be tempted to take away the lives of their Subjects; ſo they never want opportunities of of gratifying ſuch an appetite, as I have ſhewn at large elſewhere [*k*].

The conduct of Quintius, therefore, is more to be commended than that of Appius; and the opinion of Tacitus is juſt enough in other circumſtances, and under proper reſtrictions.

CHAP. XX.

That one inſtance of humanity and generoſity had a greater effect upon the Faliſci, than all the weight of the Roman arms.

WHEN the Faliſci were beſieged by Camillus, a School-maſter, to whoſe care moſt of the Nobility in that City had committed their Sons, thinking to ingratiate himſelf with Camillus and the Roman Republic, took all his Pupils out of the City with him, under pretence of exerciſe and recreation, and inſenſibly led them to the enemy's camp, where he delivered them up to Camillus, telling him that he had it then in his power to make the town ſurrender upon what terms he pleaſed. But Camillus abhorring the baſeneſs of the deed, not only refuſed to receive them, but ordered him to be ſtripped naked, and to

[*k*] See the *Prince* Chap. xvii. xix. and Pol. Diſc. Book. III. Chap. vi.

have his hands tied behind him; and having given every one of the boys a rod, made them whip him all the way back again into the town. An action ſo generous and humane, that the Faliſci were ſtruck with admiration; and inſtead of making any further defence, immediately ſurrendered.

Hence we may learn, that tenderneſs and humanity have ſometimes a much greater effect upon the minds of men, than any ſort of violence which can poſſibly be uſed: and that Cities, and even whole Provinces have often been ſubdued by one act of Compaſſion, Continence, or Generoſity, when no human force could have conquered them: of which we have many other examples in Hiſtory. The Romans were never able to drive Pyrrhus out of Italy by dint of arms: and yet Fabricius obliged him to quit it, by giving him notice that one of his domeſtics had offered to poiſon him. Again, Scipio Africanus did not gain ſo much reputation in Spain by taking new Carthage, as he did by a noble example of his continence, when he ſent back again a young and very beautiful Lady (whom he had taken priſoner) untouched, to her huſband; the fame of which action gained him the eſteem of all that nation, and made the people his friends, inſtead of enemies [*l*].

We ſee then how greatly ſuch virtues are admired by all men, and how much they are celebrated and recommended by every ſort of writers. Xenophon, in particular, takes great pains to ſhew what honour, and how many victories Cyrus acquired by his humanity, affability, freedom from pride, cruelty, luxury, and all other vices that ſtain the life of man. Nevertheleſs, as Hannibal acquired great reputation and many remarkable victories by very different methods, it may not be amiſs, perhaps, to enquire in the next Chapter to what cauſes that was owing.

CHAP. XXI.

How it came to paſs that Hannibal acquired as much glory in Italy, as Scipio did in Spain, but by quite different methods.

IT may appear ſtrange that ſome Commanders have performed very great things, and gained much glory and renown by quite different methods from thoſe preſcribed in the laſt Chapter. From whence many may be apt to conclude, that ſuch virtues do not contribute to make a Commander fortunate and renowned, any more than the qualities that are totally oppoſite to them; ſince the ſame degree of fame and repu-

[*l*] See Book II. Chap. xxi. of theſe Diſcourſes.

tation

tation is to be acquired one way as well as the other. If Scipio made himſelf maſter of all Spain by his humanity and clemency; Hannibal, on the contrary, pretty nearly effected the ſame thing in Italy, by very different means; that is, by every ſort of violence, cruelty, rapine, and perfidy: for almoſt all the Cities and States in that Province revolted to him. Conſidering therefore with myſelf, how this is to be accounted for, I think ſeveral reaſons may be aſſigned for it.

In the firſt place, all men are ſo fond of novelty, that people who live happy and free, as well as thoſe that are quite otherwiſe, often wiſh for a change of Government: it being the nature of mankind (as I have ſaid elſewhere) to be ſatiated with proſperity, as well as tired with adverſity. To this diſpoſition it is owing, that upon any rebellion or invaſion, the Chiefs of it, whether foreigners or natives, never want friends and followers to abet and aſſiſt them: and the greater the number of them is, the greater will be their progreſs. There are likewiſe two other powerful motives of human actions, viz. Love and fear, which operate very ſtrongly upon ſuch occaſions: ſo that if a General can make himſelf either much beloved or much feared, he will be followed and obeyed by many; and commmonly indeed by more in the latter caſe than in the former. Whichſoever of theſe two courſes therefore, ſuch a Commander ſhall think fit to purſue, the effect will be the ſame, if he is a man of great abilities and reputation, like Hannibal or Scipio, and knows how to remedy the inconveniencies that may proceed from his endeavouring to make himſelf either too much beloved, or too much feared. For each of theſe extremes has its inconveniencies, and ſuch too as may prove fatal to him: becauſe, by taking too much pains to gain the hearts of people, he may ſtoop ſo low as to make himſelf cheap and contemptible: and by too much ſeverity he will become odious: and to ſteer a middle courſe is very difficult, if not impoſſible. It requires great abilities therefore, to remedy the inconveniencies that may ariſe from exceſſes of either kind, as Hannibal and Scipio did; for, though they both owed their ſucceſs and reputation to purſuing the different methods abovementioned, yet it muſt be confeſſed, that they both likewiſe ſuffered ſome inconveniencies by it. With regard to Scipio, part of his army and ſome of his friends revolted from him in Spain; which was entirely owing to want of proper ſeverity, and the little awe in which they ſtood of his perſon: for the generality of mankind are naturally ſo reſtleſs, that when they ſee any little opportunity of gratifying their ambition, they preſently forget the favours they have received from their Governors, and think no more of their kindneſs and beneficence to them: ſo that in order to remedy this inconvenience, Scipio was in ſome meaſure obliged to proceed with a degree of ſeverity which he had not practiſed before.

As

As to Hannibal, we do not certainly know of any particular inſtance in which his cruelty and perfidy was of prejudice to him: but we may ſuppoſe, that the reaſon why the Neapolitans and ſome other people continued ſo firmly attached to the Romans, was becauſe they were afraid of him. This we know, however, that his ſavage and barbarous manner of proceeding made the Romans more inveterate againſt him than any other enemy they ever had. For though Pyrrhus was at their very doors, and harraſſing all Italy with a powerful army, yet they had the generoſity to acquaint him with the deſign which one of his own people had formed to poiſon him: but they never ceaſed to perſecute Hannibal, even after he was ruined, till they brought him to his end. This was the effect then of his extreme cruelty and perfidy: but ſuch were his abilities, and the reputation which he had acquired, and ſo great the awe in which others ſtood of him, that it is mentioned by all Hiſtorians as a remarkable circumſtance, that though his army was compoſed of many different nations, there never was any mutiny or diſſention in it.

I conclude, therefore, that it is not very material, which of the two abovementioned courſes a Commander takes, provided he is a man of ſufficient abilities to correct the inconveniencies that may flow from any exceſs in it. And as Hannibal and Scipio both gained great reputation, the one by laudable, the other by deteſtable means, it may not ſeem altogether foreign to our ſubject, if we ſay ſomething in the next Chapter of two Roman Citizens, who acquired the ſame degree of glory, but by very different, though laudable means in both.

CHAP. XXII.

That Manlius Torquatus by his ſeverity, and Valerius Corvinus by his gentleneſs, acquired the ſame degree of Reputation.

THERE were in Rome at the ſame time two great Commanders, Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, who were equally renowned for their proweſs and conduct againſt an enemy, and equal in their honours and the number of their triumphs; but very different was their manner of treating their Soldiers. Manlius proceeded with the utmoſt ſeverity, and never ſpared them upon any occaſion, either in point of duty or puniſhment: whilſt Valerius, on the contrary, always behaved towards them with the greateſt tenderneſs, affability, and familiarity. Manlius, in order to keep up military diſcipline in full force, and make himſelf punctually obeyed by others, put his own ſon to death, though victorious, for engaging the enemy without his orders:

Valerius

Valerius never puniſhed any one in that manner. Nevertheleſs, the methods they took, though directly contrary to each other, had the ſame effect; for they both triumphed over the enemies of Rome, both contributed to aggrandize their country, and both acquired very great reputation themſelves: none of their Soldiers ever declined fighting, or mutinied, or diſobeyed their commands in any reſpect whatſoever; though thoſe of Manlius were ſometimes ſo harſh and rigorous, that afterwards when any ſevere orders were iſſued out, they were called *Manliana imperia, Manlian orders.* It may not be amiſs therefore to enquire, in the firſt place, to what cauſes it was owing that Manlius was obliged to act with ſuch a degree of ſeverity: in the next, what it was that enabled Valerius to proceed with ſo much lenity: thirdly, how it came paſs, that theſe two methods, ſo different from one another, produced the ſame effects: and in the laſt place, which of them is moſt worthy of imitation.

Whoever conſiders the character of Manlius, from the account which Livy gives of his actions and conduct, will find that he was a very brave man, a true friend to his country, dutiful and affectionate to his parents, and ſtrictly obedient in all things to the commands of his ſuperiors. All this appears from variety of inſtances, particularly from his fighting and killing a huge gigantic Gaul, who had challenged any man in the Roman army to a ſingle combat; from defending his father at the peril of his own life, againſt one of the Tribunes who had accuſed him; and from what he ſaid to the Conſul before he went out to fight the Gaul; *injuſſu tuo adverſus hoſtem nunquam pugnabo, non ſi certam victoriam videam: Without your permiſſion I will never fight any enemy, though I was ſure of a victory.* When a man of this ſtamp therefore, comes to command an army, it may naturally be expected, that he will endeavour to make others like himſelf; that his courage will prompt him to give bold orders; and that his regard to diſcipline will make him take care that they are punctually executed: for it may be looked upon as a never-failing maxim, that in great and arduous undertakings all orders muſt be obeyed, ſeem they ever ſo harſh and rigorous (as they muſt of courſe be ſometimes upon ſuch occaſions) otherwiſe the enterprize will certainly miſcarry. Hence we may obſerve, that in order to be well obeyed, it is neceſſary in the firſt place to know properly how to command: for which purpoſe, a man ought to compare his own condition and abilities with thoſe of others that are to ſerve under him: and if he finds himſelf in a capacity to rule them, he may then enforce his commands with rigour; if not he muſt let it alone. A certain wiſe man therefore uſed to ſay, that in order to govern a Republic with a high hand, there muſt be a due proportion eſtabliſhed betwixt thoſe that rule and thoſe [illegible] to be ruled in that manner;

manner; in which caſe the power of the Governors will be durable and ſecure: but where the governed are ſtronger than their Governors, the power of the latter will be of ſhort continuance.

But to reſume my ſubject. I ſay, that harſh and ſpirited commands proceed from a rigorous and bold diſpoſition; and that whoever gives ſuch orders, muſt be very ſtrict in ſeeing them duly executed: otherwiſe they will not be regarded. A perſon however, who is not of that caſt, ſhould not give ſuch orders; but content himſelf with others of a milder nature: for, if ordinary commands only are diſobeyed, he may act with clemency and gentleneſs, as the puniſhment uſual upon thoſe occaſions will be ſufficient; which being imputed to the common eſtabliſhed laws, brings no particular odium upon himſelf. We may conclude then, that Manlius was obliged to act as he did by the extraordinary commands he gave; which were owing to the natural turn and bias of his own mind; and ſuch indeed, as are often of great advantage to a Commonwealth; becauſe they ſerve to reduce it to its firſt principles and original virtue. For, if a Commonwealth could be fortunate enough to have a number of great and virtuous men ſucceeding each other at reaſonable intervals, to reform their fellow-Citizens by their own example, to reſtore the vigour of the laws, and to correct every thing that tended to its ruin or corruption, that State would be immortal, as I have ſaid before [*m*]. Such a one was Manlius, who by the rigour of his commands kept up the ancient military diſcipline amongſt the Romans; prompted thereto, in the firſt place, by his own natural diſpoſition; and in the next, by the deſire he had that the commands which it dictated ſhould be punctually obeyed.

Valerius, on the other hand, had an opportunity of indulging the clemency and gentleneſs of his nature, merely by retaining the orders and rules that had uſually been obſerved in the Roman armies; which being good and wholeſome in themſelves, gained him ſufficient reputation, and were neither hard to be obſerved by others, nor laid him under a neceſſity of puniſhing delinquents with extreme ſeverity; becauſe indeed there were but few ſuch in his army, and thoſe meeting only with ordinary puniſhment, imputed that to the common courſe of the laws, and not to any rigour or ſeverity in their General. So that he was at liberty to treat his Soldiers with all manner of tenderneſs and humanity, that could gain their affections and ſupport his authority over them: and thus it came to paſs, that theſe two Commanders were equally well obeyed, and each of them attained the ſame end, though by very different means. Thoſe however, that are deſirous to imitate either of them, ſhould take care of falling into

[*m*] See Chap. i. of this Book.

extremes

extremes that may occaſion hatred on one ſide, or contempt on the other; (as I ſaid before with regard to Hannibal and Scipio) which is very difficult either to be avoided or remedied, except a Commander is poſſeſſed of extraordinary abilities indeed.

It now remains to conſider, which of theſe two methods is moſt praiſe-worthy: and that ſeems to be a diſputable point; becauſe ſome writers recommend one, and ſome the other. Thoſe however who treat of the inſtitution of Princes, ſeem rather to prefer the conduct of Valerius to that of Manlius: and Xenophon in particular, extolling the virtues of Cyrus, ſays almoſt the ſame things of him, that Livy does of Valerius, when he was appointed Conſul in an expedition againſt the Samnites. For that General having harangued his Soldiers with his uſual affability, as they were going to engage the enemy, the Hiſtorian gives us the following character of him. *Non alias militi familiarior dux fuit, inter infimos militum omnia haud gravatè munia obeundo. In ludo præterea militari, cum velocitatis viriumque inter ſe æquales certamina ineunt, comiter facilis vincere ac vinci, vultu eodem; nec quemquam aſpernari parem qui ſe offerret; factis benignus pro re; dictis, haud minus libertatis alienæ, quam ſuæ dignitatis memor; & (quo nihil popularius eſt) quibus artibus petierat magiſtratum, iiſdem gerebat. No Commander was ever more familiar with his Soldiers. For he never refuſed to ſhare any toil or duty with the meaneſt of them. He would often mingle with them in their military exerciſes and recreations, and uſed to run and wreſtle amongſt them; putting himſelf upon a level with any man that had a mind to contend with him, and never changing his countenance, or ſeeming to be in the leaſt altered in any reſpect, whether he got the better or not. In his behaviour he was courteous and bountiful, as occaſion required; in his converſation he knew how to ſupport his own dignity, without reſtraining the freedom of others; and (which made him ſtill more dear to them) he exerciſed his authority with the ſame goodneſs and moderation by which he had obtained it.*

Livy ſpeaks much in favour of Manlius alſo; acknowledging that the Severity he exerciſed upon his own Son, had ſuch an effect upon his whole army, and made the Soldiers ſo obedient to his commands, that the victory which he gained over the Latins was entirely owing to it: and having given a circumſtantial account of the battle, the difficulties which the Romans laboured under, and the dangers they were expoſed to that day, he ſays it was the conduct of Manlius alone that gained the victory. Nay he goes ſtill further, and after comparing the ſtrength of the two armies, makes no ſcruple to affirm that whichſoever of them had been commanded by Manlius, would certainly have got the day.

Conſidering therefore what is ſaid on both ſides of the queſtion, it ſeems hard to decide it. However, not to leave the matter wholly un-

determined, I ſay, that it is ſafer and better for a perſon who is ſubject to a Republican form of Government to act like Manlius; becauſe ſuch a manner of proceeding is all for the advantage of the public, and cannot ſeem calculated to ſerve any private intereſt or ambition: ſince by treating every one with rigour and auſterity, and regarding the good of the commonwealth alone, a man cannot hope to gain friends and partizans ſufficient to carry on any particular deſign to the prejudice of his country. But the contrary may be ſaid of ſuch a conduct as that of Valerius in the like circumſtances: for though indeed, with reſpect to the public ſervice, the advantage would be the ſame; yet ſo popular and affable a behaviour to the Soldiery, is apt to excite jealouſies, and the people will naturally grow ſuſpicious at laſt (eſpecially if a General is continued long in command) that ſuch a degree of favour may be employed to deprive them of their liberties: and that ſuch an event did not actually happen in the Roman Republic under the adminiſtration of Publicola, was becauſe the people were not then become corrupt, and he did not continue long enough in power to debauch them.

But if we are to conſider theſe two different methods of proceeding with relation to a Prince, (as Xenophon does) we certainly muſt prefer the conduct of Valerius to that of Manlius: becauſe a Prince is, above all things, to ſecure the obedience and affection of his Soldiers and Subjects by gentle and benevolent meaſures. They will obey him if he appears virtuous, and obſerves the laws; they will love him, if he is affable, humane, merciful, and endowed with ſuch other good qualities as Livy aſcribes to Valerius, and Xenophon to Cyrus: and to ſee a Prince beloved by his people, with an army at his devotion, ſuits well with the nature of a Monarchy: but the ſame cannot be affirmed with regard to a perſon who is only a Subject in a Republic, and upon a civil equality with the reſt of his fellow Citizens. We read in the Annals of Venice, that the Venetian Gallies returning thither from ſome Expedition, and lying at anchor near the ſhore, there happened a difference betwixt the Sailors and the Townſmen, which occaſioned a fray that was very bloody, and carried on with ſuch obſtinacy on both ſides, that neither the power of their officers, nor reverence to any particular Citizen, nor the authority of the Magiſtrates was ſufficient to compoſe it: but a certain Noble Venetian, who had been their Commander the year before, appearing amongſt them at laſt, they laid down their arms and diſperſed out of reſpect to him: a circumſtance which occaſioned ſuch jealouſy in the Senate, that they ſoon after had him diſpatched.

I conclude then, that a Prince will find it for his advantage to imitate Valerius; but that it would be dangerous in a Subject of a Republic, both with regard to his country and himſelf: for in the firſt place, it would be paving a way to Tyranny; and in the next, the Government would grow ſo jealous of his proceedings, that they would not

not fail to take ſome courſe to rid themſelves of him. On the other hand, I affirm that the conduct obſerved by Manlius would be prejudicial to a Prince; but advantageous to the Subject of a Commonwealth; and moſt of all to the Public: for it ſeldom can do him any hurt, except the hatred which is occaſioned by his ſeverity, ſhould be encreaſed by a jealouſy of his great reputation and abilities, as it happened to Camillus [*n*].

CHAP. XXIII.

Upon what account Camillus was baniſhed from Rome.

WE have ſaid in the laſt Chapter, that the Subject of a Commonwealth, who imitates the conduct of Valerius, may injure both himſelf and his country; and that acting like Manlius may be of great ſervice to his country, though ſometimes prejudicial to himſelf; as may appear from the example of Camillus, whoſe manner of proceeding was more like that of Manlius than Valerius. Livy therefore, ſpeaking of him, ſays, *Ejus virtutem milites oderant & mirabantur: the Soldiers both hated and admired him for his virtues.* They admired him on account of his vigilance, prudence, magnanimity, and the good diſcipline he cauſed to be obſerved in his army: they hated him becauſe he was more ſevere in puniſhing, than liberal in rewarding them: to which the Hiſtorian adds the following reaſons for their hatred. In the firſt place, he ordered the money which was taken from the Veientes to be applied to public uſes, inſtead of dividing it amongſt the Soldiers with the reſt of the ſpoil: in the next, he cauſed his triumphal chariot to be drawn by four white horſes; which they ſaid was out of arrogance, and an ambition to emulate the glory of the Sun: in the laſt, he made a vow to dedicate the tenth part of the booty taken from the Veientes to Apollo; for the performance of which, he was obliged to take it away from the Soldiers, into whoſe hands it had fallen [*o*].

Hence we may learn, that nothing makes a Ruler more odious to the people, than to deprive them of their poſſeſſions; which is a thing of ſo great importance, that it is never forgotten: for, upon every little occaſion it returns freſh upon their memories: and as men are daily ſubject to ſuch occaſions, they will daily remember it. That another thing which gives great diſguſt, eſpecially to a free people, is a proud

[*n*] Compare this Chapter with the latter end of the 23d, and all the 24th Chapter of Montaigne's Eſſays, Book II. entitled, *Obſervations on Julius Cæſar's method of making War.*

[*o*] See Chap. xxix. and lv. Book I. of theſe Diſcourſes, and the Notes upon them.

and arrogant behaviour: and though perhaps they may not in any wiſe be materially hurt by it; yet it never fails to excite their indignation: upon which account, thoſe in office and authority ought always to avoid it as a moſt dangerous ſhoal; becauſe it is weak and raſh to the laſt degree to do a thing which muſt of neceſſity create hatred, and can be attended with no manner of advantage.

CHAP. XXIV.

That the prolongation of Commiſſions was the ruin of the Roman liberties.

IF we conſider the proceedings of the Romans with attention, we ſhall find that the diſſolution of their Republic was owing partly to the diſſentions that were occaſioned by the Agrarian Law, and partly to the prolongation of Commiſſions: for if the miſchiefs which aroſe from theſe cauſes had been foreſeen, and prevented in time, it is certain that Commonwealth would have ſupported itſelf much longer, and perhaps have enjoyed more tranquillity. For though we do not know that the prolongation of Commiſſions ever occaſioned any tumult or diſturbance at Rome; nevertheleſs it is evident that the extraordinary degree of authority which ſome particular Citizens acquired by that means, was of great prejudice to the State: whereas if all the Citizens who had an offer of being continued in their offices and commands had been poſſeſſed of as much wiſdom and virtue as Lucius Quintius was, the ſame inconveniencies and misfortunes would not have enſued. His integrity and diſintereſtedneſs indeed were ſuch as highly deſerve mention: for upon an accommodation betwixt the Plebeians and Patricians, the former having continued the ſame Tribunes in office for a year longer, as the moſt likely men to curb the ambition of the Nobility, the latter likewiſe in imitation of the Plebeians, reſolved to prolong the Conſulſhip of Lucius Quintius for the ſame term. But he peremptorily refuſed to accept of it; alledging that bad precedents ought to be diſcountenanced, inſtead of being ſupported by ſuch as were ſtill worſe; and therefore deſired them to chuſe new Conſuls. Now if all the reſt of the Roman Citizens had been as wiſe and virtuous as Quintius, that cuſtom of prolonging offices and commiſſions could not have been introduced into their Commonwealth; which at laſt was the principal cauſe of its ruin.

The firſt whoſe command was extended beyond its uſual term, was P. Philo, who having laid ſiege to Palæpolis at a time when his Conſulſhip was upon the point of expiring, was continued in office by the Senate with the Title of Proconſul; becauſe they thought him ſure of ſucceeding

ſucceeding in that enterprize, and therefore were unwilling to ſnatch the glory of it out of his hands, by ſending another perſon to ſuperſede him: a thing which, though done with a good intent, and for the ſervice of the Public, was the firſt ſtep that occaſioned the loſs of the Roman liberties. For the further abroad they carried their arms, the more neceſſary ſuch prolongations appeared, and the more common they became: from whence it came to paſs, in the firſt place, that but a few of their Citizens could be employed in the command of armies, and conſequently were incapable of acquiring any conſiderable degree of experience or reputation: and in the next, that when a Commander in chief was continued for a long time in that poſt, he had an opportunity of corrupting his army to ſuch a degree as to make the Soldiers entirely throw off their obedience to the Senate, and acknowledge no other Head but himſelf. To this it was owing that Sylla and Marius found means to debauch their armies and make them fight againſt their country; and that Julius Cæſar was enabled to make himſelf abſolute in Rome. So that if the Romans had not prolonged their Commiſſions beyond the uſual date, perhaps they might not have been ſo rapid in their conqueſts, nor ſo ſoon have arrived at the Empire of the World: but then, on the other hand, very probably it would have been later before they loſt their liberties.

CHAP. XXV.

Concerning the Poverty of Cincinnatus and ſeveral other Roman Citizens.

I Have ſhewn in another place, that the beſt way to preſerve the liberties of a Commonwealth is to keep the Subjects poor, at leaſt from growing too rich [*p*]. Now though it is not ſufficiently clear that there was any proviſion made for that purpoſe in Rome, (as the Agrarian Law was conſtantly oppoſed) yet we ſee that during the courſe of four hundred years after its foundation, that State continued in extreme poverty: the reaſon of which, I take to be, that poverty was no bar to offices or honours of any kind, and that virtue and merit alone were preferred to all other qualifications, wherever they were found. A remarkable proof of which, we have in the following example. When Minucius the Conſul and his army were in a manner ſurrounded by the Æqui, and the whole City of Rome was in ſuch conſternation that they were forced to create a Dictator, (their laſt reſource in extremities) they made choice of L. Quintius Cincinnatus, who was at plough himſelf in his

[*p*] See Chap. xvi. of this Book.

own

own little eſtate at the very time when he was ſent for to be inveſted with that authority: a circumſtance much admired by Livy, who ſays upon this occaſion, *Operæ pretium eſt audire, qui omnia præ divitiis humana ſpernunt, neque honori magno locum, neque virtuti putant eſſe, niſi effuſe affluant opes. It is pleaſant after this, to hear ſome people talk of riches, as if nothing in this world was to be weighed in the ſcale againſt them; and that neither virtue nor merit of any kind were of the leaſt account, in compariſon of wealth.* Cincinnatus (as I ſaid before) was at plough himſelf in his own little eſtate, which did not exceed four acres of land, when the Deputies found him, who had been ſent by the Senate to acquaint him with the imminent danger the Republic was in, and the choice they had made of him to be their Dictator. Upon which, he changed his clothes and immediately repaired to Rome; where he got together ſome forces, and marching directly againſt the enemy to reſcue Minucius from the danger he was in, he ſoon brought them to a battle, in which they were totally defeated and plundered. But when he divided the Spoil he would not ſuffer the army which he had delivered out of the hands of the Æqui to have any ſhare of the booty; telling them they were not worthy to partake of the Spoils of an enemy, by whom they were ſo near being plundered themſelves. As to Minucius, he deprived him of his authority, and reduced him to the degree of a Lieutenant only, ordering him to ſerve in that capacity, till he had learnt better how to command. In this Expedition he had made L. Tarquinius his General of horſe, though he had not ſo much as one horſe of his own; for he was ſo poor that he was forced to fight on foot.

Hence we may ſee that poverty amongſt the Romans was no bar to honour or preferment in thoſe days; and that a wiſe and good man thought four acres of land ſufficient for his ſuſtenance. The ſame contempt of riches is obſervable in the time of Marcus Regulus; who being at the head of an army in Africa, where he had beat the Carthaginians, ſent to deſire leave of the Senate to return to Rome, that he might put his farm in order again, which he heard was neglected by his Servants. From which example we may obſerve in the firſt place, how contentedly he lived in poverty; and that he gave up all the fruit of his labours for the good of the Public, looking upon the glory he had acquired as a ſufficient reward: for if he had thought of enriching himſelf by the war he would not have troubled his head about a few acres of land at home. In the next we may admire the generoſity, and magnanimity of the ancient Romans: for when they were advanced to the command of an army, they thought themſelves ſuperior to any Potentate upon earth: and yet when their Commiſſions expired, and they returned to their former condition, they were ſo modeſt, frugal, humble, laborious, obedient to the Magiſtrates, and reſpectful to their Superiors, that

that one could hardly have thought they had been the ſame men [q]. This neglect of riches continued till the days of Paulus Emilius, which were the laſt happy times of the Roman Republic: for though he enriched his country with the Spoils of the enemy, he continued ſo poor himſelf, that when he had a mind to reward his Son-in-law who had behaved with great bravery in the wars, he made him a preſent of a Silver cup, which was the firſt piece of plate he was ever poſſeſſed of. Indeed I might quote numberleſs examples to ſhew how much more mankind are obliged to poverty than riches; and that the former has been the honour and preſervation of ſome States and Religious Eſtabliſhments; whilſt ſeveral others have been ruined by the latter [r]. But

[q] "The Elder Cato returning Conſul from Spain, ſold his War-horſe to ſave the money it would have coſt him to bring him back by Sea into Italy, (ſays Montaigne from Plutarch) and being Governor of Sardinia, made all his viſits on foot, without any other attendants than one officer of the Republic who carried his robe and a cenſe for Sacrifices; and for the moſt part carried his Mail himſelf. He boaſted that he had never worn a Gown that coſt above ten Crowns, nor ever ſent above ten-pence to market for one day's proviſions. Scipio Æmilianus, after two Conſulſhips, and two triumphs, went on an Embaſſy with no more than Seven Servants in his train: Plato had but three, Homer but one, and Zeno, founder of the Stoic Sect, none at all. Tiberius Gracchus was allowed but five-pence halfpenny a day, when employed as a Commiſſioner for public affairs, though he was at that time the firſt man in Rome." *Montaigne's Eſſays*, Book I. Chap. lii.

[r] "I ſhall fill the remaining part of this paper (ſays Mr. Addiſon, Spec. Vol. 6, N° 464) with a very pretty Allegory, which is wrought into a play by Ariſtophanes the Greek Comedian. It ſeems originally deſigned as a Satire upon the Rich, though in ſome parts of it, it is a kind of compariſon betwixt wealth and poverty.—Chremylus, who was an old and a good man, but exceeding poor, being deſirous to leave ſome riches to his Son, conſults the Oracle of Apollo upon the Subject. The Oracle bids him follow the firſt man he ſhould ſee upon going out of the temple. The perſon he chanced to ſee was to appearance an old, ſordid, blind man; but upon following him from place to place, he at laſt found by his own confeſſion that he was Plutus the God of Riches, and that he was juſt come out of the houſe of a Miſer. Plutus further told him, that when he was a boy, he uſed to declare that when he came to age he would diſtribute wealth to none but virtuous and juſt men: upon which, Jupiter conſidering the pernicious conſequences of ſuch a reſolution, took his ſight away from him, and left him to ſtrole about the world in the blind condition Chremylus beheld him. With much ado Chremylus prevailed upon him to go to his houſe, where he met an old woman with a tattered raiment, who had been his gueſt many years, and whoſe name was *Poverty*. The old woman refuſing to turn out ſo eaſily as he would have her, he threatened to baniſh her not only from his own houſe, but out of all Greece, if ſhe made any more words about the matter. *Poverty* upon this occaſion pleads her cauſe very notably, and repreſents to her old Landlord that if ſhe ſhould be driven out of the country, all the trades, arts, and ſciences would be driven out with her; and that if every one was rich, they could not be ſupplied with thoſe pomps, ornaments, and conveniencies of life which made riches deſirable. She likewiſe repreſented to him the ſeveral advantages ſhe beſtowed upon her votaries, in regard to their ſhape, their health and activity, by preſerving them from gouts, dropſies, unweildineſs and intemperance. But whatever ſhe had to ſay for herſelf, ſhe was forced to troop off.—Chremylus immediately conſidered how he might reſtore Plutus to his ſight: and in order to it, conveyed him to the temple of Æſculapius

But this has been already done by ſo many other writers, that it is here altogether unneceſſary.

CHAP. XXVI.

That the ruin of ſome States has been owing to Women.

IT happened in the City of Ardea that a young woman who was poſſeſſed of great riches, had two Suitors, one a Patrician, the other a Plebeian: but her father being dead, her guardians would have married her to the Plebeian, contrary to the deſire and advice of her Mother, who would have given her to the Patrician. This occaſioned ſuch a tumult in the City, that all the people took up arms; the Patricians in favour of one Competitor, and the Plebeians to ſupport the other. But the Plebeians being driven out of the City, applied to the Volſci for aſſiſtance; and the Patricians to the Romans. The Volſci happening to arrive firſt, joined the Plebeians and laid ſiege to the place: but the Romans coming ſuddenly upon them ſoon after, ſhut them up in ſuch a manner betwixt their camp and the walls of the town, that they were compelled by famine to ſurrender at diſcretion: upon which, the Romans immediately entered the town, and having put the authors of the ſedition to death, reſtored its former tranquillity.

In this affair there are ſeveral things worthy of obſervation. In the firſt place we ſee, that women ſometimes occaſion much miſchief and diſcord in a State, to the great prejudice of thoſe that govern it: for a further proof of which, it may be remember'd (as we have ſhewn before) that the rape of Lucretia coſt the Tarquins their kingdom, and the attempt upon Virginia was the cauſe of the Decemviri being deprived of their authority. Ariſtotle in his *Politics*, ſpeaking of Tyrants, ſays that the rage and indignation which men conceive againſt them for

was famous for cures and miracles of this nature. By this means the Deity recovered his eyes, and began to make a right uſe of them by enriching every one that was diſtinguiſhed for piety towards the Gods, and juſtice towards men; and at the ſame time by taking away his gifts from the impious and undeſerving. This produces ſeveral merry incidents; till at laſt Mercury deſcends with great complaints from the Gods, that ſince the good men were grown rich they had received no Sacrifices; which is confirmed by a Prieſt of Jupiter, who enters with a remonſtrance, that ſince this late innovation he was reduced to a ſtarving condition, and could not live upon his office. Chremylus, who in the beginning of the Play was religious in his poverty, concludes it with a propoſal which was reliſhed by all the good men who were now grown rich as well as himſelf, that they ſhould carry Plutus in ſolemn proceſſion to the temple, and inſtal him there in the place of Jupiter.—This allegory inſtructed the Athenians in two points: firſt, as it vindicated the conduct of Providence in its ordinary diſtributions of wealth: and in the next place, as it ſhewed the great tendency of riches to corrupt the morals of thoſe that poſſeſſed them."

debauching

debauching their wives, or daughters, or other relations, is frequently the occaſion of their ruin, as I have obſerved before, in my diſcourſe upon Conſpiracies. All Princes therefore and Governors of Republics ſhould carefully attend to this matter, and conſider the diſorders which may ariſe from ſuch cauſes: that ſo they may either prevent them, or provide ſuch remedies in time as may not tend to the prejudice and diſgrace of their State: for we ſee how the Republic of Ardea, by ſuffering the diſcords amongſt its Citizens to riſe to ſuch a height, became ſo divided that it was neceſſary to call in foreign help to re-unite it; which is generally a prelude to Slavery.—The next thing to be obſerved upon this occaſion, is the method that ought to be taken to re-unite a divided State: but of that I ſhall treat at large in the next Chapter.

CHAP. XXVII.

What methods are to be taken in order to re-unite a divided State: and that they judge wrong who think the beſt way to keep a City in Subjection, is to keep it divided.

FROM the method which the Romans took to reconcile the two factions at Ardea, we may ſee which is the beſt way of compoſing civil diſſentions in a divided City; and that is by cutting off the ring-leaders. For there are but three ways to re-unite ſuch a State; which are, either by putting the Heads of the factions to death, or by baniſhing them, or by obliging them to be friends under certain penalties. Of theſe three ways, the laſt is the moſt dangerous and uncertain: becauſe it is impoſſible that any forced reconciliation ſhould continue long, where much blood has been ſhed, or other outrages committed; eſpecially when the parties live together within the ſame walls, and cannot help ſeeing and perhaps converſing with each other every day; which muſt of neceſſity occaſion freſh quarrels and animoſities: of which we have a recent example in the City of Piſtoia. That City, about fifteen years ago, was divided into the two factions of the Panciatichi and Cancellieri, and ſtill continues ſo: but at that time they were together by the ears; and now they are tolerably quiet. After many bickerings and diſputes they at laſt proceeded to bloodſhed, burning and plundering each other's houſes, and committing all manner of open hoſtilities. Upon which, the Florentines who had often interpoſed betwixt them, and endeavoured to compoſe their differences by the laſt of the methods abovementioned, finding they only enflamed their reſentment ſtill more, and made things worſe inſtead of better by theſe means, grew ſo tired that they had recourſe to the ſecond method, baniſhing ſome of the

Chiefs of both factions, and impriſoning others; by which they ſoon quieted the reſt, and have kept them in pretty good order ever ſince.

The firſt method however, is certainly the beſt and moſt effectual: but as a good degree of Spirit and reſolution is neceſſary in ſuch a manner of proceeding, weak States know not how to avail themſelves of this way; and it is pretty well if they venture upon the ſecond. This is one of the errors, which (as I ſaid before) the Princes of our times are apt to fall into, when they come to deliberate upon any matter of great importance: for inſtead of following the example of others upon the like occaſions in paſt times, they think it in ſome caſes inhuman, and in others impoſſible to be imitated: which is owing to their pitiful education and their ignorance in the affairs of the world. Thus inſtead of adopting the wiſe Maxims of the Ancients, they fall in with certain modern opinions, equally ridiculous and abſurd: one of which I ſhall here take notice of, as it was eſtabliſhed by ſome wiſe politicians of our own City, who laid it down for a rule, *Che biſognava tener Piſtoia con le parti, & Piſa con le fortezze: that Piſtoia was to be kept under by fomenting diſcord amongſt the Citizens there; but Piſa by a Citadel*; not knowing how inſignificant and ineffectual both one and the other of theſe expedients was for ſuch purpoſes. As to Citadels I ſhall ſay nothing of them in this place, becauſe I have ſpoken of them at large elſewhere[ſ], and therefore ſhall only take notice of the futility of this Maxim, *that in order to keep the towns that are under your dominion in ſubjection, you muſt keep them divided.*

I ſay then in the firſt place, it is impoſſible that any Prince or Governor of a Republic ſhould keep fair with two factions at the ſame time in a town that is ſubject to their dominion: for as it is the nature of mankind to take either one ſide or the other in all diviſions, upon different motives which influence their inclinations; ſo one of the factions being diſaffected to their Prince, he muſt of neceſſity loſe the town whenever he engages in a war: for how can he expect to keep poſſeſſion of any place, when he has enemies both within it and without. But if it belongs to a Republic, there is no ſurer method to corrupt its own Citizens, and to ſow diſcord amongſt them, than to encourage factions in it: becauſe each ſide will naturally endeavour by ſome undue means or other to gain the favour of their Governors, and ſecure their protection: which muſt be attended with two very great inconveniencies: one of which is, that you never can make either of them your ſtedfaſt friends: for their Governors being ſo often changed, and ſometimes a perſon of one way of thinking, and ſometimes another of a quite different turn, being appointed to rule over them, it is impoſſible they ſhould

[ſ] See *the Prince*. Chap. xx. and Chap. xxiv. Book II. of theſe Diſcourſes.

ever

ever be ſteadily and properly governed. The other inconveniency is, that by ſuch a bias to factions in other places, you muſt neceſſarily divide your own State: of which we have an inſtance in Bicondo's Hiſtory of Florence; who ſpeaking of the proceedings of that Republic with the Piſtoians, ſays *Mentre che i Fiorentini diſegnavano reunir Piſtoia, diviſono ſe Medeſimi: whilſt the Florentines endeavoured to re-unite the Piſtoians, they fell into diviſions amongſt themſelves.* From whence we may obſerve the evils that ariſe from ſuch diviſions in a town that is dependent upon a Republic.

In the year 1501, after Arezzo had revolted from the Republic of Florence, and the vales of Tevere and Chiana were over-run by Duke Valentine and the Vitelli, the King of France ſent an army, under the command of Monſieur de Lant, to recover thoſe territories for the Florentines. But that General, finding numbers of people wherever he came, who declared themſelves of Marzocco's party, was much offended at their diviſions, and told them, "that if any of his Maſter's ſubjects in France ſhould declare themſelves of the *King's party*, they would be ſeverely puniſhed for it; as ſuch a declaration muſt imply that there was another party againſt the King; whereas his Majeſty would have it known that all his Subjects were well affected to him, and united amongſt themſelves."—Thoſe Maxims therefore which are now in ſuch vogue, though contrary to all manner of reaſon and good policy, proceed from the weakneſs of our Princes and other Rulers of States; who finding themſelves unable to ſupport their authority by laudable and ſpirited meaſures, are obliged to have recourſe to ſuch mean artifices: which perhaps may ſerve their purpoſes for a while, in quiet and peaceable times; but will be found altogether ineffectual in times of adverſity and diſtreſs.

CHAP. XXVIII.

That the Governors of a Republic ſhould keep a ſtrict eye upon the conduct of their Subjects; becauſe under the diſguiſe of beneficence and humanity they often aim at Tyranny.

THE City of Rome being diſtreſſed by famine, and the public Magazines not affording proviſions enough to ſupply the wants of the people, Spurius Melius, (a very rich man for thoſe times) diſtributed a great quantity of corn amongſt them at his own expence: by which he became ſo popular, that the Senate apprehending their liberties might be endangered by it, if he was not ſuppreſſed before he grew too powerful, immediately created a Dictator, who cauſed him to be

put to death. Hence we may remark that many actions which appear good and laudable at firſt ſight, may yet prove prejudicial and deſtructive to a Republic in the end, if timely care is not taken to prevent it.

But to diſcuſs this matter more particularly; I ſay that a Republic can neither be well governed, nor indeed ſubſiſt at any rate without men of reputation: and on the other hand, that too great a degree of reputation in a private man, is ſometimes the cauſe of its ruin. To guard againſt which, no particular Citizen ſhould be ſuffered to gain any ſort of reputation but what may be of ſervice and advantage, inſtead of prejudice, to the Commonwealth and its liberties. Now the methods by which ſuch reputation is to be acquired, are either public or private: that is, in the firſt caſe, when a man diſtinguiſhes himſelf either by his abilities in Council, or in the field, or by doing ſome other great and material ſervice to the Commonwealth: and theſe ways of gaining reputation, inſtead of being precluded, ſhould be open to all Citizens, who muſt alſo be encouraged by ſuch rewards for their good counſels and actions, as may content themſelves, and make them honoured by others: for reputation acquired in this manner can never be attended with any prejudice to the public. But in the ſecond caſe, when it is done by private methods, it is very dangerous and deſtructive: by private methods, I mean ſuch as obliging particular perſons by lending them money, by giving their daughters marriage portions, by protecting them againſt the authority of the Magiſtrates, and other ſuch favours as create dependants and partizans, and embolden them to violate the laws and corrupt others. Upon which account, a well governed Republic, as I ſaid before, ought to encourage all Citizens that endeavour to gain favour and reputation by public methods, and ſuch as tend to the glory and advantage of their country: but to diſcourage thoſe that attempt it by private means, and for other purpoſes. The Romans accordingly granted triumphs and many other honours and rewards to Citizens who had ſignalized themſelves in the ſervice of the public: but always brought thoſe to a trial, before the people, who endeavoured to advance themſelves alone, by private methods and undue practices: and if the people happened to be ſo blinded by plauſible appearances, that they would not ſuffer them to be puniſhed, a Dictator was immediately created, who being veſted with a ſort of abſolute authority, had it in his power to reſtrain ſuch irregularities by puniſhing the delinquents in a proper manner; as it happened in the caſe of Spurius Melius: for if but one offender alone of that kind is ſuffered to eſcape with impunity, it is ſufficient to ruin a Commonwealth; as it would be exceeding difficult to maintain any good order or equality in it after ſuch an example.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIX.

That the faults of the people are generally owing to the Prince.

PRINCES ought not in reaſon to complain of any tranſgreſſions which their Subjects commit, becauſe they are entirely owing either to their own remiſſneſs, or to their being guilty of the ſame themſelves: and if the people of ſome States at preſent are infamous for thieving, robbing, plundering, and other ſuch enormities, it proceeds wholly from the oppreſſion and rapaciouſneſs of their Governors. Romagna, before Alexander VI. extirminated the petty Lords who ruled over it, was full of raſcals who lived upon murder and rapine; which was not owing to the natural depravity of the people (as ſome think) but to the wickedneſs of thoſe little Tyrants, who being poor themſelves, and yet ambitious to live in ſplendour and magnificence, were obliged to have recourſe to oppreſſion and extortion of every kind [*t*]. Amongſt

[*t*] "The Italians (ſays the Author of the *Eſtimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times*, Vol. II. Sect. V.) are an effeminate people, yet in the general opinion, void of humanity: they are given to cruelty, treachery, and aſſaſſination. The queſtion is then, from what cauſes this ſingular appearance may ariſe?—It is commonly affirmed and ſuppoſed to be natural to the country. But they who talk thus, I think, mean no more (ſo far as they mean any thing) than this, that there is ſome cauſe unknown, which produces this crime in Italy, rather than elſewhere. Machiavel, who knew mankind, aſcribes this degeneracy in the people, to the wickedneſs and ill example of their rulers." *Here the author quotes the paſſage above marked from Machiavel, and then proceeds in this manner.* "This, in ſome meaſure, accounts for the inhumanity of the people: but we are ſtill at a loſs as much as ever, how ſuch an *extirminating* principle came firſt amongſt the Great. What follows then, ſeems the natural ſolution of the queſtion. When Italy became divided into a number of petty States, the contentions and factions in thoſe States were endleſs. The parties were often too ſmall to levy armies. Hence conſpiracies, inſurrections, aſſaſſinations by ſword or poiſon, were the common, becauſe the readieſt, way of proſecuting the political deſigns either of the oppreſſors or the oppreſſed. *See Machiavel's hiſtorical tracts paſſim.* By this means the dreadful practice of aſſaſſination, by being applied politically, loſt a great part of its horror in the minds of the parties who practiſed it: thus it naturally crept into private uſe, and has been of courſe tranſmitted from one generation to another.—Hence appears the great importance of curbing the violence and horrors of public contention, by what are called *the Laws of War and of Nations:* ſince the oppoſite conduct is not only attended with immediate cruelties, but, what is worſe, is in danger of ſtriking its colours into private life, and giving even to ſucceeding times the complexion of inhumanity.—We muſt not leave this ſubject, without adding a remark upon Machiavel himſelf, who undoubtedly wrote under the influence of this habit of thinking, ſo peculiar to Italy. For we ſee in the paſſage now cited that although he ſpeaks with reſentment againſt the private murders ſo common in his days, yet he mentions thoſe political aſſaſſinations with a kind of approbation, for which Alexander VI. and his Son Valentine were ſo juſtly infamous through all Europe. He expreſsly treats of this method of acquiring Government; and with all the *Sang froid*

of

Amongſt other vile and nefarious methods which they practiſed to fill their coffers, they made laws to prohibit ſuch and ſuch particular things: after which, they ſoon broke them themſelves, and encouraged others to do ſo by their own example: but they never puniſhed any one till the number of delinquents became very conſiderable; and when they did, it was not out of any reſpect to juſtice, but to enrich themſelves with fines and confiſcations. Hence it came to paſs, that their Subjects being impoveriſhed, but not in any wiſe amended in their manners, endeavoured to make up their loſſes by plundering others who were ſtill weaker than themſelves: ſo that we may impute all the evils and enormities abovementioned to the ſcandalous and wicked example of thoſe Lords; and of how much weight the example of a Prince is, we may further learn from the following inſtance in Livy. The Ambaſſadors whom the Romans ſent with the ſpoils of Veii to the temple of Apollo at Delphos, being taken by ſome Corſairs, were carried into Lipari, a port in Sicily. But Timaſitheus, Prince of that place, being informed of the nature of the prize, whither the Ambaſſadors were going, and by whom they were ſent, behaved like a Roman himſelf upon that occaſion, (though a native of Lipari) and repreſenting to the people, in the ſtrongeſt terms, how impious and ſacrilegious a thing it would be to ſeize upon an offering that was made to the Gods, the Ambaſſadors were immediately diſmiſſed with all their effects by the general conſent of the people. Upon which occaſion, the Hiſtorian ſays, *Timaſitheus multitudinem religione implevit, quæ ſemper regenti eſt ſimilis. Timaſitheus inſtilled a ſpirit of piety and devotion into the people, who*

of a man talking on a juſt and legitimate ſubject. *See his Prince*, Chap. viii. Hence concluſions have been drawn much in his diſfavour, as a man abandoned to all wickedneſs; whilſt others have adopted the contrary opinion, and affirmed, that he pointed out theſe ways of iniquitous policy and aſſaſſination, that he might teach mankind more effectually to prevent them. Now in truth theſe two opinions are equally groundleſs: for on one hand, his writings abound with inconteſtible proofs that he was a well-wiſher to his country and mankind: and on the other, it muſt be allowed, that he hath rather ſhewn the methods of treacherous policy, than the ways of preventing them. The truth is, thoſe iniquitous practices which ſhock our humanity were familiarized to his imagination by the common uſage of his country: hence he treated them as he did other political maxims of a better ſtamp, and only talked the language of his time and nation. Nay it appears from a particular paſſage in his works, that he vindicated this practice of aſſaſſination, as being in ſome caſes a principle of the trueſt humanity. "Cæſar Borgia (ſays he, in his Prince, Chap. xvii.) was accounted cruel; but his cruelty not only thoroughly reformed and united Romagna, but ſettled it in peace and kept it firm in allegiance to him. Which being duly conſidered, he will appear much more merciful than the Florentines, who to avoid the reproach of cruelty, ſuffered Piſtoia to be deſtroyed." Theſe, no doubt are horrid maxims, and could never have riſen in the mind of ſuch a man as Machiavel, but from the cauſe aſſigned above: and they are the more to be lamented, as they have thrown a cloud over the fame of one, who, in my opinion, is the greateſt political reaſoner upon facts that hath appeared in any age or country."

are

are always governed by the example of their Prince: much like which is the ſaying of Lorenzo de' Medici,

E quel che fa il ſignor fanno poi molti;
Che nel Signor ſon tutti gli occhi volti.

Princes attract the eyes of all, and good
Or bad, are copied by the multitude.

CHAP. XXX.

That a Citizen who would do any good in a Republic by dint of his own authority, muſt in the firſt place extinguiſh all envy: alſo what proviſions are to be made for the defence of a Town upon the approach of an enemy.

THE Roman Senate having intelligence that preparations were making throughout all Tuſcany to invade their dominions; and that the Latins and Hernici (who had long been in amity with their Republic) had entered into a league againſt them with the Volſci, (the perpetual enemies of the Roman name) began to apprehend that ſuch a war muſt be attended with very great danger. But as Camillus was one of the Tribunes, and veſted with Conſular power, they thought they ſhould have no occaſion to create a Dictator, if his Collegues would entruſt him with the chief command: which being propoſed to them was cheerfully complied with; *nec quicquam* (ſays Livy) *de majeſtate ſuâ detractum credebant, quod majeſtati ejus conceſſiſſent: for they looked upon it as no diſparagement to themſelves, to give the firſt place to him.*

Camillus therefore, being aſſured of their obedience, immediately raiſed three armies; one of which he conducted himſelf againſt the Tuſcans; the ſecond was encamped near Rome, under the command of Quintius Servilius, to watch the motions of the Latins and Hernici; and the third was left at home with Lucius Quintius to defend the City, and to guard the Senate-houſe and the Gates, if occaſion required. Beſides this, he ordered Horatius, one of his Collegues, to fill the Magazines with corn, arms, and other ſuch proviſions as are neceſſary in time of war; appointing Cornelius, another of the Tribunes, to preſide in the Senate and Councils, and to expedite the public buſineſs: thus the Tribunes in thoſe times, we ſee, were ready either to command or obey, as was moſt requiſite for the good of the Commonwealth.

Hence we may obſerve what great things a good and wiſe man may do, and of how much ſervice he may be to his country, when he has extinguiſhed

extinguiſhed envy merely by dint of his own merit and virtue: for that often prevents worthy and able men from doing the good they would do, by keeping them down, and not ſuffering them to be advanced to ſuch a degree of power and authority as is neceſſary to accompliſh any great purpoſe. Now envy is extinguiſhed two ways; in the firſt place, by ſome ſudden calamity, or arduous undertaking: for upon ſuch occaſions, men being ſenſible of the danger they are in, lay aſide their ambition, and readily conſent to obey thoſe by whoſe abilities alone they can hope to be delivered out of it. Thus it happened to Camillus, who having been three times Dictator, and given the moſt convincing proofs of his virtue as well as his abilities, by conſtantly attending to the public good, without any regard to his own private advantage, had ſo far extinguiſhed all envy in the breaſts of his fellow Citizens, that they feared nothing from his power, nor thought it any diminution of their own honour to ſerve under a man of his eſtabliſhed reputation and integrity. The other way by which envy is extinguiſhed, is when your rivals in power and reputation are removed, either by violence or the courſe of nature: for ſuch men will never be at reſt as long as they live, whilſt they ſee you in greater eſteem and authority than themſelves; eſpecially if they have been uſed to live in a corrupt ſtate: for then it is impoſſible they ſhould ever be moved by any danger or emergency, becauſe their education has not furniſhed them with any principles of virtue; ſo that out of the perverſity of their nature, they will rather ſee their country ruined, than not obtain their ends. Nothing but death therefore is capable of extinguiſhing this ſort of envy: and if fortune is ſo propitious to a virtuous man that his competitors go off by natural deaths, he may then eſtabliſh his reputation without ſcandal, and exerciſe his power without oppoſition or offence. But if that does not happen, he muſt endeavour to rid himſelf of them by any means whatſoever: for this muſt be done before any thing elſe can be effected. Thus whoever reads the Bible with attention, will ſee that Moſes, in order to eſtabliſh his Laws, was obliged to put many people to death, who oppoſed him out of envy [*u*]. Girolamo Savonarola,

[*u*] Upon this paſſage, E. Dacres ſays as follows. "I doubt the underſtanding which Machiavel adviſes others of, he wants himſelfe; not knowing the meaning of, or not beleeving the holy writt: whereby he puts men paſt ſuſpicion of his Atheiſme. For what he alleadges of Moſes, he muſt needs take originally from Moſes his bookes, being we have not any author of that antiquity as could write any thing of his owne knowledge touching thoſe times. But thoſe Machiavel ſeems not to beleeve further than ſerved his own humour, reading the ſcriptures only to a politique end, not ſo much for the ſtrengthening his beleefe, as the bettering his diſcourſe. Yet though Machiavel did not, I hope others will beleeve, that Moſes delivered to the Iſraelites the true oracles of God, and that it was not Moſes that puniſhed the delinquents among them, but God ſending his immediate judgments; as in the rebellion of Corah and his complices, *Numbers* xvi. Moſes

narola, and Pietro Soderini, Gonfalonier of Florence, likewiſe ſaw the neceſſity of acting in this manner: but the former being only a Friar could not do it, becauſe he had not ſufficient authority; and ſuch of his followers as had, did not rightly comprehend his meaning; though that was not his fault, for his Sermons were full of exclamations and invectives againſt the *wiſe men of this world*; a name which he gave to thoſe that envied him and oppoſed his meaſures [x]. As to Soderini, he flattered himſelf that time, moderation, the auſpiciouſneſs of his fortune, and his great beneficence, would at laſt extinguiſh the envy that ſome had conceived againſt him: for he was young, and ſo well ſupported by his friends, (the number of whom was daily increaſed by his munificence and liberality) that he hoped he ſhould have been able to ſurmount all oppoſition, without having recourſe to violence, or exerting his power in ſuch a manner as might occaſion ſcandal and diſturbance: not conſidering that time and opportunities are not to be loſt, that beneficence is ineffectual, that fortune is inconſtant, and that envy is not to be appeaſed by any ſort of favours or good offices whatſoever. So that both theſe perſons were ruined at laſt; one of them becauſe he had not authority enough to rid himſelf of thoſe who envied him; and the other by not doing it when he had it in his power [y].

Another thing to be obſerved in the conduct of Camillus, is the proviſion he made both at home and abroad for the preſervation of Rome: and indeed, ſuch Hiſtorians as Livy are much to be commended, for giving a particular and circumſtantial account of ſuch occurrences, that ſo thoſe who come after them may know how to act upon ſimilar occaſions. We ought therefore to remark upon this, that it is very imprudent and dangerous to leave the defence of a City to a parcel of tumultuous people, without order or command: of which it is plain, that Camillus was ſufficiently aware, by leaving a regular army for the ſecurity of Rome; which many perhaps may think was altogether unneceſſary, becauſe the Romans were a brave people, and inured to

Moſes did but cite them as to appearance; but God immediately ſent his vengeance, for *the Earth under them opened*, v. 31. And when that wretched fellow gathered ſtickes on the Sabboth, *Numbers* xv. Moſes awaited till God paſſed the ſentence upon him for his death and the manner thereof, v. 35. Therefore Machiavel may juſtly be taxed for traducing Moſes here of more than he hath warrant for, making no other eſteeme of Moſes his bringing the Iſraelites out of Egypt, and his leadinge them through the wilderneſſe, than of Romulus gathering together a ſcattered multitude and laying the foundation of that Commonwealth; which action, his courage and ambition of rule and glory thruſt him upon; not ſeeming to take notice that Moſes was immediately called by God and ſent to ſhew his wonders and judgments againſt the Egyptians, and to conduct the Iſraelites into Canaan, (according to God's promiſes formerly made to their forefathers) wherein he behaved not himſelfe either ambitiouſly or inſolently; nor was any thing done by his own proweſſe or policy, but merely by the ordinance of God."

[x] See *the Prince*, Chap. vi.

[y] See Chap. ix. of this Book.

war, and therefore it might have been ſufficient to put arms into their hands when occaſion required. But Camillus judged otherwiſe, and ſo would any other prudent man in the like circumſtances: for the multitude ought not to be truſted with arms, except under certain reſtrictions and proper command. In imitation of this example then, a perſon who undertakes the defence of a City, ſhould above all things take care not to arm a giddy and tumultuous multitude, but rather ſelect ſuch as he dares truſt with arms, and is ſatisfied will obey him in whatever he commands; and order thoſe who are not made choice of for that purpoſe, to ſtay at home and guard their own houſes. Whoever purſues this method in a town that is beſieged, will find it an eaſy matter to defend it well: otherwiſe it will be difficult, if not impoſſible [z].

CHAP. XXXI.

That powerful Republics and truly great men retain their dignity and firmneſs of mind in all viciſſitudes of fortune.

AMONGST all the noble actions and ſayings which Livy aſcribes to Camillus, nothing ſhews the magnanimity of that great man more plainly than the following: *Nec mihi Dictatura animos fecit* (ſaid he in one of his ſpeeches) *nec exilium ademit: I am not elated with the Dictatorſhip, nor was I dejected in baniſhment.* By which we ſee that great men are always the ſame in every reverſe of fortune: for though ſhe may change her countenance, and ſometimes exalt, and ſometimes depreſs them, yet they never vary, but conſtantly retain the ſame firmneſs of mind, and are ſo uniform in their conduct, that fortune ſeems to have no power over them: whereas mean and puſillanimous men, buoyed up with proſperity, and intoxicated with good fortune, impute all their ſucceſs to virtues of which they were never poſſeſſed; and ſo become odious and inſupportable to thoſe who have any thing to do with them. This often expoſes them to ſudden revolutions of fortune, and then they preſently fall into the other extreme, and become as abject as ever they were arrogant before. Hence it comes to paſs, that when Princes of this ſtamp fall into adverſity, they generally turn tail and run away, inſtead of exerting themſelves manfully to oppoſe it; for as they abuſed their proſperity, they are incapable of ſupporting themſelves in adverſity. Theſe virtues and theſe defects are common, not only to particular men, but to whole Republics: of which, I ſhall give two examples; one from the conduct of the Romans, the other from that of the Venetians.

[z] See *the Art of War*, Book VII. at the beginning.

The

The Romans were never diſmayed in adverſity, nor elated with proſperity: for a proof of which, we may alledge their behaviour after their defeat at Cannæ, and their victory over Antiochus. For after that defeat, though Hannibal had routed them twice before, and reduced them to the laſt extremity, they were ſo far from being daunted, that inſtead of ſuing for peace, they bravely reſolved to continue the war; and refuſing to redeem the priſoners who had been taken by the enemy, upon unreaſonable terms, they armed their old men and ſlaves, and ſent a freſh army into the field: an account of which being ſent to Carthage, Hanno told the Senate there, *He feared they were but little better for their victory at Cannæ:* from whence we ſee that the Romans were never dejected in the loweſt ebb of their fortune. On the other hand, they never grew arrogant in proſperity, as we may obſerve from the behaviour of Scipio to Antiochus: for when that Prince ſent Ambaſſadors with overtures of peace to Scipio, the latter told them he would not grant him any terms except he would retire into Syria, and ſubmit entirely to the diſcretion of the Roman Republic. But Antiochus rejecting theſe conditions, came to an engagement with the Roman army, and was utterly defeated: after which, he ſent other Ambaſſadors with orders to accept any terms from the Conqueror; who contented himſelf however with the ſame which he offered him before the battle, telling the Ambaſſadors, *Quod Romani, ſi vincuntur, non minuuntur animis, nec ſi vincunt inſoleſcere ſolent; that as the Romans were never dejected when they loſt a battle, ſo they knew how to behave with moderation when they were victorious.*

Very different was the behaviour of the Venetians in their proſperity, which they attributed ſolely to their own bravery and good conduct, though without the leaſt reaſon: for they became ſo inſolent, that they called the King of France *a Son of St. Mark*, treated the Pope and all the reſt of the Italian Princes with the utmoſt diſdain; and not content with their territories in Italy, vainly imagined they ſhould ſoon extend their dominion as far as ever the ancient Romans had done. But fortune beginning to frown upon them, and their forces being worſted at the battle of Vaila, by the French, they loſt all their acquiſitions at once; for ſome of the States that were ſubject to them revolted, and the reſt they meanly ceded to the Pope and the King of Spain: after which, they were ſo diſpirited that they ſent Ambaſſadors to the Emperor, with an offer of becoming tributary to him; and wrote letters to the Pope, in the moſt abject and ſubmiſſive terms, to move his compaſſion. To this extremity of dejection they were reduced in four days, and when they had not loſt one half of their army: for after the abovementioned battle, one of their Commiſſaries retreated ſafe to Verona with above twenty-five thouſand horſe and foot. So that if

they had acted with any ſort of Spirit, they might ſoon have brought another army into the field: and if they could not have beat the enemy, they might perhaps have obtained an honourable peace; at leaſt the loſs of their dominions would not have been attended with ſo much diſgrace. But their dejection was owing to the defect of their military inſtitutions and the conſciouſneſs of their inexperience in warlike affairs; which diſheartened them to ſuch a degree, that they were incapable of exerting themſelves as they ought to have done. But this will always be the fate of ſuch people: for inſolence in proſperity, and dejection in adverſity, are owing to mean and pitiful inſtitutions. If men are improperly educated and diſciplined, they will never be good for any thing: if otherwiſe they will know how to behave with equanimity in all conditions, and to make ſo true an eſtimate of the things of this world, as neither to become inſolent when fortune ſmiles, nor abject when ſhe frowns upon them. So that what I ſaid before of individuals will hold good with regard to whole communities; which will always act with ſpirit or puſillanimity, according as their diſcipline and inſtitutions are good and wholeſome, or mean and defective.

Now though I have ſaid elſewhere that good military diſcipline is the foundation ſtone of all States, and that without it there can neither be good laws nor good order of any kind [*a*], it may not be amiſs to repeat it here; becauſe we ſee the neceſſity of keeping up a good army in almoſt every page of Livy's Hiſtory, and that no army can ever be good except it is well diſciplined and exerciſed, which cannot be done if it is not compoſed of your own ſubjects. For as no State, either is, or can be, continually at war, it is neceſſary that its forces ſhould be duly exerciſed and diſciplined in time of peace: but that is impoſſible if your army conſiſts of foreign troops, on account of the immenſe expence you muſt be at in maintaining ſuch an army both in peace and war. Camillus, as I ſaid above, marched out with an army againſt the Tuſcans: but when they came within ſight of the enemy and found the Tuſcan army was much ſuperior to their own, they were not a little diſmayed: but Camillus being aware of it, calmly walked through the ranks, and without any further directions or altering the diſpoſition of his army, only ſaid to his Soldiers, *Quod quiſque didicit, aut conſuevit, faciat; practiſe what you have learnt, and I deſire no more.* From whence we may conclude that he well knew they had been ſufficiently diſciplined and exerciſed before, both in peace and war, to make them good ſoldiers; and that he fully confided in them. For it is certain that no material ſervice can be expected from an undiſciplined army; that no General can truſt to it; and that if Hannibal himſelf ſhould riſe from

[*a*] See *the Prince*, Chap. xii. xiii. xiv. *Pol. Diſc.* Book I. Chap. xxi. Book II. Chap. xx. and *the Art of War*, paſſim.

the

the dead, and be put at the head of ſuch a body of forces, they would preſently be cut to pieces by a well diſciplined army, though much inferior in number; becauſe when an army is engaged, the General himſelf cannot be in all places at the ſame time; and therefore it is neceſſary that his ſubordinate officers ſhould ſtrictly obey the commands he had given them before the battle begun; that they ſhould enter into the ſpirit of their orders, and know how to execute them in a proper manner: otherwiſe he muſt inevitably be defeated.

If then any ſtate will follow the example of the ancient Romans, in exerciſing and diſciplining its forces in times of peace as well as war, and accuſtom its ſubjects not only to exert their virtues both in public and private, but to arm themſelves againſt the viciſſitudes of fortune; it will always be able to maintain its dignity both in proſperity and adverſity: but if it neglects this, and leaves itſelf entirely to the caprice of fortune, without any dependence upon its own merit and endeavours, as the Venetians did, it muſt be ſhaken by every blaſt of wind, and totally ruined at laſt.

CHAP. XXXII.

What methods ſome people have taken to prevent a peace.

THE Circei and Velitræ, two Roman Colonies, revolted from that Republic in hopes of being protected by the Latins: but the Latins themſelves being ſoon after ſubdued, and unable to give them any aſſiſtance, ſome of the revolters adviſed their fellow-Citizens to return to their obedience. This advice however was warmly oppoſed by the authors of that rebellion; who being afraid they ſhould be more ſeverely puniſhed than any of the reſt, endeavoured by all means to prevent any accommodation, and for that purpoſe perſuaded their countrymen to continue in arms and commence hoſtilities againſt the Romans. And indeed it muſt be confeſſed, that when any one has a mind to prevent either a Prince or a Republic, or people, from coming to terms of agreement with others, there is no ſurer method to obtain that end than to prevail upon them to injure or affront the other party in ſo atrocious a manner, that the dread of the puniſhment they have juſtly deſerved may deter them from making any overtures of peace [*b*].

At the end of the firſt war in which the Carthaginians were engaged with the Romans, the Soldiers who had been employed by the former in Sicily and Sardinia, were ſent back into Africa, where they mutinied

[*b*] See the Speech of a Plebeian, Hiſt. Flor. Book III. about the middle of it.

for want of pay; and taking up arms under Matho and Spendius, whom they had made choice of for their leaders, they took and plundered ſeveral towns that belonged to the Carthaginians. Upon which, the Carthaginians being deſirous to try all other means before they proceeded to force, ſent Aſdrubal, one of their principal Citizens, to treat with them, in hopes he would have been able to reduce them to obedience by the influence which they ſuppoſed he muſt have over them, as he had been their Commander ſome time before. But when he arrived amongſt them, Matho and Spendius being determined to deprive their Soldiers of all hopes of ever coming to any terms with the Carthaginians, perſuaded them that it was the beſt way to kill Aſdrubal and all the reſt of the Carthaginians whom they had taken priſoners. This advice was accordingly followed: for they not only put them to the moſt cruel kinds of death they could deviſe, but afterwards publiſhed a proclamation in which they threatened to ſerve all other Carthaginian priſoners in the ſame manner that ſhould fall into their hands thereafter: by which they prevented all propoſals of peace, and made their Soldiers more obſtinate in their rebellion.

CHAP. XXXIII.

That it is of great ſervice in battle, to inſpire Soldiers with confidence both in themſelves and their General.

IT is a matter of the utmoſt importance to inſpire Soldiers with ſuch a degree of confidence before a battle, as makes them think themſelves ſure of Victory; for which purpoſe, it is neceſſary they ſhould be well armed, well diſciplined, and well acquainted with each other; which yet cannot be effected, except they are your own Subjects, or countrymen, and have lived long together. It is alſo requiſite that they ſhould have ſo good an opinion of their General, as to put great confidence in him; which they will always do, if they ſee that he is vigilant, active, brave, and keeps up his command with dignity; as he eaſily may do, if he puniſhes offenders in a proper manner, and does not harraſs his men with hard duty when it is unneceſſary: beſides which, he ſhould be punctual in fulfilling his promiſes, ready at all times to encourage them, by repreſenting how eaſy it is to ſurmount many things which ſeem difficult only at a diſtance, and by either concealing or extenuating all dangers: for this is a certain way to ſecure their confidence, and contributes much to victory [*c*]. The Romans

[*c*] See *the Art of War*, Book IV. towards the end, & alibi paſſim.

uſed

uſed to inſpire their armies with this confidence by Religious means, and always had recourſe to Auguries and Auſpices when they created Conſuls, raiſed armies, or were going to engage an enemy: in ſhort, without ſome ceremony of this kind, their wiſeſt and beſt Generals never went upon any enterprize or undertook any thing of moment; imagining that it would contribute greatly to the ſucceſs of it to have it thought the Gods were on their ſide: and if any of their Conſuls or Generals preſumed to engage an enemy in contempt of the Auſpices, they always puniſhed them for it, as they did Claudius Pulcher. Appius Claudius, accordingly, complaining to the people of the inſolence of the Tribunes, by whoſe means the Auſpices and other Religious rites had been corrupted, ſays as follows; *Eludant nunc licet Religionem: quid enim intereſt ſi pulli non paſcentur, ſi ex caveâ tardius exierint, ſi occinuerit avis? Parva ſunt hæc; ſed parva iſta non contemnendo majores noſtri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt.* *They may laugh at Religion if they pleaſe, and ſay what ſignifies it whether the poultry eat their meat or not, whether they come quickly or ſlowly out of their pens, and whether ſuch or ſuch a bird ſings or lets it alone? Theſe matters may ſeem trifling indeed; but trifling as they are, our Anceſtors exalted this Republic to the glory we now ſee it in by a Religious obſervation of them.* For ſuch things ſerve to keep Soldiers in good ſpirits and united, which conduces not a little to the ſucceſs of any undertaking: but they muſt be ſeconded by valour and good conduct, otherwiſe they will not be ſufficient of themſelves alone, as may appear from the following inſtance. The Prænestines having taken the field againſt the Romans, encamped upon the banks of the Allia, in the very place where the Romans had once been defeated by the Gauls: which they did to inſpire their own army with courage, and to ſtrike a damp into that of the enemy, when they remembered how unfortunate they had been in that place before [*d*]. Now though there was ſome policy in that ſtep, yet the event ſhewed that true valour is not to be moved by ſuch trifling circumſtances: for the Roman Dictator having reconnoitred the enemy, ſaid to his General of horſe, *vides tu fortunâ illos fretos, ad Alliam conſedisſe; at tu, fretus armis animiſque, invade mediam aciem; you ſee that the enemy have ſat down here, truſting to the fortune of the place; but truſt you to your own arms and courage, and fall on.* True valour therefore, good diſcipline, and a confidence ariſing from many victories, cannot be diſconcerted by trivial accidents and little diſorders. The two Manlii being at the head of an army which the Romans ſent out againſt the Volſci, and having detached part of their forces to forage, it happened that both thoſe who went upon that errand, and

[*d*] See Book I. Chap. lvi. Note 78, of theſe Diſcourſes, towards the latter end of it.

thoſe

thoſe that remained in their camp, were attacked by the enemy at the ſame time; out of which danger however, the Soldiers extricated themſelves by their own courage, rather than by any good conduct in the Conſuls, as Livy tells us, *militum etiam ſine rectore ſtabilis virtus tutata eſt.*

I ſhould not conclude this Chapter without taking ſome notice of an expedient made uſe of by Fabius to encourage his Soldiers: for being ſent with an army againſt the Tuſcans, and knowing how neceſſary it was to inſpire them with confidence of ſucceſs, eſpecially as they were in a ſtrange country, and had a new enemy to deal with, he told them in an harangue which he made to them, when they were going to engage, they had many reaſons to hope for victory, but he could give them another, why they might depend upon it with certainty, if it was not of ſuch a nature, that it would be dangerous to diſcloſe it. An admirable piece of Generalſhip, and well worthy of imitation.

CHAP. XXXIV.

What ſort of reputation, or character, or opinion it is, that firſt inclines the people to favour ſome particular Citizen: and whether a People, or a Prince diſpoſes of their honours and employments with greater judgment and prudence.

WE have ſhewn before that Titus Manlius, (afterwards called Torquatus) defended his father in an accuſation that was brought againſt him by Marcus Pomponius, one of the Tribunes of the people. And though the method he took to do it was ſomething extraordinary, and ſavoured of violence, yet the remarkable affection which he ſhewed to his father was ſo pleaſing to the people, that inſtead of calling him to any account for what he had done, they ſhewed their approbation of it by chuſing him ſecond Tribune of the Legions, at the next election of thoſe officers [*e*]. It may not be amiſs therefore, to conſider the motives upon which the people commonly act in the diſpoſal of their honours: from whence we ſhall ſee, that they proceed with more prudence and judgment than Princes uſually do in ſuch diſtributions, as I have aſſerted elſewhere [*f*].

[*e*] See Book I. Chap. xi.
[*f*] See Book I. Chap. lviii.

I ſay

I ſay then, that the people are determined in their choice upon theſe occaſions, either by the public character and reputation of a man, when his conduct and actions are not ſufficiently known to every one; or by ſome particular prepoſſeſſion or opinion of their own; both which motives are ſometimes owing to a man's extraction, (for when his anceſtors have been good and worthy men, it is generally thought he will be ſo too, except he behaves himſelf in ſuch a manner as to convince them of the contrary) and ſometimes to his own converſation and way of life: that is, when he aſſociates himſelf with virtuous and honourable men, and ſuch as are in high eſteem for their prudence: for ſince there is no ſurer way of judging of a man than by the company he keeps, a perſon who aſſociates with good men will juſtly be thought ſo himſelf; becauſe when people are intimate, and much converſant together, there muſt of neceſſity be a ſimilitude in their manners. But there is another way of gaining credit amongſt the people; which is by great and honourable actions, either of a public or private nature. This is the beſt and moſt ſtable foundation that any man can build his reputation upon: for that which depends upon the merit of one's Anceſtors ſoon fades and periſhes, except it is revived and renewed by a man's own virtues. The prepoſſeſſion which ariſes from your ordinary manner of life and aſſociating with good men, is a better foundation than this; though not ſo good a one as the other: for as it ariſes from opinion and expectation only, it is likewiſe apt to wear off, if not ſupported and confirmed, in ſome reaſonable time, by great and laudable actions: but the reputation which depends upon a man's own merit, takes ſo deep a root, and ſtands ſo firm, that he muſt behave very ill indeed to forfeit it afterwards.

Thoſe that are born in a Commonwealth ought therefore to purſue this courſe, and endeavour by all means to begin their career with ſome great and extraordinary action, which may ſerve as a foundation to build their future reputation upon; as the young Romans did, who always ſet out either with promoting ſome law for the good of the public, or impeaching ſome great and powerful Citizen, who had tranſgreſſed the laws, or doing ſome other ſuch new and remarkable thing as might occaſion much talk about them. This manner of proceeding is no leſs neceſſary to maintain and increaſe a good reputation, than to acquire it at firſt: for which purpoſe it ſhould often be repeated; as it was by Titus Manlius through the whole courſe of his life. For after he had defended his father in ſo ſtrenuous and extraordinary a manner, and thereby laid the foundation of his reputation, he ſome years after fought the Champion of the Gauls, as we have ſaid before, and having killed him in a ſingle

combat, took a gold collar from his neck and put it upon his own; by which he gained the name of Torquatus. Theſe things he did when he was young: and afterwards, when he grew up to years of maturity, he put his own Son to death for having engaged the enemy without orders; though he had gained a victory. Such examples of his filial affection, perſonal courage, and ſtrict regard to diſcipline and juſtice, gave him much more reputation, both in his own times, and the ages that have ſince paſſed, than all the battles he had won, and the triumphs he had obtained, though he had been as ſucceſsful in that reſpect as any other of his countrymen: and not without reaſon; for in one caſe he had many equals, but in the other, very few, or none at all. Scipio the elder, did not gain ſo much glory by his triumphs, as by ſaving his father's life in battle, when he was but a youth himſelf; and by drawing his ſword, and forcing ſeveral young Romans to take an oath that they would never abandon their country, as they had deſigned to have done after the battle of Cannæ [g]: for theſe two actions were the foundation of his reputation, and ſerved as ſteps to the triumphs which were afterwards decreed him by the Senate for his victories in Africa and Spain: and this reputation (great as it was before) he prodigiouſly increaſed, by ſending back a beautiful young Lady, whom he had taken priſoner in Spain, ſafe and inviolate to her friends. Now if ſuch a conduct muſt be obſerved by thoſe that would advance themſelves to reputation and preferment in a Commonwealth, it is equally neceſſary that Princes ſhould do the ſame, in order to acquire and preſerve the eſteem of their Subjects: for nothing recommends a Prince ſo much to his People, as either ſaying or doing ſomething extraordinary in his youth: eſpecially if it ſeems to proceed from a regard to their welfare, and has ſuch an appearance of magnanimity, juſtice, or liberality, as makes it much talked of [h].

But to reſume our ſubject. I ſay that when the people begin to have a good opinion of any particular perſon, and are moved to confer their honours and employments upon him, by one or other of the abovementioned reaſons, their judgment is not ill founded: but certainly they judge beſt, when they do it after he has given ſome proofs of his merit; becauſe, in that caſe, they ſeldom or never can be deceived. I ſpeak only of that good opinion which they conceive of a man at firſt, before he has either ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed himſelf, and eſtabliſhed his reputation by repeated inſtances of his worth, or cancelled the merit of his good actions by others of

[g] See Book I. Chap. xi.
[h] See the *Prince*. Chap. xxi.

a different

a different nature: in both which caſes they are not ſo apt to err as a Prince. For ſince it is poſſible that the people might be deceived by report, or opinion, or even by the actions of a man, and think better of him than he deſerved, (which is an error that a Prince cannot well fall into, becauſe he has counſellors to adviſe and inform him better) wiſe Legiſlators have always taken care to obviate this inconvenience, by providing that when any great office ſhould become vacant, and the people might be ſo far miſtaken in their judgment as to make choice of an improper or unworthy perſon to fill it, any Citizen ſhould not only be at liberty to publiſh his incapacity or demerit, but have the thanks of his fellow Citizens for ſo doing: that ſo when the people were better informed, they might correct their error. For a proof of this, we may appeal to an harangue which Fabius Maximus made to the people, in the time of the ſecond Punic war, when they were inclined to have created T. Ottacilius one of their Conſuls: but Fabius thinking him by no means equal to ſuch a charge at that Conjuncture, openly declared againſt him, and repreſented his inſufficiency in ſuch a light that he was ſet aſide, and another perſon elected of more worth and greater abilities. The people therefore, in the election of Magiſtrates, found their opinion of men upon ſuch circumſtances as are leaſt apt to deceive one: and when they have Counſellors to adviſe them, they are guilty of fewer errors than Princes: ſo that a Citizen who would gain their favour and good opinion, muſt firſt diſtinguiſh himſelf by ſome great and remarkable action, as Titus Manlius did [*i*].

[*i*] "The moſt painful and difficult employment in the world, (ſays Montaigne, Book III. Chap. vii.) in my opinion, is worthily to diſcharge the office of a King. I excuſe more of their failings than men commonly do, in conſideration of the vaſt weight of their function, which really aſtoniſhes me. It is difficult for ſuch boundleſs power to obſerve any decorum. Yet ſo it is, that even to thoſe who are not of the moſt happy diſpoſition, it is a ſingular incitement to virtue, to be ſtationed in ſuch a place, that whatever good you do is recorded and placed to account, and the leaſt Benefaction extends to numbers of people; and where your talent, like that of Preachers, chiefly addreſſes itſelf to the people, who are not very nice judges, eaſily deceived, and eaſily ſatisfied. There are few things in which we can give a ſincere judgment; becauſe there are few wherein we have not in ſome ſort a particular intereſt. Superiority and inferiority, command and ſubjection, are naturally liable to envy and cavil, and muſt neceſſarily be continually encroaching upon one another. I believe neither one nor the other, touching its reſpective rights: let reaſon therefore, which is inflexible and diſpaſſionate, when it can be found, determine the caſe. It is ſcarcely a month ago ſince I turned over two Scotch Authors who contended with each other upon this point. He who takes the part of the People, makes the condition of a King worſe than that of a Carter; and the writer for the Monarch, lifts him up ſome degrees above Almighty God in Sovereignty and Power." See alſo Book I. Chap. xxix. xliv. and lviii. of theſe Diſcourſes.

CHAP. XXXV.

That it is dangerous to be the chief promoter and adviſer of an Enterprize: and that the more important the Enterprize is, the greater is the danger.

IT would be too tedious a taſk to ſhew at large how dangerous a thing it is for one man to take upon himſelf to preſide and direct in any new and extraordinary enterprize, wherein the concurrent advice and aſſiſtance of many are required; how difficult it is to conduct ſuch an undertaking; and how much more ſo, to bring it to a happy concluſion. I ſhall therefore reſerve what I have to ſay upon one part of this matter for a more convenient time and place; and ſpeak only at preſent of the dangers to which a man is expoſed who preſumes to give a Prince ſuch advice in any great and important enterprize, that the ſucceſs of it, whether good or bad, muſt be imputed wholly to himſelf. For as mankind commonly judge of things by the event, if an enterprize miſcarries, all the blame is laid upon him that adviſed it; and if it ſucceeds he may gain ſome little applauſe perhaps; but the reward in that caſe is not adequate to the danger he would have been in if it had failed. Selim, the preſent Grand Signior, having made preparations to invade Syria and Egypt (as it is reported by ſome who lately come out of Turky) was adviſed by one of his Baſhaws who lived upon the confines of Perſia, to turn his arms upon the Sophi. He therefore marched with a very powerful army againſt the Perſians: but arriving in a flat open country where there were vaſt deſarts and no water to be had, and meeting with many other difficulties and dangers which in former times had often proved fatal to the Roman armies in thoſe parts, his forces were ſo diminiſhed at laſt by hunger and thirſt and ſickneſs, that, though he ſucceeded in that expedition, he loſt the greater part of his army: upon which, he was ſo enraged at the perſon who adviſed him to undertake it, that he put him to death. Many other people have been ſerved ſo in Republics upon like occaſions, as we might ſhew at large from the hiſtory of former times. It happened that one of the Roman Conſuls being choſen out of the Plebeians, by the inſtigation of ſome particular Citizens, was defeated the firſt time he led an army into the field: for which the encouragers of that election would have been called to an account, if the whole body of Plebeians had not thought themſelves obliged to protect them for the honour they had done them. Hence we ſee that the

the Counſellors of Princes and Republics lie under this dilemma; that if they do not give ſuch advice as they think beſt for their Maſters, without any other conſideration, they fail in their duty; and if they do, they often hazard their own lives and fortunes: becauſe (as I ſaid before) moſt men are apt to judge of the goodneſs or badneſs of their counſel from the event of it.

Conſidering therefore ſometimes with myſelf how theſe dangers are to be avoided, I think the beſt way is to proceed with calmneſs and moderation, and not to avow or patronize any undertaking with vehemence and earneſtneſs, as a project of your own; but to give your opinion in a modeſt manner, and ſupport it without paſſion: that ſo, if a Prince or a Republic ſhould think fit to follow it, they may ſeem to do it voluntarily, and not to be forced into it by clamour and importunity. If you act in this manner, it would be unreaſonable either in the Prince or the people to blame your advice, as it is not crammed down their throats without the concurrence and approbation of the other Counſellors: and therefore you have nothing to fear when your counſel is not oppoſed by the reſt; but when it is followed with reluctance, you are in danger, becauſe if it ſhould not ſucceed, they will all combine to ruin you. Now though indeed there is not ſo much honour to be gained this way; as when the authority of one man prevails over that of many, and his advice is crowned with ſucceſs; yet it is attended with two advantages: for in the firſt place, you run no riſque; and in the ſecond, when you propoſe any thing with modeſty, and it is carried againſt you by the obſtinacy and perverſeneſs of the reſt; if any miſcarriage ſhould enſue in the execution, it will be ſtill more for your reputation. Not that a good man ſhould ever wiſh to build his reputation upon any misfortune that may befal his Prince or his country: but when ſuch a thing has actually happened, it is more ſatisfaction to have given ſuch counſel as would have prevented it, and to hear it applauded, than to be in danger of being puniſhed for it.

This is the beſt courſe, I think, that can be taken by Counſellors in ſuch caſes: for to be ſilent and give no opinion would be not only betraying their country, but expoſing themſelves to danger: for in a little time they would become ſuſpected, and might be ſerved as the Macedonian was by Perſeus; who being defeated by Paulus Æmilius; and eſcaping into a place of ſafety with a few friends, was told by one of them (as they were talking over their misfortunes) of ſome errors he had been guilty of that were the cauſe of his ruin; at which, he turned to him, and aſking if he was not aſhamed to tell him of them, like a Traitor as he was, when there was no remedy left, he immediately killed him with his own hands: ſo that he was juſtly

juſtly puniſhed for being ſilent when he ſhould have ſpoken, and ſpeaking when he ought to have held his tongue.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Why the French always have been, and ſtill are, accounted more than men at the firſt charge; and afterwards leſs than women.

THE ardour of the Gaul who challenged any man in the Roman army to a ſingle combat, and was killed by Titus Manlius upon the banks of the Anio, puts me in mind of what Livy ſays of the Gauls in ſeveral parts of his Hiſtory, viz. that at the beginning of a battle they are more than men, but afterwards leſs than women [*k*]. Many people therefore conſidering to what cauſes this may be attributed, aſcribe it to the natural temperament and conſtitution of that people: and indeed I think there ſeems to be ſome appearance of truth and reaſon in that opinion; but I am perſuaded at the ſame time, that this innate ardour which makes them ſo fierce at the firſt onſet might be ſo corrected and regulated by art as to be kept up till the end of a battle.

For a proof of my aſſertion let it be conſidered that there are three ſorts of armies: one, in which there is both courage and good order; the former of which is in a great meaſure owing to the latter [*l*]. Of this ſort were the Roman armies, which were always remarkable for the regularity and good order that were eſtabliſhed in them by ſtrict diſcipline and conſtant exerciſe: nothing was done without the expreſs command of their General; the Soldiers neither eat nor ſlept, nor bought, nor ſold, nor did any other thing either of a civil or military nature without his permiſſion. The example therefore of thoſe armies which ſubdued the whole world ought certainly to be followed by all others: for ſuch as do not think it worth their imitation, cannot properly be called armies; and if they ever happen to do any thing extraordinary, it is rather to be imputed to a degree of fury and blind impetuoſity, than to true valour. But well diſciplined troops know how to moderate and reſtrain thoſe ſallies, and avail themſelves of their courage at proper times and places, in ſuch a manner that they are never diſmayed at any difficulty or danger: for good order and diſcipline conſtantly revive their ſpirits, and inſpire them with ſuch confidence of victory that they think nothing can ſtand before them whilſt they keep firm and compact in their ranks.

[*k*] See *the Sketch of France*, Vol. I.
[*l*] See *the Art of War*, paſſim.

Very

Very different is the caſe in the ſecond ſort of armies, which, like the French, have ardour enough indeed, but no good order amongſt them; and therefore they often fail very ſoon: for if they do not preſently make an impreſſion upon the enemy, the fury of their firſt efforts being ſpent, and having no diſcipline nor any other hope to animate and ſupport them, they grow diſpirited and run away. Whereas the Romans, on the contrary, relying on their diſcipline and good order, were not to be daunted by any ſort of difficulty or danger, nor ever deſpaired of victory; but behaved with as much valour and firmneſs at the end of a battle as in the beginning of it; or rather more if poſſible; as their courage always increaſed according to the reſiſtance they met with. But there is a third ſort of armies which (like thoſe of the Italians at preſent) have neither any courage in their conſtitution, nor diſcipline amongſt them: and theſe in truth are good for nothing at all, nor ever can gain a victory, except they chance to fall upon an army that is routed by ſome other accident. What ſort of order may be expected in ſuch armies we may ſee from the ſpeech of Papirius Curſor in Livy, when he would have puniſhed Fabius his Maſter of horſe for diſobedience of orders. *Nemo hominum, (ſays he) neque Deorum verecundiam habeat; non edicta Imperatorum, non auſpicia obſerventur: ſine commeatu, vagi milites in pacato, in hoſtico, errent; immemores ſacramenti, ſe ubi velint exauctorent; infrequentia deſerant ſigna; neque conveniant ad edictum; nec diſcernant interdiu, nocte; æquo, iniquo loco; juſſu, injuſſu Imperatoris, pugnent; & non ſigna, non ordines ſervent; latrocinii modo, cæca & fortuita, pro ſolenni & ſacratâ militia ſit. Henceforth no body will ſhew the leaſt reverence to any Inſtitutions either human or divine; they will laugh at the commands of their Generals, and deſpiſe the ſacred Auſpices; the looſe diſorderly Soldiers will wander about without any paſſport, and plunder their own country as well as that of the enemy; they will think no more of their oath, but diſcharge themſelves when they pleaſe; they will deſert their colours, and return to them no more upon any proclamation whatſoever; they will have no regard either to the advantage of time or place, when they are to engage an enemy; they will obey no ſignals or orders, but fight when they have a mind, whether their Commanders will or not, and become more like a parcel of banditti, a tumultuous and diſorderly rabble, than a regular and well diſciplined army.* Hence we may judge whether our armies at preſent *are more like a parcel of banditti, a tumultuous and diſorderly rabble, or regular and well diſciplined troops,* how different they are from ſuch as may properly be called good ſoldiers, how far from being either brave and orderly at the ſame time, like the old Romans, or even from being brave alone, like the French.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Whether Skirmiſhes before a battle are neceſſary; and how the quality of a new enemy is to be diſcovered without them.

NOT to mention the difficulties that occur in conducting all human affairs to any degree of perfection, there is no good without ſome evil ſo intimately united and interwoven with it, that it ſeems impoſſible to ſeparate them, or to obtain the one without partaking of the other. It is a hard matter therefore to arrive at perfection, except a man is favoured by fortune in ſuch an extraordinary manner as enables him to ſurmount theſe uſual and natural impediments. Theſe reflections I cannot help making whenever I read the account given by Livy of the ſingle combat betwixt Titus Manlius and the Champion of the Gauls: upon which that Hiſtorian ſays, *Tanti ea dimicatio ad univerſi belli eventum momenti fuit, ut Gallorum exercitus, relictis trepidè caſtris, in Tiburtem agrum, mox in Campaniam tranſierit. The event of this combat was of ſuch conſequence, that it in a great meaſure determined the ſucceſs of the whole war: for the Gauls immediately decamped in the utmoſt conſternation, and retreated firſt into the territories about Tibur, and from thence into Campania.* For we muſt conſider on one hand, that no General ought to do any thing, which, though ſeemingly of ſmall importance, may have an ill effect upon his army; and that to ſtake his whole fortune upon part of his forces only where he cannot exert all his ſtrength, is very raſh and imprudent, as we have ſhewn before at large [*m*]: and on the other hand it is to be conſidered, that when a General has a new Enemy to deal with of any reputation, he is obliged to make ſome trial of them by light ſkirmiſhes and fighting in ſmall parties before he comes to a general engagement; that ſo his Soldiers beginning to be acquainted with their diſcipline and manner of fighting, may not be diſmayed at the report they have heard of their proweſs: which indeed is a precaution of great importance, and ſo neceſſary, that without it he runs no ſmall riſque of being defeated. Thus when Valerius Corvinus was ſent by the Romans with an army againſt the Samnites, (an enemy with whom they had never been engaged before) Livy tells us that he frequently ſent out ſmall parties to ſkirmiſh and reconnoitre the enemy, *ne eos novum bellum, ne novus hoſtis terreret; that ſo his Soldiers might not be daunted at a new enemy, or a new way of fighting.* It muſt be confeſſed how-

[*m*] See Book II. Chap. xxii. xxiii. and the *Art of War*, paſſim.

ever

ever, that this method of ſending out ſmall parties to ſkirmiſh with the enemy is ſubject to great dangers: for if they ſhould be defeated, it would have a very different effect from what was deſigned, and diſmay your troops inſtead of animating them: ſo that this is one of thoſe things in which good and evil are ſo cloſely united together, that you cannot eaſily take one without the other.

I ſay then, that a General ſhould endeavour by all means to prevent any thing that may ſtrike a terror into his army; to which all troops are naturally ſubject when they are beat at firſt; and therefore he ought not to ſuffer them to ſkirmiſh with the enemy, except they can do it with great advantage, and are ſure of ſucceſs; neither ſhould he attempt to maintain paſſes, where he cannot employ his whole ſtrength; nor be too obſtinate in defending any town, unleſs he knows he muſt inevitably be ruined by the loſs of it; and when that is to be done, he is to draw all the reſt of his forces out of other places into the field; that ſo they may be able to act in concert with the garriſon, and exert their whole ſtrength to prevent its being taken. For when an enemy gets poſſeſſion of ſuch places only as you abandon, and you have ſtill an army entire in the field, it is no diſcredit to you, nor diſcouragement to your Soldiers: but when you loſe a place which you had undertaken to maintain, and every body expected you would do it effectually, it hurts your reputation and diſmays your troops, in ſuch a manner, that you will probably be ruined, as the Gauls were, by riſquing the event of the whole war upon a ſmall part of your ſtrength. Philip of Macedon (the father of Perſeus) a Prince well experienced in war, and of great reputation in his time, being invaded by the Romans, abandoned and laid waſte a conſiderable part of his country which he thought he ſhould not be able to defend; wiſely judging it would be leſs diſgrace to leave it to the enemy as not worth keeping, than to undertake its defence and fail in his endeavours. The Romans being reduced to great diſtreſs after the battle of Cannæ, and not by any means in a condition to protect ſome of their Subjects and allies who deſired their aſſiſtance, gave them leave to defend themſelves as well as they could. Now certainly ſuch reſolutions as theſe are much more honourable than pretending to defend others when it is not in your power: for in one caſe, you loſe your friends only; but in the other, you ruin both them and yourſelf.

But to return to the matter of ſkirmiſhing; I ſay, that if a General is obliged by a new enemy, and a manner of fighting of which his troops have had no experience, to try ſomething of that kind for the purpoſes abovementioned, he ought either to do it with ſuch advantage that he may be ſure of ſucceſs; or to follow the example of

Marius, (which is the better way of the two) when he marched againſt the Cimbri, a brave and warlike people, who had invaded Italy, and were plundering all the country: for ſeeing his troops were ſeized with a ſort of panic at the approach of ſuch a ſwarm of people, who, though naturally fierce, were not a little elated with a victory which they had already gained over the Romans, he thought it neceſſary, before he came to an engagement with them, to take ſome method that might animate his Soldiers, and diſpoſſeſs them of the terror they had conceived of thoſe barbarians: for which purpoſe, like a wiſe General, he often encamped in places where they might obſerve the march of the enemy at a diſtance and in ſecurity: that ſo his Soldiers keeping themſelves cloſe within their entrenchments, and being uſed to ſee them every day, when they perceived they had only to deal with a diſorderly multitude, encumbered with baggage, ſome of them armed with ſuch weapons as could not much annoy them, and others without any arms at all, they might recover their Spirits, and inſtead of declining an engagement, be deſirous to fight them. A manner of proceeding worthy of ſo great a General, and of being followed by others who would avoid the dangers abovementioned, and not be reduced to the ſame neceſſity that the Gauls found themſelves in, *Qui ob rem parvi ponderis*, ſays the Hiſtorian, *in Tiburtem agrum, & in Campaniam tranſierint, who being terrified at an accident of little moment, retreated firſt into the territories of Tibur, and then into Campania.*

CHAP. XXXVIII.

How a General ought to be qualified to make his Troops confide in him.

VALERIUS Corvinus (as I ſaid in the laſt Chapter) was ſent with an army againſt the Samnites, a new enemy at that time to the Roman Republic. To encourage his men therefore, and to make them acquainted with the enemy they had to do with, he ſometimes ſent ſmall parties out to ſkirmiſh, and ſometimes uſed to harangue them all together: in which harangues, eſpecially in one that he made to them, juſt before they were coming to a general engagement, he repreſented to them with great energy, how little account they ought to make of ſuch an enemy, when they conſidered their own valour and his conduct. From one part of this Speech we may learn, in what manner a Commander ought to be qualified, in order to gain the confidence of his Soldiers: *Tum etiam intueri* (ſays he) *cujus ductu auſpicioque ineunda pugna ſit: utrum qui audiendus,*

audiendus, duntaxat magnificus adhortator ſit, verbis tantum ferox, operum militarium expers; an qui & ipſe telo tractare, procedere ante ſigna, verſari mediâ in mole pugnæ ſciat. Facta mea, non dicta, vos milites ſequi volo, nec diſciplinam modo, ſed exemplum etiam a me petere, qui hâc dextrâ mihi tres conſulatus, ſummamque laudem peperi: Conſider the man under whoſe conduct and auſpices you are going to engage; whether he who now ſpeaks to you is only a magnificent boaſter, valiant in words, but ignorant in the duty of a Soldier; or whether he is not a perſon who knows how to handle his own weapons, and is uſed to put himſelf at the head of his Men, and charge the thickeſt of the enemy. Obſerve my actions, and not my words only, fellow Soldiers; follow my example, as well as my orders, and confide in me, who have obtained three Conſulſhips, and immortal honour with this very right hand. Whoever duly conſiders this ſpeech, will ſee what courſe a man ought to take in order to make himſelf reputed a great general: and he that does otherwiſe, will find in time, that his command (in what manner ſoever he obtained it, whether by favour or good fortune) will rather diſgrace than honour him: for it is not the title alone that gives dignity to the man, but the man that dignifies the title.

It muſt be obſerved likewiſe from what we have ſaid above, that if great Commanders have been obliged to make uſe of extraordinary means to animate a veteran army, when they were to engage a new enemy, all poſſible care and art muſt be uſed for that purpoſe, in an unexperienced body of troops, which have never looked an enemy in the face before: for, if a new enemy, and an unuſual manner of fighting, are apt to ſtrike a terror even into veterans, it may well be expected that any enemy whatſoever will make a greater impreſſion upon a raw new raiſed army. Good Commanders however, have always taken care to guard againſt theſe inconveniencies, and found means to ſurmount ſuch difficulties, as we may ſee from the examples of Gracchus the Roman, and Epaminondas the Theban, who beat veteran and well diſciplined armies with new raiſed troops; but they had not only exerciſed them continually for ſome months before, but accuſtomed them to ſham fights, to ſtrict obedience, and to keep firm in their ranks; after which, they had ſo much confidence in them, that they boldly advanced againſt the enemy. Any one therefore, who is a good Soldier himſelf, and has men enow, may ſoon make a good army: ſo that a Prince who has great numbers of Subjects and wants Soldiers, ought not to impute it to the incapacity of his people, but to his own indolence and bad conduct [*n*].

[*n*] See Chap. xxxiii. of this Book. Book I. Chap. xxi. See alſo *the Art of War*, Book I. & alibi paſſim.

CHAP. XXXIX.

That a General ought to be well acquainted with the Country which is the Seat of war.

AMONGST other qualifications that are neceſſary to make a good Commander of an army, we may reckon the knowledge of countries and ſituations; without which, it is impoſſible to do any great matter. Now, as all ſorts of knowledge are perfected by practice and experience, this requires much of both, and is gained chiefly by hunting and other ſuch field exerciſes: for which purpoſe, we are told by ancient Hiſtorians, that the Heroes who governed the world in former times, were all brought up and educated, as it were, in woods and foreſts. For hunting teaches you many other things that are of great uſe in war, as well as this ſort of knowledge in particular; and Xenophon tells us, in the life of Cyrus, that when that Prince was marching to invade the King of Armenia's dominions, he talked of that Expedition to his Officers, as if it was nothing more than one of thoſe chaces, in which they had often accompanied him before: the men whom he ſent to lie in ambuſh amongſt the mountains, he ſaid, were like thoſe who ſet ſnares and nets in places where wild beaſts uſed to paſs; and thoſe who ſcoured the plains, he compared to ſuch as were employed to rouſe the beaſts and chaſe them into the toils. This I mention to ſhew, that according to Xenophon's opinion, there is a great reſemblance betwixt hunting and war: upon which account, ſuch exerciſes are not only honourable but neceſſary to be uſed by great men; becauſe nothing can give them ſo perfect a knowledge of a country, or imprint it more deeply and particularly in their memory: and when a man has made himſelf thoroughly acquainted with one country, he will be able to form a pretty good judgment of another, though he has never ſeen it before; becauſe there is ſome ſort of ſimilitude and conformity betwixt all countries. But, if a man has not made himſelf well acquainted with the nature of one, it will be a long while (if ever) before he can be able to judge rightly of any other. Whereas, a perſon that is well verſed and practiſed in one, will gueſs pretty nearly at firſt ſight, how far ſuch a plain extends, in what manner ſuch a mountain riſes, how far ſuch a valley ranges, and other things of that kind, the knowledge of which he has gained by former experience [*o*]. An example of this ſort

[*o*] See *the Prince*, Chap. xiv. and *the Art of War*, Book V.

we

we have in the conduct of Publius Decius, (a Tribune in the army with which Aulus Cornelius the Conſul was ſent againſt the Samnites) who perceiving the danger into which the Conſul had led the whole army, by marching through a valley where they might eaſily be hemmed in by the enemy, called out to him, *Vides tu, Aule Cornelli, cacumen illud ſupra hoſtem? Arx illa eſt ſpei ſalutiſque noſtræ, ſi eam (quoniam cæci reliquêre Samnites) impigre capimus; Do you ſee yonder eminence, which commands the enemy's camp? we have no reſource left but to make ourſelves maſters of that poſt as faſt as we can, ſince the Samnites have blindly neglected it:* a little before which, Livy ſays, *Publius Decius Tribunus militum, conſpicit unum editum in ſaltu collem, imminentem hoſtium caſtris, aditu arduum impedito agmini, expeditis haud difficilem; Publius Decius the Tribune obſerved a hill in a wood, which hung over the enemy's camp, and ſeemed difficult of aſcent to heavy-arm'd troops, but acceſſible enough to thoſe that were light-armed.* Upon which, being ſent by the Conſul, with three thouſand picked men, to take poſſeſſion of it immediately, he ſaved the whole Roman army; and deſigning to march off himſelf with his own men in the night, the Hiſtorian tells us, that he firſt ordered ſome of his officers to attend him in the duſk of the evening, whilſt he reconnoitred the enemy, to ſee how their guards were poſted, and which way he might beſt make his retreat: and all this he did in the habit of a private Soldier, that ſo, if he ſhould be ſeen by the enemy, they might not ſuſpect he was a Commander.

Whoever then conſiders this paſſage, will ſee how neceſſary it is for a Commander to be well acquainted with the nature of the countries where he is to act: for if Decius had not been ſo, he could not have known of what importance it was to get poſſeſſion of that hill, nor been able to judge at that diſtance whether it was eaſy or difficult of aſcent: nor could he afterwards, when he had taken poſſeſſion of it, and intended to retreat when the night came on in order to join the Conſul, have formed any probable conjecture ſo far off (and when he was in a manner ſurrounded by the enemy) where they would poſt their guards, and which way he might beſt retreat. It is certain therefore that Decius had a perfect knowledge of the country, and ſaw the neceſſity of ſecuring that hill; by which, he not only ſaved the Conſul's army, but found means to retreat himſelf in ſafety with his own men, though he was entangled in that manner with the enemy.

CHAP.

CHAP. XL.

That it is not accounted diſhonourable, but quite otherwiſe, to deceive an Enemy in time of war.

THOUGH artifice and deceit are deteſtable in all other tranſactions, yet in matters of war they are not only juſtifiable, but praiſeworthy; and thoſe Generals are as much extolled who overcome an enemy by ſtratagem, as thoſe that ſubdue them by main force [*p*]. This plainly appears from the judgment which Hiſtorians paſs upon Hannibal, and ſome other great men, who were moſt remarkable for this manner of proceeding: of which there are ſo many examples, that it would be needleſs to cite any here, as they muſt be well known to every one; and therefore, I ſhall only add at preſent, that when I ſay artifice and deceit are praiſeworthy, I do not mean that ſort which conſiſts in breaking your word, betraying your truſt, or violating a treaty: for though indeed Kingdoms and States are ſometimes acquired this way, as I have ſhewn elſewhere [*q*], yet it is certain, you can never acquire true glory by it. I ſpeak only of that kind which is practiſed upon an enemy, who is ſo far from repoſing any confidence in you, that he ſets you at defiance: ſo that it relates only to military operations. Such were the artifices made uſe of by Hannibal, at the lake of Thraſymene, when he pretended to fly before the Roman Conſul; but in reality did it only to ſecure ſome paſſes, in order to block up him and his army the more effectually: and when he tied fire-brands and torches to the horns of his cattle in the night, to diſengage himſelf from Fabius Maximus. Of the ſame nature likewiſe was the Stratagem uſed by Pontius, General of the Samnites, when he hemmed in the Roman army at the *Furcæ Caudinæ:* for having concealed his forces in the mountains, he ſent ſome of his men cloathed like peaſants, with droves of cattle into the plains; who being taken by the Romans and aſked where the Samnite army was, all agreed in one ſtory (as they had been inſtructed by Pontius) and ſaid it was gone to lay ſiege to Nocera: which being credited by the Conſuls, they marched away with their forces to the relief of Nocera; but they had no ſooner entered the *Furcæ Caudinæ*, but they were ſurrounded and ſhut up there by the enemy. A victory indeed, which though gained by ſtratagem, would have been very glorious to Pontius, if he had taken his father's advice, who perſuaded him either to diſmiſs the Romans freely and

[*p*] See this point diſputed by Montaigne, Book I. Chap. v. of his Eſſays.
[*q*] See Book II. Chap. xiii.

generouſly,

generouſly, or to put them all to the ſword; but by no means to take the middle way, *Quæ neque amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit, which neither makes men your friends, nor diſables your enemies*, and has always been prejudicial in affairs of importance, as I have already ſhewn in another place [*r*].

CHAP. XLI.

That all means are to be uſed, whether honourable or diſhonourable, to ſave one's Country.

THE Roman army and their Conſuls being ſurrounded by the Samnites (as I ſaid in the laſt Chapter) were informed by the enemy that the only terms they muſt expect, were to be diſarmed, to paſs under the yoke [*ſ*], and to be ſent back to Rome: conditions ſo ignominious that the Conſuls and the whole army were aſtoniſhed at them. But Lentulus their Lieutenant General told them, "that in his opinion, they ought to ſubmit to any conditions to ſave their country; that as the ſafety of Rome entirely conſiſted in the preſervation of that army, they ſhould upon no account ſuffer it to be deſtroyed; that all means whatſoever, whether honourable or diſhonourable, were allowable for the ſupport of their country; and that if they could ſave their army, they perhaps might ſome time or other wipe off that diſgrace; if not, though they periſhed with ever ſo much honour, their country and its liberties muſt inevitably be loſt." His advice therefore was followed; and indeed it is worthy of being recommended to all Counſellors of State, and ſuch as have any ſhare in the management of public affairs: for when the ſafety of their country is at ſtake, all regard to what is juſt or unjuſt, merciful or unmerciful, honourable or diſhonourable, is entirely to be laid aſide, and every method to be taken that may in any wiſe conduce to the preſervation of their liberties and country [*t*]. The French are ſo zealous in this reſpect, both in their words

[*r*] See Book II. Chap. xxiii.

[*ſ*] This *Jugum* or *Yoke* was a Pike or Halberd laid over the tops of two others fixed in the ground, in the form of a gallows or cricket wicket, under which the Romans uſed to make their enemies paſs when they had overcome them; and were ſometimes ſo ſerved themſelves after the loſs of a battle, as in this caſe.

[*t*] Some people are of a different opinion. "I have formerly placed Epaminondas in the firſt claſs of excellent men, (ſays Montaigne, Book III. Chap. i.) and do not retract it. To what a pitch did he carry his regard to private obligation, who for the ineſtimable benefit of reſtoring his Country, made a conſcience of putting a Tyrant and his accomplices to death without the forms of juſtice! . . . . After the example of ſo great a man, let us not make any ſort of doubt that there is ſomething unlawful even againſt an

words and actions, when either the glory of their Monarch or the intereſt of their country is concerned, that they cannot bear to hear any one ſay, the King acted ſhamefully upon ſuch or ſuch an occaſion; for they think their Prince incapable either of doing or ſaying any thing that is ſhameful or diſhonourable either in proſperity or adverſity, and that in whatever he does, he always behaves in a manner becoming his Majeſty.

CHAP. XLII.

That promiſes extorted by force are not binding.

WHEN the Conſuls abovementioned arrived at Rome with their troops diſarmed and loaded with ignominy on account of the diſhonourable terms they had ſubmitted to, the firſt who declared againſt obſerving the agreement made at the *Furcæ Caudinæ* was Spurius Poſthumius himſelf, one of the Conſuls; who ſaid in full Senate, that only he and thoſe who had conſented to that agreement were bound by it, and therefore the obligation did not include the whole people of Rome: upon which account, if they had a mind to diſcharge it, they ought to ſend him back again to the Samnites with all thoſe that had promiſed to obſerve it. This opinion he maintained with ſo much obſtinacy, that the Senate at laſt acquieſced in it and ſent them all back again as priſoners to the Samnites, proteſting againſt the peace which had lately been concluded with them: but fortune was ſo favourable to him that he was ſoon diſmiſſed by the enemy and returned to Rome, where he lived in greater reputation, though he had been beaten, than Pontius did at Samnium, who had beat him.

Hence we may obſerve two things: in the firſt place, that honour is to be acquired even by contrary means and different conditions: for as it is the uſual conſequence of victory; ſo after a defeat, if a man can either ſhew that it was not owing to any miſconduct in him, or do ſomething that is great and gallant ſoon after, to throw into the balance againſt it, he will be no leſs admired and applauded than if he had gained a victory. In the next, that it is not diſhonourable to break a promiſe that is extorted by force and neceſſity: for ſuch pro-

an enemy; that the common cauſe ought not to require all things of a man, againſt private intereſt, for the ſervice of his King, his Country, or the Laws. *Non enim Patria præſtat omnibus officiis. The obligation to one's country does not ſuperſede every other obligation, ſays Tully* . . . . . The utility of an action is but a ſorry plea for the beauty and honour of it; and it is wrong to infer, that becauſe ſuch a thing is uſeful, it is therefore incumbent on every one to perform it; and not only a Duty, but for his honour."

miſes,

miſes, if they affect the welfare of the ſtate, will always be broken when the cauſe fails that occaſioned them; and that too without any reflection upon the honour of thoſe that break them. Of this we might produce a thouſand inſtances from Hiſtory, if daily experience did not make it unneceſſary. Princes we ſee make no ſcruple of violating the engagements they have been forced into as ſoon as ever they have an opportunity: nay, it is no uncommon thing for them to break others into which they have voluntarily entered, when the motives ceaſe that induced them to lay themſelves under ſuch obligations. But whether that is juſtifiable in them, or whether ſuch engagements are binding or not, I have no occaſion to determine at preſent, as the Reader may find this point already diſcuſſed in my Treatiſe entitled *the Prince* [*u*].

[*u*] See *the Prince*, Chap. xviii. The above quoted French Author ſays in the ſame Chapter, "the profit by the increaſe of the public revenue, which ſerved the Roman Senate for a pretence to the baſe concluſion I am going to relate, is not ſufficient to warrant ſuch injuſtice. Certain citizens, by the order and conſent of the Senate had redeemed themſelves and their liberty, by money, out of the hands of L. Sylla. But the affair coming upon the carpet again, the Senate condemned them to be taxable as they were before, and ordered that the money they had diſburſed for their redemption ſhould never be repaid them. Civil wars often produce ſuch vile examples, that we puniſh private men for having taken our word when we were in power; and one and the ſame Magiſtrate makes another man pay the penalty of his change, though he is in no fault. The Schoolmaſter laſhes his Scholar for his docility, and the Guide beats the blind man whom he leads by the hand. A ſhocking picture of juſtice! There are ſome rules in Philoſophy that are both falſe and puſillanimous. The example that is propoſed to us for preferring private benefit to the obligation due to faith once given, has not weight enough from the circumſtance mixed with it. Robbers have ſurprized you, and after having made you ſwear to pay them a ſum of money, give you your liberty. It is wrong to ſay that an honeſt man may be quit of his oath without payment, after he is out of their clutches. The caſe is quite otherwiſe. When fear has once prevailed upon me to intend, I am obliged to keep the ſame purpoſe, when I am no longer in fear: and though fear ſhould only force my tongue, and not my will, yet I am bound to ſtand to my word. For my own part, when my tongue has ſometimes raſhly outrun my thought, I have afterwards however made a conſcience of diſowning it: otherwiſe we ſhall by degrees aboliſh all the right which another claims to the performance of our promiſes. *Quaſi vero forti viro vis adhiberi poſſit, ſays Tully. Offic.* Lib. III. Cap. xxx. *as if violence could poſſibly operate upon a brave man.* The only condition wherein private intereſt can excuſe us for the non-performance of a promiſe, is when we have promiſed a thing that is wicked and unjuſt in itſelf: for the claim of virtue ought to ſuperſede any obligation of our own." The beſt Divines and Caſuiſts are of the ſame opinion. See this matter fully diſcuſſed by the learned Biſhop Sanderſon, in his Prælections *de juramenti obligatione. Prælect.* IV.

CHAP. XLIII.

That the ſame diſpoſition is obſervable at all times in the natives of the ſame country.

WISE men ſay (and very juſtly I think) that in order to form a probable conjecture of what is yet to come, we ought to conſider what is already paſſed; for there is nothing in this world at preſent, nor ever will be hereafter, but what has and will have a near reſemblance to what has happened in former times: becauſe mankind having the ſame paſſions in all ages, will, for the moſt part, act in the ſame manner upon ſimilar occaſions. It is true they are ſometimes more virtuous in one Province than in another, and *vice verſâ*; according to their education, from which all men take their ſubſequent turn and manner of living. We may likewiſe judge with more eaſe and certainty of future events by what is paſt, in a people amongſt whom the ſame appetites and inclinations have been predominant for a long courſe of time: as ſome nations have been remarkable for many ages either for their rapacity, or perfidy, or ſome other particular virtue or vice. Thus whoever reads the annals of Florence and compares the tranſactions of former times with thoſe of the preſent, will find that the French and Germans have always diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their avarice, pride, cruelty, and falſehood in all their dealings with us, to the great prejudice of our ſtate. Every one knows what ſums of money we paid at different times to Charles VIII. of France, upon a promiſe of reſtoring the Citadel of Piſa to us; and yet he never performed that promiſe. But to omit other modern inſtances of this kind as invidious, what paſſed betwixt our Republic and the Viſconti, Dukes of Milan, in former times, is no leſs notorious: for the Florentines being at war with them and deſtitute of all other aſſiſtance, ſolicited the Emperor of Germany to make an incurſion into Lombardy in their favour; which he readily promiſed to do with a powerful army, and to defend them againſt the Viſconti, provided they would furniſh him with an hundred thouſand Ducats to raiſe ſuch an army, and as much more when he arrived in Italy. This being agreed to, and all the money paid, he advanced as far as Verona: but pretending upon his arrival there that the Florentines had not fulfilled ſome other articles of the treaty betwixt them, he marched back again with all his forces without doing any thing in their favour. So that if the Florentines had not been either compelled by downright neceſſity, or blinded by ambition and reſentment, or if they had but read and conſidered the manner in which

which theſe Barbarians have treated them in all ages, they would not have been deceived by them at that time, nor any other, as they often have been; for then they would have found that their diſpoſition was always the ſame, and that they had conſtantly treated every body with whom they had any dealings in that manner. A remarkable example of this we have in their behaviour to the Tuſcans of old; who having been often defeated by the Romans, and reduced to ſuch diſtreſs that they found themſelves unable to make head againſt them any longer, agreed to pay a large ſum of money to the Gauls, who lived on the ſide of the Alps next to Italy, upon condition they would join forces with them againſt the Romans. But when the Gauls had received the money, they refuſed to fulfil the conditions upon which it was given them; alledging that they had taken it, not to make war upon the Romans, but to keep them from commencing hoſtilities with the Tuſcans themſelves. In this manner the poor Tuſcans were at the ſame time cheated out of their money, and diſappointed of the aſſiſtance they expected, through the avarice and perfidy of the Gauls: ſo that we ſee from theſe examples, that the Gauls and Germans have at all times behaved in the ſame manner: from whence other Princes may eaſily judge what degree of confidence they may put in them for the future [x].

CHAP.

[x] The famous friar Roger Bacon, in the ſixth part of his *Opus Majus*, ſpeaking in praiſe of experimental Philoſophy, tells us that it inveſtigates the ſecrets of nature by its own power, and without any regard to any of the other Sciences. And this, he ſays, conſiſts in two things; viz. in the knowledge of things to come, as well as of thoſe that are paſt and preſent; and in the wonderful works by which it ſurpaſſes judiciary Aſtrology in the method of forming a judgment of things future. Under this, he ſays, that ſome Authors have aſſerted the poſſibility of changing the genius and diſpoſition of a nation by altering the conſtitution of the air. Upon which occaſion, he tells us, that when Alexander the Great enquired of Ariſtotle whether he ſhould extirminate the barbarian nations he had conquered, on account of their brutal ferocity, or ſuffer them to live; that Philoſopher anſwered him, in his *Book of Secrets*, that if he could alter the air of the country, he ſhould ſuffer them to live; if not, he ſhould deſtroy them. For he thought that the air might be changed to advantage; ſo that the conſtitution of their bodies would be altered, and by that means their minds might produce good actions from the freedom of their wills; and this is one of his *Secrets*. He obſerves afterwards that ſome writers have affirmed, that an army has been ſtruck with ſuch a terror as to fly immediately; and tells us that Ariſtotle directed Alexander to carry a particular ſtone about him, by which means his enemies would always fly before him. Theſe and a great many other things, ſays he, are aſſerted by ſome Philoſophers to be true; though they do not pretend that any violence is offered to the freedom of the will: for Ariſtotle, who propoſes this, tells us, in his *Ethics*, that the will cannot be forced, but that the body may be changed by the virtues of things, and the mind excited and induced to chuſe that voluntarily to which it is not inclined; as by means of Medicinal potions many perſons have been changed, not only with regard to their bodies, but likewiſe their paſſions and inclinations.

CHAP. XLIV.

That things are ſometimes effected by bold and ſudden reſolutions, which could not have been done by ordinary means.

THE Samnites being invaded by the Romans, and not able to keep the field againſt them, left garriſons in their towns, and marched with all the reſt of their forces into Tuſcany, (which was then in truce with the Roman Republic) in hopes that the ſight of their army amongſt them might induce them to renew the war againſt their common enemy, though they had refuſed to do it before when they were ſolicited by Ambaſſadors whom the Samnites had ſent to them for that purpoſe. Amongſt other reaſons therefore which the Samnites gave for taking up arms themſelves, they told the Tuſcans, *quod pax ſervientibus gravior, quam liberis bellum eſſet, that peace was more inſupportable to Slaves, than war to men that were free:* ſo that partly by perſuaſions and partly by the preſence of their army, they at laſt prevailed upon them to break their truce with the Romans.

Hence we may obſerve that when one Prince wants to make another comply with ſome requeſt or demand, he ought not to give him time to deliberate upon it, (if he has it in his power to prevent it) but to act in ſuch a manner as may oblige him to come to a ſpeedy determination; that is, by convincing him of the miſchief he muſt of neceſſity bring upon himſelf either by refuſing or delaying to grant the requeſt. In this manner Pope Julius II. proceeded with the French; and Monſieur de Foix, the French King's General, with the Marquis of Mantua, not long ago: for his Holineſs deſigning to drive the Bentivogli out of Bologna, perceived he ſhould have occaſion for ſome French forces, and that it was neceſſary the Venetians ſhould ſtand neuter: but as he had ſounded them both for theſe purpoſes, and received ſuch ambiguous anſwers that he could not tho-

As to Ariſtotle's *panic Stone*, no ſerious man can give credit to the effects he aſcribes to it. But methinks much may be ſaid in favour of his other notion of altering the conſtitution, and conſequently the diſpoſition of men by altering the air of the Country they live in by natural means; ſuch as cutting down huge foreſts, draining fens, ploughing great quantities of land, making large rivers and falls of water, &c. For the nations whom Alexander conquered are now very different in point of ferocity from what they were in former times, and ſo are the Gauls and Germans, mentioned by Machiavel, in other reſpects. But this perhaps may be owing to other means, and it may be ſaid they are more humanized by commerce and the influence of Chriſtianity than any change in their air. The matter is left to the deciſion of ſuch as are better Naturaliſts and Divines than the Editor of this work pretends to be.

roughly

roughly depend upon them, he reſolved to make them comply with his demands, by acting in ſuch a manner as ſhould not give them time to do otherwiſe. For which purpoſe, having got what forces he could together at Rome, he marched away to Bologna; from whence he ſent in a peremptory manner to let the Venetians know they muſt ſtand neuter; and to the French, that they muſt immediately furniſh him with ſuccours: ſo that being afraid of incurring the Pope's diſpleaſure, if they either refuſed or delayed to comply with him, and finding themſelves under a neceſſity of returning a direct anſwer, they both ſubmitted to his terms. Monſieur de Foix likewiſe being at Bologna another time with an army, and hearing that Breſcia had revolted, was determined to reduce it to obedience if poſſible. But there were only two routes by which he could march thither: one, through the territories that were ſubject to the French, (but that was a very bad one, and a long way about) the other, through the Marquis of Mantua's dominions, where he might be oppoſed by that Prince in ſeveral narrow paſſes and defiles betwixt the Lakes and Moraſſes with which that country abounds, and which were very well fortified and defended. Reſolving however to take the neareſt road in ſpite of all difficulties, he immediately marched that way; and without giving the Marquis time to conſider whether he would grant or refuſe him a paſſage, he ſent to him for the keys of thoſe ſeveral paſſes, as ſoon as ever he arrived in his territories. So that the Marquis being ſurprized by the ſuddenneſs of the demand, and having no time to deliberate upon it, was forced to deliver them up to him: which he would not have done if de Foix had proceeded in a cooler and more phlegmatic manner; becauſe he was at that time in league with the Pope and the Venetians, and had a Son in the Pope's hands at the Court of Rome: which he might have pleaded as very good reaſons for acting otherwiſe, if the occaſion had not been ſo unexpected [*y*].

[*y*] Theſe ſudden ſtrokes, or *Coups de main* have ſucceeded well in our preſent war with the French, particularly at Louiſbourg and Quebec.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLV.

Whether it is a better way in battle to receive the enemy's firſt ſhock, and not to exert your ſtrength till they have in ſome meaſure ſpent their fury; or to attack them vigorouſly at firſt.

THE Conſuls Decius and Fabius being ſent out by the Romans with two armies againſt the Tuſcans and Samnites, and coming to an engagement with the enemy, their methods of fighting were ſo different from each other, that it may not be amiſs to conſider which of them is moſt worthy of imitation. Decius for his part fell furiouſly upon one of the enemy's wings, and with all his force at once: but Fabius endeavoured only to ſuſtain the firſt attack of the wing he was engaged with; judging it better to act coolly and firmly in the beginning, and reſerve the vigour of his men till the enemy had ſpent their firſt ardour and began to grow faint and feeble. From the event of the battle it appeared that Fabius acted with more judgment than Decius: for the latter having exhauſted his ſtrength in the firſt onſet, and ſeeing his men almoſt ſurrounded by the enemy, determined to ſacrifice himſelf at the head of his troops (as his father had done before him) in hopes of gaining ſome glory at leaſt by an honourable death, when he found he could not obtain a victory. But Fabius being informed of this, and no leſs ambitious to diſtinguiſh himſelf by living and acting like a man, than his Collegue had ſhewn himſelf by dying in that manner, advanced with the forces which he had reſerved for that purpoſe, and gained a complete victory. From whence it is plain, that it is ſafer and more prudent to follow the example of Fabius, than of Decius upon the like occaſions [z].

CHAP.

[z] Julius Cæſar, no incompetent Judge in theſe matters, was of a different opinion: for he condemns Pompey for making his army ſtand ſtill at the battle of Pharſalia to receive the Enemy's charge; becauſe (as Plutarch obſerves) ſuch a manner of proceeding ſlackens the violent impreſſion which the motion of running gives to the firſt blow, and hinders that claſhing of the combatants which uſes to fill them with fury and impetuoſity on the firſt encounter; eſpecially when they ruſh upon one another with vigour. This is what Plutarch ſays on this ſide of the queſtion. But if Cæſar had been beaten, why might it not as well have been urged by another on the contrary, that the ſtrongeſt and moſt ſteddy poſture of fighting, is that wherein a man ſtands planted firm without motion; and that he who makes a halt upon a march, by confining and reſerving his force within himſelf for an occaſion, has a great advantage over him who has already ſpent his breath in the career? Beſides, an army being compoſed of many different parts, it is impoſſible for it to advance briſkly, and with ſuch an uniform motion as not to break or diſturb the order of battle, and to hinder the foremoſt of the men from being engaged before their comrades can properly ſupport them. But let us hear what Cæſar himſelf ſays.

CHAP. XLVI.

How it comes to paſs that the ſame families in a Commonwealth often retain the ſame manners and cuſtoms a long time.

WE ſee that not only one City has cuſtoms and inſtitutions very different from thoſe of another, and produces men either of a more rigid or more gentle diſpoſition; but that there is ſuch a difference likewiſe betwixt ſeveral particular families in the ſame City. The truth of this is evident from the hiſtory of all States, particularly from that of the Roman Republic; in which we ſee the Manlii were always rigid and inflexible; the Publicolæ gentle and humane; the Appii ambitious and oppreſſors of the common people; and that many other families had ſome peculiar quality which diſtinguiſhed them from all the reſt. Now this diſtinction cannot proceed from blood alone, (which muſt of courſe be often altered by variety of marriages) but from the different manner in which different families are educated: for what a man has been taught in his infancy, and accuſtomed to hear either praiſed or condemned in his youth, makes ſuch an impreſſion upon him, that he generally forms the ſubſequent part of his life according to thoſe inſtructions: otherwiſe it would have been impoſſible that the Appii ſhould all have had the ſame turn, and been conſtantly actuated by the ſame paſſions and deſires, as Livy remarks upon ſeveral of them; particularly upon one, who having been appointed Cenſor refuſed to lay down his authority at the

ſays. *Inter duas acies tantum erat relictum ſpatii, ut ſatis eſſet ad concurſum utriuſque exercitus: ſed Pompeius ſuis prædixerat, ut Cæſaris impetum exciperent, neve ſe loco moverent, aciemque ejus diſtrahi paterentur. Idque admonitu C. Triarii feciſſe dicebatur, ut primus excurſus viſque militum infringerentur, acieſque diſtraheretur, atque ſuis ordinibus diſpoſitis diſperſos adorirentur: levius quoque caſura pila ſperabat, in loco retentis militibus, quam ſi ipſi immiſſis telis occurriſſent. Simul fore, ut duplicato curſu, Cæſaris milites exanimarentur & laſſitudine conficerentur. Quod nobis quidem nullâ ratione factum a Pompeio videtur: propterea quod eſt quædam animi incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innatæ omnibus, quæ ſtudio pugnæ incenduntur. Hanc non reprimere, ſed augere Imperatores debent. Neque fruſtra antiquitus inſtitutum eſt, ut ſigna undique concinerent, clamoremque univerſi tollerent: quibus rebus & hoſtes terreri, & ſuos incitari exiſtimaverunt.* In the unnatural battle betwixt the two Perſian brothers, Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian who commanded the Greeks of Cyrus's party, led them on in good order, and without hurry to the charge: but coming within fifty paces of the enemy he put them upon full ſpeed, hoping in ſo ſhort a career to keep them both in order and breath, and at the ſame time to give the advantage of impetuoſity both to themſelves and their miſſile arms. Others have ſettled the queſtion thus: if your enemy comes in a full career upon you, ſtand firm to receive him; if he ſtands firm to receive you, ruſh violently upon him. *See Montaigne's Eſſays,* Book I. Chap. xlvii. *Cæſ. Com. de Bello Civili,* Lib. III. Cap. 92.

end

end of eighteen months, (as the Laws required, and his Collegue had actually done) alledging that he might continue in office five years if he pleaſed, according to the firſt Law that was made concerning Cenſors, which was not then repealed: and though there were many debates and much contention about it, there was no remedy; nor could he be prevailed upon to reſign, notwithſtanding both the Senate and the people tried all means to force him. Again, whoever reads his ſpeech againſt P. Sempronius, one of the Tribunes of the People, will ſee how full it is of the inſolence and arrogance peculiar to his family: whilſt all the reſt of his fellow citizens were vying with each other in inſtances of modeſty and ſtrict obedience to the Laws and Religion of their country.

CHAP. XLVII.

That a good Citizen ought to forget private injuries, when the public good requires it.

WHEN Manlius commanded the Roman army which was ſent againſt the Samnites, he happened to receive a wound in an engagement with them, which diſabled him from acting as General any longer. Upon which, the Senate apprehending their army might ſuffer for want of a Commander, thought it neceſſary to create Papirius Curſor Dictator, to ſupply the place of Manlius. But as the Dictator was to be nominated by Fabius, who was then with an army in Tuſcany, and the Senate was afraid he would not appoint Curſor, becauſe there was an enmity betwixt them, they ſent two of their body to wait upon Fabius, and deſire he would lay aſide all private reſentment and confirm their choice for the ſake of the public: which he did out of regard to his country; though it was plain from many circumſtances that it went much againſt the grain. An example which ought to be followed by all who would be eſteemed good Citizens.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLVIII.

When an enemy ſeems guilty of any remarkable error, it ought at firſt to be ſuſpected as an artifice.

FULVIUS being left with the command of the Roman army in Tuſcany, during the abſence of the Conſul, who was gone to aſſiſt in the celebration of ſome ceremonies at Rome, the Tuſcans endeavoured to draw him into an ambuſh they had laid for him near his own camp: for which purpoſe, they ſent out ſome of their Soldiers, diſguiſed like Herdſmen with droves of cattle, who paſſed not only in ſight of the Roman camp, but almoſt cloſe by the entrenchments. But the General ſuſpecting they would not have had the boldneſs to have taken ſo unuſual a ſtep, if it had not been to draw him into ſome ſnare, acted with ſuch circumſpection that he diſcovered their deſign and defeated it.

Hence we may obſerve, that a General ought to take great care of being deceived by what may look like a palpable error in an enemy, and to ſuſpect there is ſome artifice at the bottom: as it is not reaſonable to imagine, that people who are always ſuppoſed to be upon their guard, can otherwiſe be ſo raſh and imprudent. But the hopes of victory often dazzle men in ſuch a manner, that they cannot diſcern the miſchief that is concealed under theſe appearances, and therefore run blindly upon their deſtruction.

The Gauls having defeated the Romans upon the banks of the Allia, marched directly to Rome; and finding all the Gates not only open, but unguarded, continued under arms all that day, and the next night, before they would enter the City, apprehending ſome trap was laid for them there; as they could not prevail upon themſelves to believe the Romans would ever have abandoned their laſt reſource in ſo fooliſh and cowardly a manner. In the year 1508, when the Florentines laid ſiege to Piſa, Alphonſo del Mutolo, an inhabitant of that City being priſoner in their camp, promiſed, if they would ſet him at liberty, that he would deliver up one of the gates of the town into their hands: upon which, they releaſed him, but afterwards, when he came to the camp again (as he often did) to treat more particularly about the matter with certain deputies appointed for that purpoſe, he did not do it privately, but in an open manner, and always attended by ſeveral other Citizens, whom he deſired to withdraw only when he entered into any converſation with the deputies. From which ſort of behaviour, they might very well have doubted of his ſincerity;

becauſe, if he had really deſigned to fulfil his engagement, he would have acted with more privacy. But the Florentines were ſo eager to get poſſeſſion of the City that they raſhly confided in his promiſe, and advancing at a certain hour to take poſſeſſion of one of the gates according to his appointment, they met with ſuch a reception there, that they left many of their officers and a vaſt number of private men behind them, to their great mortification and diſgrace [*a*].

CHAP. XLIX.

That a Republic ought frequently to make new Laws and Proviſions for the preſervation of its Liberties: and how Q. Fabius obtained the name of Maximus.

I Have ſaid before that new diſorders of one kind or other muſt neceſſarily happen very often in a great Commonwealth, which require new remedies; and that the more dangerous they are, the greater need they have of a ſkilful Phyſician. Now though we read of many ſtrange and unexpected accidents and diſorders, in the Hiſtories of all States indeed, we ſhall find ſtill more and ſtranger in that of the Roman Republic, than perhaps in any other. For the confirmation of which, we may quote the conſpiracy wherein all the married women of Rome had engaged to murder their huſbands; ſome of whom they actually poiſoned, and had prepared materials to diſpatch the reſt. Another inſtance of the ſame kind, was the conſpiracy formed by the Bacchanals, and diſcovered in the time of the Macedonian war: for ſo many thouſands both of men and women were concerned in it, that it muſt probably have overturned the State, if it had not been diſcovered in time, and moſt of the offenders put to death, according to the cuſtom of the Romans; who made no ſcruple of puniſhing a multitude at once upon ſuch occaſions. So that if other proofs were wanting to ſhew the power, the authority, and magnanimity of that Republic, it might fully appear from their puniſhing ſuch numbers of delinquents at one time. Thus they ſometimes condemned a whole Legion, ſometimes all the inhabitants of a City to death; and ſometimes not only baniſhed eight or ten thouſand people at a time, but impoſed other conditions upon them, of ſuch a nature as made them very hard to be borne by a ſingle man, much more by ſo many. In this manner they ſerved the remainder of the army that eſcaped with their lives from the battle of Cannæ: for they baniſhed

[*a*] See Chap. XVIII. of this Book.

them

them all to Sicily, where they were forbidden either to live in any town, or to eat their meat any otherwiſe than ſtanding. But the moſt remarkable of all their executions was the decimation of their forces; that is, when they put every tenth man to death by lot quite through an army: and certainly no way can be deviſed that could be more juſt, or ſtrike a greater terror into a multitude; becauſe when the delinquency is general, and no certain author or ringleader can be pitched upon, it is impoſſible to puniſh them all; and to puniſh one part only and ſpare the other, would be hard upon thoſe that ſuffered, and encourage thoſe that did not to offend another time.

The women therefore, who deſigned to have poiſoned their huſbands, and the Bacchanals were puniſhed as they deſerved: and though ſuch maladies have very bad effects in a Commonwealth, yet they are not mortal; becauſe they are generally diſcovered before it is too late to remedy them. But that is not the caſe with regard to thoſe that affect the State: for they are ſeldom diſcovered in time, except by very able Phyſicians, and even then, if not treated with great prudence and care, commonly end in the ruin of the Government: of which we have a remarkable inſtance in Livy. The Romans having been very liberal in granting the freedom of their City to other people, they grew ſo numerous there at laſt, and had ſuch a weight in the public Councils, that the Government began to vary from its uſual courſe; new men being employed, and different meaſures purſued from what had been cuſtomary before. But Quintus Fabius being aware of this when he was Cenſor, and foreſeeing the miſchievous effects that muſt enſue from it, took care to prevent them in time, by reducing all the new Citizens into four tribes; that ſo when their influence was contracted in ſuch a manner, they might not have it in their power to overturn the ancient conſtitution of the Republic. A piece of ſervice ſo grateful to his Countrymen, that they conferred upon him the ſurname of Maximus.

The END of the THIRD and LAST BOOK.

THE

ART OF WAR.

IN SEVEN BOOKS.

WRITTEN BY

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence.

BOOK I.

THE

FRENCH TRANSLATOR's

Advertiſement to the Reader.

ALTHOUGH the manner of making war is very different at preſent from what it was in Machiavel's days, his Treatiſe, or rather Dialogues, upon that ſubject may ſtill be of great uſe. For in the firſt place, they are written by a Genius of the higheſt rank, and founded upon ſome general Principles which will always hold good: and in the next, (beſides the pleaſure of ſeeing what alteration is made in this Science by Time) they may furniſh other men of parts and abilities with ſome uſeful and improveable hints; eſpecially thoſe that follow the profeſſion of arms. There are further many judicious Reflections in the courſe of this Work, which cannot fail of being very agreeable to Connoiſſeurs: and towards the end of the ſecond Book, the Author launches out into a digreſſion, in which he ſhews with great perſpicuity to what cauſes it is chiefly owing, that the number of eminent Commanders is greater or leſs in different times and places.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

N. B. *The reſt of this Advertiſement is wholly taken up in elucidating ſome military terms and phraſes, which ſhall be explained in their proper places hereafter. But as there was an old Engliſh Tranſlation of Machiavel*

Machiavel's Art of War, *publiſhed in the year* 1588 *by one Peter Whiteborne, who calls himſelf* Student of Gray's Inn; *I ſhall take the liberty of preſenting the Reader with his Dedication of it to Queen Elizabeth: for though the language is now grown obſolete and uncouth, yet the Sentiments are juſt and worthy of obſervation. The Tranſlation indeed is a very bad one, and not intelligible at preſent: the Dedication is as follows.*

To the moſt high and excellent Princes ELIZABETH, by the grace of God Queene of England, Fraunce, and Ireland, defender of the Faith, and of the Church of England, and Ireland, on Earth next under God, the ſupreme Governour.

ALTHOUGH commonly every man, moſt worthy and renommed Soueraigne, ſeeketh ſpecially to commende and extoll the thing, whereunto he feeleth himſelfe naturally bent and inclined; yet all ſuch partialitie and private affection laid aſide, it is to be thought (that for the defence, maintenance, and advauncement of a Kingdom, or Common Weale, or for the good and due obſervation of peace, and adminiſtracion of juſtice in the ſame) no one thing can be more profitable, neceſſarie, or more honourable, than the knowledge of Service in warre, and deeds of armes, becauſe conſidering the ambition of the World, it is impoſſible for any Realme or Dominion long to continue free in quietnes and ſavegard, where the defence of the Sword is not alwaies in a readineſſe. For like as the Greekes, being occupied about trifling matters, taking pleaſure in refiting of Comedies, and ſuch other vaine things, altogether neglecting Martiall feats, gave occaſion to Philip King of Macedonia, father to Alexander the great, to oppreſſe and to bring them in ſervitude under his ſubjection: even ſo undoubtedly, libertie will not be kept, but men ſhall be troden under foote, and brought to moſt horrible miſerie and calamitie, if they giving themſelves to paſtimes and pleaſure, forſake the juſt regard of their own defence, and ſavegard of their countrie, which in temporall regiment, chiefly conſiſteth in warlike ſkilfulnes. And therefore the auncient Captaines and mightie Conquerours, ſo long as they floriſhed, did deviſe with moſt great diligence, all manner of wayes to bring their men to the perfect

perfect knowledge of what ſo ever thing appertained to the warre, as manifeſtly appeareth by the warlike games, which in olde times the Princes of Grecia ordained upon the mount Olimpus, and alſo by the orders and exerciſes, that the auncient Romanes uſed in ſundrie places, and eſpecially in Campo Martio, and in their wonderfull ſumptuous Theaters, which chiefly they builded to that purpoſe. Whereby they not onely made their Souldiours ſo expert, that they obtained with a few, in fighting againſt a great huge multitude of enemies, ſuch marvailous victories, as in many credible hiſtories are mentioned, but alſo by the ſame meanes, their unarmed raſcall people that followed their Campes, got ſuch underſtanding in the feats of warre, that they in the day of battail, being left deſtitute of ſuccour, were able without any other helpe to ſet themſelves in good order, for their defence againſt the enemie, that would ſeeke to hurt them, and in ſuch dangerous times, have done their countrie ſo good ſervice, that verie often by their helpe, the adverſaries have beene put to flight, and fieldes moſt happily wonne. So that the antiquitie eſteemed nothing more happy in a common weale, then to have in the ſame many men ſkilfull in warlike affaires: by meanes whereof their Empire continually inlarged, and moſt wonderfully and triumphantly proſpered. For ſo long as men for their valiauntnes, were then rewarded and had in eſtimacion, glad was he that could finde occaſion to venter, yea and ſpend his life to benefite his countrie: as by the manly actes that Marcus Curtius, Oratius Cocles, and Gaius Mucius did for the ſavegard of Rome, and alſo by other innumerable examples, doth plainly appeare. But when through long and continual peace, they began to be altogether given to pleaſure and delicatenes, litle regarding Martial feats, nor ſuch as were expert in the practiſe thereof, their dominion and eſtates did not ſo much before increaſe and proſper, as then by ſuch meanes and overſight, they ſodainly fell into decay and utter ruine. For ſuch truly is the nature and condicion, both of peace and warre, that where in government there is not had equall conſideracion of them both, the one in fine doth worke and induce the other's oblivion, and utter abholicion. Wherefore, ſith the neceſſitie of the ſcience of warres is ſo great, and alſo the neceſſarie uſe thereof ſo manifeſt, that even Ladie Peace hir ſelfe, doth in manner from thence crave hir chiefe defence and preſervacion, and the worthineſſe moreover and honour of the ſame ſo great, that as by proofe wee ſee, the perfect glorie thereof, cannot eaſilie finde roote, but in the hearts of moſt noble, courageous, and manlike perſonages. I thought moſt excellent Princes, I could not either to the ſpecial gratefying of your highnes, the univerſal delight of al ſtudious gentlemen, or the common utilitie

of the publique wealth, imploy my laboures more profitable in accompliſhing of my dutie and good will, then in ſetting forth ſomething, that might induce to the augmenting and increaſe of the knowledge thereof: and eſpecially the example of your highneſſes moſt politike government over us, giving plaine teſtimonie of the wonderfull prudent deſire that is in you, to have your people inſtructed in this kind of ſervice, as well for the better defence of your Highnes, themſelves, and their countrie, as alſo to diſcourage thereby, and be able to reſiſt the malignitie of the enemie, who otherwiſe would ſeeke paradventure to invade this noble realme or kingdome.

When therefore, about ten yeares paſt, in the Emperour's warre's againſt the Mores and certain Turkes, being in Barbarie; at the ſiege and winning of Calibbia, Moneſterio, and Affrica, I had as well for my further inſtruction in thoſe affaires, as alſo the better to acquaint mee with the Italian tongue, reduced into Engliſh, the book called The arte of Warre, of the famous and excellent Nicholas Machiavel, which in times paſt, he being a counſailour, and Secretairie of the noble citie of Florence, not without his great laud and praiſe did write: and having lately againe, ſomewhat peruſed the ſame, the which in ſuch continuall broyles, and unquietnes, was by me tranſlated, I determined with my ſelfe, by publiſhing thereof, to beſtow as great a gift (ſince greater I was not able) amongſt my countrie men, not expert in the Italian tongue, as in like works I had ſeene beſore mee, the Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Spaniardes, and other forreine nacions, moſt lovingly to have beſtowed among theirs: the rather undoubtedly, that as by private reading of the ſame booke, I then felt my ſelfe, in that knowledge marvailouſly holpen and increaſed, ſo by communicating the ſame to many, our Engliſhmen finding out the ordering and diſpoſing of exploites of warre therein contained, the aide and direction of theſe plaine and briefe precepts, might no leſſe in knowledge of warres become incomparable, then in prooves alſo and exerciſe of the ſame altogether invincible: which my tranſlacion, moſt gracious Soveraigne, together with ſuch other thinges, as by mee hath bene gathered, and thought good to adde thereunto, I have preſumed to dedicate unto your highneſs, not onely becauſe the whole charge and furniture of warlike counſailes and preparations, being determined by the arbitremen of Governours and Princes, the treatiſe alſo of like effect ſhould in like manner as of right depend upon the protection of a moſt worthy and noble Patroneſſe, but alſo that the diſcourſe itſelfe, and the worke of a forraine author, under the paſport and ſafe conduite of your highnes moſt noble name, might by ſpeciall authoritie of the ſame, winne

amongſt

amongſt your Majeſties ſubjectes, much better credite and eſtimacion. And if, moſt mighty Queene, in this kinde of Philoſophie, (if I may ſo terme it) grave and ſage counſailes, learned and wittie precepts, or pollitike and prudent admonicions, ought not to be accounted the leaſt and baſeſt jewells of weale publike; then dare I boldly affirme, that of many ſtraungers, which from forreine countries, have heretofore in this your Majeſties realme arrived, there is none in compariſon to be preferred, before this worthy Florentine and Italian; who having freelye without any gaine of exchaunge (as after ſome acquaintaunce and familiaritie will better appeare) brought with him moſt ritch, rare and plentifull Treaſure, ſhall deſerve, I truſt of all good Engliſh hearts, moſt lovingly and friendly to bee intertained, imbraced and cheriſhed; whoſe new Engliſh apparel, how ſo ever it ſhall ſeeme by mee, after a groſſe faſhion, more fitly appointed to the Campe, then in nice termes atired to the Carpet, and in courſe clothing rather put foorth to battaile, then in any brave ſhew prepared to the banket; nevertheleſſe my good will I truſt, ſhall of your grace be taken in good part, having faſhioned the phraſe of my rude ſtile, even according to the purpoſe of my travaile, which was rather to profite the deſirous man of warre, then to delight the ears of the fine Rethorician, or daintie curious ſcholeman. Moſt humbly beſeeching your highnes, ſo to accept my labour herein, as the firſt frutes of a poore Souldiour's ſtudie, who to the uttermoſt of his ſmal power, in the ſervice of your moſt gratious majeſtie, and of his countrie, will at all times, according to his boundent dutie and allegeaunce, promptly yeeld himſelfe to any labour, travaile or daunger, what ſo ever ſhall happen. Praying in the meane ſeaſon the almightie God, to give your highnes in a long proſperous raigne, perfect health, deſired tranquilitie, and againſt all your enemies, lucky and joyful victorie.

Your humble Subject and dayly

Oratour,

PETER WHITEHORNE.

THE

AUTHOR's PREFACE,

ADDRESSED TO

Lorenzo Strozzi, Nobleman of Florence.

MANY are now of opinion, My Dear Lorenzo, that no two things are more diſcordant and incongruous than a civil and a military Life. Hence we ſee daily, that when a man goes into the army, he preſently changes, not only his dreſs, but his behaviour, his company, his air, his manner of ſpeaking, and affects to throw off all appearance of any thing that may look like common life and converſation. For a man that is to be ready equipped for any ſort of violence, deſpiſes the formal garb of a Citizen, and thinks no dreſs fit for his purpoſe but a ſuit of armour: and as to civility and politeneſs, how can we expect to find any ſuch thing in one who imagines it would make him look effeminate, and rather be a hindrance to his preferment than otherwiſe; eſpecially when he thinks it his duty, inſtead of talking and looking like other men, to fright every body he meets with a volley of oaths, and a terrible pair of whiſkers? This indeed gives ſome countenance to ſuch an opinion, and makes people look upon a ſoldier as a different ſort of a creature from all other men.

But if we conſider the nature of government, and the inſtitutions of the Ancients, we ſhall find a very ſtrict and intimate relation betwixt theſe two conditions; and that they are not only compatible and conſiſtent with each other, but neceſſarily connected and united together. For all the arts and ſciences which have been introduced into ſociety for the common benefit of mankind, and all the ordinances that have been eſtabliſhed to make them live in the fear of God, and obedience to human Laws, would be vain and inſignificant,

if

if not ſupported and defended by a military force; which, when properly conducted and applied, will maintain thoſe ordinances and keep up their authority, though perhaps they may not be altogether perfect and without flaw or defect in themſelves. But the beſt ordinances in the world will be deſpiſed and trampled under foot, if not upheld as they ought to be by a military power; like a magnificent Palace that is uncovered at the top, which though full of jewels and coſtly furniture, muſt ſoon moulder into ruin, as it has nothing but its ſplendor and riches to defend it from the injuries of the weather. The ancient Lawgivers and Governors of Kingdoms and Republics took great care therefore to inſpire all their ſubjects, but particularly their ſoldiers, with fidelity, love of peace, and the fear of God. For who ought to be more faithful than a man that is entruſted with the ſafety of his country, and has ſworn to defend it to the laſt drop of his blood? Who ought to be fonder of peace than thoſe that ſuffer by nothing but war? Who is under greater obligations to worſhip God than Soldiers, who are daily expoſed to innumerable dangers, and have moſt occaſion for his protection? Theſe things being well conſidered by thoſe who governed States and modelled armies in former times, and ſtrongly enforced upon others that were under their command, had ſuch an effect upon their conduct and behaviour, that the life of a ſoldier was edifying and ſerved as a pattern for others. But ſince our diſcipline is now depraved to ſuch a degree, that it is totally different from what it anciently was, it is no wonder that other men have ſo bad an opinion of a military life, and endeavour, as much as they can, to avoid the company and converſation of all ſuch as follow the profeſſion of arms.

As I am of opinion, therefore, from what I have both ſeen and read, that it is not even yet impoſſible to revive the diſcipline of our anceſtors, and in ſome meaſure to retrieve the reputation of our ſoldiery, I have written the following treatiſe concerning the Art of War, as well for the improvements of others who are deſirous to imitate the Ancients in warlike exploits, as for my own private ſatisfaction, and to avoid the imputation of ſpending my leiſure in idleneſs. Now, though perhaps it may ſeem a preſumptuous undertaking to treat of an Art which I never profeſſed; yet I cannot help thinking myſelf more excuſable than ſome other people, who have taken upon them the actual exerciſe of it: for an error in my writings may eaſily be corrected, without prejudice to any body; but an error in their practice may ruin a whole State. Conſider the nature of this work then, good Lorenzo, and freely beſtow either your cenſure or commendation upon it, as you think it juſtly deſerves. I inſcribe

it

it to you, not only as a teſtimony of my gratitude, (though conſcious to myſelf how ſmall a return it is for the favours I have received from you) but becauſe it is uſual to addreſs things of this nature to perſons who are diſtinguiſhed by their nobility, their riches, their great parts, or munificence; and I know very well that in birth and fortune you have not many equals, ſtill fewer in parts, and in generoſity and liberality, none at all.

The Reader is deſired to take notice that the following Letter or Mark in the ſeveral Plans inſerted in this Work

o	Stands for	Target men.
d		Ordinary Pikemen.
e		Pikemen Extraordinary.
x		Corporals of Target-men.
*		Corporals of Pikemen.
r		Ordinary Velites, or light armed Infantry.
t		Velites Extraordinary.
C		Captains of a Battalion.
B		The Lieutenant Colonel of a Battalion.
P		The Colonel of a Regiment.
G		The General of an Army.
z		The Colours.
S		The Drums.
g		The Gens d'armes, or heavy armed Horſe.
Q		Their Captains.
y		The light Horſe.
J		Their Captains.
oo		The Artillery.

THE

THE ART OF WAR.

BOOK I.

THE CONTENTS.

Fabrizio Colonna refreſhing himſelf in Coſimo Rucellai's gardens at Florence, enters into a converſation concerning the Art of War. That an honeſt man ought not to make war his only profeſſion. That no Prince or Republic ſhould ſuffer any of their Subjects to make war their only occupation. In what countries the beſt Soldiers are to be raiſed. Whether it is better to take them out of towns, or out of the country. The conveniencies and inconveniencies of trained Bands, or a ſettled Militia. Of what ſort of men an Army ought to be compoſed. How the Romans raiſed their Legions. Whether a Militia ſhould be numerous, or not. How to prevent the inconveniencies to which a Militia is ſubject. Of raiſing and paying Cavalry.

SINCE it is allowable, I think, to ſpeak well of any man after he is dead, becauſe there can then be no longer any imputation or ſuſpicion of flattery in it, I willingly take this opportunity of doing juſtice to the memory of my dear deceaſed friend Coſimo Rucellai, whoſe name I never remember without tears in my eyes; as I knew him to be poſſeſſed of every quality that his friends and country could wiſh for in a worthy man and a good Citizen. For I am very certain he would chearfully have ſacrificed all that he had in the world, and even life itſelf, for his friends, and that there was

no

no enterprize how difficult and dangerous ſoever, which he would not have undertaken for the good of his country: and I muſt acknowledge, that amongſt all the men I ever was acquainted with, I never met with any one whoſe heart was more diſpoſed to great and generous actions. The only thing that he lamented at his death, was, that it ſhould be his fate to die ſo young, and at home too, without honour, or the ſatisfaction of having ſerved any man in ſo effectual a manner as he paſſionately deſired to have done; ſo that he was afraid (as he told his familiar acquaintance) nothing more could be ſaid of him after he was dead, than that they had loſt a good friend. Many others however, beſides myſelf can give ſufficient teſtimony, not only of his virtues, but of the many amiable and gentleman-like accompliſhments he was poſſeſſed of; though there are now but few traces of them left. Time indeed has ſpared ſome ſmall ſpecimens of the ſprightlineſs of his Genius, conſiſting chiefly of ſhort proluſions and love Sonnets, which (though he was not of an amorous turn) he compoſed at vacant hours in his youth, to avoid being altogether idle, and to entertain himſelf as well as others, till he ſhould find it neceſſary to employ his thoughts upon ſubjects of a higher and more ſerious nature. But even from theſe little ſamples, it appears how happy he was in expreſſing his conceptions, and what a figure he might have made in Poetry, if he had thought it worth his while to give himſelf wholly up to it.

Since fortune therefore has deprived us of ſo valuable a friend, the only remedy we have left, is to conſole ourſelves as well as we can with the memory of his company, and the recollection of ſuch things, whether of a pleaſant or ſerious caſt, as we have often admired in him whilſt he lived. And becauſe the converſation that happened not long ago in his gardens, betwixt him and Fabrizio Colonna, concerning the Art of War (at which I and ſome other friends were preſent) is the freſheſt upon my memory, I will endeavour to recollect what I can of it, and commit it to writing: for as Fabrizio laid open the myſteries of that art with great perſpicuity on one ſide, and ſeveral pertinent queſtions were propoſed, many objections ſtarted, and divers arguments ſupported with no leſs ſtrength of reaſon by Coſimo chiefly on the other; a ſummary account of that conference may ſerve not only to revive the remembrance of his abilities in the minds of ſuch friends as were then met together, but to make ſome that were abſent regret they had not been there too, and to recapitulate to others the ſubſtance of various topics (no leſs uſeful in a civil than a military life) at that time handled in a very maſterly manner, by another great and experienced man. But to our purpoſe.

FABRIZIO.

FABRIZIO COLONNA returning from the wars in Lombardy, where he had commanded his Catholic Majeſty's forces a conſiderable time with great reputation, took Florence in his way, with a deſign to repoſe himſelf a few days in that City, and to viſit the Duke and ſome other Gentlemen there, with whom he was acquainted. Coſimo Rucellai therefore invited him to ſpend a day with him in his gardens; not merely to gratify his natural turn to hoſpitality and politeneſs, but in hopes likewiſe of being indulged in a long converſation with him concerning ſeveral things he wanted to know, and of which he thought he could not have a better opportunity of informing himſelf, than from the mouth of ſo great a man. The invitation being freely accepted by Fabrizio, he came to the Gardens at the time appointed, where he was received by Coſimo, and ſome of his moſt intimate friends, amongſt whom were Zanobi Buondelmonti, Battiſta dalla Palla, and Luigi Alamanni, (all young men, very dear to him, of the ſame diſpoſition, and engaged in the ſame ſtudies) whoſe virtues and good qualities are ſo well known to every body, that it would be altogether unneceſſary to ſay any thing here in praiſe of them.——To be as brief as I can then, Fabrizio was regaled there with all poſſible demonſtrations of honour and reſpect: but after the entertainment and uſual formalities were over (which generally are few and ſhort amongſt men of ſenſe, who are more deſirous of gratifying the rational appetite) the days being long, and the weather intenſely hot, Coſimo, under a pretence of avoiding the heat, took his gueſts into the moſt retired and ſhady part of the Gardens; and being all ſat down, ſome upon the graſs (which is very green and pleaſant there) and ſome upon ſeats placed under the trees, Fabrizio ſaid it was a moſt delightful garden, and looking earneſtly at ſome of the trees, ſeemed not to know the names of them; but Coſimo being aware of it, immediately ſaid, perhaps you may not be acquainted with this ſort of trees; and indeed I am not at all ſurpriſed at it, for they are very old ones, and were much more in vogue amongſt our anceſtors than they are at preſent. Having then told him the names of them, and that they were planted by his Grandfather Bernardo, who was fond of ſuch amuſements: I thought ſo, replied Fabrizio; and both the place and the trees put me in mind of ſome Princes in the Kingdom of Naples, who took much delight in planting groves and ſhady arbours, to ſhelter them from the heat. ——Here he ſtopped ſhort, and after he had pauſed a little while, proceeded in this manner.——If I was not afraid of giving offence (ſaid he) I would tell you my opinion of theſe things: and yet I think none of you will be affronted at what is ſaid amongſt friends in

free converſation; not with any deſign to vilify or depreciate ſuch a taſte, but for the ſake of a little innocent argumentation. How much better then would thoſe Princes have done (I ſpeak it without intending to reflect upon their memories) if they had endeavoured to imitate the ancients in bearing hardſhips and inconveniencies, inſtead of giving themſelves up to eaſe and indolence; in ſuch exploits as were performed in the ſunſhine, and not in the ſhade; in following their example whilſt they continued hardy and honeſt, and not when they became delicate and corrupt; for after that our country ſoon fell into ruin and diſtraction.——You have now introduced a ſubject, ſaid Coſimo (but to avoid the frequent and tireſome repetition of *ſuch a one ſaid, ſuch a one anſwered, and ſuch a one replied*, I ſhall hereafter only prefix the name of the ſeveral ſpeakers, to what they ſaid in the courſe of this converſation) you have now introduced a ſubject which I have long wiſhed to hear thoroughly diſcuſſed, and therefore ſhould take it as a particular favour, if you would ſpeak your ſentiments of it freely, and without reſerve, or fear of offending any one here: for my own part, I will take the liberty of propoſing ſome queſtions and doubts to you, in which I ſhould be glad to be ſatisfied: but if I ſhall ſeem either to impeach or excuſe any one's conduct in my queſtions or replies, it will not be merely for the ſake of blaming or defending them, but for better information, if I am miſtaken in my judgment.

Fabrizio. It will be a great pleaſure to me, I can aſſure you, on the other hand, to give you all the ſatisfaction I can in ſuch queſtions as you ſhall think fit to propoſe to me: but I will not pretend to obtrude my opinions upon you as deciſive and infallible: when you have heard them, I beg you will judge for yourſelf: perhaps I may now and then aſk you a queſtion too in my turn, and make no doubt but I ſhall receive as much ſatiſfaction at leaſt, in your anſwers, as you will do in mine: for it often happens that a pertinent queſtion puts a man upon conſidering ſome things, and gives him light into many others, which otherwiſe he would never have thought of or known.

Coſimo. Let us return then, if you pleaſe, to what you ſaid of my Grandfather and ſome others, who you think would have done better to have imitated the example of the ancients in a hardy and active manner of living, than in making ſuch proviſions for eaſe and luxury. As for my Grandfather, I ſhall make ſome ſort of apology for him; and leave the others to be dealt with as you pleaſe: for I do not believe there was any man of his time, who deteſted a ſoft and delicate way of life more than he did, or was a greater friend to toil and labour. Nevertheleſs, he found it impoſſible either for himſelf

ſelf or his ſons to practice what he moſt approved; for ſuch was the corruption of the age he lived in, that if any one had ſpirit enough to deviate ever ſo little from the common cuſtoms and manner of living in thoſe times, he would have been laughed at and ridiculed by every body. So that if a man ſhould have expoſed himſelf naked upon a ſandy beach to the heat of a noon-day ſun in the middle of ſummer, or rolled himſelf in ſnow in the depth of winter, as Diogenes did, he would have been looked upon as a madman: if any one had brought up his children, like the Spartans, in cottages or farm houſes; if he had accuſtomed them to ſleep in the open air, to go barehead and barefoot, to bathe in the coldeſt ſtreams, in order not only to make them bear hardſhips the better, but to deſpiſe both life and death, he would have been accounted a beaſt rather than a man: if laſtly, he had lived upon pulſe and roots and ſuch ſort of things, if he had made no account of money, like Fabricius of old, he might perhaps have been admired by ſome few, but he would have been followed by nobody at all. My Grandfather therefore was diſcouraged from imitating the example of the ancients, in thoſe things, by the general practice of the times, and forced to content himſelf with doing it in others, which did not lay him ſo open to the charge of affecting ſingularity.

FABRIZIO. You have made a very handſome apology for your Grandfather in that particular, Sir, and there is indeed much truth and reaſon in it. But in what I ſaid of imitating the ancients in their manner of living, I did not mean to carry matters to ſuch extremities as you ſeem to think, but to propoſe ſome other things of a gentler and more practicable nature, and ſuch as would be more ſuitable to the preſent times; which I think might very well be eſtabliſhed, if they were introduced and countenanced by ſome man of authority in a Government. And if we conſider the practice and inſtitutions obſerved by the old Romans (whoſe example I am always fond of recommending) we ſhall find many things worthy of imitation, which may eaſily be tranſplanted into any other ſtate, if it is not become totally corrupt.

COSIMO. Pray what things are thoſe?

FABRIZIO. To honour and reward virtue; not to deſpiſe poverty; to keep up good order and diſcipline in their armies; to oblige their fellow Citizens and Subjects to love one another; to decline faction; to prefer the good of the public to any private intereſt; and other ſuch things which would be compatible enough with theſe times, and may eaſily be introduced if due means were taken for that purpoſe: becauſe they appear ſo reaſonable in themſelves, and the expediency

of them is ſo obvious to common ſenſe, that nobody could gainſay or oppoſe them; and he that takes this courſe, plants trees under the ſhade of which he may enjoy himſelf with equal pleaſure, and perhaps more ſecurity, than we do here.

Cosimo. What you have ſaid of this matter admits of no contradiction, and therefore I ſhall leave it to the conſideration of thoſe whom it moſt concerns; and ſhould be glad to know, why you, who blame others for not imitating the ancients in other weighty and important concerns, have not thought fit in any wiſe to copy them yourſelf in their military diſcipline, and the Art of War, which is your Profeſſion, and in which you have gained ſo much reputation.

Fabrizio. You are now come to the point I expected: for what I ſaid, muſt naturally lead you to aſk ſuch a queſtion; and, for my own part, I ſhall moſt willingly give you what ſatisfaction I can. And though I could make a ſhort and ready excuſe for my conduct in this reſpect, yet ſince we have ſo much leiſure, and ſo convenient a place for it, I ſhall diſcuſs the matter at large; eſpecially as it will give me great pleaſure to inform you thoroughly of what you ſeem ſo deſirous to know.——Men who have any great deſign in hand muſt firſt make all neceſſary preparations for it; that ſo when a proper opportunity offers, they may be ready to put it in execution according to their mind. Now when theſe preparations are made with caution and privacy, they are not known or talked of by others: ſo that a man cannot be blamed for negligence or omiſſion in that reſpect, except ſome occaſion happens which ſhews that he has either not made due preparations for the execution of his deſign, or never thought of it at all: and therefore, as I never yet had any ſuch opportunity of ſhewing what preparations I have made to revive the military diſcipline of the ancients amongſt us, nobody can reaſonably blame me for not doing it. This might ſerve for a ſufficient anſwer to your charge.

Cosimo. It might ſo indeed, if I was ſure you never had ſuch an opportunity.

Fabrizio. Since you ſeem to doubt of that, I will ſhew you at large (if you will have patience to hear me) what preparations are neceſſary for that purpoſe; what ſort of an opportunity is requiſite; what impediments may obſtruct the preparations, and prevent thoſe opportunities from happening; and laſtly, (which ſeems a contradiction in terms) that it is at the ſame time the eaſieſt and moſt difficult thing in the world to accompliſh ſuch a purpoſe.

Cosimo. You cannot oblige us more: and if you are not tired with ſpeaking, you may aſſure yourſelf we ſhall never be tired of

of hearing you. But as the ſubject is copious and much to be ſaid upon it, I muſt beg leave to call in the aſſiſtance of theſe friends now and then: and both they and I hope you will not be offended if we ſhould now and then happen to interrupt you with any queſtion that may ſeem unneceſſary or unreaſonable.

FABRIZIO. You are all heartily welcome to aſk what queſtions ſoever you think fit; for I ſee the ardour and ingenuity of youth incline you to have a favourable opinion of my Profeſſion, and to liſten to what I have to ſay concerning the duties of it: but when men are grown grey-headed, and their blood is frozen in their veins, they generally either hate the very name of a ſoldier, or become ſo poſitive that they can never be argued out of their opinions. Aſk freely then and without reſerve: for that will give me an opportunity of breathing a little ſometimes, as well as the ſatisfaction of anſwering your queſtions in ſuch a manner as may leave no doubt or ſcruple remaining upon your minds.——To begin then with what you ſaid yourſelf, that in the Art of War (which is my Profeſſion) I have not imitated the ancients in any reſpect whatſoever, I anſwer, that War being an occupation by which a man cannot ſupport himſelf with honour at all times, ought not to be followed as a buſineſs by any but Princes or Governors of Commonwealths; and that if they are wiſe men they will not ſuffer any of their Subjects or Citizens to make that their only Profeſſion. Indeed no good man ever did: for ſurely he cannot be called a good man, who exerciſes an employment that obliges him to be rapacious, fraudulent, and cruel at all times, in order to ſupport himſelf; as all thoſe muſt be of courſe (of what rank ſoever they are) who make a trade of war; becauſe it will not maintain them in time of peace: upon which account, they are under a neceſſity either of endeavouring to prevent a peace, or of taking all means to make ſuch proviſions for themſelves in time of war, that they may not want ſuſtenance when it is over [a]. But neither of theſe courſes is conſiſtent with common honeſty: for whoever reſolves to heap as much in time of war as will ſupport him for ever after, muſt be guilty of robbery, murder, and many other acts of violence upon his friends as well as his enemies: and in endeavouring to prevent a peace, Commanders muſt have recourſe to many pitiful tricks and artifices to deceive thoſe that employ them. But if they fail in their deſigns, and find they cannot prevent a peace, as ſoon as their pay is ſtopped, and they can live no longer in the licentious manner they uſed to do, they ſet up for Soldiers of fortune, and having got a parcel of their diſbanded men together, make no ſcruple of plun-

[a] See the Hiſtory of Florence, *paſſim*.

tarily into the ſervice when it was neceſſary, they were no leſs glad to return to their families when they were no longer wanted: the truth of which is manifeſt from many circumſtances; particularly from the privilege which the Roman Citizens enjoyed, of not being forced into the army againſt their inclination. So that whilſt that Republic continued well governed (which was till the time of the Gracchi) there never was any Soldier who made war alone his occupation: from whence it came to paſs that few of them were diſſolute or licentious; and thoſe that were ſo, were ſeverely puniſhed for it. Every well governed Commonwealth therefore ſhould take care that this Art of war ſhould be practiſed in time of peace only as an exerciſe; and in time of war, merely out of neceſſity, and for the acquiſition of glory; referring it (when conſidered as a conſtant buſineſs and employment) to be proſecuted by the Public alone: for if any Citizen has any other end or deſign in following this profeſſion, he is not a good man: and if any Commonwealth acts otherwiſe it is ill governed.

Cosimo. I am thoroughly ſatisfied of the reaſonableneſs of what you have hitherto ſaid concerning this matter, and admit the concluſion you have drawn to be very juſt as far as it relates to a Commonwealth: but I cannot tell whether it will hold good with regard to Princes: for I think a Prince ſhould have ſome ſuch perſons about him as make arms their only profeſſion.

Fabrizio. A Kingdom that is well governed and conſtituted ought to be ſtill more afraid of ſuch perſons than a Commonwealth; becauſe *they* chiefly, if not only, corrupt Princes, and become Miniſters of their Tyranny. It is vain to urge any Monarchy that now exiſts, as an inſtance to the contrary: for there is not one that is well governed and conſtituted. A Kingdom that is well conſtituted never gives the Sovereign power to its Prince in any thing but the command of its armies: in which caſe alone indeed it is abſolutely neceſſary he ſhould have it; becauſe ſudden reſolutions are often neceſſary, and ſuch as cannot be carried into execution ſo ſpeedily as they ought to be, except the ſupreme command is lodged in the hands of one man only: in other matters, nothing ought to be done without his Council; and therefore his Counſellors ſhould take particular care not to let ſuch men be too near his perſon, as would be continually adviſing him to make war, whether it is neceſſary or not; becauſe they cannot tell how to ſupport themſelves in time of peace. But I will enlarge a little further upon this ſubject, and not inſiſt merely upon a Kingdom that is perfectly well governed and conſtituted, but content myſelf (for argument's ſake) with ſuch as we ſee at this time. I ſay then that even in ſuch Governments thoſe perſons are much to be feared who make

make war their only buſineſs; becauſe the ſtrength of all armies, without doubt, conſiſts in their Infantry: ſo that if a Prince has not power enough over his Infantry to make them diſband and return cheerfully to their former occupations when a war is over, he is in a fair way to be ruined. For no ſort of Infantry can be ſo dangerous as that which is compoſed of people who make war their only calling: becauſe a Prince muſt either keep them continually engaged in war, or in conſtant pay during the time of peace, or run the riſque of being ſtripped of his kingdom by them: but it is impoſſible for any Prince, either to keep them continually engaged in war, or in conſtant pay when it is over; and therefore he muſt run no ſmall riſque of loſing his Kingdom. Whilſt the Romans continued wiſe and good they never ſuffered any of their Citizens to make war their only employment, (as I ſaid before) though they were able to keep them in conſtant pay, becauſe they were continually at war: but in order to avoid the inconveniencies which might have enſued from the toleration of ſuch a cuſtom, they changed their forces (as they could not alter the times) in ſuch a manner, that at the end of every fifteen years, their Legions were filled with new men that were in the flower of their youth: for they took none but ſuch as were betwixt eighteen and thirty-five years of age, in full health and vigour; and never kept them till they grew old and infirm, as the ſame people afterwards did in more corrupt times. For Auguſtus, and after him Tiberius, more careful to eſtabliſh and increaſe their own power than to promote the public good, began to diſarm the Roman people (in order to make them more paſſive under their tyranny) and kept the ſame armies continually on foot upon the confines of the Empire: but not thinking thoſe ſufficient to keep the Senate and people in due awe, they raiſed other forces, called the *Pretorian Bands*, which were always quartered either in the City or near it, and ſerved not only as Guards to the Emperor's perſon, but to bridle the people. Afterwards, however, when the Emperors ſuffered the men who compoſed thoſe Bands to lay aſide all other occupations, and to make war their ſole Profeſſion, they ſoon became inſolent and formidable, not only to the Senate, but to the Emperors themſelves; many of whom they put to death, and then diſpoſed of the Empire as they pleaſed, taking it from ſome, and giving it to others: nay it frequently happened that different Emperors were elected by different armies at the ſame time; which ſoon occaſioned the diviſion of that Empire, and at laſt the utter ruin of it. A Prince therefore who would reign in ſecurity, ought to make choice of ſuch men alone for his Infantry, as will cheerfully ſerve him in war when it is neceſſary, and be as glad to come back to their own houſes after it is over; which will

always be the caſe with thoſe that have other occupations and employments to live upon; for which purpoſe, when a peace is concluded, he ſhould order his Generals and great officers to return to their reſpective charges and Governments elſewhere; the Gentlemen who have ſerved as Volunteers, to the care of their eſtates; and the private men to their particular callings: that ſo every one may be ready to enter into a war to procure a good peace, and no man preſume to diſturb the peace, in order to ſtir up a war.

Cosimo. Indeed, Sir, I think there is much truth and reaſon in what you have ſaid; but as the ſubſtance of it is ſo very different from the judgment I had formed to myſelf of theſe matters before, I cannot ſay that I am altogether ſatisfied in ſome reſpects: for I know ſeveral Lords and Gentlemen who are ſupported by the profeſſion of arms alone in time of peace; as yourſelf for inſtance, and ſome others of your rank and quality, who receive penſions from Princes and other ſtates: I ſee likewiſe many Soldiers, eſpecially Cavalry and Gens-d'Armes, ſtill kept in pay for the ſecurity of fortreſſes and other Cities; ſo that it appears to me that there is ſufficient employment and occaſion for them all in time of peace.

Fabrizio. Surely you cannot be of that opinion: for if there was no other reaſon to convince you of the contrary, the ſmall number of men that is reſerved to garriſon thoſe places might be a ſufficient anſwer to your objection. What proportion is there betwixt a few regiments of Infantry that are neceſſary to defend ſome ſtrong places in time of peace, and thoſe that are to be kept in pay for the proſecution of a war? Are not many more wanted in time of war to reinforce thoſe garriſons, beſides the numbers that are to be employed in the field, which are always diſbanded as ſoon as a peace is concluded? As to the common ſtanding Guards that are requiſite in any State (which need not be many) Pope Julius II. and your own Republic have ſufficiently ſhewn the world how dangerous they thought thoſe people who made war their only occupation, by diſmiſſing them for their inſolence, and hiring Swiſs Guards in their room, who were not only born and brought up in ſtrict obedience to Laws, but picked and choſen out of their ſeveral vocations in a prudent and regular manner: your objection therefore that Soldiers of every kind are neceſſary, and may find ſufficient employment in time of peace as well as war, muſt naturally fall to the ground. But why Horſe and Gens d'Armes ſhould be kept in pay in times of peace, perhaps may not appear ſo obvious: nevertheleſs, if we conſider the matter thoroughly, it may eaſily be accounted for from the corruption of the times. For it is a bad cuſtom introduced by men who make a trade of war, and would be attended with many dangerous conſequences in a State, if

any

any conſiderable number of them was kept in pay; but as there are ſeldom enow to make up an army of themſelves, they can do no great miſchief at preſent: though they have done formerly, as I ſhewed before in the caſes of Franciſco Sforza, his father, and Braccio da Montone. It is a bad cuſtom however, and ſuch as I approve not.

Cosimo. Would you have none at all then? Or if you would have any, in what manner would you raiſe and employ them?

Fabrizio. As a Militia; not like the Gens d'Armes of France (who are as inſolent and dangerous as our own) but after the manner of the Ancients, who always raiſed their Cavalry out of their own Subjects; and after a war was over, ſent them home again to ſupport themſelves upon their reſpective occupations, as I ſhall ſhew more at large before I have done with this ſubject. So that if troops of horſe are kept together, and receive pay, and live entirely upon it, even in times of peace, it is owing to corruption and bad government. And though indeed I myſelf and ſome other Commanders, whom I know, receive penſions and ſtipends in time of peace, I muſt confeſs I think it a very corrupt cuſtom: for a wiſe and well governed Republic ought never to keep ſuch Commanders in conſtant pay, but rather to employ its own Citizens in time of war, and afterwards to diſmiſs them to follow their former employments. So likewiſe a Prince, if he would act wiſely, ſhould not allow a penſion or ſtipend to any one in time of peace, except by way of reward for ſome ſignal piece of ſervice, or in order to avail himſelf of ſome able man in time of peace as well as war. And ſince you have pitched upon me as an example of this kind, I will take the charge to myſelf and make the beſt apology I can for it. I ſay then, that I never made war my ſole buſineſs and occupation: my profeſſion is to govern my ſubjects well, to defend and protect them: for which purpoſe, I ſtudy the arts both of peace and war; and if I am rewarded and eſteemed by the Prince whom I have the honour to ſerve, it is not ſo much for the experience I have in military affairs, as becauſe he is pleaſed to retain me as one of his Counſellors in time of peace. A Prince therefore who would govern wiſely ſhould admit no other ſort of perſons into his Confidence: for if his Counſellors are too fond either of peace or war, they will lead him into errors and inconveniencies. Thus much I thought myſelf obliged to ſay in conſequence of what I propoſed at firſt: and if it is not ſatisfactory, I make no doubt but you will be able to find others who can give you better information in the things you ſeemed ſo deſirous of knowing. You begin however, I dare ſay, to be aware how difficult a matter it muſt be to revive the military diſcipline of the Ancients at preſent, what preparations are neceſſary for that purpoſe, and what occaſions and opportunities are wanting for it. But if you

you are not already tired with what I have ſaid, I could throw a little more light upon this ſubject, by comparing the particulars of our modern practice and inſtitutions with the diſcipline of the Ancients.

Cosimo. If we were deſirous at firſt to hear you enter into a diſcuſſion of theſe things, we can aſſure you that what you have already ſaid, has redoubled that deſire in us: we thank you therefore moſt heartily for the ſatisfaction you have given us, and earneſtly deſire the favour of you to proceed.

Fabrizio. Since it is your pleaſure then, I will deduce this matter from the fountain head; that ſo I may be enabled to explain myſelf with more perſpicuity, and you to underſtand me the better.—— Whoever engages in a war muſt endeavour by all means to put himſelf in a condition to face his enemy in the field, and to beat him there if poſſible. For this purpoſe, it is neceſſary to form an army: to form an army, he muſt not only raiſe men, but arm and diſcipline, and exerciſe them frequently, both in ſmall and large bodies; he muſt teach them to encamp and decamp, and make the enemy familiar to them by degrees, ſometimes by marching near them, and ſometimes by taking poſt in a ſituation where they may have a full view of them. Theſe preparations are abſolutely neceſſary in a field war, which is the moſt effectual and honourable of all others: and a General who knows how to conduct ſuch a war, to form and draw up an army, and to give an enemy battle in a proper and Soldier-like manner, cannot err much in other reſpects: but if he is deficient in this part of his profeſſion (though he be ever ſo able a man in other points) he will never bring a war to a happy concluſion: beſides, if he wins a battle, it cancels all other errors and miſcarriages; but if he loſes one, it effaces the memory of all his former merits and ſervices. To form an army therefore, it is neceſſary in the firſt place to make choice of proper men for that purpoſe: which the Antients termed *delectus*, but we call *liſting* or *levying*. Thoſe then who have preſcribed rules in the Art of war, are unanimouſly of opinion that ſuch men ſhould be raiſed in temperate climates; that ſo they may be both brave and quick of apprehenſion: becauſe it has been generally obſerved that hot countries produce men that are quick and ſharp witted, but not courageous; and on the other hand, that the inhabitants of cold countries are for the moſt part hardy and brave, but of dull and heavy underſtandings. This rule indeed might be followed by a Prince who had the whole world at command, and could raiſe his men where he pleaſed. But to give a rule which may be obſerved by any State, I ſay that every Prince or Republic ſhould raiſe their men in their own dominions, whether hot, cold, or temperate: for we ſee by ancient examples, that good diſcipline and exerciſe will make good Soldiers in any country,

and

and that the defects of nature may be ſupplied by art and induſtry; which in this caſe are more effectual than nature itſelf. Beſides, the raiſing of men in any other country cannot properly be called *delectus*, or *making a choice*; becauſe that term ſignifies to pick and cull the beſt men in a Province, and implies a power to chuſe ſuch as are unwilling, as well as thoſe that are willing, to ſerve in the wars; which cannot be done in any country but your own: for in territories that are ſubject to another State, you muſt be content with ſuch as are willing to ſerve you, and not expect to pick and chuſe whom you pleaſe [*e*].

Cosimo. But you may either take or refuſe whom you think fit of thoſe that are willing to ſerve you; and therefore that may be called *delectus*.

Fabrizio. You are right in one reſpect: but conſider the defects to which ſuch a choice is ſubject, and you will find that in effect it is no choice at all. In the firſt place, thoſe that are not your own Subjects, but yet are willing to enter into your pay, are ſo far from being the beſt men, that they are generally the worſt in any State: for if there be any ſcandalous, idle, incorrigible, irreligious wretches, any run aways from their parents, any blaſphemers, common cheats, or fellows that had been initiated into every kind of villany, thoſe are the people that commonly liſt under your banners; and what ſort of ſoldiers they are likely to make I leave every one to judge for himſelf. Now when there are more of theſe honeſt gentry that offer their ſervice than you want, you may pick and chuſe out of them indeed; but you can never make a good choice, becauſe they are all ſo bad. It often happens however, that there are not ſo many, even of theſe, as you have occaſion for to fill up your Regiments: ſo that you muſt be obliged to take them all; and then ſurely you cannot ſo properly be ſaid to make a *delectus*, *a choice*, as to raiſe men at any rate. Of ſuch diſorderly people our Italian armies and thoſe of moſt other nations are compoſed at preſent, except in Germany; becauſe our Princes have it not in their Power to make any man ſerve in their wars except he is willing. Conſider with yourſelves therefore whether it is poſſible to revive the diſcipline of the Ancients in armies which are raiſed in this manner.

Cosimo. What other method would you take then to raiſe them?

Fabrizio. That which I recommended before: a Prince ſhould chuſe them out of his own ſubjects, and exert his authority in ſuch a choice.

[*e*] See the *Prince*, Chap. xii. xiii. xiv. and Pol. Diſc. Book I. Chap. xxi.

Cosimo.

COSIMO. Do you think any part of the ancient diſcipline might be revived in an army thus choſen?

FABRIZIO. Without doubt it might, if ſuch an army was commanded by its natural Sovereign, in a Principality: or by one of the governing Citizens in a Commonwealth, who ſhould be appointed Commander in Chief during the time of his authority; otherwiſe it would be a very difficult matter to do it.

COSIMO. Why ſo?

FABRIZIO. I will explain that to you more at large hereafter: let it ſuffice at preſent to ſay, that no good can be done any other way.

COSIMO. Well then, ſince theſe Levies are to be made in your own dominions, is it better to draw the men out of the Country or out of Towns?

FABRIZIO. All authors who have written upon this ſubject agree, that it is better to take them out of the Country; becauſe ſuch men are inured to hardſhips and fatigues, to endure all ſorts of weather, to handle the mattock and ſpade, to throw up ditches, to carry heavy burdens, and are, generally ſpeaking, more temperate and incorrupt than others. But as Horſe as well as Foot are neceſſary in an army, I would adviſe that the Horſe ſhould be taken out of Towns, and the Foot out of the Country.

COSIMO. Of what age would you have them?

FABRIZIO. If I was to raiſe a new army, I would chuſe them from ſeventeen to forty years of age: but, if I was only to recruit an old one, I would have none above ſeventeen.

COSIMO. I do not well underſtand the reaſon of this diſtinction.

FABRIZIO. I will tell you the meaning of it then. If I was to raiſe an Army, or eſtabliſh a Militia, in a State where there was none before, it would be neceſſary to take the beſt and moſt docible men I could find of all ages, (provided they were neither too young nor too old to carry arms) in order to diſcipline them in ſuch a manner as I ſhall inform you of in its proper place: but if I was to raiſe men only to recruit an army that had been long on foot, I would take none above ſeventeen, becauſe there would be men enow for my purpoſe of riper age in ſuch an army before.

COSIMO. Then you would put your troops upon the ſame footing with thoſe in our Country?

FABRIZIO. Yes; but I would arm, and officer, and exerciſe, and diſcipline them, in a manner that I fancy is not known amongſt yours.

COSIMO. You would have trained bands, I ſuppoſe?

FABRIZIO. Why not, Sir?

COSIMO. Becauſe ſeveral wiſe and able men diſapprove of them.

FABRIZIO.

FABRIZIO. That cannot well be ſurely. Some men perhaps may be accounted wiſe and able, though they really are not ſo.

COSIMO. The bad proof thoſe bands have always made ſeems to countenance that opinion.

FABRIZIO. Are you ſure it is not owing to your own fault rather than any defect in them, that they have always made ſo bad proof? Perhaps I may convince you that it is before we part.

COSIMO. We ſhall be much obliged to you for ſo doing. But in the firſt place I will tell you upon what accounts theſe bands are diſapproved of; that ſo you may be the better enabled to refute the objections that are made to them. It is ſaid then, that they are of little or no ſervice, and conſequently that if any Prince or State confides in them they are ſure to be undone: or, that if they are good Soldiers, the perſon that commands them may ſeize upon the Government himſelf by their aſſiſtance. To confirm this, the example of the Romans is cited, who loſt their liberties by keeping up ſuch forces: the caſe of the Venetians and the King of France is likewiſe inſtanced for the ſame purpoſe; the former of whom make uſe of foreign troops only, to prevent any of their own Citizens from ſeizing upon the Government: and the latter has diſarmed all his ſubjects in order to rule them with more eaſe. But there is much more to be apprehended (it is urged) from the unſerviceableneſs of theſe troops, for which two reaſons are aſſigned: the firſt is, that they are raw and inexperienced; the ſecond, that they are compelled to ſerve by force: for when people are grown up to years of maturity, they ſeldom learn any thing perfectly; and ſurely no material ſervice can be expected from men who are forced into the army whether they will or not.

FABRIZIO. All theſe objections ſeem to be made by very ſhort-ſighted people, as I ſhall ſhew preſently. For as to the unſerviceableneſs of theſe Bands, I ſay that no troops can be more ſerviceable than ſuch as are choſen out of one's own ſubjects; nor can thoſe ſubjects be raiſed in a better or more proper manner. But ſince this will not admit of diſpute, I ſhall not throw away any more time in endeavouring to prove it; eſpecially as there is ſufficient evidence of it in the hiſtories of all nations. What has been ſaid concerning inexperience and compulſion, I allow to be juſt and reaſonable: for inexperience is the mother of cowardice, and compulſion makes men mutinous and diſcontented: but both experience and courage are to be acquired by arming, exerciſing, and diſciplining them in a proper manner, as I ſhall plainly demonſtrate to you. As to the matter of compulſion, I anſwer, that ſuch men as are to be raiſed by the command of their Prince, ſhould neither be altogether volunteers, nor

yet

yet forcibly compelled into the ſervice: for if they were to be altogether volunteers, the miſchiefs would enſue which I juſt now mentioned, it could not properly be called a *delectus*, and few would be willing to ſerve. Compulſion, on the other hand, would be attended with no leſs inconveniencies; and therefore a middle courſe ought to be taken, in which, without either uſing men with downright violence, or depending entirely upon their own voluntary offers, they may be moved by the obedience they think due to their Governors, to expoſe themſelves to a little preſent hardſhip, rather than incur their diſpleaſure: and by theſe means (their own will ſeeming to cooperate with a gentle ſort of compulſion) you will eaſily prevent thoſe evils which might otherwiſe reſult from a ſpirit of licentiouſneſs or diſcontent. I will not venture however to affirm, that an army compoſed of ſuch men is invincible; for even the Roman Legions were often routed, and Hannibal himſelf was at laſt conquered: ſo that it is impoſſible to model any army in ſuch a manner as to prevent it from being ever defeated. The wiſe and able men therefore of whom you ſpeak, ſhould not be ſo peremptory in pronouncing ſuch forces altogether unſerviceable, becauſe they have ſometimes loſt a battle perhaps; for though they may happen to be defeated once or twice, they may be victorious afterwards, when they have diſcovered the cauſes that contributed to their defeat, and provided remedies againſt them for the future; eſpecially as their diſgrace (when the cauſes of it come to be looked into) may probably be owing rather to bad conduct in the Commanders than any defect in the order or inſtitution itſelf: your acquaintance therefore inſtead of condemning one, ſhould endeavour to correct the other; and how that is to be done I will ſhew you as we proceed. In the mean time I ſhall convince you how little foundation there is for the objection which you urge, that ſuch bands, under the command of an aſpiring Subject or Citizen, may deprive a Prince or Republic of their authority and dominions: for it is certain that no Subjects or Citizens, when legally armed and kept in due order by their maſters, ever did the leaſt miſchief to any ſtate: on the contrary, they have always been of the higheſt ſervice to all Governments, and have kept them free and incorrupt longer than they would have been without them. Rome continued free four hundred years, and Sparta eight hundred, though their Citizens were armed all that while: but many other States which have been diſarmed have loſt their liberties in leſs than forty years. No State therefore can ſupport itſelf without an army, and if it has no Soldiers of its own, it muſt be forced to hire foreign troops, which will be much more dangerous; becauſe they are more liable to be corrupted, and become ſubſervient to the ambition of

ſome

ſome powerful Citizen, who may eaſily avail himſelf of their aſſiſtance to overturn the eſtabliſhed Government, when he has nobody to deal with but an unarmed and defenceleſs multitude. Beſides, every State muſt naturally be more afraid of two enemies than one: and that which takes foreign troops into its pay, muſt therefore be apprehenſive of them, as well as of its own forces: for which indeed you will ſee there is ſufficient reaſon, if you remember what I ſaid juſt now concerning Franciſco Sforza: whereas a State which employs no troops but ſuch as are compoſed of its own Subjects has only one enemy to fear. But to omit all other proofs which might be adduced to ſupport this point, I ſhall only lay it down as a certain truth, that no man ever yet founded a Monarchy or a Republic but he was well aſſured the Subjects, if armed, would always be ready and willing to defend it: and if the Venetians had acted as wiſely in this reſpect as in others, they might have erected a new Monarchy in the world: for the neglect of which, they are the more inexcuſeable, as they had arms put into their hands by their firſt Legiſlators: but not being poſſeſſed of much territory at land, they employed their ſtrength chiefly at ſea, where they carried on their wars with great ſpirit, and made conſiderable acquiſitions. At laſt, however, when they were obliged to engage in a land war for the relief of Vicenza, inſtead of truſting ſome Citizen of their own with the command of their forces, they took the Marquis of Mantua into their pay for that purpoſe. Now if this falſe ſtep, which clipped the wings of their ambition, and put a ſtop to their further aggrandizement, was owing to an opinion that though they knew how to make war at Sea, they did not at land, it was a ſimple and ill-founded diffidence: for a Sea-commander who has been uſed to fight the winds and waves, as well as the enemy, will ſooner make a good Land-officer where he has nothing to deal with but men, than a Land-officer will make a good Sea-commander. The Romans nevertheleſs, who were moſt expert in Land-wars, but knew little of naval affairs, being engaged in a quarrel with the Carthaginians, who were very powerful at Sea, did not take either Grecian or Spaniſh forces into their Service, though they were the beſt Seamen in the world at that time; but left the command of that expedition to their own Land-officers, who made a deſcent upon the enemy's coaſt, and ſubdued the whole Country. But if the Venetians acted in that manner out of an apprehenſion that, if they did otherwiſe, ſome one of their own Citizens might ſeize upon the Government himſelf, it was an unreaſonable jealouſy: for (not to repeat what has been already ſaid) if none of their Sea-commanders ever made themſelves maſters of any [illegible] upon their

coaſts; much leſs occaſion had they to fear that any of their Citizens who commanded their armies ſhould make uſe of them for ſuch a purpoſe. If they had conſidered this, they would have been convinced that tyranny and uſurpation are not owing to the Citizens being armed, but to weak conduct in a Government; and that whilſt a State is well conducted, it has nothing to fear from the arms of its Subjects: the reſolution therefore which they took upon that occaſion was a very imprudent one, and brought great diſgrace and many misfortunes upon them. As to the error which the King of France is guilty of in diſarming his Subjects, inſtead of keeping them well diſciplined and ready for war, (an inſtance which you urge againſt me) every impartial man muſt own that it is a great default in judgment, and has much weakened that Kingdom. But I have made too long a digreſſion, and may ſeem perhaps to have forgot my Subject: yet I was in ſome meaſure obliged to do it, in anſwer to your objections, and to ſhew you that a State ought by no means to depend upon any troops but ſuch as are compoſed of its own Subjects; that thoſe Subjects cannot be raiſed in any manner ſo well as by way of trained bands: and that there can be no better method deviſed to form an army, or militia, or to introduce good order and diſcipline amongſt the Soldiers. If you ever read the inſtitutions eſtabliſhed by the firſt Kings of Rome, particularly by Servius Tullus, you muſt remember that the *Claſſes* which he formed, were a ſort of trained bands, or bodies of men fit to bear arms, out of which, an army might preſently be raiſed upon any ſudden emergency for the defence of the State.——But to return to our Levies, I ſay again that if I was to recruit an old army, I would take men of about ſeventeen years of age; but if I was to raiſe a new one, and to make it fit for ſervice in a ſhort time, I would take them of all ages betwixt ſeventeen and forty.

Cosimo. Would you have any regard to their reſpective trades or occupations?

Fabrizio. Some Authors who have written upon this Subject, will not admit of fowlers, fiſhermen, cooks, bawdy-houſe-keepers, or any other ſort of people who make an occupation of pleaſure or ſporting; but prefer plowmen, ſmiths, farriers, carpenters, butchers, hunters, and ſuch like: but, for my own part, I ſhould not ſo much conſider the nature of their profeſſion as the goodneſs of the men, and which of them would be the moſt ſerviceable. For this reaſon I ſhould ſooner make choice of huſbandmen, and ſuch as have been accuſtomed to labour in the fields, as more uſeful in an army than any other kind of people: next to theſe, I would take ſmiths, carpenters,

penters, farriers, and ſtone-cutters, of whom it is neceſſary to have many; becauſe they are very often wanted, and it is a good thing to have Soldiers that can turn their hands to more ſervices than one.

Cosimo. But how may one diſtinguiſh thoſe that are fit for war from thoſe that are not?

Fabrizio. I will firſt inform you of the method I would take to raiſe levies to form a new army; becauſe I ſhall have an opportunity of mentioning ſeveral things at the ſame time, that are neceſſary in the choice of men to recruit an old one.——I ſay then, we muſt judge whether a man is fit for ſervice, either from the experience we have had of his former behaviour, or from probable conjecture: but in ſuch as are altogether raw men, and never ſerved before, (of whom we muſt ſuppoſe all new levies chiefly, if not wholly, to conſiſt) we can have no experience of their fitneſs: upon which account, we muſt have recourſe to ſuch conjectures as we may be able to form from their age, their occupation, and appearance. Of the two firſt we have already ſpoken; it only remains therefore to ſay ſomething of the laſt. Some, like Pyrrhus, would have their Soldiers tall and large of ſtature; others, like Julius Cæſar, prefer ſuch as are active and vigorous: of which they form a conjecture from the ſymmetry of their limbs, and the vivacity of their aſpect. Some that have treated of this ſubject, acccordingly recommend thoſe that have quick and lively eyes, muſcular necks, wide cheſts, brawny arms, long fingers, ſmall bellies, round ſides, ſpare legs, and little feet, which are for the moſt part ſigns of ſtrength and agility; two qualities that are principally neceſſary in a Soldier. But above all, we ought to have ſtrict regard to their morals and behaviour: otherwiſe we ſhall make choice of ſuch as having neither modeſty nor honeſty, will be a ſcandal to an army, and not only become mutinous and ungovernable themſelves, but ſow the ſeeds of corruption amongſt others: for it is not to be expected that any kind of virtue or praiſe-worthy quality can be found in ſuch men. Here perhaps it may not appear impertinent (nay indeed it ſeems abſolutely neceſſary, I think) to put you in mind of the method taken by the Roman Conſuls, as ſoon as they entered upon their office, to raiſe the forces that were wanted for the ſervice of that year: that ſo you may be more fully convinced of the importance of ſuch a choice. Upon theſe occaſions then, (as their Republic was almoſt continually engaged in war) being obliged to make choice of ſome that had ſerved before, and others that were altogether raw men, they had an opportunity in one caſe of pitching upon ſuch as they knew by experience were fit for their purpoſe, and were forced in the other to make uſe of thoſe that

ſeemed to be ſo from probable conjecture. It ſhould likewiſe be obſerved that ſuch Levies are made either for preſent ſervice, or to be diſciplined in order to be employed when occaſion ſhall require. But as I have hitherto ſpoken of thoſe only that are to be raiſed and diſciplined for future ſervice, in countries where there was no army before, and conſequently no proper choice can be made from any experience of ſuch men as are fit for Soldiers, I ſhall continue that ſubject: becauſe it is an eaſy matter either to raiſe good recruits or form armies for immediate ſervice, in places where a military force has been once eſtabliſhed; eſpecially, if the rulers of the State have ſufficient authority to enforce it, as the Romans did of old, and the Swiſs do at this day: for though there muſt of courſe be many new men, yet there will alſo be ſo many veterans, in this ſort of Levies, that both together will ſoon make a very good army. The Roman Emperors, however, when they began to keep up garriſons and ſtanding armies upon the confines of the Empire, thought fit to appoint certain Maſters or Inſtructors to teach and diſcipline their *Tirones* (or new raiſed men) in warlike arts and exerciſes, as we may ſee in the life of the Emperor Maximus: an inſtitution obſerved at home only whilſt Rome continued free; but in ſuch a manner, that the young Romans who had been trained up, and inured to this ſort of diſcipline, made excellent Soldiers when a *delectus* was neceſſary, and they were called out into the ſervice of their Country: but afterwards, when this cuſtom of training up the youth at home was left off by the Emperors, they were forced to make uſe of the ways I juſt now mentioned.——But to return to the method obſerved by the Romans in making their Levies. As ſoon as the Conſuls (who always conducted their wars) had entered upon their office, they began to raiſe forces, each Conſul having two legions allotted him, which conſiſted of Roman Citizens only, and were the main ſtrength and flower of their armies. For this purpoſe, they firſt appointed twenty-four military Tribunes, ſix to each legion; whoſe office reſembled that of our Lieutenant-Colonels, or Commanders of a Battalion. This done, they called all the people together that were able to bear arms, and placed the Tribunes of each legion apart: after which, thoſe Officers caſt lots out of which Tribe or Claſs they ſhould begin their choice, and upon which Tribe ſoever the lot fell, they took four of the beſt men out of it, one of whom was made choice of by the Tribunes of the firſt legion, another by thoſe of the ſecond, another by thoſe of the third, and the laſt fell to the ſhare of the fourth. After this, they picked out four more, out of whom, the firſt was choſen by the Tribunes of the ſecond legion, the ſecond by thoſe of the

the third, the third by thoſe of the fourth, and the fourth by thoſe of the firſt. When theſe were thus diſpoſed of, four others were drawn out: the firſt of whom was taken by the third legion, the ſecond by the fourth, the third by the firſt, and the fourth by the ſecond; thus varying the turns of their choice out of all the Tribes, till the four legions were all equal and complete. Now theſe levies might be employed in immediate ſervice, as I ſaid before: and ſince they conſiſted of men, many of whom had been tried in the wars before, and the reſt well exerciſed and diſciplined at home, ſuch a choice might be made partly from experience, and partly from conjecture: but where the men are altogether raw and untried, and muſt be exerciſed and diſciplined from the beginning to make them fit for future ſervice, the choice muſt be made by conjecture alone, founded upon their age and appearance.

Cosimo. What you have ſaid appears to be very juſt: but before you proceed any further, I could wiſh you would be ſo kind to gratify my curioſity in one point, which you have put me in mind of by ſaying, that where the levies that are to be made have not been uſed to military ſervice before, they muſt be choſen by conjecture: for I have heard great fault found with our Militia in many reſpects, eſpecially with regard to their number; ſome being of opinion that if they were fewer, they might be better choſen; that it would not be ſo troubleſome and inconvenient to the country, not to the men themſelves; and that they might have larger pay, which would make them more content and ready to obey your commands. I ſhould be glad to know therefore, whether you would have a large or ſmall number of ſuch people, and how you would proceed in the choice of them in either caſe.

Fabrizio. Without doubt it is much better to have a large number of them than a ſmall one: for indeed where there is not a great number, it is impoſſible ever to have a good Militia: as to the objections which you ſay ſome others have made to it, I ſhall preſently ſhew you the futility of them.——I ſay then, in the firſt place, that the ſmallneſs of the number does not make them ever the better Soldiers, in a country where there is plenty of men, as in Tuſcany for inſtance: for if you are to chuſe them from experience, you will find very few there that have had any trial, as not many have been in the wars; and out of thoſe few, there are hardly any that have given the leaſt mark of worth, or deſerve to be preferred to others; ſo that whoever wants to raiſe men in that country can have no aſſiſtance from experience, but muſt depend wholly upon conjecture. Since this is the caſe then, I ſhould be glad to know what I am to do, and

by what rules I muſt make my choice of a certain number, if twenty well-looking young fellows ſhould be brought before me. Surely every body muſt allow, that it would be the beſt way to arm and exerciſe them all (ſince it will be impoſſible to judge at firſt ſight which of them will make the beſt proof) and defer your choice till they have all had the ſame exerciſe and inſtruction: for then you will eaſily perceive which of them are moſt ſpirited and active, and likely to be the moſt ſerviceable. Upon the whole therefore, the maxim of chuſing but few, that they may be ſo much the better, is ſimple and ill grounded. As to a large number being troubleſome and inconvenient, both to the country and the men themſelves, I anſwer that no number of ſuch men, whether ſmall or great can be troubleſome or inconvenient to any one: for no body is hindered by being a Militia-man from purſuing his uſual occupation, or following his neceſſary affairs; ſince they are only obliged to meet together, and to be exerciſed on holidays, which can be of no prejudice either to the country or themſelves; on the contrary, it would be a great recreation to both: for young men inſtead of being idle at thoſe times, or perhaps ſpending their leiſure in ſomething worſe than idleneſs, would go to theſe exerciſes with pleaſure, and others would be not a little entertained with ſuch a ſpectacle. In anſwer to the objection, that a ſmall number may be better paid, and conſequently will be better ſatisfied and more obedient to command, let it be conſidered that no number of Militia (how ſmall ſoever) can be kept in continual pay in ſuch a manner as to be always ſatisfied with it. Let us ſuppoſe (for example) a Militia to conſiſt of five thouſand men, whoſe pay (if they are to be paid to their ſatisfaction) will amount to at leaſt ten thouſand ducats *per* month. But in the firſt place, five thouſand foot are not ſufficient to make up an army; and in the next, a monthly payment of ten thouſand ducats would be an inſupportable burden upon moſt States, and yet not enough to keep their Soldiers in content and obedience: ſo that though the expence would be extravagant, your army would be ſo inconſiderable that it would not be able to defend your own dominions, much leſs to act offenſively upon occaſion. If you increaſe their pay or their number, it will ſtill be more difficult to pay them: and if you diminiſh either, they will become diſſatisfied and unſerviceable. Thoſe who talk of raiſing a Militia therefore, and of paying them when they have nothing for them to do, talk of things that are either impoſſible, or will anſwer no end: but it is highly neceſſary, I own, to pay them, and well too, when they are called out to ſerve their country. If ſuch an Eſtabliſhment however ſhould happen to occaſion any little inconvenience to the Community in

time

time of peace, (which yet can hardly be) ſurely that muſt be much over-balanced by the conveniencies and advantages which reſult from it: for without a regular and well-ordered Militia there is no living in ſecurity. I conclude then, that thoſe who are for keeping up but a ſmall Militia, that ſo they may be able to pay them the better, or for any other of the reaſons you have alledged, are out in their Politics: for (which makes ſtill more for my opinion) any number, be it ever ſo conſiderable, will be continually diminiſhing upon your hands through many unavoidable accidents; and therefore a ſmall one would ſoon dwindle away to nothing. Beſides, when your Militia is numerous, you may employ a conſiderable force at once, if you ſee occaſion; which muſt always have a greater effect than a ſmall one, and be much more for your reputation. I might add, that if you raiſe but a ſmall number of Militia-men in a large country, and deſign to have them well exerciſed, they muſt of courſe be at ſuch a diſtance from each other, that they cannot all be got together upon the days and at the places appointed for that purpoſe, without great trouble and inconvenience: and if they are not duly exerciſed they will be good for nothing at all, as I ſhall ſhew in its proper place.

Cosimo. You have fully refuted the objections I ſtarted upon this head, I muſt confeſs: but I have another doubt within myſelf which I ſhould be glad to have ſolved. The perſons I mentioned before ſeem to think, that a great number of armed men muſt naturally occaſion much confuſion and diſorder, and frequent tumults in any country.

Fabrizio. This notion is altogether as ill-grounded as thoſe which have been already diſcuſſed, as I hope I ſhall be able to convince you. For if a Militia can occaſion any diſorders, it muſt either be amongſt themſelves or others; which yet may eaſily be prevented, if ſuch an Eſtabliſhment is not ſo badly conſtituted and regulated itſelf as to defeat the end of its inſtitution. For if it is properly conducted, it naturally ſuppreſſes all diſturbances amongſt its own conſtituents, inſtead of fomenting them; becauſe they are under the command of ſuperiors: and if the inhabitants of the country where you raiſe a Militia are either ſo little uſed to war that they are in a manner unarmed, or ſo united amongſt themſelves, that they have no factions amongſt them, it will ſecure them againſt the fear of foreign enemies, but cannot in any wiſe contribute to divide them. For men who are well diſciplined will always be as tender of violating the laws when they have arms in their hands, as when they have not; and will continue ſo if they are not corrupted by their Commanders; which it will be no difficult matter to prevent, as I ſhall ſhew you preſently. But if the people are warlike and yet given to faction, ſuch an eſtabliſhment is moſt likely

to

to re-unite them: becauſe, though they may have arms and Chiefs of their own; yet their arms are ſuch as will be of no ſervice to their country, and their Chiefs only ſerve to foment diviſions and animoſities, inſtead of promoting union and tranquility: whereas this inſtitution furniſhes them with arms that will be ſerviceable to their country, and Chiefs to ſuppreſs their differences. For when any man thinks himſelf injured or offended in a divided country, he immediately applies to the Head of his faction, who, in order to keep up his own intereſt and reputation, is obliged to aſſiſt him in taking revenge, inſtead of diſcouraging violence. But a Chief appointed by public authority acts in a quite different manner: ſo that by eſtabliſhing a good and well ordered Militia, diviſions are extinguiſhed, peace reſtored, ſome people that were unarmed and diſpirited, but united, continue in union and become warlike and courageous; others that were brave and had arms in their hands, but given to faction and diſcord before, become united, and turn thoſe arms and that courage upon the enemies of their country, which they formerly uſed to exert againſt each other. But to prevent a Militia from injuring others, or overturning the laws and liberties of their country (which yet cannot be effected but by the power and iniquity of the Commanders) it is neceſſary to take care that the Commanders do not acquire too great an authority over the private men. Now authority of this kind is either natural or accidental: to guard againſt the one, it ſhould be provided that an Officer ſhould not have any command over the men that were raiſed in the diſtrict where he was born: but over ſuch only as were drawn out of other places where he has no natural intereſt or connections: as to the other, it may in a great meaſure be prevented by changing the Officers, and ſending them to command in different parts every year: for a long continuation of command over the ſame people is apt to create too ſtrict an union betwixt them, which may eaſily be converted to the prejudice of the Government. How ſerviceable this method has been to thoſe that have followed it, and how fatal the neglect of it to others, plainly appears from the Hiſtories of the Aſſyrian and Roman Empires; where we find that the former continued above a thouſand years without any ſedition or civil war; which was entirely owing to the cuſtom which the Government obſerved of changing the Commanders of their armies every year, and ſending them into different Provinces. On the contrary, the omiſſion of this cuſtom in the Roman Empire, (from the time of Julius Cæſar) was the occaſion of all the civil wars betwixt the Commanders of different armies, and of all the conſpiracies which thoſe Commanders afterwards formed againſt the Emperors. But if any of the firſt Emperors (eſpecially of thoſe that were eſteemed the

the beſt, as Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, Severus, or ſome others like them) had been provident enough to have changed their Generals at certain times, that Empire would have enjoyed more tranquility and been longer lived: for then thoſe Commanders could not have had an opportunity of rebelling, the Emperors would have lived in greater ſecurity, and the Senate (when the throne became vacant) would have had more authority, and conſequently have acted with more judgment in the choice of a Succeſſor. But (whether it proceeds from ignorance, or inattention, or indolence in mankind, I know not) it is certain that bad cuſtoms are ſeldom changed, let who will be at the helm, or what example ſoever may be brought either to diſcredit them, or recommend their contraries.

Cosimo. I am afraid I have broke in upon the order you propoſed to yourſelf, and led you away from your ſubject, by aſking impertinent queſtions; for behold from talking of Levies we are got to another topic: ſo that if I had not deſired you would excuſe my freedom when we began this converſation, I ſhould have thought myſelf obliged to aſk your pardon for it.

Fabrizio. You need not make any apology for that, Sir, ſince what has been ſaid is nothing more than was neceſſary to ſhew the nature of a Militia: an inſtitution which (as it is condemned by many) I have taken upon me to defend and explain; and therefore it behoved me to point out the beſt manner of raiſing one. But before I deſcend to other particulars, I ſhould ſay ſomething concerning the choice of Cavalry. Theſe troops were anciently choſen from amongſt the richeſt Citizens (with due regard, however, to their age and other qualifications) and there were but three hundred of them in a legion: ſo that the Romans never had above ſix hundred horſe in a Conſular army.

Cosimo. Would you have theſe troops likewiſe trained up and diſciplined at home, in order to employ them upon occaſion?

Fabrizio. Moſt certainly; and it is abſolutely neceſſary to do ſo, if you would have Cavalry of your own, and not be obliged to take up with thoſe that make a trade of hiring themſelves out to any body that wants them.

Cosimo. In what manner would you chuſe them?

Fabrizio. As the Romans did. I would take them out of the richeſt of the people; I would officer them as others are officered at preſent: I would have them well-armed, well-exerciſed, and diſciplined.

Cosimo. Would it be proper to allow them any pay?

FABRIZIO. To be ſure: but as much only as would be ſufficient to keep their horſes: for if you gave them any more, it would be ſo burdenſome to your Subjects that they would murmur at it.

COSIMO. What number would you have; and how would you arm them?

FABRIZIO. That is another matter: but I will anſwer your queſtion after I have told you how the Infantry ought to be armed and prepared for a field battle.

The END of the FIRST BOOK.

THE

THE ART OF WAR.

BOOK II.

THE CONTENTS.

What Arms and Armour were chiefly uſed by the Ancients. Concerning the Arms and Armour made uſe of at preſent, and the invention of the Pike. Whether the Ancient or Modern way of arming is the better. How Infantry ought to be armed; and of the neceſſity of Cavalry. Which of the two are moſt to be depended upon. How the Ancients exerciſed their Soldiers: and in what manner they ſhould be exerciſed at preſent. How many men a Regiment ſhould conſiſt of: and how they ſhould be diſciplined and exerciſed in Battalions and Companies. Concerning the three principal ways of drawing up a Battalion in order of Battle. Of rallying Soldiers after they have been diſordered, and making a whole Battalion face about at a time. How to draw up a Battalion in ſuch order as to face an enemy on any ſide. How to draw up a Battalion with two horns, and another in a hollow ſquare. Of the Baggage and Carriages belonging to a Battalion: of the neceſſity of many officers; and the uſefulneſs of Drums and other Military Muſic. A digreſſion concerning Military Virtue; and to what it is owing that it is now become ſo rare. What number of Horſe is neceſſary in a Regiment; and how many Carriages ought to be allowed them for their baggage.

FABRIZIO. NOW we are provided with men, it is time to arm them I think: for which purpoſe, let us ſee what arms were chiefly uſed by the Ancients, and chuſe the beſt. The Romans divided their Infantry into heavy and light-armed Compa-

nies: the light armed were called *Velites*; under which name were included all thoſe that made uſe of Slings, bows, and darts: the greater part of them wore Caſques upon their heads for their defence, and a ſort of Target or Buckler upon their left arm. They fought in no order, but out of the ranks, and at a diſtance from the heavy armed foot, who had helmets which reached down to their Shoulders, Cuiraſſes, and Brigandines, which covered their bodies and thighs, greaves and gauntlets upon their legs and arms, a ſhield about four feet long and two broad, plated with an iron rim or border at the top to defend it againſt the edge of ſharp weapons, and another at the bottom to keep it from being damaged by frequent rubbing againſt the ground. Their offenſive weapons conſiſted of a Sword about a yard long by their left ſide, a dagger on the right, and a dart in their hand (called *pilum*) which they threw at the enemy at the firſt charge. Such were the arms with which the Romans conquered the world. Some old writers indeed ſay, that beſides theſe, they had a ſpear like what we call an *Eſpontoon* or *half pike*: but I cannot ſee how ſo troubleſome a weapon could be made uſe of by thoſe that carried Shields; which muſt hinder them from uſing both hands at once; and for one it muſt be too unwieldy. Beſides, ſuch weapons could be of no ſervice, except in the front of an army where there is room to manage them; which would be impoſſible in the other ranks: for thoſe (as I ſhall ſhew hereafter) muſt be drawn up thick and cloſe together, ſince that is the beſt way of forming an army, though perhaps it may be attended with ſome inconveniencies. All ſuch weapons therefore as exceed the length of four feet are of little or no ſervice in cloſe fight: for if you have one of thoſe Spears, and are obliged to take both hands to it (admitting that your Shield was no incumbrance to you) you could not annoy an enemy with it that preſſes hard upon you: but if you make uſe of one hand only, in order to avail yourſelf of your Shield with the other, you muſt take hold of it by the middle of the Staff; and then there will be ſo much of it behind you, that thoſe who are upon your back will prevent you from making any uſe of it. To convince you then that the Romans either never had any ſuch Spears; or that, if they had, they were of little or no ſervice, read the account which Livy gives of their moſt remarkable battles, and you will find that he very ſeldom makes mention of any Spears, but tells us, that as ſoon as they had thrown their darts, they fell upon the enemy with their Swords. I would have nothing at all to do with theſe Spears then, but truſt to the Sword and Buckler, and ſuch other weapons and armour as the Romans made uſe of.——The armour of the Grecians was not ſo heavy as that of the Romans: but for offenſive weapons, they depended more upon the Spear than the Sword; eſpecially the Macedonian

donian Phalanx, which was armed with Spears above twenty feet long, called *Sariſſæ*, with which they broke in upon the enemy, and yet kept good order in their own ranks: and though ſome authors ſay they had ſhields too; yet I cannot ſee (for the reaſons above-mentioned) how they could manage them and the Spears at the ſame time. Beſides, in the battle betwixt Paulus Æmilius and Perſeus King of Macedon, I do not remember any mention made of Shields, but of the *Sariſſæ* only, which were very troubleſome to the Romans: ſo that I imagine the Macedonian Phalanx was like the Swiſs Regiments at preſent, whoſe ſtrength lies wholly in their Pikes. The Roman Infantry, beſides their armour, likewiſe had creſts and plumes upon their caſques and helmets, which afforded an agreeable ſpectacle to their friends, and ſerved to ſtrike a terror into their enemies. As to the armour of their Cavalry, it conſiſted at firſt of a round ſhield and a helmet; the reſt of their body was uncovered. Their arms were a Sword and a long thin Javelin or Lance with an iron head, ſo that being incumbered with a ſhield and a Lance at the ſame time, they could uſe neither of them properly; and their bodies being in a great meaſure uncovered, were not a little expoſed to the enemy. But afterwards they were armed like the infantry; excepting that they ſtill carried a ſmall ſquare ſhield, and a thicker lance, armed at both ends, that ſo if one ſhould be broken off, they might avail themſelves of the other. With theſe weapons, and this ſort of armour for their horſe and foot, the Romans ſubdued the whole World; and it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe from their ſucceſs that they were the beſt appointed armies that ever exiſted. Livy himſelf indeed, when he is comparing their ſtrength with that of an enemy, often tells us, that in their armour, their weapons, their diſcipline and courage, they were much ſuperior: for which reaſon I have choſen to ſpeak more particularly of the arms and armour of the Conquerors than of the conquered.——It now remains that I ſay ſomething of thoſe that are in uſe at preſent. The Infantry cover their body with a demi-cuiraſs, or iron breaſt-plate which reaches down to their waiſt; they have a Spear eighteen feet long, called a Pike, and a broad ſword by their ſide: this is their common way of arming themſelves: for very few of them have back plates, greaves, or gauntlets, and none at all any caſques or helmets; and thoſe few inſtead of pikes, carry halberds about ſix feet long with ſharp points, and heads ſomething like a battle-axe: they have likewiſe Muſqueteers amongſt them, inſtead of the Slingers and Bowmen employed by the Ancients. Theſe arms and this ſort of armour were invented, and are ſtill uſed by the Germans, particularly by the Swiſs: for being poor, but deſirous at all times to defend their liberties

againſt the ambition of the German Princes, (who are rich and can afford to keep Cavalry, which the poverty of the Swiſs will not allow them to do) they are obliged to engage on foot, and therefore find it neceſſary to continue their ancient manner of fighting, in order to make head againſt the fury of the enemy's Cavalry. Upon this account they ſtill uſe the Pike, a weapon that enables them not only to keep off the horſe, but very often break and defeat them; and without which, men of the greateſt experience in military affairs ſay, that Infantry are good for little or nothing. The Germans accordingly put ſo much confidence in this ſort of Infantry, that with fifteen or twenty thouſand of them they will attack any number of horſe; of which we have had many inſtances of late; and ſuch is the general opinion of their excellence from the many remarkable Services they have done, that ſince the expedition of Charles VIII. into Italy, all other nations in Europe have adopted the ſame weapons and manner of fighting; the Spaniards in particular have got very great reputation by it.

COSIMO. Which method of arming would you recommend, the German, or that of the ancient Romans?

FABRIZIO. The Romans without doubt; and I will ſhew you the advantages and diſadvantages of them both. The German Infantry are able not only to ſuſtain the ſhock of Cavalry, but to break them; they are more expeditious upon a march and in forming themſelves; becauſe they are not overloaded with arms. On the other hand, they are much expoſed to wounds, both at a diſtance and when they are cloſe engaged, becauſe they are ſo ſlightly armed; they are of no great Service in ſtorming a town, or even in a field battle where they meet with a vigorous reſiſtance. But the Roman Infantry knew how to deal with Cavalry as well as the German; their armour was ſuch that they were not ſo liable to be wounded either in cloſe fight or at a diſtance; they both attacked, and ſuſtained an attack much better, on account of their targets; they did more execution with their ſwords when they fought an enemy hand to hand, than the Germans can do with their Pikes; and if the latter have Swords too, they are not capable of effecting any great matters with them, becauſe they have no targets: they were ſo well armed and ſo ſecure under the ſhelter of their targets, that they were very ſerviceable in ſtorming a breach. So that they laboured under no other incenvenience but the weight of their armour; which yet they got the better of by accuſtoming themſelves to carry heavy burdens, and to endure all other ſorts of hardſhip and fatigue, which made that matter eaſy and familiar to them. You muſt conſider likewiſe that Infantry are often obliged to engage other Infantry and Cavalry together: and that if they

they cannot ſuſtain the ſhock of Cavalry, (or even if they can) and are yet afraid of facing another body of Infantry that is better armed and diſciplined than themſelves, they are of little account. Now if you will compare the German Infantry with the Roman, you will find the former very fit to oppoſe Cavalry (as I ſaid before), but that they would certainly have the diſadvantage, if they were to engage other Infantry that were no better than themſelves, if they were armed and appointed like the Romans: ſo that one is to be preferred to the other, becauſe the German are only fit to cope with horſe, but the Roman knew how to deal both with horſe and foot.

COSIMO. I ſhould take it as a favour if you would give us ſome particular inſtance of this by way of illuſtration.

FABRIZIO. You will find many in hiſtory, where the Roman Infantry have beat infinite numbers of horſe, and none where they have been worſted by other Infantry, either through any deficiency in their own arms, or advantage of thoſe in an enemy. For if there had been any deficiency in their own, and they had met with other people that armed their Soldiers better than they did, they could not have made ſuch prodigious conqueſts, without laying aſide their own method and arming themſelves in the ſame or a better manner: but as they never did this, we may fairly conclude they never found any other people who excelled them in that reſpect. But this cannot be ſaid of the German Infantry: for they have always made bad proof when they have been engaged by other Infantry as obſtinate and well conducted as themſelves: which muſt be owing to the advantage the enemy had over them in their arms. Philip Viſconti, Duke of Milan, being invaded by an army of eighteen thouſand Swiſs, ſent Count Carmignuola againſt them, who was at that time Commander in chief of his forces. But Carmignuola having no more than ſix thouſand horſe and a ſmall body of foot in his army, and coming to an engagement with them, was preſently defeated with great loſs. As he was an able Soldier, however, he ſaw what advantage ſuch an enemy had over Cavalry; and having raiſed another army, he went to look for the Swiſs a ſecond time: but when he came near them, he ordered all his Gens d'Armes to diſmount and fight on foot; which they did with ſuch ſucceſs that they killed fifteen thouſand of the enemy, and the reſt, ſeeing no poſſibility of eſcaping, threw down their arms and ſurrendered.

COSIMO. How is this to be accounted for?

FABRIZIO. I told you a little while ago: but as you ſeem either to have forgot, or not to have underſtood what I ſaid, I will repeat it. When the German Infantry, who (as I ſaid b[illegible] in-differently provided with defenſive armour, and [illegible] the [illegible]

Sword and the Pike for their offenſive weapons, come to engage an enemy that is well-armed at all points (as the Gens d'Armes were, whom Carmignuola cauſed to diſmount) they are eaſily dealt with: for the enemy has nothing to do but to receive their pikes upon their targets, and to ruſh in upon them Sword in hand; after which, the danger is chiefly over: for the German pikes are ſo long, that they cannot avail themſelves of them in cloſe fight, nor will their ſwords ſtand them in any great ſtead, as they are ſo ſlightly armed themſelves, and are engaged with enemies that are completely armed from head to foot. So that whoever conſiders the advantages and diſadvantages on each ſide, will ſee that thoſe who are ſo poorly armed have no remedy againſt an enemy that is completely armed, when he charges home, and has ſuſtained the firſt puſh of the pikes. For when two armies are reſolved to engage, and advance upon each other every moment, they muſt of neceſſity ſoon come cloſe together: and though ſome of the men in the firſt ranks on one ſide, may either be killed or overthrown by the pikes on the other, there will be enow left to carry the day: hence it came to paſs, that Carmignuola made ſuch a ſlaughter amongſt the Swiſs, with little or no loſs on his own ſide.

Cosimo. It muſt be conſidered that Carmignuola's men were Gens d'Armes, though they were on foot, and covered all over with armour, which enabled them to do what they did: I ſhould think it would be a good way therefore, to arm Infantry in the ſame manner.

Fabrizio. If you would recollect what I ſaid concerning the armour which the Roman Infantry made uſe of, you would be of another opinion; for men who have caſques upon their heads, their bodies defended by ſhields and cuiraſſes, their legs and arms covered with greaves and gauntlets, are better able to defend themſelves againſt pikes, and to break in upon them, than Gens d'Armes on foot: of which I will give you a modern example or two. A body of Spaniſh Infantry being tranſported from Sicily into the Kingdom of Naples, to relieve Gonſalvo da Cordovo, who was ſhut up in Barletta by the French, Monſieur d'Aubigni was ſent to oppoſe their march with ſome Gens d'Armes and about four thouſand Swiſs foot. When they came to engage, the Swiſs preſſed ſo hard upon the enemy with their pikes, that they ſoon opened their ranks: but the Spaniards, under the cover of their bucklers, nimbly ruſhed in upon them with their ſwords, and laid about them ſo furiouſly, that they made a very great ſlaughter of the Swiſs, and gained a complete victory. Every one knows what numbers of Swiſs Infantry were cut

to

to pieces at the battle of Ravenna in the ſame manner: for the Spaniſh foot having cloſed with the Swiſs, made ſo good a uſe of their ſwords, that not one of the enemy would have been left alive, if a body of French Cavalry had not fortunately come up to reſcue them: after which, the Spaniards, however, drew up cloſe together in good order, and made a handſome retreat with little or no loſs. I conclude therefore, that no Infantry can properly be called good, but ſuch as are able not only to make head againſt Cavalry, but againſt any other ſort of Infantry whatſoever: and this muſt be entirely owing to their diſcipline and manner of arming, as I have often ſaid before.

COSIMO. How then would you have them armed?

FABRIZIO. I would take ſome of the Roman arms and armour, and ſome of the German; half of my men ſhould be armed with one, and half with the other; for if in every ſix thouſand foot, three thouſand were provided with ſwords and ſhields like the Romans, two thouſand with pikes, and one thouſand with muſkets, like the Germans, it would be ſufficient for my purpoſe, as I ſhall ſhew you preſently. For I would place my Pikemen either in the front of the battle, or where I thought the enemy's Cavalry were moſt likely to make an impreſſion: and the others I would poſt in ſuch a manner as to ſupport the Pikemen, and puſh forwards when a way was opened for them: which I think would be a better method of arming and drawing up a body of Infantry, than any other that is uſed at preſent.

COSIMO. So much for Infantry. I ſhould now be glad to know whether you would recommend the ancient or modern way of arming Cavalry.

FABRIZIO. Conſidering the war ſaddles and ſtirrups which are now in uſe, and were not known to the Ancients, I think men muſt ſit much firmer on horſeback at preſent than they could do formerly. I think likewiſe, our way of arming is more ſecure, and that our Gens d' Armes are capable of making a greater impreſſion than any ſort of Cavalry the Antients ever had. I am not of opinion however, that we ought to depend any more upon Cavalry in general than they did in former times: for (as I ſaid before) we have often ſeen them ſhamefully beaten of late by Infantry; and indeed they muſt always come off with the worſt when they engage Infantry that are armed and appointed in the manner abovementioned. Tigranes, King of Armenia, brought an army of an hundred and fifty thouſand horſe into the field (many of whom were armed like our Gens d' Armes at preſent, and called *Cataphratti*) againſt Lucullus the

Roman General, whoſe army conſiſted only of ſix thouſand horſe and fifteen thouſand foot: upon which Tigranes ſaid, *they were more like the train of an Ambaſſador than an army*. Nevertheleſs, when they came to engage, the King was routed: and the Hiſtorian, who gives us an account of that battle, imputes the defeat entirely to the little ſervice that was done by the Cataphratti, whoſe faces were covered in ſuch a manner that they could hardly ſee, much leſs annoy the enemy, and their limbs ſo overloaded with heavy armour, that when any of them fell from their horſes, they could hardly get up again, or make any uſe of their arms. I will venture to affirm therefore, that ſuch States as depend more upon Cavalry than Infantry, will always be weak and expoſed to ruin; as Italy has been in our times: for we have ſeen it over-run from one end to the other, and plundered by foreigners, merely becauſe its Princes have made little or no account at all of Infantry, and truſted ſolely to Cavalry. It is right however to have ſome Cavalry to ſupport and aſſiſt Infantry; but not to look upon them as the main ſtrength of an army: for they are highly neceſſary to reconnoitre a country, to ſcour the roads, to make incurſions, and lay waſte an enemy's country, to beat up their quarters, to keep them in continual alarm, and to cut off their convoys: but in field battles, which commonly decide the fate of nations, and for which armies are chiefly deſigned, they are fitter to purſue an enemy that is routed and flying than any thing elſe: and conſequently are much inferior to foot [*f*].

Cosimo. Here I could wiſh to have two difficulties reſolved. In the firſt place, every body knows that the Parthians never uſed any other forces but Cavalry in their wars, and yet they ſhared the world with the Romans: in the next, I can neither ſee how Infantry can be able to ſuſtain Cavalry; nor to what the ſtrength of the one, and the weakneſs of the other is owing.

Fabrizio. I either told you before, or deſigned to tell you, that what I intended to ſay concerning the Art of War ſhould be limited to Europe; and therefore ſhall think myſelf excuſed from accounting for the conduct of the Aſiatic nations. I cannot help obſerving to you, however, that the diſcipline of the Parthians was quite different from that of the Romans: for the former all fought on horſeback, in a looſe and irregular manner, which is not much to be depended upon: the latter, on the contrary, fought chiefly on foot in cloſe and regular order: and their ſucceſs was various according to the nature of the countries in which they happened to fight. For in encloſed places, the Romans generally got the better; and the Parthians had the advantage in large open plains: and indeed the nature of the

[*f*] See Pol. Diſc. Book II. Chap. xviii.

the country they had to defend was very favourable to their manner of fighting; for it was flat and open, a thouſand miles from any ſea coaſt, with ſo few rivers in it, that they might ſometimes march two or three days together without ſeeing any, and very thin of towns and inhabitants: ſo that the Roman armies which marched but ſlowly on account of the heavineſs of their armour, and the good order they obſerved, were much annoyed by an active and light-armed enemy, who always fought on horſeback, and were at one place over night, and perhaps fifty or ſixty miles off the next day: in this manner the Parthians availed themſelves of their horſe with ſo much ſucceſs, that they ruined the army conducted by Craſſus, and reduced that under the command of Mark Anthony to the utmoſt diſtreſs. But (as I ſaid before) I ſhall confine myſelf to Europe alone in what I have to ſay of theſe matters, and quote only the examples of the Greeks and Romans in former times, and the Germans at preſent. ——Let us come now to the other point if you pleaſe, viz. what it is that makes Infantry ſuperior to Cavalry.——I ſay then, in the firſt place, that Cavalry cannot march through all roads, as foot can; and they are ſlower in their motions, when it is neceſſary to change their order: for if there ſhould be occaſion to retreat when they are advancing, or to advance when they are retreating; to wheel off to the right or left; to move when they are halting, or to halt when they are in motion, it is certain they cannot do it ſo ſoon as Infantry; and if they are thrown into confuſion by ſome ſudden ſhock, they cannot rally ſo eaſily even when the ſhock is over. Beſides, it often happens that a brave and ſpirited fellow is put upon a pitiful horſe, and a coward upon one that is unruly and ungovernable; in either of which caſes, ſome diſorder muſt enſue. Why then ſhould it ſeem wonderful that a firm and compact body of foot ſhould be able to ſuſtain an attack of Cavalry; eſpecially as horſes are ſenſible animals, and when they are apprehenſive of danger, cannot eaſily be brought to ruſh into it? You ſhould likewiſe compare the force that impels them to advance, with that which makes them retreat, and you will then find, that the latter is much more powerful than the former: for in one caſe, they feel nothing but the prick of a ſpur, but in the other, they ſee a rank of pikes, and other ſharp weapons preſented to them; ſo that you may ſee both from ancient and modern proofs, that good Infantry will always be able not only to make head againſt Cavalry, but generally to get the better of them. But if you object, that the fury with which the horſes are driven on to charge an enemy, makes them regard a pike no more than a ſpur; I anſwer, that though a horſe be upon his career, yet he will loſe of his ſpeed

when he comes near the pikes; and when he begins to feel the points of them, he will either ſtand ſtock ſtill, or wheel off to the right or left. To convince yourſelf of this, try if you can ride a horſe againſt a wall, and I fancy you will find very few, if any, how ſpirited ſoever they may be, that can be made to do that. Julius Cæſar, before an engagement which he had with the Swiſs in Gaul, not only diſmounted himſelf, but cauſed all his Cavalry to diſmount alſo, and ſent their horſes away to a place at ſome diſtance from the field of battle, as fitter for flight than to fight upon. Notwithſtanding theſe natural impediments, however, to which Cavalry are ſubject, a General who commands an army, which conſiſts chiefly of Infantry, ſhould always lead them through roads upon his march, where he cannot be attacked by Cavalry without great trouble and inconvenience; and ſuch roads may eaſily be found in moſt countries. If he marches over hills, they will protect him from the fury of their career, which you ſeem to think irreſiſtible: if he marches through a flat country, the hedges, and ditches, and woods, will generally ſecure him; every little bank or thicket how inconſiderable ſoever, every vineyard or plantation, is ſufficient to embarraſs Cavalry, and to prevent their acting with any material effect; and if they come to engage, it is probable they may meet with the ſame impediments in a field of battle as upon a march; for the leaſt obſtruction ſpoils their career, and damps their ardour. The Roman armies, however, I muſt tell you, put ſuch confidence in their armour and manner of fighting, that if it was in their power to chuſe one place, that was ever ſo rough and confined, in order to ſhelter them from the fury of the enemy's Cavalry, and to prevent them from extending their lines; or another where ſuch Cavalry might act with the greateſt advantage, they always made choice of the latter.——But now we have armed our Infantry, it is time to exerciſe them: let us ſee therefore in what manner the Romans uſed to exerciſe their Infantry before they were ſuffered to engage an enemy; for though ſoldiers may be well-choſen and armed, they will never be good for any thing if they are not diligently exerciſed. Now this exerciſe ought to be of three kinds. In the firſt place, they muſt be taught to endure all ſorts of hardſhip and fatigue, as well as to be dexterous and agile: in the next, to handle their arms well: and laſtly, to obſerve orders, and obey command, and to keep their ranks and ſtations whether it be upon a march, or in battle, or in encamping; which are the three principal operations in an army, and if they are well executed, a General will come off with reputation even when he loſes a battle. The Ancients therefore had very ſtrict laws and ordinances to enforce the

conſtant

conſtant practice of theſe exerciſes in every particular: their youth were accuſtomed to run races, to leap, to pitch the bar, and to wreſtle; all which are very neceſſary qualifications in Soldiers: for ſwiftneſs of foot will enable them to be before-hand with an enemy in ſeizing an advantageous poſt, to come upon them on a ſudden, and to overtake them when they are flying: if they are nimble and dexterous, they will know how to avoid a blow, and find no difficulty in getting over a foſſe or breaſt-work: and if they are ſtrong, they will be able to carry their arms with more eaſe; to make a greater impreſſion upon the enemy, or to ſuſtain a ſhock the better. But above all, they ſhould be inured to carry heavy burdens, which is very neceſſary: for upon ſome great and preſſing occaſions, they may be obliged to carry proviſions with them for ſeveral days, beſides their arms, which they could not do if they were not accuſtomed to ſuch things: and by theſe means great dangers are often avoided, and ſometimes glorious victories obtained. To accuſtom their young men to their armour, and to teach them how to handle their arms with dexterity, the ancients uſed to clothe them in armour which was twice as heavy as that which they were to wear in battle, and inſtead of a ſword, they put a thick cudgel in their hands which was loaded with lead in the inſide, and much heavier than a ſword: after this, they fixed poſts in the earth about ſix feet high, and ſo firm that no blows could move them; upon which the young men uſed to exerciſe themſelves with their cudgel and buckler, as if they had been real enemies, ſometimes making a ſtroke at the top, as if it had been the head or face of a man, ſometimes at the right or left ſide, ſometimes at the lower part, ſometimes advancing briſkly upon it, and at others retreating a ſtep or two; by which means they became dexterous and expert, not only in defending themſelves, but annoying an enemy, and the weight of their falſe arms made their true ones ſeem light and eaſy to be wielded. The Romans taught their Soldiers rather to thruſt than to cut with their ſwords, becauſe thruſts are more dangerous, harder to be warded off, and he that makes them does not expoſe his own body ſo much, and is ſooner ready to redouble than to repeat a full ſtroke. Do not think it ſtrange, however, that the Ancients were ſo exact and particular in things, which to you, perhaps, may ſeem trifling and ridiculous: but conſider, that when men come to fight hand to hand, very little advantage is of great importance; and I muſt beg leave to tell you, that ſeveral good Authors have entered into a much more minute and circumſtantial detail of theſe matters than I have done: for the Ancients thought nothing conduced more to the welfare and ſecurity of

their country, than to have a great number of men well-diſciplined, and exerciſed, and ready for war; well knowing, that neither riches nor magnificence, but the reputation of their arms alone, could keep their enemies in awe and ſubjection: and that defects in other things may ſometimes be remedied; but that in war, where the fatal conſequences of them are immediately felt, they admit of no remedy. Beſides, expertneſs in theſe exerciſes makes men bold and courageous in battle: for inſtead of being afraid, every one is eager to diſtinguiſh himſelf in ſuch points as he knows he excels in. The Ancients therefore, took great care to make their youth perfect in all ſoldier-like exerciſes: for they likewiſe accuſtomed them to throw darts, that were much heavier than thoſe they carried in war, at the poſts I mentioned before; which taught them to be very expert in the uſe of that weapon, and made their arms ſtrong and muſcular. They were alſo taught how to uſe the croſs bow, the long bow, and the ſling; and in all theſe things there were maſters appointed on purpoſe to inſtruct them: ſo that when they were called out to ſerve in the wars, they were ſo well prepared that they wanted nothing to make them excellent Soldiers, but to be taught how to keep their ranks upon a march or in battle, and to obey orders: which they quickly learnt by being incorporated with others who had ſerved a long time, and were thoroughly experienced in that part of diſcipline.

Cosimo. What exerciſes would you recommend to ſuch as are to compoſe our Infantry at preſent?

Fabrizio. Moſt of thoſe which I have already mentioned, as running, wreſtling, leaping, carrying heavy arms, the uſe of the croſs bow, the long bow, and the muſket; which laſt is a new weapon, you know, but a very uſeful one. To theſe exerciſes I would accuſtom all the youth in the country, but thoſe in particular who are deſtined to be Soldiers: and for this purpoſe, I would ſet aſide all holidays and idle times. I would likewiſe have them taught to ſwim, which is very neceſſary; for all rivers have not bridges over them, nor can they expect to find boats always ready to tranſport them: ſo that if your Soldiers cannot ſwim, you will loſe many advantages and opportunities of doing great things [g]. The reaſon why

[g] When the ancient Greeks would upbraid any one with extreme inſufficiency, they told him in a proverbial manner, *that he could neither read nor ſwim.* Julius Cæſar was alſo of opinion, that ſwimming was of great uſe in war, and he himſelf found it ſo; for chuſing moſt commonly to march on foot, as Alexander the Great alſo did, he always ſwam over the Rivers in his way, when expedition was required. When he was in Egypt, being forced to get into a little boat for his ſafety, and ſo many people leaping in with

why the Romans exerciſed their youth in the Campus Martius was becauſe the Tiber ran cloſe by it; that ſo when they were fatigued, they might refreſh themſelves in the river, and learn to ſwim. —— I ſhould alſo chuſe (like the Ancients) to have thoſe properly exerciſed that are to ſerve in the Cavalry; for it is very neceſſary; becauſe it not only teaches them to ride well, but to avail themſelves of their ſtrength in a better manner. For which purpoſe, they had wooden horſes upon which they exerciſed themſelves, vaulting upon them ſometimes with armour on, and ſometimes with none, without any aſſiſtance, and on either ſide of the horſe: ſo that upon a ſignal or word of command from their inſtructors, they were all either mounted or diſmounted in a moment. Now as theſe exerciſes both for horſe and foot were practiſed without any difficulty or inconvenience in former times, they might eaſily be introduced again amongſt the youth of any ſtate at preſent, if the Governors of it ſo pleaſed; as in fact they have been in ſome of the weſtern nations, where they divide the inhabitants into Claſſes, which take their reſpective names from the different ſorts of arms they make uſe of in battle: and as theſe conſiſt of pikes, halberds, muſkets, and bows; the men that carry thoſe weapons are called pikemen, halberdeers, muſketeers, bowmen, or archers. Every inhabitant is likewiſe obliged to declare in which of theſe Claſſes he chuſes to be enrolled: and as ſome of them cannot be fit to bear arms, either on account of their age or ſome other impediment, they make a *delectus* or choice out of each Claſs, and call thoſe who are thus choſen *jurati*, becauſe they make them take an oath of fidelity and obedience. Theſe *jurati* then are called together upon holidays, and exerciſed in the uſe of ſuch arms as they take their name from; every Claſs having its particular place aſſigned by the Governors of the State, where it is to rendezvous and be exerciſed; and every man belonging to it, as well as the jurati, is to appear and bring his proportion of money with him to defray the expences that are occaſioned by thoſe meetings. What therefore is actually done by others, I ſhould think might be done by our

with him, that it was in danger of ſinking, he choſe, though he was of an advanced age, to commit himſelf to the ſea, and ſwam to his fleet, which lay about two hundred paces off, holding his pocket book above water in his left hand, and drawing his armour in his teeth. *Sueton. in J. Cæſare*, Sect. 64. Another time, during the war he was engaged in with Petreius and Afranius, he commanded his whole army to paſs a River by ſwimming, without any manner of neceſſity.

—— rapuitque ruens in prælia miles.
Quod fugiens timuiſſet iter, mox uda receptis
Membra fovent armis, gelidoſque a gurgite, curſu
Reſtituunt artus. LUCAN. L. IV. v. 151. &c.

country-

countrymen: but they are grown ſo lazy and degenerate that they will not imitate any thing that is good; though it was entirely owing to ſuch exerciſes that the Ancients had ſuch excellent Infantry, and that the States in the Weſt, abovementioned, have much better at preſent than we have; for the Romans either exerciſed them at home the time of their Republic, or abroad, under the reign of their Emperors, as I have ſaid before; but the Italian States will not exerciſe them at home, and abroad they cannot; becauſe they are not their own Subjects, and therefore will do nothing but juſt what pleaſes themſelves. Hence it comes to paſs, that theſe military exerciſes are now wholly neglected, and all manner of diſcipline is at an end; which is the true reaſon why many States, eſpecially in this country, are become ſo weak and contemptible.——But to reſume our ſubject. It is not ſufficient to make a good army, that the Soldiers are inured to hardſhips and fatigue, ſtrong, ſwift, and expert in the uſe of their arms: they muſt likewiſe learn to keep their ranks, to obey words of command, and ſignals by drum or trumpet, and to obſerve good order, whether they halt, advance, retreat, are upon a march, or engaged with an enemy: for without a ſtrict attention to theſe points, an army will never be good for any thing: as it is certain that a parcel of diſorderly and ill-diſciplined men, though ever ſo brave, are not ſo much to be depended upon as others who are not ſo courageous by nature, but orderly and well-diſciplined; for good order makes men bold, and confuſion cowards. But that you may better comprehend what I am going to ſay, it is neceſſary to premiſe, that every nation has had particular corps, or bodies of Soldiers in their Armies and Militias, which though differing in their names, varied but little in the number of men they were compoſed of; as they generally conſiſted of ſix, or at moſt, of eight thouſand. Thus the Romans had their *Legions*, the Greeks their *Phalanxes*, the Gauls their *Catervæ*, and the Swiſs at preſent (who are the only people that have any traces of the ancient military inſtitutions left amongſt them) what we ſhould call *Regiments* in our country: but they all divided them into Battalions or ſmaller bodies, as beſt ſuited their purpoſes. Let us then call them by the name that is moſt familiar to us, and form them according to the beſt diſpoſitions that have been made, either by the Ancients or Moderns. Now as the Romans divided their Legion, which conſiſted of betwixt five and ſix thouſand men, into ten *Cohorts*, we will alſo divide our Regiment, which is to conſiſt of ſix thouſand foot, into ten Battalions of four hundred and fifty men a piece; of whom four hundred ſhould be heavy armed, and the other fifty light armed. Of the heavy

heavy-armed, let three hundred have ſwords and targets, and be called *Targetmen*; another hundred ſhould have pikes, and be called *Ordinary Pikemen*; the other fifty light-armed men muſt carry muſkets, croſs-bows, halberds, and targets, whom we will call by the old name of *Ordinary Velites*; ſo that in the ten Battalions there will be three thouſand *Targetmen*, one thouſand *ordinary Pikemen*, and five hundred *ordinary Velites*; that is to ſay, four thouſand five hundred. But as our Regiment is to conſiſt of ſix thouſand men, we muſt add fifteen hundred more; of whom a thouſand muſt have pikes, and be called *Pikemen extraordinary*; the other five hundred ſhould be light-armed, and called *Velites extraordinary*; and thus one half of our Infantry would be compoſed of Targetmen, and the other of Pikemen, and others armed in a different manner. Every Battalion ſhould have a Lieutenant Colonel, or particular Commander of its own, four Captains, and forty Corporals, beſides a Captain and five Corporals of the ordinary Velites. Over the thouſand Pikemen extraordinary, there ſhould be three Commanders or Lieutenant Colonels, ten Captains, and an hundred Corporals; in the Velites extraordinary, two Lieutenant Colonels, five Captains, and fifty Corporals. I would then appoint a Colonel or Commander of the whole Regiment, with his drum and Colours; which every one of the Commanders abovementioned ſhould likewiſe have: ſo that the whole would conſiſt of ten Battalions, compoſed of three thouſand Targetmen, a thouſand ordinary Pikemen, as many extraordinary, five hundred ordinary Velites, five hundred more extraordinary, in all ſix thouſand: amongſt whom, there would be ſix hundred Corporals, fifteen Lieutenant Colonels, fifteen drums and colours, ſixty-five Captains, and the Colonel with his colours and drum.——You ſee I have been guilty of ſome repetition: but it is purely to make you underſtand me the better, and that you may not be puzzled or perplexed when I come to ſpeak of drawing up an army in order of battle.——I ſay then, that all Princes and Governors of Republics ſhould arm their Militia in this manner, and form them into ſuch Regiments; of which they ought to raiſe as many as their dominions will admit; after which, having divided them into Battalions according to the directions I have juſt now given, in order to make them perfect in their diſcipline, it will be ſufficient to exerciſe them Battalion by Battalion: and though one Battalion has not men enow in it to form a competent army of itſelf, yet by this means, every man may learn to do his own duty. For two things muſt be obſerved in all armies: firſt, that the men be taught what they are to do in their reſpective Battalions; and next, how every Battalion is to act

when it is joined with others to form an army: and thoſe that are ready and expert in the firſt, will ſoon learn the ſecond; but ſuch as are not perfect in one, can never be taught the other. Every Battalion then muſt firſt be taught ſeparately to keep good order in its own ranks upon all occaſions, and in all places; and afterwards, how to act in conjunction with the reſt, to attend to the drums and other inſtruments, by which all motions are regulated and directed in time of battle; to underſtand from the difference of ſounds, whether it is to maintain its ground, or to advance, or retreat, or wheel off, or face about. So that when the men know how to keep their ranks in ſuch a manner that no ſort of ground nor any manœuvre can throw them into diſorder; when they underſtand what they have to do by the beat of the drum or ſound of the trumpet, and where to take their ſtation, they will ſoon learn how to act in concert with the other Battalions of their Regiment, when they are aſſembled to form an army. But as it is neceſſary to exerciſe them all together ſometimes, the whole Regiment ſhould be aſſembled once or twice a year in time of peace, to be formed like an army with front, flanks, and rear in their proper places, and to be exerciſed for ſome days, as if they were preparing to engage an enemy. Now ſince a Commander draws up his forces for battle, either upon ſight of an enemy, or in apprehenſion of one that is not far off, his army ſhould be exerciſed according to the occaſion, and ſhewn in what order it is not only to march, but to engage, if need ſhould require; with particular inſtructions how to act, if it ſhould be attacked on this or that ſide. But when he would prepare his men to attack an enemy that is in ſight, he ſhould ſhew them how and where to begin the attack, whither they are to retreat if they ſhould be repulſed, who are to take their places, what ſignals, ſounds, and words of command they are to obſerve, and inure them to ſham fights in ſuch a manner, that they may be rather deſirous than afraid to come to a real one. For it is not the natural courage of men that makes an army bold, but order and good diſcipline: becauſe, when the firſt ranks know whither to retreat, and who are to advance in their place if they ſhould be worſted, they will always fight with ſpirit, having relief ſo near at hand: nor will the next ranks be daunted at the misfortune of the firſt, as they are prepared for ſuch an event, and perhaps not ſorry for it, becauſe they may think it will give them the glory of a victory which others could not obtain. Theſe exerciſes are particularly neceſſary in an army newly raiſed, and they ought not to be neglected in one that is compoſed of veterans; for though the Romans were trained up to the uſe of arms from their youth,

youth, yet their Generals always exerciſed them in this manner with great aſſiduity for ſome time before they expected to come to an engagement: and Joſephus tells us in his hiſtory, that even the very ſuttlers and rabble that uſed to follow their armies, often did good ſervice in battle by having ſeen the Soldiers frequently exerciſed, and learned to handle their arms, and keep firm in their ranks. But armies compoſed of new men, which have been raiſed either for preſent ſervice, or to be formed into a Militia in order to be employed upon occaſion, will be good for nothing at all, if the Battalions are not firſt exerciſed ſeparately, and afterwards all together: for as good order and diſcipline are abſolutely neceſſary, great care ought to be taken to keep them up amongſt thoſe that know their duty, and greater ſtill ſurely to inſtruct ſuch as are entirely ignorant of it: to effect which, a wiſe and able Commander will ſpare no ſort of pains or endeavours.

Cosimo. You ſeem to have deviated a little from your point I think: for before you have told us how a ſingle Battalion ought to be exerciſed, you talk of exerciſing a whole army, and preparing it for battle.

Fabrizio. You ſay very true indeed; and I confeſs my zeal for theſe exerciſes and inſtitutions, and my concern at their being now ſo much neglected, have led me a little out of the way, and occaſioned me to break in upon the order I had propoſed to myſelf. But I will return to it.——You may remember that I told you it is of the utmoſt importance in diſciplining a Battalion to make the men keep their ranks well: for which purpoſe, it is neceſſary to exerciſe them in the manner called *Snail-faſhion* [*b*]; and as I ſaid there ſhould be four hundred heavy-armed foot in a Battalion, I will keep to that number. Theſe four hundred men muſt be formed into eighty ranks, of five in each rank, which ſhould learn both how to extend themſelves, and how to reduce themſelves into cloſer order, whether they are moving ſlowly or briſkly forwards: but in what manner this is to be done, is eaſier to comprehend by ſeeing it actually performed than from any deſcription; which is not abſolutely neceſſary here, becauſe every one who has the leaſt experience in military affairs knows the method of it, and that its chief uſe is to accuſtom the men to keep their ranks. But let us now proceed to draw up a Battalion. There are three principal ways then of doing this: the firſt and beſt of which is to draw it up cloſe and compact in the form of an oblong ſquare: the ſecond is to form it in a ſquare with two horns [*i*] in the front: and the third is to

[*b*] That is, (I ſuppoſe) to teach them how to contract or extend themſelves upon occaſion, as that animal does.

[*i*] The original ſays *con la fronte cornuta*, i. e. *with a horned front*: the word *corno* in the Italian language, like *cornu* in the Latin, ſignifying a *horn* as well as the *wing of an army*.

throw it into a ſquare with an area or vacancy in the middle, which is commonly called a *hollow ſquare*. The firſt may be effected two ways; one, by doubling the ranks, that is, by receiving the ſecond rank into the firſt, the fourth into the third, the ſixth into the fifth, and ſo on; that ſo where there were eighty ranks before with five men in every rank, they may be reduced to forty with ten in a rank. and by doubling them a ſecond time, to twenty with twenty in a rank. This will make an oblong ſquare: for though there will be as many men in the files as in the ranks, yet the men in the ranks muſt ſtand ſo cloſe together as to touch each other, but thoſe in the files muſt be at leaſt four feet diſtant one from another: ſo that the ſquare will be longer from the front to the rear, than from the extremity of the right flank to that of the left; that is, the files will be longer than the ranks. The fifty ordinary Velites belonging to the Battalion muſt not be mixed with the other ranks, but poſted on each flank, and in the rear, when it is formed.——The other way of drawing up a Battalion cloſe and compact in the form of an oblong ſquare is better than this, and therefore I will be more particular in deſcribing it. You remember, I take it for granted, of how many private men and what officers it is to conſiſt, and how they are to be armed: without further repetition then, I ſay, that the Battalion muſt be formed into twenty ranks, with twenty men in every rank; that is to ſay, five ranks of Pikemen in the front, and fifteen of Targetmen in the rear: there muſt be two Captains in the front, and two in the rear: the Lieutenant Colonel or Commander of the Battalion with his Colours and Drum muſt take poſt in the interval betwixt the five ranks of Pikemen and the fifteen of Targetmen: the Corporals are to be placed upon the two flanks, one at the extremity of each rank in ſuch a manner, that every one of them may have his men by his ſide; thoſe on the right will have them on their left, and thoſe on the left will have them on their right: the fifty ordinary Velites ſhould be poſted upon the flanks and in the rear of the Battalion. Now in order to throw it into this form, you muſt draw it up in eighty ranks, with five men in every rank, and placing the Velites by themſelves either in the front or the rear, every Captain muſt put himſelf at the head of his Company or hundred men, or twenty ranks of five men in each; of which the five front ranks, or thoſe immediately behind him, muſt be Pikemen, and the reſt Targetmen. The Lieutenant Colonel or Commander of the Battalion with his drum and colours, are to be placed in the interval betwixt the pikes and targets of the ſecond Company, and will take up the room of three Targetmen: twenty Corporals muſt be placed upon the left flanks of the ranks commanded by the firſt Captain; and twenty more upon the

the right flanks of the ranks commanded by the laſt Captain: and it muſt be obſerved that the Corporals of the Pikemen muſt carry pikes themſelves, and thoſe of the Targetmen muſt have targets and Swords. Your ranks being thus diſpoſed, if you deſire to form them in order of battle to face an enemy, you muſt cauſe the Captain of the firſt twenty ranks to halt with his men, the Captain of the ſecond twenty, to keep advancing, but inclining a little to the right, cloſe along the flank of the firſt twenty, till he comes abreaſt of their Captain, and there to halt himſelf: the third is then to advance with his men in the ſame manner by the right flank of the other two Companies, till he is in a line with the two firſt Captains, and there to halt as they do: after which, the fourth Captain and his Company are to move forward likewiſe by the right flank of thoſe that are already joined, and halt when he has advanced as far as the other three: all which being executed, two of thoſe Captains muſt immediately quit the front rank and take poſt in the rear; and then the Battalion will be formed in an oblong ſquare as it was by the other method. The Velites muſt likewiſe be poſted on each flank as they were before: one of theſe ways is called *doubling the ranks in a right line*; the other, *doubling them by the flanks:* the former is the eaſier of the two; the latter more convenient, and may be better adapted to anſwer different occaſions. For in the former you muſt conform to the number, becauſe five doubled makes ten, ten twenty, twenty forty; ſo that if you double your ranks in a right line, you cannot make a front of fifteen, or twenty-five, or thirty, or thirty-five, but muſt be governed in that by the number in your firſt rank; and as it is often neceſſary to form a front of ſix or eight hundred foot, doubling your ranks in a right line would throw the men into confuſion. I therefore like the latter method beſt: and though perhaps there may be more difficulty in it, yet that will ſoon be ſurmounted by frequent practice and exerciſe. I ſay then it is a matter of the utmoſt importance to have Soldiers that know how to take their proper Stations in a moment: for which purpoſe, it is neceſſary to form them into ſuch Battalions, to exerciſe them all together, to teach them to march either quick or ſlow in all directions, and to keep ſuch order, that no paſs or defile, how rough or difficult ſoever, can oblige them to break their ranks. For if Soldiers can do this, they are good Soldiers, and may be called Veterans, though they have never ſeen the face of an enemy: but if they have been in a thouſand battles, and are ignorant in that point, they are no better than raw men. What has been ſaid, relates only to drawing up a Battalion in cloſer order when it is marching in ſmall ranks: but after that has been done, if it ſhould happen to be thrown into diſorder,

diſorder, either by the nature of the country through which it is obliged to march, or by an enemy, or by any other accident, and you want to reduce it to its former order immediately; there lies the main point and chief difficulty: to ſurmount which, much exerciſe and practice and experience are neceſſary; and therefore the Ancients ſpared no pains to make their Soldiers ready and expert in rallying whenever they were thrown into confuſion. For this purpoſe, two things are neceſſary, viz. that there ſhould be ſeveral peculiar marks of diſtinction in every Battalion; and that the ſame men ſhould always be placed in the ſame ranks. For inſtance, if a man was ſtationed in the ſecond rank at firſt, let him continue in it ever after; and not only in the ſame rank, but in the very ſame place of it: and that he may not be at a loſs how to do that, there muſt be ſeveral peculiar marks to guide and direct him, as I ſaid juſt now. In the firſt place, it is neceſſary the Colours ſhould be ſuch as to be eaſily diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of all other Battalions, when ſeveral are joined together: in the next, that the Lieutenant Colonels, Captains, and other officers ſhould wear different plumes: and laſtly (which is of ſtill more importance) that every Corporal ſhould be diſtinguiſhed by ſome particular mark: in which the Ancients were ſo remarkably careful and exact, that they cauſed their numbers to be marked upon their caſques in great figures, as the *firſt*, *ſecond*, *third*, *fourth*, and ſo on: but not thinking that ſufficient, every Targetman had the number of his rank and his place in that rank engraved upon his target. When men are thus diſtinguiſhed from each other, and accuſtomed to know and keep their reſpective ſtations, it is an eaſy matter to rally them if they are thrown into confuſion: for when the Standard is once fixed, the Captains and Corporals will preſently know their Stations; and reſume them (whether on the right or left) at a due diſtance from it: the private men likewiſe, being guided by their uſual marks and the difference of Colours, will preſently fall into their proper ranks and places: juſt as when you are to put together the Staves of a barrel which you have marked before it was taken to pieces, you may eaſily effect it: but if thoſe Staves have not been marked, you will find it exceeding difficult, if not impoſſible. Theſe things may ſoon be learned by frequent practice and exerciſe, and are not eaſily forgotten: and thus the new raw men being inſtructed by the Veterans, a whole Province by ſuch exerciſe may be made good and experienced Soldiers in time.——It is neceſſary alſo to teach your men to move all at a time, when there is occaſion, in ſuch a manner as to make either flank or rear become the front, or the front become either the rear or one of the flanks; which may eaſily be effected by cauſing every man to face at once towards any particular

particular part, which then will become the front. It is true that when they face to either flank, it will make ſome alteration and diſproportion in the ranks, becauſe the diſtance which will then be betwixt the front and the rear, will not be ſo great as that betwixt one extremity of the flanks and the other: which is quite contrary to the form in which a Battalion ought to be drawn up: this however may ſoon be rectified by well-exerciſed and experienced Soldiers, and therefore cannot occaſion any great diſorder. But there is another manœuvre of great importance, in which ſtill more readineſs and expertneſs are requiſite; and that is, when a whole Battalion is to move all at once like one ſolid body; for inſtance, when it is to wheel to the left about in ſuch a manner as to front on that ſide where the left flank was before: for then thoſe that are on the left at the extremity of the front rank muſt ſtand faſt, and thoſe that are neareſt them on the right muſt move ſo ſlow, that the reſt who are farther from them on the right, and thoſe at the other extremity of that rank, may not be obliged to run; otherwiſe, they will be in great confuſion.—— Now as it always happens, when a Battalion is attacked on its march from one place to another, that the Companies which are not poſted in the front are forced to fight either in one of the flanks or the rear, and the Battalion is under a ſudden neceſſity of making a front where that flank, or perhaps the rear, was before; in order to form thoſe Companies in due proportion and order, all the pikes are to be placed in that flank which is to become the front, and the Corporals, Captains, and Lieutenant Colonel muſt take their reſpective poſts as in the method of forming a Battalion above deſcribed. To effect this then, in forming the Battalion into eighty ranks of five men in every rank, you muſt put all the Pikemen into the twenty firſt ranks, with five of their Corporals in the front rank, and five in the laſt of that Company: and then the other ſixty ranks, or three Companies, will wholly conſiſt of Targetmen; in the firſt and laſt rank of which there muſt be five of their Corporals. The Lieutenant Colonel, with his ſtandard and drum, are to take poſt in the center of the firſt Company of Targetmen, and the four Captains at the head of their reſpective Companies. When it is thus formed, if you would have all the Pikemen upon the left flank, you muſt double the Companies one by one by their right flanks: but if you would have them on the right flank, you muſt double them by the left: and thus the Battalion will have all its Pikemen upon one flank, the Corporals in the front and rear, the Captains in the front, and the Lieutenant Colonel in the center. This is the order it is to obſerve whilſt it is marching: but upon the approach of an enemy, if you would have its front where one of the flanks was before, you have nothing to do but to order

order your men to face to that flank where the Pikemen are, and then the whole Battalion, with all its ranks and officers, are preſently changed, and in the order I deſcribed before: for every man will be in his proper ſtation, except the Captains, and they will ſoon take their poſts.——But when a Battalion is marching forwards, and apprehenſive of being attacked in the rear, the ranks muſt be ſo diſpoſed that the Pikemen may be poſted there: for which purpoſe, five ranks of them ſhould be placed in the rear of every Company, inſtead of its front where they are uſually ſtationed: in all other reſpects let the ordinary diſpoſition be obſerved [k].

Cosimo. If I remember right, you told us that this manner of exerciſe is calculated to reduce all the Battalions of a Regiment into the form of an army; and that it was ſufficient for ſuch a purpoſe. But if it ſhould happen that this Battalion of four hundred and fifty men ſhould be obliged to fight by itſelf, how would you draw it up in that caſe?

Fabrizio. The Lieutenant Colonel ſhould conſider in the firſt place, where it will be moſt neceſſary to place his Pikemen, and to poſt them there accordingly; which may eaſily be done without breaking in upon the abovementioned diſpoſition: for though that is the order which ſhould be obſerved by a Battalion when it acts in conjunction with others againſt an enemy; yet it may ſerve upon all other occaſions whatſoever. However, in ſhewing you the two other methods of drawing up a Battalion, which I promiſed you a little while ago, I will anſwer your queſtion more particularly: but they are ſeldom uſed; and if ever, it is when a Battalion is to act alone and independent upon all others.——In order then to form a Battalion with two wings (or more properly two horns) in the front, you are to diſpoſe your eighty ranks of five men in a rank in this manner. In the firſt place, you muſt poſt a Captain at the head of twenty-five ranks, which are to conſiſt of two Pikemen on the left, and three Targetmen on the right. Next to the five firſt ranks, let there be twenty more, with twenty Corporals poſted in them; all of them betwixt the Pikemen and the Targetmen, except the five which carry pikes; for they muſt be placed amongſt the Pikemen. After theſe twenty-five ranks thus drawn up, let there be poſted another Captain at the head of fifteen ranks of Targetmen. In the interval betwixt this Company and the third, the Lieutenant Colonel, with his Colours and drum, is to poſt himſelf at the head of the third Company, conſiſting of fifteen ranks more of Targetmen. The third Captain is to take poſt at the head of the fourth Company, which is to conſiſt of twenty-five ranks,

[k] The Velites then, we are to ſuppoſe, muſt be ſtationed as before.

every

every one of which is to have three Targetmen on the left, and two Pikemen on the right: and after the five firſt ranks there muſt be twenty more with Corporals in them poſted betwixt the Targetmen and the Pikemen; in the rear of this Company the fourth Captain is to take his Station. If then you would form theſe ranks thus drawn up into a Battalion with two horns, you muſt order the firſt Captain to halt with his twenty-five ranks, and the ſecond to make a motion to the right, and then to advance with his fifteen ranks of Targetmen to double the right flank of the twenty-five ranks that have halted, till he comes a-breaſt of the rank that is the fifteenth from their rear, and there to halt himſelf. After this, the Lieutenant Colonel, with his fifteen ranks of Targetmen, is to do the ſame on the right flank of the two firſt Companies. Laſt of all, the third Captain, with his twenty-five ranks, and the fourth Captain in the rear of them, is to move to the right, and then advance along the right flank of the other three Companies, but not to halt till his rearmoſt rank is in a line with their rearmoſt rank: all which being done, the Captain of the firſt fifteen ranks of Targetmen muſt quit his Station, and repair to the left of the rearmoſt rank, and the fourth Captain to the right of it. In this manner you will have a Battalion of twenty-five ranks, ſome conſiſting of five, and others of twenty men: with two horns (one at each angle of the front) each of which will conſiſt of ten ranks of five men a-piece, and a ſpace betwixt the horns large enough to receive ten men a-breaſt. The Lieutenant Colonel takes poſt in this open, a Captain at the front of each horn, and another at each angle in the rear of the Battalion; two files of Pikemen and twenty Corporals are placed on each flank. The horns may ſerve to ſecure the carriages and baggage, as well as the artillery, if there be any: the Velites may be ranged along the flanks, on the outſide of the Pikemen.——Now in order to reduce this horned Battalion into a *Hollow Square*, you need only to take eight of the rearmoſt of thoſe fifteen ranks that have twenty men a-piece in them, and place them immediately in the front of the two horns, which will then become the flanks of the Hollow Square. In this Area left in the middle, the Lieutenant Colonel is to take place with his Colours and Drum: and it may likewiſe receive the carriages and baggage, but not the Artillery; which is to be planted either in the front or on the flanks.——Theſe are the methods that may be taken to form a ſingle Battalion when it is to paſs alone through dangerous and ſuſpected places: but the ſolid Battalion, without horns or Area in the middle of it, is certainly the beſt: nevertheleſs, either one or other of thoſe forms may be neceſſary ſometimes to ſecure the carriages, baggage, &c. The Swiſs have li[illegible] forms of drawing

up their Battalions: one of them is in the ſhape of a Croſs; in the ſpaces betwixt the arms of which, they place their muſketeers to ſhelter them from the firſt ſhock of an enemy; but as ſuch Battalions are only fit to engage ſeparately, and it is my intention to ſhew in what manner ſeveral Battalions united muſt fight, I ſhall not give myſelf the trouble of deſcribing the order they obſerve.

Cosimo. I think I ſufficiently comprehend the method that is to be followed in exerciſing the men of whom your Battalion conſiſts; but, if I miſtake not, you ſaid you would add a thouſand Pikemen extraordinary, and five hundred Velites extraordinary, to the ten Battalions of which your Regiment is to be compoſed. Would you not cauſe them alſo to be exerciſed?

Fabrizio. Certainly, and very well too: for I would exerciſe the Pikemen, by Companies at leaſt, if not altogether, in the diſcipline of the Battalion: for I ſhould employ them more than the ordinary Pikemen, eſpecially upon particular occaſions, as in convoys, eſcorts, plundering, and the like. As to the Velites, it may ſuffice to exerciſe them ſeparately at home in their particular method of fighting, without bringing them into the field: for as they are to fight in a looſe and detached way, there is no occaſion to call them together when the reſt of the Battalion is aſſembled to be diſciplined in their own manner. You muſt therefore (as I ſaid before, and beg leave to ſay again) take great care to exerciſe your Battalions in ſuch a manner, that the men be taught to keep their ranks, to know their proper ſtations, to rally or alter their diſpoſition in a moment, when they are either got into troubleſome defiles, or apprehenſive of being attacked, or are diſordered by an enemy: for when they are perfect in theſe things, it will be an eaſy matter to learn where the ſtation of a Battalion is, and what it has to do when it is joined with others to form an army. So that if any Prince or Republic would be at the trouble of eſtabliſhing this diſcipline and theſe exerciſes, they would always have good Soldiers enow in their dominions to make them ſuperior to their neighbours, and put them in a condition to give law to others, inſtead of receiving it from them. But ſuch is the degeneracy of the times we live in, that theſe things are ſo far from being in any eſteem at preſent, that they are totally neglected and laughed at: which is the reaſon that our armies are now good for nothing; and that if there be yet any officers or private men amongſt us who have the leaſt ſhare of experience, or courage, or abilities of any kind, they have no opportunity of ſhewing them.

Cosimo. How many carriages would you aſſign to a Battalion?

Fabrizio. In the firſt place, no Captain or Corporal ſhould be ſuffered to ride upon a march; and if the Lieutenant Colonel had a mind

a mind to ride, it ſhould be upon a mule, and not upon a horſe. I would allow him two baggage horſes however, one to every Captain, and two betwixt three Corporals; becauſe I would lodge three of them together when they are in camp, as I ſhall ſhew in its proper place. So that every Battalion ſhould have ſix and thirty horſes to carry its tents, kettles, hatchets, mattocks, ſpades, with other ſuch implements and utenſils as are neceſſary in an encampment, and any thing elſe that may be uſeful or convenient, if there is room for it.

Cosimo. Though I believe all the officers in your Battalion may be neceſſary, yet I ſhould be afraid that ſo many would create confuſion.

Fabrizio. That might be the caſe if they were not all under the command of one perſon; but as they are, they rather ſerve to preſerve and promote good order; and indeed it would be impoſſible to keep it up without them: for a wall that is weak and tottering in every part, may be better ſupported by many props and buttreſſes, though they are but feeble ones, than by a few, be they ever ſo ſubſtantial; becauſe their ſtrength cannot be of much ſervice at any conſiderable diſtance. For this reaſon, there ought to be a Corporal over every ten Soldiers in all armies, who ſhould be a man of more ſpirit and courage, at leaſt of greater authority, than the reſt, in order to animate them both by his words and example, and exhort them continually to keep firm in their ranks, and behave themſelves like men. How neceſſary theſe things are, may plainly appear from the example even of our own armies, all which have their Corporals, Drums, and Colours, though none of them do their duty. As to Corporals, if they would anſwer the end for which they were firſt appointed, every one of them ſhould have his particular men under him, ſhould lodge with them, ſhould charge with them, and always be in the ſame rank: for then they might keep them ſo regular and compact in their ſeveral ſtations, that it would be almoſt impoſſible for any enemy to break or diſorder them; and if that ſhould ever happen, they might preſently be rallied: but in theſe times they are employed in other purpoſes of a different nature, and do nothing as they ought to do, though their pay is conſiderable. It is the ſame with regard to Colours, which are ſtill continued, rather to make a fine ſhew, than for any other uſe that is made of them. Whereas the Ancients availed themſelves of them as guides and directions in caſe of diſorder: for as ſoon as the Colours were fixed, every man [illegible] poſt, and immediately returned to it. They likewiſe kn[illegible] to move, and when to halt, by the motion or halt[illegible] and therefore it is neceſſary there ſhould be many [illegible] and that every

every Corps ſhould have its particular Enſign, and marks of diſtinction: for then it will know what it has to do, and act with ſpirit. The Soldiers then are to obſerve the motion of their Enſigns, and the Enſigns the beat of the drum; for that, when rightly managed, is a direction to the whole army, which is to act and move in a certain meaſure and pace, according to its different notes and ſounds, that ſo it may know how to keep due time and order. For this purpoſe, the Ancients had their pipes and fifes, and other ſorts of military muſic, perfectly adapted to different occaſions: for as a man that is dancing, and keeps time with the muſic, cannot make a falſe ſtep; ſo an army that properly obſerves the beat of its drums cannot eaſily be diſordered. The Ancients, therefore, uſed to vary the ſounds and notes of their military muſic according to the occaſion, and as they wanted either to excite, or abate, or confirm the ardour of their Soldiers: and as their tunes and marches were different, they gave them different names: the Doric was calculated to inſpire men with reſolution and firmneſs, the Phrygian excited martial ardour, or rather fury: for Alexander the Great (as it is ſaid) being at dinner one day, and hearing a Phrygian march ſounded, was ſo tranſported with it, that he leaped up from the table and drew his ſword, as if he had been going to charge an enemy. It would be very uſeful then, either to revive theſe meaſures, or invent new ones for ſuch purpoſes; but if that cannot be done, thoſe at leaſt ſhould not be neglected or laid aſide, which teach Soldiers to obey command: and theſe may be varied and adapted according to the occaſion in ſuch a manner, that by frequent uſe and exerciſe, they may learn to diſtinguiſh them, and know their ſignification: but at preſent our drums are chiefly employed to make a noiſe and parade.

Cosimo. I ſhould be very glad to be informed (if you have ever conſidered the matter) how it comes to paſs that we are ſo degenerated, and that not only theſe exerciſes, but all manner of military diſcipline, are now fallen into ſuch neglect and diſuſe amongſt us.

Fabrizio. I will give you my opinion of the matter very freely, Sir. You know then, there have been many renowned Warriors in Europe, but few in Africa, and fewer ſtill in Aſia: the reaſon of which is, that the two laſt mentioned quarters of the world have had but one or two Monarchies, and but few Republics in them; and that Europe, on the contrary, has had ſeveral Kingdoms, but more Republics in it. Now men become great and excellent, and ſhew their abilities accordingly as they are employed and encouraged by their Sovereigns, whether they happen to be Kings, Princes, or Republics: ſo that where there are many States, there will be many great men; but where there are few of one ſort, there will not be many of the other. In Aſia, there

there were Ninus, Cyrus, Artaxerxes, Mithridates, and ſome few others like them. In Africa (without having recourſe to the early times of the ancient Egyptians) we read of Maſſiniſſa, Jugurtha, and ſome Carthaginian Commanders of eminent note; the number of whom, however, is very ſmall in compariſon of that which Europe has produced: for in this quarter of the world, indeed, there have been numbers of great men that we know of, and many more without doubt, whoſe memories are now extinguiſhed by the malevolence of time: becauſe every State being obliged to cheriſh and encourage men of merit and abilities, either out of neceſſity or for other reaſons, where there are many different States, there muſt of courſe be many great men. Aſia, on the contrary, has not produced many extraordinary men: becauſe that quarter of the globe being ſubject in a great meaſure to one Monarchy alone, of ſo large an extent that moſt parts of it languiſh in continual inactivity, cannot form any conſiderable number of men to great and glorious enterprizes. The ſame may be ſaid of Africa; though indeed there have been more able Commanders in that Country than in Aſia; which was owing to the Republic of Carthage: for there will always be a greater number of ſuch men in Republics than in Monarchies; becauſe merit is generally honoured in the former, but feared in the latter: from whence it comes to paſs, that able men are cheriſhed and encouraged in one, but diſcountenanced and ſuppreſſed in the other. If we conſider Europe in the next place, we ſhall find that it was always full of Principalities, Kingdoms, and Republics, which lived in perpetual jealouſy of each other, and being obliged to keep up good diſcipline in their armies, were under a neceſſity of honouring and encouraging military merit. For in Greece, beſides the Macedonian Monarchy, there were ſeveral Republics, every one of which produced many great and eminent men. In Italy, there were the Romans, the Samnites, the Tuſcans, and the Ciſalpine Gauls: France, Germany, and Spain abounded with Republics and Principalities: and if we do not read of ſo many great men in any of them as amongſt the Romans, that is owing to the partiality of Hiſtorians, who generally follow the ſtream of fortune, and content themſelves with praiſing the Conqueror. It is but reaſonable however to ſuppoſe, there were a great many illuſtrious men amongſt the Samnites and Tuſcans, as they ſupported themſelves againſt the Romans an hundred and fifty years. The ſame may be ſuppoſed of France and Spain: but the merit which moſt authors are ſo ſhy of allowing in particular men, they are forward enough to celebrate in whole nations, when they tell us, with what bravery and reſolution they exerted themſelves in defence of their liberties. Since it is manifeſt then, that where there are many States there will always be many able men, it is certain, that when the

number of thoſe States is diminiſhed, the number of ſuch men will likewiſe decreaſe by degrees, as the effect muſt ceaſe when the cauſe is taken away. Thus, when the Roman Empire had ſwallowed up all the Kingdoms and Republics in Europe and Africa, and moſt of thoſe in Aſia, merit and abilities met with no countenance any where but at Rome: ſo that great men began to grow ſcarcer and ſcarcer in Europe, as well as in Aſia, till at laſt, there were hardly any to be found; for as all manner of ſpirit and worth was extinguiſhed, except amongſt the Romans, ſo when they became corrupt, the whole world in a manner was corrupted, and the Scythians poured by ſwarms into an Empire, which, having extinguiſhed the virtue of moſt other nations, was not able to preſerve its own. And though that Empire was afterwards diſmembered by thoſe Barbarians, yet the ſeveral parts of it into which it was cantoned never recovered their priſtine vigour; for, in the firſt place, it is a very difficult matter, and requires a long courſe of time, to revive good order and diſcipline when it is once aboliſhed: and in the next, the Chriſtian Religion has wrought ſuch a change in the manners and cuſtoms of mankind, that they are now no longer under a neceſſity of defending themſelves with ſuch a degree of obſtinacy and deſpair as they did in former times. For then, all ſuch as were vanquiſhed in battle, were either put to death, or carried into perpetual ſlavery in the enemy's country, where they ſpent the remainder of their lives in labour and miſery: if a town was taken, it was either demoliſhed, or the inhabitants were ſtripped of their goods, diſperſed all over the world, and reduced to the laſt degree of poverty and wretchedneſs: ſo that the dread of theſe evils obliged them to keep up good diſcipline in their armies, and to honour all thoſe that excelled in the Art of War. But at preſent, thoſe terrible apprehenſions are in a great meaſure diſſipated and extinguiſhed: for after an army is defeated, thoſe that fall into the hands of the Conqueror are ſeldom or never put to death; and the terms of their ranſom are made ſo eaſy, that they do not long continue priſoners. If a town has changed ſides an hundred times, it is not demoliſhed, nor are the inhabitants either diſperſed or ſtripped of their poſſeſſions: the worſt they have to fear is being laid under contribution: ſo that men now no longer care to ſubmit to the rigour and continual hardſhips of military diſcipline, to ward off evils which they are but little afraid of. Beſides, the Provinces of Europe are ſubject to few Heads at preſent, in compariſon of what they were formerly: all France is under the dominion of one King; all Spain under that of another; and there are not many Principalities or Republics in Italy: ſo that the petty States find protection under the wings of the ſtrong, and thoſe that are more powerful

powerful are not afraid of utter ruin, even if they ſhould be conquered, for the reaſons already given.

Cosimo. But we have ſeen many towns ſacked, and ſome Kingdoms entirely ruined within theſe laſt five and twenty years: examples, which ought to ſerve as warnings to others to provide for their ſecurity by reviving the ancient military diſcipline and inſtitutions.

Fabrizio. You ſay very true: but conſider what towns thoſe were which ſuffered in that manner, and you will find they were not States themſelves, but inferior members of States: if Tortona was ſacked, Milan was not; Capua ſuffered, but Naples eſcaped; Breſcia and Ravenna felt the laſh of the Conqueror, but Venice and Rome came off with impunity: ſo that theſe examples are not ſufficient to make a State change its purpoſe; but rather determine it to perſevere in its reſolution, when it ſees it can at any time redeem itſelf from deſtruction by a ranſom; for it will not expoſe itſelf and its ſubjects to the continual fatigues of military diſcipline and exerciſes, when they ſeem not only unneceſſary in a great meaſure, but attended with much trouble and inconvenience. As for the dependent members which ought to be moſt affected with theſe examples, it is not in their power to ſave themſelves; and thoſe States which have already been ruined, ſee their error when it is too late to correct it, whilſt others, which have not yet ſhared the ſame fate, take no pains to prevent it; chuſing to live a lazy indolent life, free from trouble and inconvenience, and to rely upon fortune rather than their own virtue: for ſeeing there is ſo ſmall a proportion of virtue now left amongſt mankind, that it has but little influence in the affairs of the world, and that all things ſeem to be governed by fortune, they think it better to follow her train, than contend with her for ſuperiority. To evince the truth of what I have ſaid, if further proof is wanting, let us conſider the ſtate of Germany at preſent, which being full of Principalities and Republics, abounds with great and able Commanders; and indeed, whatſoever is worthy imitation in the military diſcipline of theſe times, is owing to thoſe States, which being jealous of their neighbours, and abhorring the thoughts of ſlavery (a condition it ſeems not much dreaded in ſome other countries) take all proper means to defend their liberties, and therefore continue free and reſpectable.——This, I think, may ſuffice to ſhew the cauſes of our degeneracy, and the preſent neglect of military diſcipline amongſt us; but I cannot tell whether you are of the ſame opinion: perhaps what I have ſaid has either not given you the ſatisfaction you wanted, or not been thoroughly underſtood, and conſequently may have left ſome doubts upon your mind.

Cosimo.

Cosimo. None at all, Sir, I aſſure you: on the contrary, I perfectly comprehend what you have ſaid, and am very well ſatisfied with it; but beg the favour of you to reſume our ſubject, and to let us know in what manner you would diſpoſe your Cavalry in theſe Battalions, what number of them you would have, and how they ſhould be armed and officered.

Fabrizio. You might think, perhaps, I had forgot that, but I have not; though I have but little to ſay of Cavalry, for two reaſons. In the firſt place, becauſe the main ſtrength of an army conſiſts in its Infantry; and in the next, Cavalry, even in theſe times, are much better diſciplined than Infantry; and if they are not ſuperior, they are equal however to the Cavalry of the Ancients. I have already ſhewn how they ought to be exerciſed; and as to their arms, I would arm both the Gens d' Armes and the light horſe as they are armed at preſent: but the light horſe ſhould moſtly conſiſt of Croſs-bow men, with ſome muſketeers amongſt them, which, though of little ſervice in other reſpects, are yet very neceſſary to frighten the country people, and drive them from paſſes, which perhaps they may have undertaken to defend: for they are more afraid of one muſketeer, than of twenty men that are armed in any other manner. With regard to their number (as I propoſed at firſt to take a Roman legion for my model) I ſhould think three hundred good horſe in a Regiment would be ſufficient; of which an hundred and fifty ſhould be Gens d' Armes, and the reſt light horſe; with a Captain, a Cornet, fifteen Corporals, and a drum to each troop: every ten Gens d' Armes ſhould have five baggage horſes, and every ten light horſemen, two, which (like thoſe belonging to the Infantry) ſhould carry their tents, kettles, horſe furniture, and other implements and utenſils. Do not think this out of compaſs, for every one of our Gens d' Armes have four horſes allowed them for that purpoſe; but that is an abuſe; for in Germany they have no other horſe than that which they are mounted upon, and only one carriage to every twenty for their baggage. The Roman heavy-armed horſe had no more; but the Triarii indeed were always quartered near their Cavalry, and obliged to aſſiſt them in dreſſing and taking care of their horſes: an example which might eaſily be followed in theſe times, as I ſhall ſhew more particularly, when I come to ſpeak of encampments: for ſurely what was formerly done by the Romans, and is ſtill practiſed by the Germans, may be effected at preſent, and therefore, thoſe that omit or neglect theſe things are much to be blamed. Theſe Squadrons being raiſed and enrolled in the ſame manner with the reſt of the Regiment, ſhould ſometimes be

be reviewed with the other Battalions, when they are aſſembled, and exerciſed in ſkirmiſhes and ſham fights with them, to make them well acquainted with each other, and perfect in thoſe exerciſes. So much for this head. Let us now proceed to draw up an army in ſuch an order of battle, as is moſt likely to enſure us a victory, when we come to engage an enemy; for this is the end for which all armies are raiſed, and ſo much care and pains are to be taken in diſciplining them.

The END of the SECOND BOOK.

THE ART OF WAR.

BOOK III.

THE CONTENTS.

The order of battle obſerved by the Romans. Of the Roman Legion, the Macedonian Phalanx, and the Swiſs Regiments. That it is the beſt way to uſe part of the Roman arms and armour; and part of the Grecian. Of what number of men the Roman armies generally conſiſted. A method of drawing up a Regiment or Army recommended. A deſcription of a battle. Reaſons for the ſeveral manœuvres in it. Concerning the general exerciſes of an army.

COSIMO. SINCE we are going to vary the Subject, I beg leave to reſign my Office of Interrogator in this converſation; for, as I hate preſumption in others, I would not willingly ſeem guilty of it myſelf. I therefore lay down the Dictatorſhip, and give up my authority to any other perſon in company, that will pleaſe to accept of it.

ZANOBI. It would have been very grateful to us all, if you would have continued in that office: but ſince you decline it, be pleaſed at leaſt to tell us, which of us you depute to ſucceed you in it.

COSIMO. I deſire to leave that to Signior Fabrizio.

FABRIZIO.

FABRIZIO. I freely accept it; and think we ſhould follow the example of the Venetians, who always appoint the youngeſt to ſpeak firſt in their Councils and Aſſemblies; eſpecially as the art of ſpeaking well is properly the exerciſe of youth, and therefore we may ſuppoſe young men the beſt qualified to talk of the ſeveral duties and exerciſes of war, as well as the readieſt and fitteſt to put them in execution.

COSIMO The lot then falls upon you, Luigi: and as I myſelf am much pleaſed with my Succeſſor, I make no doubt but he will be equally agreeable to you all. Let us loſe no more time however, but return to our Subject.

FABRIZIO. I know very well, that in order to ſhew how an army ought to be drawn up in order of battle, it would be neceſſary to deſcribe the method in which the Greeks and Romans formed their troops for that purpoſe: but as this is done at large by ancient Hiſtorians, I refer you to them, and omitting ſeveral other particulars, ſhall ſpeak only of ſuch as are abſolutely neceſſary to be adopted by thoſe that would improve our preſent Syſtem of military diſcipline: for which purpoſe, I will ſhew you at the ſame time, how an army ought to be formed in order of battle at preſent, how it is to be exerciſed in ſham fights, and in what manner to behave in real engagements. The greateſt error then that a General can be guilty of in drawing up an army for battle, is to give it but one front: becauſe in ſo doing, he commits himſelf and his fortune entirely to the event of the firſt conflict: and this is the effect of having loſt the method, obſerved by the Ancients, of receiving one line into another: for without that, thoſe in the front can neither be ſupported nor relieved in the time of action; both which, were effectually performed by the Romans. Now to point out the method by which theſe things were effected, I muſt tell you that they divided their Legion into the *Haſtati*, the *Principes*, and *Triarii*; the firſt were placed in the front or firſt line of the army in thick and cloſe array; the Principes in the ſecond line, but in looſer order; and the Triarii in the third, with ſtill larger intervals betwixt the men in their ranks, into which they could admit both the Principes and Haſtati upon occaſion. Beſides theſe, they had their Slingers, bowmen, and other light-armed Soldiers, who were not incorporated with theſe ranks, but poſted on the right and left betwixt the Cavalry and Infantry in the front. Theſe light-armed forces uſed to begin the engagement, and if they made any impreſſion upon the enemy (which ſeldom happened) they purſued their advantage: but if they were driven back, they retreated either along the flanks of the army, or through certain intervals of it left open for that purpoſe, to cover the Suttlers and Servants, and other unarmed people that followed the camp. After this, the Haſtati advanced againſt the enemy, and if they were repulſed, they retreated leiſurely into the

ſpaces

ſpaces left for them amongſt the Principes, and again advanced with them to renew the battle: but if this line alſo was overpowered, it fell back into the Triarii, and all three, being thus joined together, made their third attack with greater vigour and ſtrength than ever; and if that miſcarried, the day was loſt, becauſe they had no other reſource or means of relief left [*l*]. The Cavalry were ſtationed on each ſide of the Infantry in the form of two wings, and ſometimes engaged the enemy's Cavalry, and ſometimes ſupported their own Infantry, as occaſion required. This method of renewing the attack three ſeveral times, with a continual increaſe of ſtrength and vigour, can hardly be withſtood, except either your fortune be very bad indeed, or the reſolution of the enemy much greater than that of your own forces.——The Greeks were ſtrangers to this method of renewing the front of their Phalanxes: and though they were very well officered, and conſiſted of many ranks, yet they made but one body, or rather one front. To relieve each other, one rank did not retire into another (as the Romans did) but one ſingle man advanced into another's place when it was vacant; which was effected in this manner. When their Phalanx was drawn up in files (which we will ſuppoſe to conſiſt of fifty men a-piece) with its front towards the enemy, all the ſix firſt ranks might engage at once: for their lances (which they called *Sariſſæ*) were ſo long, that thoſe of the ſixth rank reached over the ſhoulders of the men in the firſt. In the time of action therefore, if any man in the firſt rank was either killed or diſabled, the man that was next behind him in the ſecond rank preſently ſtepped into his place; the perſon immediately behind him in the third rank filled the vacancy in the ſecond, and ſo on; the ranks in the rear continually filling up the deficiencies of thoſe in the front: ſo that all the ranks were conſtantly kept full and entire, except the rearmoſt, which was exhauſted at laſt, becauſe there was no other to reinforce it. Theſe Phalanxes therefore might be waſted away and annihilated by degrees, but ſeldom could be broken; as the cloſe order and groſſneſs of their body made them in a manner impenetrable.——The Romans at firſt formed their Legions in this manner, in imitation of the Grecian Phalanx: but growing out of conceit with it at laſt, they divided them into more corps, as *Cohorts* and *Manipuli*, or *Companies*, being convinced that ſuch bodies have moſt life and vigour in them, as have the moſt Officers to animate and inform them, and are divided in ſuch a manner that each diviſion can act ſeparately and ſupport itſelf. The Swiſs Regiments at preſent, are likewiſe formed upon the model of the ancient Phalanxes, and follow their method both in cloſeneſs of order and relieving their ranks: and when

[*l*] See Pol. Diſ. Book II. Chap. xvi.

they come to engage, they are placed on the flanks of each other, but not in a parallel line. They have no method of receiving the firſt into the ſecond, if it ſhould be repulſed; but in order to relieve each other, they place one Regiment in the front, another a little behind it on the right; ſo that if the firſt is hard preſſed, the ſecond may advance to its aſſiſtance: a third is placed behind both theſe, and on the right too, at the diſtance of a muſket-ſhot; that ſo, if the other two ſhould be driven back, it may advance to relieve them, and all of them have ſufficient room either to retreat or advance without falling foul upon one another: becauſe great bodies cannot be received into each other like little ones; and therefore the little diſtinct corps, of which the Roman Legions were compoſed, are the moſt proper both to receive and relieve each other: and that the method obſerved by the Swiſs is not ſo good as that which was taken by the ancient Romans, appears very plainly from the Succeſs of the Roman Legions, which always got the better of the Grecian Phalanxes whenever they happened to engage them; becauſe both their arms and armour, and their way of receiving one rank into another, were much better than the arms and diſcipline, and cloſe order, of the Phalanx.——Now in order to form an army upon the model of both, I would make the Grecian Phalanx my pattern in ſome reſpects, and the Roman Legion in others: and therefore, as I told you before, I would have two thouſand Pikemen in my Regiment, armed after the manner of the Macedonian Phalanx, and three thouſand men with Swords and Targets like the Roman Legion. I have divided my Regiment into ten Battalions, as the Romans did their Legion into ten Cohorts: like them too, I have appointed Velites to begin the Battle: and as I have retained the arms of both nations, I would likewiſe in ſome meaſure imitate the order and diſcipline of each: for which reaſon I have taken care that the five firſt ranks of every Battalion ſhould conſiſt of Pikemen, and the reſt of Targetmen; that ſo it might be enabled not only to ſuſtain the ſhock of the enemy's Cavalry in the front, but to make an impreſſion upon their Infantry, and to open it in ſuch a manner to the right and left that the Targetmen may come in to complete the victory. Now if you conſider this method, and the nature of theſe arms, you will find how well they are calculated for that purpoſe: becauſe the pikes are of admirable ſervice againſt horſe, and amongſt Infantry they do no ſmall execution before they come to fight hand to hand: for after that, they are of no uſe at all: upon which account, the Swiſs place one rank of Halberdeers behind every three ranks of Pikemen, to give them room to make uſe of their pikes; but that room is not ſufficient. Placing our Pikemen then in the front, and the Targetmen behind them, they ſerve both to ſuſtain the enemy's horſe, and open and diſorder their foot: but after the battle is joined,

and

and they become uſeleſs, the Targetmen advance with their Swords, which are weapons that may be managed in the cloſeſt fight.

Luigi. We are impatient to hear how you would draw up an army, thus armed and appointed, in order of battle.

Fabrizio. I was juſt going to do it. You muſt know then, that a Conſular army amongſt the Romans did not exceed two Legions; that is to ſay, about eleven thouſand foot, and ſix hundred horſe; but they were compoſed wholly of their own Citizens. Beſides theſe, they were furniſhed with as many more of both ſorts by their friends and allies, which they divided into two bodies, called the right and left wing, and ſtationed them on each flank of their Main battle; but they never ſuffered the number of theſe auxiliaries to ſurpaſs that of their Legions; though there was generally a larger proportion of Cavalry amongſt them than in their own forces. With ſuch an army, conſiſting of about twenty-two thouſand foot, and two thouſand good horſe, a Conſul went upon moſt expeditions: but when the enemy was very formidable, they ſent out two Conſuls with two ſuch armies united. ——You muſt know likewiſe, that in the three principal operations of an army, viz. upon a March, in an Encampment, and in Battle, they conſtantly poſted their Legions in the center, rightly judging that the forces in which they repoſed the greateſt confidence ſhould always be compact and united; as I ſhall ſhew you when I come to ſpeak more particularly and diſtinctly of theſe three operations. But this auxiliary Infantry, by their union and daily converſation with the legionary Infantry, ſoon became as ſerviceable as they were: for they were exerciſed and diſciplined in the ſame manner, and formed in the ſame order of battle before an engagement: ſo that when we know how the Romans drew up one Legion for that purpoſe, we know in what manner they drew up a whole army: and as I ſaid they formed their Legion in three lines, in ſuch a manner that one line might receive another, I have conſequently told you how they drew up their whole army in the day of battle.

To form an army then in order of battle after the manner of the Romans, as they had two Legions, I will take two Regiments; by the arrangement of which, you may ſee how a whole army is to be drawn up: for if you would add any more, there is nothing further to be done but either to multiply or enlarge the ranks. It will be needleſs, I ſuppoſe, to put you in mind of how many foot a Regiment conſiſts, that there are ten Battalions in it, what ſort of arms and armour they have, how many Companies there are, and what Officers in each, what number of Velites and Pikemen both ordinary and extraordinary, how many T[illegible] for when I ſpoke of theſe things a little while ag[illegible] take particular notice of them,

them, and to remember them as abſolutely neceſſary to give you a clear idea of the whole arrangement: and therefore, without any repetition of that kind, I ſhall proceed to draw up my army. For this purpoſe, I would place the ten Battalions of one Regiment on the left, and the ten of the other on the right. Thoſe on the left are to be formed in this manner.——Poſt five Battalions on the flank of each other in the front, with an interval of eight feet betwixt every one of them; and let the ſpace which they occupy be two hundred and eighty-two feet in breadth, and eighty in depth. In the rear of theſe five I would place three others, at the diſtance of eighty feet, one of which ſhould be in a right line with the Battalion that is on the left flank of thoſe in the front; the ſecond with that on the right flank; and the third with that in the center: ſo that theſe three will take up as much ground both in breadth and depth as the other five: but though the ſpace betwixt every one of thoſe five is but eight feet, I would have the ſpace betwixt theſe three to be ſixty-ſix. In the rear of theſe I would poſt the two remaining Battalions at the diſtance of eighty feet, one of them in a right line with that on the left of the three laſt mentioned, and the other with that on the right; with an interval betwixt one and the other of ninety-two feet. The ground therefore which all theſe Battalions, thus formed, take up, will be two hundred and eighty-two feet in breadth, and four hundred in depth. The Pikemen extraordinary I would range along the left flank of theſe Battalions at the diſtance of forty feet, and I would make an hundred and forty ranks of them of ſeven men in every rank: ſo that they would cover the whole left flank of the Battalions drawn up in the manner I have deſcribed, and there would be forty ranks remaining to guard the baggage, Suttlers, and other unarmed people who follow the camp in the rear of the army; after poſting the Captains and Corporals in their proper places. Of the three Lieutenant Colonels belonging to them, I would place one at the front, another in the center, and another in the rear. But to return to the front of the army; next to the Pikemen extraordinary, I would place the five hundred Velites extraordinary, and allow them to take up a ſpace of eighty feet. Next to them on the left, I would place my Gens d'Armes, and allow them a ſpace of four hundred and fifty feet: and next to them, my light horſe, whom I would allow the ſame ſpace. The ordinary Velites I would leave with their reſpective Battalions in their proper places, (that is, in the intervals betwixt one Battalion and another) to be attendants as it were upon them; unleſs I ſhould think fit to put them under the cover of the Pikemen extraordinary; which I would do ſometimes, and ſometimes I would not, according as it was moſt for my advantage. The Colonel of the Regiment, with his colours and drum, I would place either in the center of that ſpace which

is

is left betwixt the firſt and ſecond lines of the Battalions, or in the front of them, and in the interval betwixt the laſt of the firſt five and the Pikemen extraordinary, as I ſaw moſt convenient; with ſixty, or at leaſt thirty picked men about him, who ſhould not only have ſenſe enough to carry his orders properly and diſtinctly to the different parts of the army, but be able to repel the enemy if he ſhould be attacked. ——In this manner I would form the Regiment on the left, which would be juſt one half of the army, and will occupy a ſpace of five hundred and ſeventy-two feet in breadth, and four hundred in depth, excluſive of the ſpace taken up by the forty ranks of Pikemen extraordinary that are to guard the baggage, &c. in the rear, which will be two hundred feet. The other Regiment I would draw up in the ſame manner on the right of this, with an interval betwixt them of ſixty feet: and at the head of this interval I would place ſome pieces of Artillery, behind which, the General of the army ſhould take poſt with his Standard and drum, and two hundred picked men at leaſt, moſt of them on foot; of whom there ſhould be ten or more fit to carry any orders; and he himſelf ſhould be mounted and armed in ſuch a manner that he might command either on horſeback or on foot, as occaſion required. As for Artillery, ten thirty-ſix pounders would be ſufficient for the reduction of a town; and I would make uſe of them rather to defend my Camp than in a field engagement: for my field pieces ſhould be but eight pounders or thereabout; and theſe I would place along the front of the whole army, except the ground was ſuch that I could place them conveniently and ſafely in the flanks where the enemy could not come at them. This method of drawing up an army may anſwer the end both of the Grecian Phalanx and the Roman Legion: for you have the Pikemen in the front, and all the reſt of the Infantry are ſo formed in their proper ranks, that either in charging an enemy, or ſuſtaining the charge, they may (like the Phalanx) recruit their front ranks out of thoſe in the rear. On the other hand, if they are ſo hard puſhed that they are obliged to give way, they may retreat into the intervals of the ſecond line, and advance again in conjunction with it to face the enemy: and if they are repulſed the ſecond time, they may retire into the ſpaces betwixt the Battalions in the third line, and renew the battle with ſtill greater vigour: ſo that, according to this method, you may reinforce your ranks either in the Grecian or the Roman manner. As to the ſtrength of ſuch an army, no Body can be more compact: for each wing is perfectly well fortified in every part, both with officers and private men properly armed, and appointed in ſuch a manner, that if there is any apparent weakneſs in it, it muſt be in the rear where the carriages and Suttlers, &c. are [illegible] thoſe are covered by the Pikemen extraordinary [illegible] fortified therefore

on all ſides, an enemy cannot attack it any where but it will be ready to receive him: for the rear is in no danger; becauſe if the enemy be ſo ſtrong that he is able to attack you on every ſide at once, it muſt have been madneſs in you to take the field againſt him. But ſuppoſing he ſhould be ſuperior to you in number by one third, and his army as well armed and drawn up as your own; if he weakens it in order to attack you in ſeveral parts at the ſame time, and you happen to break in upon him in any one, the day is your own. As to Cavalry, you have nothing to apprehend from them; for the Pikemen which environ you on all ſides will ſufficiently ſecure you againſt their fury, even though your own ſhould be repulſed. Your officers are ſo conveniently poſted, that they may do their duty with eaſe; and the ſpaces betwixt one Battalion and another, and betwixt every rank, not only ſerve to receive each other upon occaſion, but give the officers ſufficient room to go backwards and forwards with orders from the General. Now as I told you before, that the Romans had about twenty-four thouſand men in their armies, I would have our army conſiſt of the ſame number: and as their auxiliaries learnt their diſcipline and order from their Legions, I would have our auxiliaries likewiſe formed upon the model of our Regiments. Theſe things may eaſily be effected by a little practice: for in adding two other Regiments to the army, or the ſame number of other men that it conſiſts of (let it be what it will) you have nothing to do but to double your ranks by placing twenty Battalions on the left, inſtead of ten, and as many more on the right; or to extend or contract them, according to the nature of the ground, and the poſture of the enemy.

Luigi. I perfectly underſtand you, Sir. Methinks I ſee your army drawn up for battle. I am impatient to have it begin. For Heaven's Sake do not turn Fabius Maximus upon us: if you do, I am afraid I ſhall be tempted to abuſe you as the Roman people did that great man.

Fabrizio. I am ready. The ſignal is given. Do not you hear our Artillery? It has fired and done but little execution amongſt the enemy. The Velites extraordinary and light horſe have ſet up a great ſhout and begun the attack with the utmoſt fury. The enemy's Artillery has made one diſcharge; and being ill pointed, their balls have gone over the heads of our Infantry without doing them any hurt: but to prevent it firing a ſecond time, our Velites and light horſe endeavour to make themſelves maſters of it: a Body of the enemy poſt themſelves before it; ſo that the Artillery on both ſides is become uſeleſs. See with what courage and dexterity our men charge them: the expertneſs they have acquired by long exerciſe and diſcipline, inſpires them with confidence: the Battalions move forward in regular pace and good order with the Gens d'Armes on their flanks to attack the enemy; our Artillery draws

off

off through the ſpace that was left vacant by the Velites to make room for it. See how the General encourages his men, and aſſures them of victory. Obſerve our Velites and light horſe returning, and extending themſelves along the flanks of our army to ſee if they can meet with any of the enemy's light-armed forces there.——The two armies are now engaged: ſee with what firmneſs and ſilence our men receive the charge: do not you hear the General giving his orders to the Gens d'Armes to maintain their ground, and not to advance upon the enemy, nor deſert the Infantry upon any account whatſoever? You ſee a party of our light horſe have now detached themſelves to charge a Body of the enemy's Muſketeers that were coming to take us in flank; and how the enemy's Cavalry are advancing to ſupport them: but the Muſketeers, to avoid being entangled betwixt them, are retiring to their own army. See with what reſolution and dexterity our ordinary Pikemen handle their weapons: but the Infantry on each ſide are now come ſo cloſe together that our Pikemen can no longer make any uſe of their pikes; and therefore, according to their uſual diſcipline, they retreat by degrees till they are received by the Targetmen. You ſee how a large Body of the enemy's Gens d'Armes have in the mean time diſordered our Gens d'Armes on the left, who retire (as they had learnt before) into the Pikemen extraordinary, and being ſupported by them, not only make head againſt the enemy again, but repulſe them with great ſlaughter. Now the ordinary Pikemen of the firſt Battalions have retreated amongſt the Targetmen; they leave them to maintain the battle, and behold what havock they make amongſt the enemy; with what confidence and ſecurity they preſs upon them; ſee how cloſe they are engaged with them, they hardly have room to manage their ſwords. The enemy are embarraſſed and falling into confuſion: their pikes are too long to do any further execution, and their ſwords are of no ſervice againſt men that are ſo well ſecured by their armour. What a Carnage! what a number of wounded men! They begin to run away. See, they are flying on the right and on the left. The battle is over; we have gained a glorious victory.——It might have been more complete however if we had exerted our whole ſtrength. But you ſee we were under no neceſſity of employing either our ſecond or third line, as the firſt was ſufficient to do the buſineſs: ſo that I have nothing more to add upon this occaſion; except it be to anſwer any objection or doubt you may have to propoſe.

Lurgi. You have carried every thing before you with ſuch amazing rapidity, that I cannot well tell whether I ought to ſtart any objection or not. With ſubmiſſion however to your ſuperior judgment, I will make bold to aſk you a free queſtion or two. Be ſo good therefore to tell me in the firſt place, why you would ſuffer your

more than once: and why you ordered it to be drawn off ſo ſoon, without making any ſort of uſe of it afterwards. In the next place, you managed that of the enemy juſt as you pleaſed, and had it pointed ſo ill, that it could do no execution: which indeed I ſuppoſe may be the caſe ſometimes; but if it ſhould happen (as I believe it often does) that the ſhot ſhould take place, what remedy would you preſcribe? And ſince I have mentioned artillery, I will here propoſe all that I have to ſay upon that ſubject, that ſo we may have no occaſion to return to it hereafter. I have heard many people laugh at the arms and armour, and military diſcipline, of the Ancients, and ſay they would be of little or no ſervice at all now, ſince the invention of Artillery, which would break all their ranks, and beat their armour to pieces: ſo that it would be folly to draw up a body of forces in ſuch order as cannot be maintained, and undergo the fatigue of carrying armour, which can by no means ſecure them.

FABRIZIO. Your objections are of ſeveral kinds; and therefore you muſt have patience if you expect a particular anſwer to them all. It is true our artillery made but one diſcharge, and I was in ſome doubt whether I ſhould ſuffer even that; becauſe it is of more importance to keep one's ſelf from being hurt, than to annoy the enemy. Now in order to ſecure yourſelf from Artillery, you muſt either keep out of the reach of its ſhot, or place yourſelf behind a wall, or a bank, or ſome fence of that kind; there is no other cover that I know of, and that muſt be very ſtrong. But when an army is drawn up in order to engage, it cannot ſkulk behind a wall or a bank, nor yet keep at ſuch a diſtance as not to be annoyed by the enemy's artillery. Since there is no method then to ſhelter one's ſelf from it, the General muſt have recourſe to ſuch means as will expoſe him and his men to the leaſt danger; for which purpoſe, the beſt, and indeed the only way, is to make themſelves maſters of it, if poſſible, and as ſoon as they can. To do this, it is neceſſary that a body of your men ſhould march up, and ruſh ſuddenly upon it; but not in cloſe order: becauſe the ſuddenneſs of the attack will prevent it from firing more than once, and when your men are thinly drawn up, it cannot do much execution amongſt them. Now a compact body of regular forces is not at all proper for this ſervice: for if it moves faſt, it muſt naturally fall into diſorder of itſelf; and if it extends and weakens its ranks, it will preſently be broken by the enemy: upon which conſiderations, I drew up my army in a manner that was moſt proper for ſuch an attempt; for having placed a thouſand Velites in the wings of it, I ordered them to advance, together with the light horſe, as ſoon as our Artillery had fired, to ſeize upon that of the enemy. This is the reaſon why I would not ſuffer our own to make a ſecond diſcharge, leſt the enemy ſhould have time to do the ſame, as they eaſily might have done,

done, and perhaps before our Artillery was loaded again, if I had not taken theſe means to prevent it. So that the only way to make the enemy's Artillery of no ſervice, is to attack it as ſoon as poſſible: for if they deſert it, it falls into your hands of courſe; but if they defend it, they muſt place a body of forces before it, and then they will not dare to fire it again, becauſe their own men muſt be the chief ſufferers by it.——Theſe reaſons, I think, might be ſufficient of themſelves, without quoting any examples to ſupport them: but as antiquity furniſhes us with many, I will give you one or two.——When Ventidius had reſolved to come to an engagement with the Parthians (whoſe ſtrength conſiſted chiefly in their bows and arrows) he ſuffered them to advance almoſt to the very entrenchments of his camp before he drew out his army: and this he did, that he might fall ſuddenly upon them, and before they could make uſe of their arrows. Cæſar tells us, that in a battle with the Gauls, they made ſo ſudden and furious an attack upon him, that his men had not time to throw their darts at the enemy, as the Romans always uſed to do. Now from theſe inſtances we ſee, that in order to ſecure an army in the field from the effects of any weapons or engines that annoy them at a diſtance, there is no other way, but to march up to them as faſt as poſſible, and get poſſeſſion of them if you can, or at leaſt to prevent their effects. Beſides all theſe, I had ſtill another reaſon which determined me to fire my artillery no more than once: perhaps it may ſeem trifling to you; but with me it has much weight. There is nothing that occaſions greater confuſion and embarraſſment amongſt a body of men, than to have their ſight dazzled or obſtructed: a circumſtance which has been the ruin of many gallant armies that have been blinded either by the ſun or clouds of duſt: and what can contribute more to that than the ſmoke of artillery? It would be more prudent therefore to let the enemy blind themſelves, than to go blindfold yourſelf to ſeek them: for which reaſon, I would either not make any uſe of artillery at all, or if I did (to avoid cenſure now great guns are in ſuch credit) I would plant it in the flanks of my army; that ſo when it was fired, the ſmoke might not blind the men in my front, where I would have the flower of my army. The effects of that may be ſeen from the conduct of Epaminondas, who going to engage the enemy, cauſed all his light horſe to trot backwards and forwards a great pace in the front of their army, which raiſed ſuch a duſt that it threw them into diſorder, and gave him an eaſy victory over them.——As for my ſeeming to have pointed the enemy's artillery as I pleaſed, and made the ſhot fly over the heads of our Infantry; I anſwer, that it much oftner happens ſo than otherwiſe: for Infantry ſtands ſo low, and it is ſo nice a matter to manage heavy pieces of cannon well; that if you either elevate or lower them ever ſo little too [illegible] in one caſe:

caſe the balls will fly quite over their heads, and in the other, they ſtrike into the earth, and never come near them: the leaſt inequality of ground likewiſe is a great preſervation to them; for any little bank or brake betwixt them and the Artillery, ſerves either to intercept the ſhot, or divert their direction. And as to cavalry, eſpecially Gens d'Armes (becauſe they are drawn up in a cloſer order, and ſtand ſo much higher than light horſe, that they are more expoſed to danger) they may continue in the rear of the army till the artillery has fired. It is certain that ſmall pieces of Cannon and muſket-ſhot do more execution than heavy artillery; againſt which, the beſt remedy is to make a reſolute attack upon it as ſoon as poſſible: and if you loſe ſome of your men in it, (which muſt always be the caſe) ſurely a partial loſs is not ſo bad as a total defeat. The Swiſs are worthy of imitation in this reſpect: for they never decline an engagement out of fear of Artillery; but always puniſh thoſe with death who offer to ſtir out of their ranks, or ſhew the leaſt ſign of being frighted at it. I cauſed my Artillery therefore to be drawn off as ſoon as it had been diſcharged, in order to make room for the Battalions to advance; and made no further mention of it, as a thing of no conſequence after the two armies had joined battle.——You ſay likewiſe, that many people laugh at the arms and armour, and military diſcipline of the Ancients, as good for nothing ſince the Invention of Artillery: from whence one would be apt to imagine the Moderns had made effectual proviſion againſt it. If ſo, I ſhould be glad to hear what that proviſion is; for I confeſs I know of none, nor do I think it poſſible to make any, but what I have already mentioned. Why do our Infantry at preſent wear corſlets? and why are our Gens d'Armes covered with armour from head to foot? If they deſpiſe this manner of arming among the Ancients, as of no ſervice againſt artillery, why do they continue to uſe it themſelves? I I could likewiſe wiſh to be informed, why the Swiſs, (like the ancients) form their Regiments of ſix or eight thouſand foot, drawn up in cloſe order; and for what reaſon all other nations have begun to imitate them; ſince that method expoſes their armies to no leſs danger, (with regard to artillery) than many other inſtitutions that were in vogue amongſt the Ancients, but are neglected and laid aſide at preſent? Theſe are queſtions, which I fancy the people whom you mention, cannot eaſily anſwer: but if you would propoſe them to Soldiers of judgment and experience, they would tell you, that they arm themſelves in that manner, not becauſe they think ſuch armour will effectually ſecure them againſt Cannon balls, but becauſe it will defend them againſt croſs-bows, pikes, ſwords, and many other offenſive weapons, which an enemy may make uſe of. They will tell you further, that the cloſe order obſerved by the Swiſs, is neceſſary to make an impreſſion upon

upon the enemy's Infantry, to ſuſtain their cavalry, and to prevent themſelves from being eaſily broken: ſo that we ſee Soldiers have many other things to dread beſides artillery, againſt which, this order, and this ſort of arms and armour, ſerve to ſecure them. Hence it follows, that the better an army is armed, and the cloſer and ſtronger it is drawn up, the leſs it has to fear: and therefore the perſons whoſe opinion you alledged not long ago, muſt either have had very little experience, or not have conſidered the matter in the light they ought to have done. For ſince we find that only the pikes and cloſe order of the Ancients, (ſtill in uſe amongſt the Swiſs) have done ſuch wonderful ſervice, and contribute ſo much to the ſtrength of our armies at preſent; why may we not conclude, that the reſt of the military Inſtitutions obſerved by the Ancients (but now entirely laid aſide and neglected) might be equally ſerviceable? Beſides, as the fury of Artillery does not make us afraid of drawing up our Battalions in cloſe order, like the Swiſs; certainly there can be no other diſpoſition contrived that can make us more apprehenſive of its effects. Further, if we are not terrified at the enemy's Artillery in laying ſiege to a town, when it may annoy us with the greateſt ſecurity, and we can neither come at it, nor prevent its effects, becauſe it is covered by walls; but muſt endeavour to diſmount it with our own Cannon, which perhaps may require much time, and expoſe us to a continual fire all the while; why ſhould we ſo much fear it in the field, where we may preſently either make ourſelves maſters of it, or put a ſtop to its firing? The invention of Artillery therefore, is no reaſon, in my opinion, why we ſhould not imitate the Ancients in their military diſcipline and Inſtitutions, as well as their courage: and if this matter had not been thoroughly diſcuſſed in a piece lately publiſhed, I would have dwelt longer upon it at preſent: but for brevity's ſake I refer you to that diſcourſe [*m*].

LUIGI. I have read it, and am of opinion upon the whole, that you have ſufficiently ſhewn, that the beſt remedy againſt artillery, is to ſeize upon it as ſoon as you can; that is, in a field battle. But ſuppoſe the enemy ſhould place it in the flanks of their army; where it would ſtill gall you, and yet be ſo well ſecured, that you could not make yourſelf maſter of it. For in drawing up your army, you may remember that you left an interval of eight feet betwixt every Battalion, and of forty betwixt the Battalions and the Pikemen extraordinary: now if the enemy ſhould form their army in the ſame order, and place their Artillery deep in thoſe intervals, I ſhould think it would annoy

[*m*] See Pol. Diſc. Book II. Chap. xvii.

you.

you very much, without any riſque of being taken, becauſe you could not come at it there.

FABRIZIO. Your objection carries much weight with it, and therefore I will endeavour either to take it off, or to find ſome remedy in that caſe. I told you before, that the Battalions, when engaged with an enemy, are in conſtant motion, and of conſequence muſt draw cloſer and cloſer to each other; ſo that if you leave but ſmall intervals betwixt them for the Artillery, they will ſoon be filled up in ſuch a manner, that it cannot be of any ſervice: but if you make them large, in order to avoid that inconvenience, you muſt naturally run into a much greater; becauſe you then leave room enough for the enemy to ruſh into them, and not only ſeize upon your Artillery, but throw your whole army into confuſion. But to make ſhort of the matter, I beg leave to tell you once for all, that it is impoſſible to place your Cannon betwixt your Battalions, eſpecially ſuch as are fixed upon carriages: for as they are drawn one way, and point another, they muſt all be turned into a different direction before they can be fired; and to do that, will require ſo large a ſpace, that fifty pieces would diſorder any army: ſo that they muſt of neceſſity be placed ſomewhere out of the Battalions; and then they may be come at in the manner I have already preſcribed. Let us ſuppoſe however, that they could be placed within the Battalions, and that we could hit upon ſome medium, which on one hand would prevent the battalions from fruſtrating the effects of the Artillery when they drew cloſer together; and on the other, not leave the intervals betwixt them ſo large, that the enemy might puſh into them: I ſay, that even then a method might be found to elude its force, by opening counter-intervals in the enemy's army, to let your ſhot paſs through without doing any execution. For to ſecure your Artillery effectually, perhaps you would place it at the very bottom of the intervals betwixt your Battalions; in which caſe (to avoid killing your own men) it muſt be pointed in ſuch a manner, as to throw its ſhot directly and continually through the interval it is planted in; and therefore, by opening ſuch another interval right over-againſt it in the enemy's army, they will paſs through it without doing them any damage at all: for it is a general rule, always to give way to ſuch things as cannot be oppoſed; as the Ancients uſed to do when they were attacked by Elephants and armed Chariots.——You ſee I gained a victory with an army formed and appointed in the manner I recommended; and I muſt beg leave to repeat (if what I have already ſaid be not ſufficient) that ſuch an army muſt of neceſſity defeat any other, at the very firſt onſet, that is armed and drawn up like ours at preſent, which, for the moſt part can make but one front, is entirely unprovided with Targets, and not only armed in ſuch a manner, that they

they cannot defend themſelves againſt an enemy that cloſes with them, but ſo formed, that if they poſt their Battalions flank to flank, they make their lines too thin and feeble; and if they place them in the rear of each other, not having any method of receiving one another, they ſoon fall into confuſion, and are eaſily broken. And though indeed they are divided into three bodies, called the Van-guard, the Main-battle, and the Rear-guard; yet this diviſion is of no uſe, except upon a March, or to diſtinguiſh them in an encampment: for in engagement they are combined, and therefore all liable to be defeated at once by the firſt ſhock.

LUIGI. I further obſerved in your late Battle, that your Cavalry were repulſed, and forced to take cover under the Pikemen extraordinary, by whoſe aſſiſtance, they not only made head againſt the enemy a ſecond time, but repulſed them in their turn. Now I am perſuaded that Pikemen may ſupport Cavalry in a thick and cloſe drawn-up body like the Swiſs Regiments: but in your army there are but five ranks of Pikemen in the front, and ſeven on the flanks; ſo that I cannot ſee how they can keep off a body of horſe.

FABRIZIO. Though I told you before, that ſix ranks of Pikemen might charge at a time in the Macedonian Phalanx, yet I muſt now add, that if a Swiſs Regiment conſiſted of a thouſand ranks, no more than four or five of them at moſt could charge at once: for their Pikes being eighteen feet long, three feet we may imagine muſt be taken up betwix one hand and the other: ſo that the firſt rank would have but fifteen feet to make uſe of: in the ſecond, beſides the three feet betwixt the mens hands, as much more muſt be taken up by the diſtance betwixt one rank and another, and then there would be but twelve feet of the pike that could be of any ſervice: the third, for the ſame reaſons, would have but nine feet; the fourth but ſix; and the fifth but three: the other ranks behind could make no uſe at all of their pikes, but ſerve to recruit and ſupport the firſt five ranks, as we have ſhewn before. If then five of their ranks could keep off the enemy's Cavalry, why cannot our five do the ſame, as they likewiſe have other ranks in their rear to ſupport them, though they have not pikes like the others? And if the ranks of Pikemen extraordinary, which are placed upon the flanks of our army, may ſeem to you too thin, they may be reduced into a ſquare, and poſted on the flanks of the two Battalions in the rear; from which place they may ſuccour either the front or rear, and aſſiſt the horſe upon occaſion.

LUIGI. Would you always then make uſe of this form and order of battle, whenever you are to engage an enemy?

FABRIZIO. No indeed: I would always ſuit my order of battle to the nature of my ground, the quality and number of the enemy, as I

ſhall ſhew you before we part. But I recommended this order not only as the beſt, (as it certainly is) but as a rule to direct and aſſiſt you in forming others: for every art has its general rules and principles upon which it is founded. One thing however, I would have you remember, and that is, never to draw up an army upon any occaſion in ſuch a manner, that the front cannot be relieved by the rear: for whoever is guilty of that error, prevents the greateſt part of his army from doing him any ſervice at all, and will never gain a victory over an enemy that has the leaſt degree either of courage or conduct.

LUIGI. I confeſs I have ſtill another objection to the order in which you diſpoſed your army. You made your front conſiſt of five Battalions, poſted on the flank of each other: your ſecond line of three: and your third of two. Now I ſhould think it would be better to invert that order: for ſurely it muſt be more difficult to break that army which is ſtronger and ſtronger the farther you penetrate into it, than another that is weaker and weaker.

FABRIZIO. If you will pleaſe to recollect that the third line in the Roman Legions was compoſed of ſix hundred Triarii only, and that they were placed in the rear, you would drop your objections: for you ſee that, according to that model, I have placed but two Battalions in the rear, which yet conſiſts of nine hundred men: ſo that if I have been guilty of any error in following the example of the Romans in that reſpect, it is by making my rear ſtronger than they did. Now though the authority alone of ſuch an example might ſerve for a ſufficient anſwer to your objection, yet I will give you my reaſons for what I have done.——The front ranks of an army ought always to be thick and compact, becauſe they are to ſuſtain the firſt ſhock of the enemy, and have no friends to receive into them: for which reaſon, they ſhould be cloſe and full of men; otherwiſe they will be looſe and feeble. But as the ſecond line is to receive the firſt into it upon occaſion before it is to engage, there ſhould be large intervals left in it for that purpoſe; and therefore it muſt not conſiſt of ſo many men as the firſt: for if the number of them was either larger, or but barely equal, you muſt either leave no intervals in it, (which would occaſion confuſion) or if you do, it will be longer than the firſt, which would be out of proportion, and make a ſtrange appearance. As to what you ſay of the enemy finding our army weaker and weaker the farther they penetrate into it, it is a manifeſt error: for they cannot come to engage the ſecond line, till it has received the firſt into it: ſo that they will find the ſecond line much ſtronger than the firſt was, when they are both united, and the third line ſtill ſtronger than either of the other two, becauſe they will then have the ſtrength of the whole army to cope with at once: and as the third line is to receive more men than

the

the ſecond, it is neceſſary it ſhould have larger intervals in it, and conſequently conſiſt of fewer men of its own.

LUIGI. I am thoroughly ſatisfied in this point. But if the five Battalions in the front retire into the three that are in the ſecond line; and afterwards thoſe eight into the two that are in the rear, it does not ſeem poſſible that the eight Battalions in the ſecond line, much leſs the ten in the third, can be contained in the ſame ſpace of ground that the firſt five were.

FABRIZIO. To this I anſwer in the firſt place, that the ſpace of ground is not the ſame in that caſe: for there were intervals betwixt the firſt five, which are filled up when they retire into the ſecond line, and the ſecond into the third: there was likewiſe an interval betwixt the two Regiments, and betwixt them and the Pikemen extraordinary, which all together afford them room enough. Beſides, the Battalions take up different ſpaces of ground whilſt they keep their ranks, and when they are diſordered: for in the latter caſe, the men either get cloſer together, or extend themſelves. They extend themſelves when they are ſo hard preſſed, that they are going to run away; and they keep cloſer together when they are determined to make an obſtinate reſiſtance. I might add, that when the five ranks of Pikemen in the front have done their buſineſs, they retire through the intervals betwixt the Battalions, into the rear, to make way for the Targetmen to advance upon the enemy; where they will be ready for any ſervice, in which the General ſhall think fit to employ them: for in the front they could be of no further uſe after the two armies were cloſe engaged: and thus the ſpace allotted will be ſufficient to contain the whole army. But if it ſhould not, the flanks being compoſed of men, and not ſtone walls, can eaſily open and extend themſelves in ſuch a manner as to make room enough.

LUIGI. When the five firſt Battalions retire into the three in the ſecond line, would you have the Pikemen extraordinary, whom you place in the flanks of your army, ſtand faſt in their ranks, and form two horns as it were to the army? or would you have them likewiſe retire with the Battalions? In the latter caſe, I cannot imagine whither they are to retire, as they have no Battalions in their rear with proper intervals to receive them.

FABRIZIO. If the enemy does not attack them at the ſame time that the Battalions are forced to retire, thoſe Pikemen may continue firm in their ſtation, and take the enemy in the flanks, as they are preſſing upon the Battalions in their retreat: but if they are attacked at the ſame time (as moſt likely they will be) they alſo muſt retire; which they may do very well, though they have no Battalions in their rear to receive them, by doubling their ranks in a right line to the center,

and receiving one rank into another, in the manner I ſhewed you a while ago. But to double them in order to retreat, you muſt obſerve a different method from that which I then ſpoke of: for in that caſe, I told you the firſt rank muſt receive the ſecond, the third the fourth, and ſo on; but in this you muſt begin in the rear inſtead of the front, that ſo the ranks may retreat, and not advance in doubling each other. But to anſwer the whole of what may be objected to the manner in which I conducted the late battle, I muſt beg leave to tell you again, that I drew it up and cauſed it to engage, in the firſt place, to ſhew you how an army ought to be formed in order of battle; and in the next, how it ſhould be exerciſed. The order, I make no doubt, you now perfectly comprehend; and as to the exerciſe, I ſay that the Regiments ought to be joined together, and exerciſed in this manner as often as poſſible; that ſo the officers may learn to poſt their Battalions in their proper places: for as every private man ſhould know his own rank, and place in that rank, ſo every Lieutenant Colonel ſhould know where to ſtation his Battalion in the army, and all of them learn to obey their General. They ſhould likewiſe know how to join one Battalion with another, and to take their reſpective poſts in an inſtant: for which purpoſe, the Colours of every Battalion ſhould have their number marked upon them in ſuch a manner as to be viſible to every one, not only to diſtinguiſh the Battalions from one another, but that the Lieutenant Colonel of every Battalion, and his men, may the more eaſily know where to find each other. The regiments ought likewiſe to be numbered, and their numbers marked upon the Colonel's Colours, in order to know which Regiment is poſted on the right, and which on the left; what Battalions are placed in the firſt, ſecond, or third line, &c. There ſhould likewiſe be regular ſteps and gradations to preferment in our army: for inſtance, the loweſt officer ſhould be a Corporal, the next above him, a Captain of fifty ordinary Velites, the next, a Captain of a Company in the Battalions, the next, the Lieutenant Colonel of the tenth Battalion, the next, the Lieutenant Colonel of the ninth, the next, the Lieutenant Colonel of the eighth, and ſo on in ſucceſſion, till you come to the Lieutenant Colonel of the firſt Battalion, who ſhould be next in command to the Colonel of the Regiment; to which poſt no-body ſhould be advanced, till he had paſſed through all the ſubordinate degrees juſt now mentioned. But as there are alſo three Lieutenant Colonels of the Pikemen extraordinary, and two of the extraordinary Velites, I would have them rank with the Lieutenant Colonel of the tenth Battalion: for I ſee no abſurdity in having ſix officers of equal rank in the ſame Regiment, as it may ſerve to create an emulation amongſt them, and excite every one of them to behave himſelf in ſuch a manner, as to be thought worthy of being

ing preferred to the command of the ninth Battalion. Every one of theſe officers then knowing where his Corps is to be poſted, the whole army will preſently be in proper order, as ſoon as the General's ſtandard is erected. This is the firſt exerciſe an army ſhould be accuſtomed to; that is, to range itſelf immediately in order of battle upon occaſion: for which purpoſe, it ſhould be drawn up and ſeparated again, not only every day, but ſeveral times in the day.

LUIGI. What other marks of diſtinction would you have upon the Colours beſides their particular number?

FABRIZIO. The General's Standard ſhould have the arms of his Prince upon it: the others may have the ſame, with ſome variation of the field or colours, as the Prince ſhall think fit: for that is a matter of no great moment, provided they are ſufficient to diſtinguiſh one Corps from another. But let us now paſs on to another ſort of exerciſe, in which an army ought to be very ready and expert; and that is, the learning to move in due pace and diſtance, and to keep its ranks when it is in motion. The third kind of exerciſe is to teach the men to act as they ſhould do, when they are actually engaged with an enemy; to diſcharge the Artillery, to draw it off; to cauſe the Velites extraordinary to begin the attack, and then to retire; to make the firſt line fall back into the ſecond, as if it was hard preſſed, and then the ſecond into the third; and afterwards to reſume their firſt ſtations; and to uſe them ſo frequently to theſe and other ſuch things, that every man may know every part of his duty, which will ſoon become eaſy and familiar to him by practice. The next exerciſe is to inſtruct your men in the nature of ſignals, and how to act by beat of drum, ſound of trumpet, or particular motion of the Colours: for ſuch orders as are given by word of mouth, they will eaſily underſtand. And as different notes and ſounds are of great importance, and have various effects, I will tell you what ſorts of military muſic were uſed by the Ancients. The Lacedæmonians, as Thucydides informs us, made uſe of Flutes in their armies, as the moſt proper inſtrument to make them move regularly and reſolutely, but not with precipitation. The Carthaginians, for the ſame reaſon, uſed harps in their firſt attack: Halyattes, King of Lydia, made uſe of both: but Alexander the Great, and the Romans, uſed horns and trumpets, which they thought the fitteſt inſtruments to rouſe the courage of their men, and inſpire them with martial ardour. But as we have imitated both the Greeks and Romans in arming our men, we will alſo borrow our military muſic from each of thoſe nations. The General then ſhould have his trumpets about him, as the propereſt inſtruments to animate his army, and ſuch as may be heard farther than any other. The Lieutenant Colonels and other officers of the Battalions ſhould have ſmall drums and flutes,

not

not to be played upon as they commonly are, but in the ſame manner that they are ſounded at great banquets and other feſtivities. With theſe trumpets the General may preſently make his army underſtand when he would have it either halt, or advance, or retreat; when he would have the Artillery diſcharged, and the Velites extraordinary move forwards; and by various notes and ſounds acquaint them with all the different manœuvres he thinks neceſſary to be made: which Signals ſhould afterwards be repeated by the drums: and in this the whole army ſhould frequently be exerciſed, becauſe it is of the utmoſt conſequence. As to the Cavalry, they may have trumpets too, but of a ſmaller ſize and different ſound. This is all that occurs to my memory at preſent, as neceſſary for the forming and exerciſing an army.

LUIGI. I have but one queſtion more to propoſe, and hope it will not tire your patience if I aſk why the Velites extraordinary and light horſe in the late battle began the attack with a great ſhout? whereas there was a dead ſilence when the reſt of the army began to engage. I confeſs I am at a loſs to account for this, and therefore beg the favour of you to explain it to us.

FABRIZIO. Various are the opinions of ancient authors concerning this matter; that is, whether thoſe that begin the battle ſhould ruſh on with furious ſhouts and outcries, or march up to the attack with ſilence and compoſure. The latter way is certainly the moſt proper to preſerve good order, and for hearing words of Command more diſtinctly; the former, to animate your own men, and diſmay the enemy: and as I think ſome regard ought to be had to all theſe circumſtances, I made one part of my army begin with a great ſhout; the other with profound ſilence. But I do not think a continual ſhout can be of any ſervice, but quite the contrary; becauſe it will prevent the General's orders from being heard, which muſt be attended with terrible conſequences; nor is it reaſonable to ſuppoſe the Romans uſed any ſuch ſhouts after the firſt onſet; as we read in many parts of their Hiſtory, that when their armies were beginning to give way, it was often prevented by the exhortations and reproaches of their Commanders; and that their order of battle was ſometimes changed even in the heat of action; which things could not have been done, if the Voice of the officers had been drowned in the ſhouts of the Soldiers.

The END of the THIRD BOOK.

THE

THE ART OF WAR.

BOOK IV.

THE CONTENTS.

Of ſeveral precautions and artifices that are to be made uſe of both in drawing up an army for battle, and in the action, and after it is over. Two other ways of forming an army. That a General ought never to hazard an engagement, except he either has an advantage over the enemy, or is compelled to it. Some rules to be obſerved by a General. How to avoid a Battle when the enemy is determined to engage at all events. In what manner Soldiers are to be animated to fight: and how their ardour is to be abated when it runs to high. That a General ought to be an Orator as well as a Soldier, and to harangue his men ſometimes, in order to mould them to his particular purpoſes. That Religion animates Soldiers, and keeps them in their duty. That it is proper to inſpire them with a contempt of the enemy; and ſometimes to lay them under a neceſſity of fighting bravely.

LUIGI. SINCE we have gained one glorious victory under my auſpices, I do not care to tempt ſo fickle and inconſtant a Deity as Fortune any further: upon which account, I deſire to give up my poſt to Zanobi Buondelmonti (the youngeſt man in company who has

has not yet filled it) according to the order agreed upon; and dare ſay he will accept that honour, (or rather trouble) both out of complaiſance to me, and becauſe he has naturally more courage and Spirit than falls to my ſhare, and will not be afraid of riſquing another battle, in which he has a chance to be beaten as well as to conquer.

ZANOBI. Sir, I ſhall willingly accept whatever you think fit to confer upon me; though I confeſs I had much rather have continued an Auditor: for the queſtions you propoſed, and the objections you ſtarted, whilſt you was in the poſt you now deſire to reſign, were much more pertinent and neceſſary than any that occurred to me. But not to throw away any more time in ceremonies, which perhaps may be diſagreeable to Signior Fabrizio, let us entreat him to proceed, if we have not already treſpaſſed too much upon his patience.

FABRIZIO. That I will do with great pleaſure, eſpecially as this change of perſons will give me an opportunity of ſeeing the difference of your reſpective judgments and diſpoſitions. But I ſhould be glad to know whether you have any more queſtions to aſk relating to the matter we were laſt engaged in.

ZANOBI. I could wiſh to be informed of three things before we quit it: in the firſt place, whether there be any other way of forming an army in order of battle that you can think of at preſent? in the next, what precautions are neceſſary before a General leads his army on to engage the enemy; and if any accident or diſorder ſhould happen during the battle, in what manner it is to be remedied?

FABRIZIO. I will endeavour to give you what ſatisfaction I can in thoſe points. But I ſhall not anſwer your queſtions ſeparately and diſtinctly: becauſe what I ſhall ſay in anſwer to one queſtion may ſometimes poſſibly ſerve likewiſe as an anſwer to another.——I told you before, that I gave you a general order of battle, which you might eaſily change into any other, as the number and quality of the enemy, and the nature of your ground, ſhall require: for you muſt always act according to thoſe circumſtances. But let me deſire you to remember that you cannot be guilty of a greater or more fatal error than in making a large extenſive front, except your army be very numerous: for if it is not, you ought by all means to form it in ſuch a manner that it may be deeper than it is wide. For when your army is not ſo large as that of the enemy, you muſt have recourſe to other expedients, ſuch as drawing it up ſo that it may be flanked by ſome river or moraſs, or ſecuring it in that part by ditches and entrenchments to prevent it being ſurrounded, as Julius Cæſar uſed to do in his wars with the Gauls. But you muſt make it a general rule in ſuch caſes to contract or extend your front according to the number of your own men and thoſe of the enemy; and when you are ſuperior to them in that reſpect, you ſhould

endeavour

endeavour to draw them into plains and open places; eſpecially if your army is well-diſciplined, that ſo you may extend your front and ſurround them: for in rough and narrow places your ſuperiority of number will not be of any great advantage to you, becauſe you cannot give your ranks their due extent: upon which account, the Romans always made choice of clear open ground, and avoided ſuch a field of battle as was rough and confined. On the contrary, if you have but a ſmall army and ill-diſciplined, you muſt ſeek out for an advantageous ſituation to ſhelter your men, and where their inexperience cannot be of much prejudice to you: it will be better ſtill if it be upon an eminence, from whence you may fall down upon the enemy with greater weight. You ſhould take care however not to draw up your army either upon the declivity of a hill, or any place near the ſkirts of it, where an enemy may get above you: for in that caſe you will be much annoyed by their artillery, and your men ſo embarraſſed that you cannot annoy the enemy again with your own Cannon. Great regard is likewiſe to be had to the wind and Sun in forming an army for battle: for if you have them in your face, one will dazzle your ſight with its rays, the other will blind you with duſt. Beſides, when the wind is againſt you, it will diminiſh the force of your blows: and as to the Sun, you muſt not only take care that it is not in your face when the battle begins, but that it may not afterwards be troubleſome to you. For which purpoſe, you ſhould contrive to have it full upon your back at firſt if poſſible; that ſo it may be a great while before it comes upon your face: as Hannibal did at Cannæ, and Marius when he defeated the Cimbrians. If you are inferior to the enemy in horſe, poſt your army amongſt vineyards and hedges, and other ſuch impediments when you have an opportunity; as the Spaniards did not long ago, when they beat the French at Cirignuola in the Kingdom of Naples. It has likewiſe often happened that the ſame armies which have been beaten by others, have beat them again in their turn, only by changing their order and their ground: the Carthaginians, for inſtance, having been ſeveral times defeated by Marcus Regulus in rough and narrow defiles, were at laſt victorious by the conduct of Xantippus the Lacedæmonian, who adviſed them to come down into the plains, where they availed themſelves of their Elephants and Cavalry in ſuch a manner that they fairly beat the Romans. I have obſerved from the conduct of many great Generals amongſt the Ancients, that when they knew where the enemy placed the main ſtrength of their army, inſtead of employing the flower of their own forces, they appointed the worſt they had to oppoſe them in that quarter, and the beſt of their troops to oppoſe the worſt of the enemy: but afterwards, when the battle was begun, they ordered their choiceſt troops not to preſs upon the enemy, but only to ſuſtain the charge, and the weakeſt

to retire by degrees into the rear of the army: for by theſe means the beſt part of the enemy's army is inſenſibly ſurrounded, and whilſt they think themſelves ſure of a victory they are preſently thrown into confuſion and routed. Thus, when Cornelius Scipio was ſent into Spain againſt Aſdrubal the Carthaginian, being aware that Aſdrubal thought he would place the Legions (which were his beſt troops) in the center of his army, and that Aſdrubal would therefore do the ſame; when they came to an engagement, he changed his uſual order of battle, placing the Legions in the two wings, and the worſt of his forces in the center of his army. But juſt before the battle began, he ordered the center to move forwards very ſlowly, and the two wings to advance briſkly: ſo that the wings only of both armies were engaged, whilſt the center of each was at ſuch a diſtance from one another that they could not come together in due time; and the ſtrongeſt part of Scipio's army being engaged with the weakeſt of Aſdrubal's, the latter was entirely defeated. This method might be practiſed in thoſe times, but it cannot at preſent, now Artillery is in uſe: for the diſtance which muſt be left betwixt the center of each army would give the Artillery time to fire again and again, which would do as much miſchief as if they were cloſe engaged. It is time therefore to lay it aſide, and to have recourſe to the method I preſcribed a little while ago; that is, to let the whole army engage, and the weakeſt part of it give way.——If your army is larger than that of the enemy, and you want to ſurround them without diſcovering your deſign, let your own be drawn up with a front equal to theirs, and afterwards when the battle is begun, let your main body retire by little and little, and the wings extend themſelves: by which the enemy will find themſelves ſurrounded and entangled before they were aware of it. When a General would ſecure his army in ſuch a manner that he may be almoſt certain of not being routed if he comes to an engagement, he ſhould poſt it in ſome place from whence he may eaſily and preſently retreat into a ſafe and defenſible ſituation, as behind a moraſs, or amongſt mountains, or into ſome ſtrong fortreſs, whither the enemy cannot purſue him, though he may purſue them upon occaſion: as Hannibal uſed to do in the ebb of his fortune when he began to be afraid of Marcus Marcellus. Some Generals, in order to diſturb and diſconcert the enemy, have ordered their light armed troops to begin the battle, and then to retire into their proper ſtation again; and after both armies were warmly engaged, to ſally out from the flanks again and make a ſecond attack, which has ſometimes ſucceeded ſo well that the enemy has been thrown into diſorder and routed by it. If you are inferior to the enemy in Horſe (beſides the methods already recommended) you ſhould place a body of Pikemen in their rear; and in the heat of action, let the Horſe open to the right and left to make

way

way for the Pikemen to advance upon the enemy, which will certainly give you the advantage over them: ſome have accuſtomed part of their light-armed Infantry to mingle with their Horſe, and to fight in conjunction with them, which has been of very great ſervice to them. But of all thoſe that have excelled in drawing up armies in order of battle, without doubt Hannibal and Scipio ſhewed the moſt conſummate ſkill and abilities in the African wars; for as Hannibal's army conſiſted not only of Carthaginians, but Auxiliaries of various nations, he placed eighty Elephants in his front; next to them his Auxiliaries, behind them, his Carthaginians; and laſt of all, his Italians, in whom he put but little confidence. His deſign in this diſpoſition was, that his Auxiliaries having the enemy in their front, and the Carthaginians in their rear, ſhould not have an opportunity of running away if they were ſo inclined; but being under a neceſſity of fighting, he hoped they might either break or diſconcert the Romans in ſuch a manner, that when he advanced with a freſh body of his beſt troops, he might entirely defeat them. Scipio, on the other hand, drew up his three lines of Haſtati, Principes, and Triarii (after the uſual manner of the Romans) in ſuch order that they might eaſily ſupport or receive each other. In the front of his army, he left ſeveral intervals over againſt Hannibal's Elephants: but to make it appear cloſe and united, he filled them up with Velites, whom he ordered to give way as ſoon as the Elephants advanced upon them, and retire through the ordinary ſpaces into the Legions, in order to leave a free paſſage for the Elephants; by which means he evaded the fury of thoſe beaſts, and coming to a cloſe engagement with the enemy, entirely defeated them.

ZANOBI. Now you mention that battle, I remember to have read in ſome account of it, that Scipio did not ſuffer the Haſtati to retire into the line of the Principes, but cauſed them to file off to the right and left, and take poſt in the flanks of his army, to make room for the Principes to advance. Now I ſhould be glad to know for what reaſon he deviated from the uſual order and diſcipline of the Romans upon this occaſion.

FABRIZIO. I will tell you. Hannibal had placed the ſtrength of his army in the ſecond line: Scipio therefore, in order to oppoſe him with equal force, joined his Principes and Triarii together, ſo that the intervals amongſt the Principes being taken up by the Triarii, there was no room left to receive the Haſtati: upon which account, he cauſed them to open to the right and left, and wheel off to the flanks. But remember that this method of opening the firſt line to make room for the ſecond to advance, cannot be made uſe of but when you have the advantage over the enemy; for then it may eaſily be put in practice, as it was by Scipio: but if you have the worſt of the battle, and

are repulſed, you cannot do it without expoſing yourſelf to the danger of a total defeat: and therefore it is neceſſary to have intervals in the ſecond and third lines to receive your men upon ſuch occaſions.——But to return to our ſubject. The ancient Aſiatics, amongſt other inventions to annoy the enemy, had chariots with ſcythes fixed to their axletrees, which ſerved not only to open the enemy's ranks, but to mow them down as they drove through them. Now there were three ways of guarding againſt theſe dangerous machines: for the enemy either drew up in ſuch cloſe order, that they could make no impreſſion upon them; or received them in the intervals betwixt the Battalions, as Scipio did the Elephants; or made ſome ſtrong fence againſt them, as Sylla did in the battle he fought with Archelaus, who had a great number of theſe armed chariots: for he fixed ſeveral rows of ſharp-pointed ſtakes or paliſadoes in the ground before his firſt line, which ſtopped the career of the chariots, and prevented the execution they muſt otherwiſe have done. The new method which Sylla uſed in drawing up his army at that time, is likewiſe worthy of notice: for he placed his Viletes and light horſe in the rear, and all his heavy-armed men in the front, leaving ſeveral intervals in it, through which thoſe in the rear might advance when occaſion required; by which means he gained a complete victory.——In order to throw the enemy into confuſion after the battle is begun, it is neceſſary to have recourſe to ſome invention that may ſtrike a terror into them: which may be done either by ſpreading a report that you have ſuccours coming up, or making a falſe ſhew of ſuch ſupplies at a diſtance; which has often occaſioned ſuch a conſternation in an army, that it has been preſently defeated. This ſtratagem was put in practice by the Roman Conſuls, Minucius Ruffus and Accilius Glabrio: Caius Sulpicius likewiſe mounted a great number of ſuttlers and ſervants that followed his camp, upon mules, and other beaſts that were of no ſervice in battle; and having drawn them up and accoutred them like a body of horſe, he ordered them to make their appearance upon a neighbouring hill, as ſoon as he was engaged with the Gauls; which had ſuch an effect, that he ſoon routed them. The ſame was done by Marius, in a battle which he fought with the Germans.——If then theſe falſe alarms have ſuch conſequences in the heat of an action, what may not be expected from a real one; eſpecially if the enemy is ſuddenly and unexpectedly attacked either in the flank or in the rear, when they are engaged in the front? But this is no eaſy matter to effect, except you are favoured in in it by the nature of the country: for if it be plain and open, you cannot conceal ſuch a body of your forces as is neceſſary upon ſuch

occaſions

occaſions [n]; but if it abounds with woods or mountains, you may lie in ambuſh and fall ſuddenly upon an enemy, when he leaſt expects it, and be aſſured of ſucceſs.——It is ſometimes likewiſe of great ſervice in time of battle, to raiſe a report that the enemy's General is killed, or that one part of their army is giving way: and it has been no unuſual thing to throw Cavalry into diſorder by ſtrange noiſes, and uncommon appearances: thus Creſſus brought a great number of Camels againſt the enemy's horſe: and Pyrrhus made uſe of Elephants againſt that of the Romans, which occaſioned great confuſion and diſturbance amongſt them. The grand Signior, not long ago, routed the Sophia of Perſia and the Sultan of Syria, merely by the uſe of muſkets; the exploſion of which ſtruck ſuch a terror into their Cavalry, that they turned tail and ran away. The Spaniards, in their battles with Hamilcar, uſed to place carriages full of flax, and drawn by oxen, in the front of their armies; and ſetting fire to the flax as ſoon as the battle begun, the oxen were ſo frighted at it, that they ruſhed in amongſt the enemy, and opened their ranks.——Where the nature of the country is ſuch, that you cannot well draw the enemy into an ambuſh, you may however dig ditches and pit-falls in the plains, and cover them lightly over with bruſh wood and clods, leaving intervals of ſolid ground through which you may retire yourſelf in the heat of the battle, and if the enemy purſues you, he is undone. If you are aware of any accident that happens during the action, which you think may diſpirit your men, it is the beſt way either to conceal it, if you can, or to give it ſuch a turn as may ſerve to produce a quite different effect, as Tullus Hoſtilius did, and after him Lucius Sylla, who ſeeing a body of his forces go over to the enemy he was engaged with, and that it had greatly diſcouraged his own men, immediately ſpread a report through his army, that it was done for a ſecret purpoſe, and by his own order: ſo that inſtead of being daunted, they fought with more courage, and beat the enemy. The ſame Commander having ſent a party of Soldiers upon ſome attack, in which they were all killed, and being afraid it might diſcourage the reſt of his army, ſaid in public, that he had ſent them upon that errand on purpoſe to be cut off, becauſe he knew they were a parcel of raſcals and traytors. Sertorius, in a battle with the Spaniards, killed one of his own men who brought him word that one of his Generals was ſlain; imagining that if he publiſhed it, it would ſtrike a damp into his army.——It is a very difficult matter to ſtop an army that is beginning to run away, and

[n] And yet Hannibal found means to draw the Romans into a ſort of an ambuſh in the middle of a plain, at the famous battle of Cannæ. See the account of that battle by Sir W. Raleigh, in his Hiſtory of the World. Book V. Chap. 3.

to

to make it charge again; but here we muſt make a diſtinction betwixt one that is actually running, and another that is only inclining; for in the firſt caſe, it is almoſt impoſſible; in the ſecond, there may be ſome remedy found. Some of the Roman Generals have done it by reproaching their Soldiers, and upbraiding them with cowardice, as we may inſtance in the conduct of Sylla, who ſeeing part of his Legions begin to fly before the army of Mithridates, rode up to the head of them with a drawn Sword in his hand, and cried out, "If any body "ſhould enquire after your General, tell them you left him fighting in "the plains of Bœotia." Attilius the Roman Conſul detached a body of his beſt troops to ſtop the flight of ſome others that were running away, and told them that if they did not turn back, they ſhould be attacked by their own friends, as well as by the enemy. Philip of Macedon finding ſome of his troops were afraid of the Scythians, poſted a body of Cavalry, in which he moſt confided, in the rear of his army, with orders to kill any man that offered to quit his rank: upon which, the reſt chuſing rather to hazard their lives in battle, than to be killed without mercy if they fled, exerted their courage, and fought ſo manfully that they beat the Scythians [a].——Several of the Roman Generals have taken a pair of Colours out of the hands of an Enſign in the heat of battle, and thrown it into the midſt of the enemy, with a promiſe of a reward to thoſe that ſhould retake it: but this was done not ſo much to prevent their running away; as to create an emulation amongſt their Soldiers, and encourage them to fight with greater ardour. Having now ſpoken of ſuch things as are neceſſary to be done, not only before a battle, but in the the time of action, it may not be amiſs perhaps to ſay ſomething of what ought to be done after it is over; eſpecially as I ſhall be very brief in this point, which yet ſhould not be omitted, becauſe it is a part of our Syſtem.——I ſay then, that when you have gained a victory, you ought by all means to purſue it, and to

[a] Memorable was the behaviour of two Lacedæmonian Matrons to their Sons, when they had fled from battle, as it is recorded in two Greek Epigrams, of which the following are literal tranſlations.

Fugiebat Lacon olim pugnam; obviam vero factæ mater
Dixit, in pectus enſe ſublato,
Vivus quidem tuæ matri uſque dedecus injungis,
Et Strenuæ Spartæ patrias leges Solvis.
Si vero occideris meis manibus, mater quidem audiam
Infelix, ſed in meâ patriâ conſervatâ.

Mater filium deſertorem pugnæ poſt mortem Sociorum
Occidit, partus-dolorum recordationem aſpernata:
Legitimum etenim Sanguinem diſcernit Lacedæmon
Virtute præliantium, non genere infantium.

imitate

imitate Julius Cæſar rather than Hannibal in that reſpect; the latter of whom loſt the Empire of the World, by trifling away his time at Capua, after he had routed the Romans at the battle of Cannæ. Cæſar on the other hand, never reſted after a victory, but always purſued and harraſſed the enemy after they were broken and flying, with greateſt vigour and fury than he attacked them at firſt.——But when a General happens to loſe a battle, he is to conſider in the firſt place, how to make the beſt of his loſs; particularly if he has any conſiderable force left. Perhaps he may reap ſome advantage, either from the neglect, or tardineſs, or inadvertency of the enemy: for after a victory, Soldiers often grow too remiſs and ſecure, and give the army they have beaten an opportunity of beating them in their turn; as L. Marcius did the Carthaginians, who having ſlain the two Scipio's in battle, and defeated their armies, made little account of the forces that were left under the command of Marcius, till they were attacked and routed by him. Hence we ſee, that nothing is ſo eaſy to effect, as what the enemy imagines you will never attempt; and that men are frequently in the greateſt danger, when they think themſelves moſt ſecure. But if a General can reap no ſort of advantage from his firſt loſs, he ſhould by all means endeavour at leaſt to make it as light and ſupportable as he can, and to prevent any further damage: for which purpoſe, he ought to uſe every method either to divide or retard the enemy if they purſue him. In the firſt caſe, ſome when they were aware they could ſtand their ground no longer, have ordered their inferior Commanders to ſeparate and retreat with their forces by different ways to ſome appointed rendezvous; which has made the enemy afraid of dividing his forces, and ſuffer all or moſt of them to eſcape: in the ſecond, many have ſuffered the beſt of their baggage and effects to fall into the enemy's hands upon the road, that ſo whilſt they were buſy in plundering and ranſacking that, they might have time to ſave themſelves. The artifice made uſe of by Titus Dimius, to conceal the loſs he had ſuſtained in battle, is not unworthy of notice: for after he had fought from morning till night, and had a great number of his men killed, he cauſed moſt of them to be buried in the night: ſo that the next day, when the enemy ſaw ſo many of their own men, and ſo few of the Romans killed, they looked upon themſelves as worſted, and immediately began to retreat.——And now I think I have in a great meaſure anſwered your queſtions; though not ſo diſtinctly and particularly perhaps, as you expected. It is true, I have ſomething yet to add concerning the method of forming armies in order of battle: as ſome Generals have drawn up their forces in the ſhape of a wedge, with its edge in the front; imagining that form to be the beſt adapted to penetrate and open the ranks of an enemy. To provide againſt this,

the

the other ſide commonly drew up their army in the form of a pair of open ſhears, to receive the wedge in the vacuity, and ſo to ſurround and attack it on every ſide. Upon this occaſion, let me recommend a general rule to you: which is, *that in order to fruſtrate any of your enemy's deſigns, it is the beſt way to do that of yourſelf, which he endeavours to force you to:* for then you may proceed in a cool and orderly manner, and turn that to your advantage, which he intended as the means of your ruin: but if you are compelled to it, you will ſurely be undone. To confirm the truth of this, it is needleſs to repeat what I have ſaid before: for when the enemy advances in a wedge, with a deſign to open, and as it were to cleave your army aſunder, if you open it yourſelf in the form abovementioned, it is certain you muſt cut him to pieces, and he cannot much hurt you. Hannibal placed Elephants in the front of his army, to break in upon that of Scipio: but Scipio having opened a way for them himſelf, gained a complete victory by it. Aſdrubal likewiſe poſted the flower of his army in the center of his front, for the ſame purpoſe: but Scipio ordering his front to open and file off, diſappointed his intention, and defeated him: ſo that when ſuch deſigns are known, they are generally fruſtrated, and prove the ruin of the contrivers.

I think I have likewiſe ſomething left to ſay, relating to the precautions which a General ſhould make uſe of before he leads on his army to battle: for in the firſt place, I am of opinion, that he ſhould never come to an engagement, except he either has an advantage over the enemy, or is compelled to it. Now the advantage may ariſe from the nature of the ground, the order, ſuperiority, or bravery of his army: and he may be compelled to engage, by a conviction, that if he does not, he muſt inevitably be ruined: which may happen, either when he has no money to pay his troops, and they begin to mutiny and talk of diſbanding; or when he has no proviſions left, and muſt otherwiſe be ſtarved; or when he knows the enemy daily expects to be reinforced: for without doubt, in ſuch circumſtances, he ought always to engage; becauſe it is better to try your fortune whilſt there is any chance of victory (though ever ſo ſmall) than to ſit ſtill and be ſure to be undone. It is therefore as great a fault in a General not to hazard an engagement upon ſuch occaſions, as if he had a fair opportunity of gaining a victory, and neglected it, either out of ignorance or cowardice. Some advantages may reſult from the negligence and miſconduct of the enemy; and others from your own vigilance and good conduct: many armies have been routed in paſſing rivers, by an enemy, who has waited till one half of them has been tranſported, and then fallen upon them; as Cæſar did upon the Swiſs, when he cut off a fourth part of their army, which was ſeparated from the reſt by a river they had

had paſſed. Sometimes an enemy is ſo jaded and fatigued by too raſh and haſty a purſuit, that if your men have had a little time to reſt and refeſh themſelves, you have nothing to do but to face about and gain a victory. If an enemy offers you battle early in the morning, you ought not to draw out your army to fight him immediately; but rather to let his men wait under arms for ſome hours, till their ardour is abated, and then to come out of your entrenchments and engage him, as Scipio and Metellus did in Spain; the former, when he had Aſdrubal upon his hands, and the latter, Sertorius. If the enemy has diminiſhed his ſtrength, either by dividing his army (as the Scipios did in Spain) or upon any other occaſion, you ought by no means to omit that opportunity of fighting him. Moſt prudent Generals have choſen rather to receive the enemy, than to attack them: becauſe the fury of the firſt ſhock is eaſily ſuſtained by men that ſtand firm and reſolute, and ready prepared in their ranks: and when that is over, their fury commonly ſubſides into langour and deſpair.

By proceeding in this manner, Fabius routed both the Samnites and the Gauls: but Decius, his Collegue, taking the other courſe, was defeated and ſlain [*p*]. Some Generals, who have thought the enemy ſuperior to them, have choſen to defer a battle till the evening; that ſo if they ſhould be worſted, they might ſave themſelves under ſhelter of the night: others who have known that the enemy would not fight at particular times, out of reverence to the laws of their Religon, have taken that opportunity to attack and defeat them: of which advantage Julius Cæſar availed himſelf againſt Arioviſtus in Gaul, and Veſpaſian againſt the Jews in Syria. But above all things, a General ſhould take care to have men of approved fidelity, wiſdom, and long experience in military affairs, near his perſon, as a ſort of Council; from whom he may learn, not only the ſtate of his own army, but that of the enemy's; as which of them is ſuperior to the other in number; which of them is the better armed and diſciplined; which of them is the ſtronger in Cavalry; which of his own troops are fitteſt to undergo hard ſervice and fatigue; and whether his Infantry or Cavalry are likely to be of moſt ſervice. Let them well conſider the nature of the country where they are; whether it be more advantageous to the enemy or themſelves; which of the two can be moſt conveniently furniſhed with proviſions and other ſupplies; whether it be better to come to an engagement directly, or to defer it; and what advantage or diſadvantage may accrue from time: for it ſometimes happens, that when Soldiers ſee a war protracted, and a battle put off from time to time, they loſe their ardour, and become ſo weary of hardſhips, that they grow mutinous and defert

[*p*] See Pol. Diſc. Book III. Chap. xlv.

their Colours. It is likewiſe of great importance to know the qualities and diſpoſition of the Enemy's General, and of thoſe that are about him; for inſtance, whether he is bold and enterprizing, or cautious and timid. He ſhould next conſider how far he can confide in his Auxiliaries; and be particularly careful not to bring his army to an engagement, if he perceives his men are in the leaſt diſpirited or diffident of victory: for it is a bad omen indeed, when they think an enemy invincible. In ſuch circumſtances, you muſt either endeavour to avoid a battle, by following the example of Fabius Maximus (who always took the advantage of ſituations where Hannibal durſt not attack him) or, if you think the enemy will not attack you, how advantageous ſoever your ſituation may be, you muſt entirely quit the field, and canton your forces in different towns and fortreſſes, to tire him out with ſieges and blockades.

ZANOBI. Is there no other way of avoiding an engagement?

FABRIZIO. I think I told ſome of you in a converſation we once had before upon this very point, that an army in the field cannot poſſibly avoid an engagement, if the enemy is determined to fight it at all events; except it ſuddenly decamps, and removes to the diſtance of fifty or ſixty miles from the enemy, and always keeps retreating as they advance [q]. Fabius Maximus never refuſed to fight Hannibal; but did not chuſe to do it without an advantage; and Hannibal, conſidering the manner in which he always took care to fortify himſelf, was too wiſe to force him to it: but if Fabius had been attacked, he muſt either have fought him at all events, or have run away.

Philip of Macedon, the father of Perſeus, being at war with the Romans, encamped upon the top of a very high hill, to avoid coming to an engagement with them: but they attacked and routed him there. Cingetorex [r], General of the Gauls, retreated to a conſiderable diſtance, that he might not be obliged to fight the Roman army, commanded by Julius Cæſar, who had ſuddenly paſſed a river that was betwixt them, contrary to his expectation. The Venetians in the late wars, might have avoided a battle with the French, if they had marched away from them (as Cingetorex did from Cæſar) inſtead of waiting till they paſſed the Adda: but they neither took the opportunity of attacking them whilſt they were paſſing that river, nor could they afterwards retreat; for the French were then ſo cloſe at their heels, that as ſoon as the Venetians began to decamp, the French fell upon them and defeated them. In ſhort, there is no other way of avoiding a battle, if the

[q] See Pol. Diſc. Book III. Chap. x.

[r] The Author is guilty of a little miſtake here; it was not Cingetorex, but Vercingetorex. *See Cæſ. Com. de Bello. Gallico.* Lib. VII. Cap. xxxv.

enemy

enemy is fully determined to bring you to one: and therefore it is to no purpoſe to alledge the example of Fabius Maximus; for in that caſe, Hannibal avoided an engagement as much as Fabius.——It often happens, that Soldiers are eager to engage, when (conſidering the ſuperiority of the enemy, the nature of the ground, or ſome other circumſtances) you are convinced you cannot do it without diſadvantage, and therefore would willingly decline a battle: it may likewiſe happen, that either neceſſity may oblige, or opportunity invite you, to engage, but you find your Soldiers diſpirited and averſe to it; in one of which caſes, it is neceſſary to repreſs their ardour, and in the other to excite it. In the firſt, when perſuaſion and exhortations have no effect, it is the beſt way to let ſome part of them be roughly handled by the enemy; that ſo, both thoſe who have ſuffered, and thoſe who have not, may learn to be more tractable and conformable to your will another time: for what was the effect of chance in the army of Fabius Maximus, may be done on purpoſe by any other Commander, upon a like occaſion. It happened, that not only the General of his Cavalry, but all the reſt of his army, were very impatient to fight Hannibal; though Fabius himſelf was utterly againſt it: which diſſention grew to ſuch a height, that at laſt they divided the army betwixt them. Fabius, with his troops, kept cloſe in his entrenchments; the other went out and engaged the enemy, but would have been entirely defeated, if Fabius had not at laſt marched out to his ſuccour: from which example, both the General of his Cavalry, and all the reſt of the army, were convinced, that it would have been wiſer to have ſubmitted to the opinion of Fabius.—— As to the means of animating your men, and enflaming them with a deſire to engage, it would be a good way, in the firſt place, to exaſperate them againſt the enemy, to tell them they are deſpiſed, to inſinuate that you have corrupted ſome of their officers, and hold a private correſpondence with them, to encamp in a ſituation where you may daily ſee what they are doing, and now and then take an opportunity of ſkirmiſhing with them: for things that are often ſeen, at laſt become familiar, and are but little regarded [*f*]. If theſe meaſures fail, you ſhould treat them with diſdain, and harangue them in a weighty and pathetic manner, upbraiding them with cowardice, and endeavouring to make them aſhamed of themſelves, by telling them, that if the reſt have not courage enough to follow you, you will take ſuch or ſuch a Regiment, which you know you can depend upon, and fight the enemy with that alone [*t*]. But to make your men the bolder and more courageous and reſolute, you ought above all things, to take care

[*f*] See Pol. Diſc. Book III. Chap. xxxvii.
[*t*] As Cæſar and Alexander did.

that they may neither ſend any of their money or plunder away to their own houſes, or depoſite it in any other place of ſafety, till the war is over; that ſo they may be aſſured, that if they run away, they may ſave their lives perhaps, but muſt certainly loſe their treaſure; the love of which moſt commonly operates as ſtrongly upon men as that of their life.

ZANOBI. You ſay that Soldiers ſhould be animated to fight by haranguing them: would you harangue the whole army then, or the officers only?

FABRIZIO. It is an eaſy matter to induce a few people either to do a thing or to let it alone; for if arguments are not ſufficient, you may make uſe of force and authority: but the great difficulty is to make a whole army change their reſolution, when the execution of it muſt either be of prejudice to the public, or thwart your own private ſchemes and deſigns; becauſe in that caſe, you can avail yourſelf of nothing but words, which muſt be heard and conſidered by the whole army, if you would have the whole army affected by them. For this reaſon, it is neceſſary that a General ſhould be an Orator as well as a Soldier; for if he does not know how to addreſs himſelf to the whole army, he will ſometimes find it no eaſy taſk to mould it to his purpoſes. But there is not the leaſt attention ſhewn to this point at preſent. Read the Life of Alexander the Great, and you will ſee how often he was obliged to harangue his troops; which otherwiſe he could never have conducted (rich and full of Spoil as they were) through the deſarts of India and Arabia, where they underwent every ſort of hardſhip and fatigue. Many things may prove the ruin of an army, if the General does not frequently harangue his men: for by that, he may diſpel their fears, enflame their courage, confirm their reſolution, point out the ſnares that are laid for them, promiſe them rewards, inform them of danger, and the way to eſcape it, rebuke, entreat, threaten, praiſe, reproach, or fill them with hopes, and avail himſelf of all other arts that can either excite or allay the paſſions and appetites of mankind. If any Prince or Republic, therefore, would make their armies reſpectable, they ſhould accuſtom their Generals to harangue the men, and the men to liſten to their Generals.——Religion likewiſe, and the oath which Soldiers took when they were enliſted, very much contributed to make them do their duty in former times: for upon any default, they were threatened not only with human puniſhments, but the vengeance of the Gods [*u*]. They had alſo ſeveral other religious ceremonies, which had a very good effect in all their enterprizes; and would have ſtill in any place where Religion is held in due reverence. Sertorius

[*u*] See Pol. Diſc. Book I. Chap. xi. xii. xiii. xiv. xv.

well

well knew this, and uſed to have conferences with a Hind, which he ſaid was ſent by the Gods to aſſure him of victory. Sylla pretended to converſe with an image he had taken out of the temple of Apollo; and ſeveral have given out that ſome God or other has appeared to them in dreams and viſions, and commanded them to fight the enemy. In the days of our Anceſtors, when Charles VII. of France was at war with the Engliſh, he pretended to be adviſed in every thing by a Virgin ſent from Heaven, commonly called *the Virgin of France* [x]; which gained him many a victory.——It is proper alſo to teach your men to hold the enemy in contempt, as Ageſilaus the Spartan did: who having taken ſome of the Perſians, cauſed them to be ſtripped naked and ſhewn to his Soldiers, that ſo when they had ſeen the delicacy and tenderneſs of their contexture, they might deſpiſe them hereafter. Some Commanders have laid their men under a neceſſity of fighting, by depriving them of all means of ſaving themſelves, except by victory; which is certainly the beſt method of making them fight deſperately: and this reſolution is commonly heightened, either by the confidence they put in themſelves, their arms and armour, their diſcipline, good order, and the victories they have lately gained, or by the eſteem they have for their General, which is owing rather to the opinion they have of his valour and conduct, than to any particular favour they have received from him [y]; or by the love of their country, which is natural to all men. Of laying them under a neceſſity of fighting, there are various ways; but that is the ſtrongeſt and moſt operative, which leaves men no other alternative but either to conquer or die.

[x] Or the Maid of Orleans.

[y] See Pol. Diſc. Book III. Chap. xii. xxxiii. xxxviii.

The END of the FOURTH BOOK.

THE

ART

THE ART OF WAR.

BOOK V.

THE CONTENTS.

In what order the Romans uſed to march through an enemy's country; and how an army ought to be drawn up for that purpoſe. How to reduce an army into order of battle immediately: and to form it in ſuch a manner that it may be able to defend itſelf on any ſide, in caſe of a ſudden attack. Concerning orders that are to be given by word of mouth, beat of drum, or ſound of trumpet. Of Pioneers, and the Proviſions that are neceſſary for an army. In what manner the Ancients divided the ſpoil taken from the enemy amongſt their Soldiers. How to diſcover Ambuſcades upon a march. That a General ought to be well acquainted with the country through which he is to paſs; and to keep his deſings ſecret. What means are to be taken for that purpoſe. Some other precautions that are neceſſary upon a march. How to avoid an engagement, if the enemy preſſes hard upon you, as you are going to paſs a river; and in what manner rivers may be paſſed with ſafety. How ſome Generals have eſcaped when they have been ſhut up in a paſs, or ſurrounded by the enemy.

FABRIZIO. I Have ſhewn you how an army ought to be formed that is going to engage another, how an enemy may be defeated, and many other circumſtances relating to it, which may happen

pen through various accidents and occurences. It is now time therefore, I think, to inform you in what manner I would have one drawn up, which has not an enemy actually in ſight, but expects to be attacked on a ſudden: particularly when it is marching either through an enemy's country, or one that is ſuſpected of inclining to the enemy. ——You muſt know then, in the firſt place, that the Roman Generals uſually ſent ſome troops of horſe before their armies to reconnoitre the country, and ſcour the roads: after them came the right wing, with the carriages and baggage belonging to it in its rear: then followed one of the legions with its carriages, and next to that, the other in the ſame manner: laſt of all, came the left wing with its baggage, and the reſt of the horſe in the rear of all. This was the order which they commonly obſerved upon a march; and if they were attacked either in the front or rear, they immediately cauſed all the carriages to be drawn off to the right or left, as beſt ſuited their convenience, and the nature of the ground would admit; after which, the whole army, being freed from that incumbrance, faced about to the enemy. If they were attacked on the right flank, they drew off the carriages to the left, and vice verſâ, converting the flank that was attacked into a front. This being a very good and orderly method, in my opinion, I think it is worthy of imitation; and therefore, upon the like occaſions, I would always ſend my light horſe before the army to reconnoitre the country, and ſcour the roads: the four Regiments of which it conſiſts ſhould march next, one after another; every one of them having its own baggage in its rear. And as there are two ſorts of baggage, *viz.* that which belongs to individuals, and that which is for the uſe of the army in general, I would divide the latter into four parts, and aſſign one fourth of it to the care of every regiment: the artillery, Suttlers, and others who attended the camp, ſhould alſo be diſtributed amongſt them in the ſame manner; that ſo every Regiment might have an equal ſhare of thoſe impediments. But as it ſometimes happens, that you march through a country, which inſtead of being ſuſpected, is profeſſedly your enemy, and where you hourly expect to be attacked, you will then be obliged to change the form and order of your march for greater ſecurity; and to draw up your men in ſuch a manner that neither the Peaſants nor the enemy's army may find you unprepared to receive them on any ſide, if they ſhould make a ſudden attack upon you. In ſuch caſes, the Roman Generals uſed to form their armies into an oblong ſquare, ſo that they might defend themſeves on every ſide, and be ready to fight as well as to march: and I confeſs I like that diſpoſition ſo well, that I would follow their example in drawing up the two Regiments, I have taken for the model of an army, in the ſame manner upon the like occaſions: that is, in an oblong

ſquare

ſquare with a hollow in the middle of it, of four hundred and twenty-four feet on every ſide. My flanks then would be that diſtance from one another; in each of which, I would place five Battalions in the rear of each other, with an interval of ſix feet betwixt every one of them: ſo that theſe Battalions would take up the ſpace of four hundred and twenty-four feet in depth, including the intervals betwixt them; every Battalion being ſuppoſed to take up eighty feet. In the front and rear of the hollow ſquare in the middle, I would place the other ten Battalions; that is, five of them in the front of it, and five in the rear; in ſuch a manner that four of them abreaſt of each other ſhould be next to the front of the right flank, and four drawn up in the ſame manner next to the rear of the left, with an interval of eight feet betwixt every one of them: another I would poſt next to the front of the left flank, in a line with the four firſt, and another next to the rear of the right, in a line alſo with the four others there. Now as the diſtance from one flank to another is four hundred and twenty-four feet, and the Battalions poſted in front of the ſquare (including the intervals betwixt them) will take up no more than two hundred and ſeventy-four feet, there will remain a vacant ſpace of one hundred and fifty feet betwixt the four Battalions on the right, and the ſingle one on the left. There will alſo be the ſame room left betwixt the battalions in the rear without any difference; except that the ſpace in the front will be near the left flank, and that in the rear near the right. In the former of theſe, I would place my ordinary Velites, and my extraordinary in the latter, which would not amount to quite a thouſand in each ſpace.——But to order it ſo that the hollow ſquare in the middle of the army ſhould be completely four hundred and twenty-four feet on every ſide, care muſt be taken that neither the five Battalions that are poſted in the front, nor the other five in the rear of it, may take up any part of the ſpace that is included betwixt the flanks: for which purpoſe, the laſt man on the right and left of the firſt rank of the Battalions in the rear ſhould be cloſe (not in a right line, but rather obliquely) with the innermoſt man in the laſt rank of each flank: and the laſt man on the right and left of the laſt rank of the Battalions in the front, ſhould be cloſe (in the ſame manner) with the innermoſt man in the firſt rank of each flank; and then there will be a ſpace left at every angle of the army large enough to receive a body of three hundred and thirty-three Pikemen extraordinary: but as there would ſtill be two more corps of Pikemen extraordinary left, each conſiſting of three hundred and thirty-four men, I would draw them up in a ſquare form in the middle of the area within the army; at the head of which, the General himſelf, with his proper Officers and attendants, ſhould take poſt. Now though theſe Battalions

thus drawn up march all in one direction, but may be obliged to fight on any ſide, you muſt take care to qualify them properly for that purpoſe: and therefore the five firſt Battalions being ſecured on all ſides but in their front, muſt be formed with their Pikemen in their foremoſt ranks. The five laſt Battalions are likewiſe covered on every ſide, except their rear; and therefore they muſt be formed with their Pikemen in their rearmoſt ranks. For the ſame reaſon each flank ſhould alſo have its Pikemen in the outermoſt ranks. The Corporals and other Officers ſhould take their proper poſts at the ſame time; that ſo when the army comes to engage, every corps, and every member of that corps, may be in its due place, according to the order and method I deſcribed before, when I was ſpeaking of ranging an army in battle array. The artillery I would diſtribute along each flank; the light horſe ſhould be ſent before to reconnoitre the country and ſcour the roads: and the Gens d' Armes I would poſt in the rear of each flank, at the diſtance of eighty feet from the Battalions. For it ſhould be a general rule in drawing up an army, always to poſt your horſe either on the flanks or in the rear: becauſe, if you poſt them in the front, you muſt either do it at ſuch a diſtance from the army, that if they ſhould be repulſed by the enemy, they may have time and room enough to wheel off without falling foul upon your Infantry, or you muſt leave proper intervals in the front to receive them in ſuch a manner as not to diſorder the reſt of your forces. This is a matter that deſerves to be well remembered; for many who have neglected theſe precautions have been thrown into diſorder, and routed by their own men. The carriages, ſuttlers, and other unarmed people who follow the camp, ſhould be placed in the hollow ſquare, and ſo ranged that any perſon upon occaſion may have a free paſſage through them, either from the front to the rear, or from one flank to another. The depth of the whole army, when the Battalions are thus diſpoſed, will be five hundred and eighty-four feet from front to rear, excluſive of the horſe and artillery: and as it is compoſed of two Regiments, it muſt be conſidered how each of them is to be poſted. Now ſince the Regiments are diſtinguiſhed by their reſpective marks and numbers, and each of them conſiſts of ten Battalions and a Colonel, the five firſt Battalions of the firſt Regiment ſhould be poſted in the front of the army, and the other five in the left flank; in the angle of which, on the inſide, the Colonel of it ſhould take his ſtation: after which, the five firſt Battalions of the ſecond Regiment ſhould be placed in the right flank, and the other five in the rear, with their Colonel in the angle which they make there. When the army is thus formed, you are to put it in motion, and to obſerve this order during your whole march; which will effectually ſecure you againſt any tumultuary attack

from

from the people of the country. All other proviſions for that purpoſe are unneceſſary, except you ſhall think fit now and then to ſend a troop or two of light horſe, or a party of Velites to drive them away: for ſuch ſort of diſorderly people are ſo afraid of regular forces, that they will never come within reach of their pikes, much leſs of their ſwords; but may ſet up a great ſhout perhaps, and make a feint of attacking you, like a parcel of curs barking at a maſtif, which yet they dare not venture to come near. Thus Hannibal all the while he was traverſing Gaul to invade Italy, made little or no account of the country people. ——For the ſake of convenience and expedition upon a march, you ſhould ſend Pioneers before the army to make a clear paſſage for it: and theſe Pioneers ſhould be covered by the light horſe that are ſent forwards to reconnoitre the country. In this order an army will march ten miles in a day with great eaſe, and have time enough to encamp and refreſh itſelf before it is dark: for the uſual march of an army is about twenty miles a day.——If you ſhould happen to be attacked by a regular army, it cannot be ſo ſuddenly but you will have ſufficient time to put yourſelf in a proper poſture of defence: becauſe ſuch an army muſt move in an orderly manner, and therefore you will be able to draw up your forces, either in the form I have been deſcribing, or in ſome other of the like nature. For if you are attacked in the front, you have nothing to do but to draw your Artillery from the flanks, and your horſe out of the rear, and to poſt them in the places and at the diſtances I juſt now recommended. The thouſand Velites in the front may advance; and having divided themſelves into two bodies of five hundred in each, let them take place betwixt the horſe and each wing of the army. The void which they leave may be filled with the two Corps of Pikemen extraordinary, which were poſted in the middle of the hollow ſquare. The Velites extraordinary, which were in the rear, may divide into two bodies, and range themſelves along each flank of the Battalions to ſtrengthen them; and all the carriages, ſutlers, &c. may draw off through the open, which will then be left there, into the rear of the battalions. The hollow ſquare being thus left empty, let the five Battalions, which were in the rear, march up through the vacancy betwixt each flank towards the front; three of them advancing till they come within eighty feet of thoſe in the front, and the other two halting at the ſame diſtance in the rear of thoſe three, with proper intervals betwixt them all. All this may be done in a very little time; and then your order of battle will much reſemble the firſt and principal of thoſe which I recommended ſome time ago: and if it be cloſer in the front, it is likewiſe groſſer in the flanks; which will make it ſo much the ſtronger. But as the five Battalions in the rear had poſted their Pikemen in their laſt ranks for the reaſons abovemen-

tioned, it will be neceſſary upon this occaſion to place them in their foremoſt ranks, in order to ſupport the front of the army: for which purpoſe, they muſt either wheel to the right or left about (Battalion by Battalion) all at once, and like one ſolid body, or the Pikemen muſt paſs through the ranks of the Targetmen, and place themſelves in the front of them, which is a much more expeditious way than the other, and ſubject to leſs diſorder. The ſame muſt be done upon any attack, in all parts of the army where the Pikemen are in the rear of the Targets, as I ſhall ſhew you. If the enemy preſents himſelf in the rear, you have nothing more to do than to make your whole army face about to that part, and then your rear immediately becomes the front, and your front the rear: after which, you muſt obſerve all the directions in forming that front, which I gave you before. If the enemy is likely to fall upon your right flank, the whole army muſt turn its face that way, and make the front there, as I have already ſaid; taking care to place your Cavalry, Velites, and Artillery according to that diſpoſition; in which alterations there is but little difference, excepting in the diſtance betwixt each flank, and that which there is betwixt the front and the rear. It is true, that in converting the right flank into the front, the Velites which are to fill the ſpace betwixt the horſe and the wings of the army, ſhould be thoſe that are neareſt the left flank; and the two corps of Pikemen in the area ſhould advance to fill their places: but before they do that, the carriages, &c. ſhould quit the area, and retire through the open left by the Velites behind the left flank, which will then become the rear of the army. The other Velites, which were poſted in the rear, ſhould keep their place, that ſo no open may be left there; becauſe that which was the rear before, will now become the right flank: all the other neceſſary manœuvres in this caſe muſt be conducted in the manner already preſcribed. What has been ſaid of making a front of the right flank may be applied to the left; as the like manœuvres and diſpoſition are to be made upon that occaſion. If the enemy be ſo numerous, and drawn up in ſuch a manner that he may attack you on two ſides at once, you muſt ſtrengthen them both with thoſe which are not attacked, by doubling their ranks, and dividing all the Artillery, Velites, and Cavalry betwixt them. But if he attacks you on three or four ſides at the ſame time, either he or you muſt be very imprudent; for ſurely no wiſe General would ever expoſe himſelf to be attacked on ſo many ſides at once by a powerful and well-ordered army: and on the other hand, the enemy cannot do that with ſucceſs, except his army is ſo numerous that he can ſpare almoſt as many men as your whole army conſiſts of to attack you on every ſide. If then you are ſo indiſcreet as to venture

yourſelf

yourſelf in an enemy's country, or any other place where you may be attacked by an army three times as ſtrong, and as well-diſciplined as your own, you have nobody to blame but yourſelf, if any misfortune happens to you: but if the misfortune is not owing to your own imprudence, but to ſome ſtrange and unexpected accident, you may ſave your reputation indeed, though you are totally ruined by it, which was the caſe of Scipio in Spain, and Aſdrubal in Italy. But if the enemy is not much ſtronger than you are, and attacks you on two or three ſides at once, in hopes of throwing you into diſorder by it, that is his error and your advantage: becauſe in that caſe, he muſt weaken himſelf ſo much, that you may eaſily ſuſtain the charge in one place, and attack him vigorouſly yourſelf in another; by which he muſt of conſequence be defeated.——This method of drawing up an army therefore, againſt an enemy who is not actually in ſight, but may yet attack you on a ſudden, is very neceſſary; and it is of great importance to accuſtom your Soldiers not only to be formed and to march in this order, but to prepare themſelves for battle, as if they were going to be attacked in the front, and then to fall into their former order again, and move forwards: after which, they ſhould be ſhewn how the rear or either of the flanks may be converted into the front, and then reduced into their firſt arrangement: all which muſt be often practiſed, if you would have your army ready and expert in theſe exerciſes. This is a point which all Princes and Commanders ſhould carefully attend to: for military diſcipline conſiſts chiefly in knowing how to command and execute theſe things; and that only can be called a good and well-diſciplined army, which is perfect in the practice of them: and if ſuch a one was now in being, I think it would not be poſſible to find another that could beat it. If it be ſaid that the forming an army in theſe ſquares is attended with a good deal of trouble and difficulty, I allow it; but as it is very neceſſary, the difficulty muſt be got over by frequent exerciſe; and when that is once done, all other parts of military diſcipline will ſeem light and eaſy.

ZANOBI. I agree with you that theſe things are highly neceſſary, and think you have explained them ſo well, that nothing material has either been omitted, or can be added. There are two other points however, in which I ſhould be glad to be ſatisfied: in the firſt place, when you would convert either the rear or one of the flanks into the front of your army, and the men are to face about to that part, are they to do it by word of command, or by beat of drum, or ſome other ſignal? In the next, whether thoſe whom you ſend before your army to clear the roads and make a free paſſage for it, ſhould be Soldiers belonging to your Battalions, or other ſort of people appointed on purpoſe for that ſervice?

FABRIZIO.

FABRIZIO. Your firſt queſtion is very pertinent: for many armies have been thrown into great confuſion, when the General's orders have either not been heard, or miſtaken: ſuch orders therefore ſhould be very clear and intelligible, eſpecially upon important occaſions: and if they are ſignified either by beat of drum or ſound of trumpet, it ſhould be done in ſo diſtinct a manner, that one note or ſound cannot be miſtaken for another: but if they are delivered by word of mouth, you ſhould take great care not only to avoid general terms, and to make uſe of particular ones, but even in thoſe, not to hazard any that may admit of a double interpretation [*y*]. Some armies have been ruined by their Officers crying out, *give way, give way*, inſtead of *retreat*; which ſhould be a ſufficient warning never to make uſe of that expreſſion again. If you want to convert either the rear or one of the flanks into the front, and would have your men turn their face that way, do not ſay *turn ye*, but *face about to the right, the left, or the rear*, as the occaſion requires. In like manner all other words of Command ſhould be plain and ſimple, as, *charge home, ſtand faſt, advance, retreat*, &c. and if orders can be delivered clearly and diſtinctly by word of mouth, let them be given that way; if not, make uſe of a drum or a trumpet.——As to Pioneers, I would depute ſome of my own Soldiers for that ſervice; not merely becauſe the Ancients uſed to do ſo, but that I might have the fewer unarmed people, and conſequently the fewer incumbrances in my army: for which reaſon, I would take as many as I wanted out of every Battalion, who ſhould leave their arms and accoutrements to be taken care of by the men in the next ranks to them, and be furniſhed with axes, mattocks, ſpades, and other neceſſary implements of that kind: ſo that when the enemy approached they might preſently return to their reſpective ranks in the army, and take up their arms again.

ZANOBI. But who muſt carry their pioneering implements?

FABRIZIO. The carriages appointed for that purpoſe.

ZANOBI. I doubt you would not be able to make your Soldiers do that ſort of work.

FABRIZIO. Very eaſily, as I will convince you before we part: but let us wave that matter at preſent if you pleaſe, becauſe I will tell you in the firſt place, how I would ſupply them with proviſions; for as we have pretty well fatigued them I ſuppoſe with ſo much exerciſe, it is now high time to give them a little refreſhment.——All Princes and Commanders ſhould take particular care that their armies may be as light and little encumbered as poſſible; that ſo they may be at all times

[*y*] See Pol. Diſc. Book III. Chap. xii. xxiii. xxviii.

fit

fit and ready for any enterprize or expedition. Now the difficulties occaſioned either by the want or too great plenty of proviſions, may be reckoned amongſt the moſt conſiderable that are incident to an army.

The Ancients did not give themſelves much trouble about furniſhing their troops with wine: for when they came into countries where there was none to be had, they drank water with a little vinegar in it to give it a taſte: ſo that inſtead of wine, they always carried vinegar along with them. They did not bake their bread in ovens, as is uſual in towns: for every Soldier had a certain allowance of meal or flour, and lard, which being kneaded together, made a very good and nouriſhing bread. They uſed likewiſe to carry a ſufficient quantity of oats and barley for their horſes and other cattle: for they had herds of oxen, and flocks of ſheep and goats, which were driven after the army, and therefore did not occaſion any great embarraſſment. To theſe precautions it was owing that their armies would ſometimes march for many days together, through deſart countries and rugged defiles, without diſtreſs or difficulty. On the contrary, our modern armies, which can neither live without wine, nor eat any bread but what is baked and made as it is in towns (of which they cannot carry a quantity ſufficient for any long time) muſt often either be reduced to great diſtreſs, or obliged to provide themſelves with thoſe neceſſaries in a manner that muſt be very troubleſome and expenſive. I would therefore re-eſtabliſh this method in my army, and not ſuffer any ſort of bread to be eaten by the Soldiers but what they made themſelves: As to wine, I ſhould not prohibit the uſe of it, if any was brought into the camp; but I would not take the leaſt pains to procure it for them: in all other things likewiſe relating to proviſions, I would follow the example of the Ancients, by which many difficulties and inconveniencies might be avoided, and many great advantages gained in any expedition.

ZANOBI. We have beat the enemy in a field battle, and afterwards marched our army into his territories, it is but reaſonable now that we ſhould make our advantage of it by plundering his country, laying the towns under contribution, and taking priſoners. But firſt I ſhould be glad to know how the Ancients proceeded upon ſuch occaſions.

FABRIZIO. I take it for granted (as we had ſome converſation upon this matter once before) that you will allow that wars, as they are conducted at preſent, impoveriſh not only thoſe that are beaten, but thoſe alſo that are conquerors; for if one ſide loſes its territories, the other is at an immenſe expence in gaining them: which was not the caſe in former times, when the Conqueror was always enriched by victory. The reaſon of this is, that the plunder is not now brought to account, as it uſed to be formerly, but left wholly to the diſcretion of the Soldiers, which occaſions two very great diſorders, one of which I have already

already mentioned; the other is, that it makes the Soldiers ſo greedy of ſpoil, that they lay aſide all regard to order and military diſcipline: from which it has often happened, that the Conqueror has had the victory ſnatched out of his hands again [z]. The Romans, however, who were very attentive to this point, provided againſt both theſe inconveniencies, by ordering that all the plunder ſhould belong to the public, which ſhould afterwards diſpoſe of it as they thought fit. For this purpoſe, they had public officers attending their armies, whom they called *Queſtors* or *Treaſurers*, in whoſe hands all the booty taken in war was depoſited; out of which, the Conſul paid the Soldiers, defrayed the expences of the ſick and wounded, and all other neceſſary charges of the army. The Conſul indeed had a power of diſtributing ſome part of the plunder amongſt the Soldiers, and he often did; but this was not attended with any ill conſequence: for when the enemy was conquered, all the ſpoil that had been taken from them, was placed in the middle of the army, and a certain proportion of it given to the Soldiers according to their rank and merit. This cuſtom made them more intent upon victory than plunder: for after the legionary Soldiers had defeated the enemy, they never purſued them, nor even ſo much as ſtirred out of their ranks; the Cavalry, and other light-armed forces, being employed for that purpoſe: for if the plunder was to have been the property of the firſt man that laid hold of it, it would neither have been reaſonable or poſſible to have kept the Legions firm and quiet in their ranks; and therefore ſuch a meaſure muſt have been of very bad conſequence. Hence it came to paſs that the public was enriched by any victory; as every Conſul, when he entered Rome in triumph at his return from the wars, always brought with him the greateſt part of the treaſure which he had amaſſed by contributions and plundering the enemy, into the common Stock.——The Ancients acted very wiſely in another point relating to this matter: for they ordered the third part of every man's pay to be lodged in the hands of the Standard-bearer of his Corps, who was not to be accountable for it till the end of the war. This ſeems to have been done for two reaſons: in the firſt place to ſave their money, which they otherwiſe might have ſquandered away in idle and unneceſſary expences, as moſt young men are apt to do when they have too much in their pockets; and in the next, to make them more reſolute and obſtinate in defending their Colours, as they muſt know that if the Standard was taken, they ſhould loſe all their arrears.——A due obſervation of theſe Inſtitutions, I

[z] The important error at the Battle of Minden, may ſerve to impreſs this maxim upon every Soldier's memory.

think

think, would very much contribute to revive the ancient military diſcipline amongſt us.

ZANOBI. When an army is upon a march, it muſt certainly be expoſed to many dangerous accidents, to obviate and avert which, the utmoſt ſagacity and abilities of the General, as well as the moſt determined bravery of the Soldiers, are neceſſary to be exerted. You would much oblige us, Sir, if you would point out thoſe occaſions.

FABRIZIO. I ſhall very willingly comply with your requeſt, ſince thoſe things are abſolutely neceſſary to be known by any one that is deſirous of being perfectly inſtructed in the Art of War. A General then ought above all things to beware of Ambuſhes whilſt his army is upon a march: into which he may either happen to fall of himſelf, or be cunningly drawn by the enemy before he is aware. To prevent one, he ſhould ſend out ſtrong parties to reconnoitre the country, and be particularly circumſpect if it abounds with woods and mountains, becauſe thoſe are the fitteſt places for Ambuſcades, which ſometimes prove the deſtruction of a whole army, when the General is not aware of them, but can do him no harm when he is. Flights of birds, and clouds of duſt, have frequently diſcovered an enemy: for whenever the enemy approaches they muſt of courſe raiſe a great duſt, which ſhould ſerve you therefore as a ſufficient warning to prepare for an attack. It has often happened likewiſe, that when Generals have obſerved a great number of pigeons or other birds, that uſually fly together in flocks, ſuddenly take wing, and hover about in the air a great while without lighting again, they have ſuſpected there was an Ambuſcade thereabout; in which caſe, by ſending out parties to diſcover it, they have ſometimes eſcaped the enemy, and ſometimes defeated them.—— To avoid being drawn into an Ambuſcade by the enemy, you muſt be very cautious of truſting to flattering appearances: for inſtance, if the enemy ſhould leave a conſiderable booty in your way, you ſhould ſuſpect there is a hook in the bait; or if a ſtrong party of the enemy ſhould fly before a few of your men, or a few of their men ſhould attack a ſtrong party of your army; or if the enemy runs away on a ſudden, without any apparent cauſe, it is reaſonable to imagine there is ſome artifice in it, and that they know very well what they are about: ſo that the weaker and more remiſs they ſeem to be, the more it behoves you to be upon your guard, if you would avoid falling into their Snares [*a*]. For this purpoſe, you are to act a double part; and though you ought not to be without your private apprehenſions of the enemy, yet you ſhould ſeem outwardly in all your words and actions to undervalue and deſpiſe them: the one will make you more vigilant,

[*a*] See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book VI. at the beginning.

and leſs apt to be ſurprized; and the other, inſpire your Soldiers with courage and aſſurance of victory. You ſhould always remember likewiſe, that an army is expoſed to more and greater dangers in marching through an enemy's country, than in a field battle: upon which account, it concerns a General to be doubly circumſpect at ſuch times. The firſt thing he ought to do is, to get an exact map of the whole country through which he is to march; that ſo he may have a perfect knowledge of all the towns, their diſtance from each other, the roads, mountains, rivers, woods, moraſſes, and the particular ſituation and nature of them. For this purpoſe, it is neceſſary to procure ſeveral perſons by different means, and from different parts, who are well acquainted with thoſe places, whom he ſhould examine ſeparately, and compare their accounts, that ſo he may be able to form a true judgment of them: beſides which, he ſhould ſend out parties of horſe under experienced Commanders, not only to diſcover the enemy, but to obſerve the quality of the country, and to ſee whether it agrees with his map, and the information he has received [*b*]. He muſt likewiſe keep a ſtrict eye over his guides, whom he ſhould encourage to ſerve him faithfully, with promiſes of great rewards, if they did their duty, and threaten them with the ſevereſt puniſhment, if they deceived him. But above all things, he ought to keep his deſigns very ſecret; which is a matter of the utmoſt importance in all military enterprizes: and to prevent his army from being thrown into diſorder by any ſudden attack, he ſhould order his men to be conſtantly prepared for it: for if a thing of that kind is foreſeen and expected, it is neither ſo terrible nor prejudicial when it happens, as it otherwiſe might have been. Many, in order to prevent confuſion upon a march, have placed their carriages and unarmed people near the ſtandard, and ordered them to follow it as cloſe as poſſible; that ſo if there ſhould be occaſion either to halt or retreat, they might do it with greater eaſe and readineſs; which, I think, is a cuſtom not unworthy of imitation. A General ſhould alſo be very careful neither to ſuffer one part of his forces to detach itſelf from the other whilſt they are upon a march, nor to let any of the Corps move faſter or ſlower than the reſt: for then his army would become weak and unconnected, and conſequently expoſed to greater danger. It is neceſſary, therefore, to poſt officers along the flanks, to keep an uniform pace amongſt them, by reſtraining thoſe that march too faſt, and quickening others that move too ſlowly; which cannot be done more properly than by beat of drum, or ſound of ſome muſical inſtrument. The roads ſhould alſo be laid open, and cleared in ſuch a manner, that one Battalion at leaſt may march through them at a time, in order of battle. The quality and cuſtoms of the enemy are to be conſidered in the next place, and whether they uſually make their

[*c*] See Pol. Diſc. Book III. Chap. xlviii.

their attack in the morning, or at noon, or in the evening, and whether they are more powerful in horſe or foot: according to which circumſtances, you are to regulate your own proceedings and preparations. But let us ſuppoſe ſome particular caſe. It happens ſometimes that a General is obliged to decamp before the enemy, becauſe he is not able to cope with them, and endeavours to avoid an engagement: but as ſoon as the enemy are aware of it, they likewiſe decamp, and preſs ſo hard upon his rear, that they muſt probably come up with him, and force him to an engagement before he can paſs a river that lies in his way. Now, ſome who have been in this dangerous ſituation have thrown up a deep ditch in the rear of their army, and filled it with fagots, and other combuſtible matter, which they have ſet fire to, and thereby gained time to paſs the river in ſafety, before the enemy could get over the ditch.

ZANOBI. I can hardly think ſuch an expedient as this could be of much ſervice, becauſe I remember to have read, that Hanno the Carthaginian being ſurrounded by the enemy, ſet fire to a parcel of fagots on that ſide where he deſigned to make his puſh; which had ſuch an effect, that the enemy thinking him ſufficiently ſecured from eſcaping in that quarter, drew off their guards to another; but as ſoon as he was aware of that, he ordered his men to throw their targets before their faces, to defend them from the flames and ſmoke, and to puſh through the fire; by which means, he got clear with his whole army.

FABRIZIO. Very true; but recollect what I ſaid, and compare it with what Hanno did: I told you that the others cauſed a deep ditch to be thrown up, and filled with combuſtibles, which they ſet on fire: ſo that the enemy had not only the fire but the ditch to paſs before they could come at them. Now Hanno had no ditch, and therefore as he deſigned to paſs through the fire, he took care it ſhould not be a very fierce one: otherwiſe, that alone would have ſtopped him, without any ditch. Do not you remember that when Nabis was beſieged in Sparta by the Romans, he ſet fire to that part of the town in which he was himſelf, to prevent the enemy, who had already got poſſeſſion of ſome ſtreets, from advancing any farther? by which, he not only ſtopped them where they were, but drove them entirely out of the town again. But to return. Quintus Luctatius, the Roman, having the Cimbrians cloſe at his rear, and coming to a river which he wanted to paſs, ſeemed determined to halt there and fight them; for which purpoſe, he fixed his ſtandard, threw up entrenchments, erected tents, and ſent out parties of horſe to forage: in ſhort, he acted in ſuch a manner, that the Cimbrians being fully perſuaded he deſigned to encamp there, likewiſe entrenched themſelves, and ſent out ſeveral parties

into the country as he had done; which Luctatius being aware of, immediately ſtruck his tents, and paſſed the river without any moleſtation. Some have diverted the courſe of a river, when they had no other means of paſſing it, and drawn off one part of the ſtream another way, till the other has become fordable. When the current is very rapid, the ſtrongeſt and heavieſt horſe ſhould be placed higher up the ſtream than the foot, to break the force of it, and facilitate their paſſage; and the light horſe rather lower than the foot, to pick up any of them that may happen to be carried away by it: but rivers that are not fordable muſt be paſſed by the help of bridges, pontoons, and other ſuch conveniencies; and therefore it is neceſſary to carry proper materials and implements for the conſtruction of them along with an army. It happens ſometimes that you find the enemy poſted on the other ſide to oppoſe your paſſage: in which caſe, I would recommend an expedient made uſe of by Julius Cæſar in Gaul, who coming to a river, and finding Vercingetorex poſted with an army on the oppoſite bank, marched down one ſide of it for ſeveral days, whilſt Vercingetorex marched down the other. At laſt, Cæſar having encamped in a woody part of the country, where he could conceal part of his men, drew three cohorts out of every Legion, and left them there, with orders to throw a bridge over the river, and to fortify it as ſoon as they could when he was gone: after which, he purſued his march. Vercingetorex, in the mean time, obſerving the number of his Legions was the ſame, and not ſuſpecting that any part of them were left behind, attended his motions as he had done before, on the other ſide; but when Cæſar thought the bridge was finiſhed, he made a ſudden counter-march, and finding every thing executed according to his orders, immediately paſſed the river without any oppoſition.

ZANOBI. What rule or mark is there by which one may diſcover a ford with any certainty?

FABRIZIO. A river is always the ſhalloweſt and moſt fordable where you ſee a ſort of a ridge or ſtreak acroſs it, betwixt the tail of a ſtill and the head of a ſtream; becauſe there is more gravel and ſand left there than in any other place: the truth of which obſervation has been confirmed by long experience, and therefore it may be depended upon.

ZANOBI. But ſuppoſe the bottom ſhould either be ſo rough and broken, or ſo ſoft and full of holes, that Cavalry cannot paſs with ſafety; what remedy is there in that caſe?

FABRIZIO. I would make hurdles and ſink them; over which they might paſs with eaſe.——But to proceed. If a General and his army happen to be incloſed in a paſs betwixt two mountains, out of which there are but two ways of extricating himſelf, one in his front, the other

other in his rear, and they are both occupied by the enemy, there is ſtill a method left to get clear of them, which has been practiſed by others with ſucceſs in ſuch circumſtances; and that is, to throw up a very deep and large ditch in his rear, with an intent, as it may ſeem, to ſecure himſelf effectually on that ſide, and to take all other methods to make the enemy believe he deſigns to exert his whole ſtrength in the front, in order to force his way out on that ſide, if poſſible, without apprehending any danger in his rear. The enemy therefore, in the like caſes, having been deceived by theſe appearances, have naturally turned their whole force from the rear where they thought they had him ſafe, to block him up more ſecurely in the front; upon which, he has taken an opportunity of ſuddenly throwing a draw-bridge over the ditch, and eſcaped that way out of the hands of the enemy. Lucius Minucius, the Roman Conſul, and his army, being ſhut up by the enemy in the mountains of Liguria, and ſeeing no other means to get clear of them, ſent a body of Numidians which he had with him, very badly armed, and mounted upon poor lean horſes, towards the paſs that was blocked up by the enemy, who immediately doubled their guards, and took all neceſſary meaſures to defend it with vigour upon their firſt appearance: but perceiving, as they came nearer, what a pitiful figure they made, they drew off part of their guards. The Numidians being aware of this, preſently ſet ſpurs to their horſes, and made ſo furious an attack upon thoſe that were left, that they broke through them, and afterwards made ſuch havock and devaſtation in the adjacent country, that the enemy were forced to quit their poſts, and leave the paſs open for Minucius and his whole army to come out of the mountains where they had been ſhut up. Some Generals, when they have been attacked by a much ſuperior force, have drawn up their men very cloſe together, and ſuffered themſelves to be ſurrounded by the enemy; in order to make their way by one reſolute puſh through that part of their army which they ſaw was the thinneſt and weakeſt: and this method has ſometimes ſucceeded very well. Mark Anthony, in his retreat out of Parthia, obſerving the enemy attacked him early every morning when he was decamping, and harraſſed his rear all day long, reſolved afterwards not to decamp till noon: upon which, the Parthians concluding he would not move at all that day, returned to their own Camp, and left him to continue his march all the reſt of the day, without any diſturbance. The ſame Commander, to guard againſt the arrows of the Parthians, ordered all his men to kneel down when the enemy drew near, and the ſecond rank to cover the heads of the firſt with their targets, the third of the ſecond, the fourth of the third, and ſo on: by which means the whole army was under a roof as it

were, and ſafe from their arrows.——This is all that occurs to my memory at preſent concerning the accidents that may happen to an army upon a march: if you have no other queſtions to aſk relating to this matter, I will paſs on to another part of our Subject.

The END of the FIFTH BOOK.

THE

THE ART OF WAR.

BOOK VI.

THE CONTENTS.

What ſort of Situations the Romans and Greeks made choice of for their encampments. The form of an Encampment. Concerning the Centinels and Guards that are poſted about a Camp: and the neceſſity of obſerving who goes out and comes into it. Of Military Juſtice, and the Method taken by the Ancients in puniſhing offenders. That the Ancients allowed neither Women nor Gaming in their Armies. Their method of decamping. That they uſed to encamp in healthful ſituations, and where they could neither be ſurrounded by an enemy, nor cut off from Proviſions. Directions concerning Proviſions. How to encamp more or leſs than four Regiments or Legions; and what number of men is ſufficient to fight an Enemy. What means ſome Generals have uſed to get clear of any Enemy. How to make a Prince become ſuſpicious of his Counſellors and Confidants, and to divide his forces. How to ſuppreſs Mutiny and Diſcord in an army. In what manner the Ancients interpreted bad Omens and other ſiniſter events. That an enemy ſhould not be reduced to deſpair: and of ſeveral artifices that may be uſed to decoy and over-reach them. In what manner a ſuſpected town or country is to be ſecured; and how to gain the affections of a people. That a War ſhould not be carried on in Winter.

ZANOBI. SINCE we are going to vary our Subject, I beg leave to lay down my office, and hope Battiſta della Palla will take it up: in ſo doing, we ſhall in ſome meaſure imitate the example of experienced

experienced Commanders, who in time of battle (as Signior Fabrizio has informed us) generally place the beſt of their men in the front and rear of their armies; that the former may begin the attack with vigour, and the latter ſupport it with reſolution: Coſimo Rucellai therefore was wiſely pitched upon to lead the van (if I may uſe the expreſſion) in this converſation, and Battiſta della Palla to bring up the rear: Luigi Alamanni, and I, took upon us to conduct the ſecond line: and as we all readily ſubmitted to the charge aſſigned us, I dare ſay Battiſta will do the ſame.

BATTISTA. I have hitherto ſuffered myſelf to be governed entirely by the company, and ſhall do for the future. Let us intreat you then, Signior Fabrizio, to proceed in your diſcourſe, and to excuſe this interruption.

FABRIZIO. If it is any interruption, it is an agreeable one I aſſure you; for this change of officers, as I told you before, rather refreſhes my recollection than otherwiſe.——But to reſume our Subject. It is now time to encamp and repoſe our army in ſecurity: for all creatures, you know, naturally require due intervals of reſt from their labour, and no-body can properly be ſaid to reſt, that does not enjoy ſecurity at the ſame time. You might expect perhaps that I ſhould have firſt encamped my army, and then ſhewn the order of a march, and laſt of all, how it ſhould be formed to engage an enemy. But I have done quite the contrary; and indeed I was obliged to it: for as I was to ſhew what an army upon a march had to do, when it was forced on a ſudden to prepare for action, it was neceſſary to tell you firſt in what order of battle it ſhould be drawn up.——Now to lodge your men in ſecurity, your camp ought to be ſtrong and well governed: the former of which points depends either upon art, or the nature of its ſituation; the latter, upon care and good diſcipline in the Commander. The Greeks uſed to look out for a ſituation that was ſtrong by nature; and never would encamp in any place that was not fortified either by a mountain or a river, or wood, or ſome other defence of that kind: the Romans, on the contrary, not depending ſo much upon nature as art and good diſcipline in their encampments, conſtantly made choice of ſituations where they could range their forces in uſual order, and exert their whole ſtrength upon occaſion. Hence it came to paſs that the form of their encampments was always the ſame; becauſe they never ſwerved from their eſtabliſhed diſcipline, but pitched upon a ſituation which they could make conformable to it: whereas the Greeks were often obliged to vary the form and manner of their encampments, becauſe they made their diſcipline give way to the ſituation of the place, which could not always be the ſame, or ſimilar to it.——When the ſituation therefore was but indifferent, the Romans uſed to ſupply that

defect

defect by art and induſtry: and ſince I have hitherto propoſed the conduct of that people as a model in moſt caſes, I would likewiſe recommend their method in the encampment of their armies: not that I would follow it exactly in every particular, but in ſuch only as may beſt ſuit the circumſtances of the preſent times. I have told you more than once already, that they had two Legions of their own Citizens in their Conſular armies, amounting to about eleven thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe; beſides which, they had eleven thouſand more foot compoſed of the auxiliaries furniſhed by their friends and confederates: but they never had a greater number of auxiliaries than of their own Citizens in thoſe armies; except in their horſe, in which they were not ſo ſcrupulous. I told you likewiſe, that they always poſted their Legions in the center, and their auxiliaries in each wing, whenever they came to an engagement; which cuſtom they alſo obſerved in their encampments, as you muſt have read, I dare ſay, in ancient Hiſtory; and therefore I ſhall not trouble you now with a circumſtantial detail of the method they followed upon ſuch occaſions, but content myſelf with informing you in what manner I would chuſe to encamp an army at preſent; from whence you will eaſily perceive what I have borrowed from the Romans.——You know that as they had two Legions in a Conſular army, I have likewiſe compoſed mine of two Regiments, each conſiſting of ſix thouſand foot and three hundred horſe: you remember into how many Battalions I divided them, in what manner they are armed, and by what names the different forces of which they conſiſt are diſtinguiſhed: you know laſtly, that in drawing them up either for battle or a march, I have made mention of no other troops, but only ſhewn that when their number is to be doubled, there is nothing more to be done than to double the ranks.——But now I am to ſhew you the method of encamping, I ſhall not confine myſelf to two Regiments only, but inform you how a whole army ſhould be diſpoſed of, conſiſting (like thoſe of the Romans) of two Regiments of our own forces, and the ſame number of Auxiliaries: and this I do to give you a clear idea of a complete encampment; for in the exerciſes and operations which I have hitherto deſcribed and recommended, there was no occaſion to bring a whole army into the field at once.

In order then to encamp an army of twenty-four thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, divided into four Regiments, two of our own Subjects and two of Auxiliaries, I would obſerve this method. After I had pitched upon a convenient ſituation, I would erect my Standard in the middle of a Square, two hundred feet deep on every ſide; one of which ſides ſhould face the eaſt, another the weſt, another the north, and another the ſouth: and in this ſquare the General ſhould fix his quarters. In the next place, (as it was generally the practice of the

Romans, and ſeems worthy of imitation) I would ſeparate my ſoldiers from the people who do not carry arms, and ſuch as ought to be ready and fit for action from thoſe that are loaded and encumbered in another manner: for which purpoſe, I would quarter either all or the greater part of my Soldiers on the eaſt ſide of the camp, and the others on the weſt; making the eaſt ſide the front, the weſt the rear, and the north and ſouth the flanks of my camp. To diſtinguiſh the quarters of my Soldiery I would draw two parallel lines thirteen hundred and ſixty feet in length, and at the diſtance of ſixty from each other, from the General's Standard towards the eaſt; at the extremity of which, I would have the eaſtern gate of my camp. By theſe means, a paſſage would be formed directly from that gate to the General's quarters of twelve hundred and ſixty feet in length, (for the diſtance from the Standard to the extremity of his quarters on every ſide is an hundred feet) and this interval ſhould be called the *Main Paſſage*. In the next place, let another paſſage be drawn from the ſouth to the north gate athwart the head of the Main Paſſage, and ranging cloſe by the eaſt ſide of the General's quarters, which ſhould be two thouſand five hundred feet in length (as it is to reach from one flank of the camp to the other) and ſixty in breadth: and let this be called the *Croſs-way*. Having thus marked out the General's quarters, and drawn theſe two paſſages, I would proceed to provide quarters for the two Regiments of my own Subjects: one of which I would lodge on the right hand, and the other on the left of the Main Paſſage. For this purpoſe, I would place thirty-two lodgments on the left, and as many more on the right of that paſſage, leaving a ſpace betwixt the Sixteenth and Seventeenth lodgment of Sixty feet in breadth for a *Traverſe-way* to paſs through the midſt of the quarters of theſe two Regiments, as you may ſee it marked out in the plan of an encampment which I luckily happen to have in my pocket. In the front of theſe two orders of lodgments, on each ſide of the Main Paſſage where they border upon the Croſs-way, I would quarter the Commanders of my Gens d'Armes; and their private men in the fifteen lodgments next adjoining to them: for as I have allowed an hundred and fifty Gens d'Armes to each Regiment, there would be ten private men in every one of theſe compartments. The tents of the Commanders ſhould be eighty feet broad and twenty deep; and thoſe of their private men thirty in depth and ſixty in breadth. But I muſt here deſire you to remember once for all, that whenever I make uſe of the word *breadth*, I mean the ſpace that is extended from north to ſouth; and when I ſpeak of *depth*, I would be underſtood to deſign that which ranges from eaſt to weſt.——In the next fifteen compartments which are to be on each ſide of the main paſſage, and on the eaſt of the traverſe-way (and to take up the ſame ſpace with

that

that occupied by the Gens d'Armes) I would quarter my light horſe; which being an hundred and fifty in each Regiment, would likewiſe amount to ten in every tent: and in the remaining ſixteenth I would lodge their Commanders, aſſigning them the ſame room with that taken up by the Commanders of the Gens d'Armes. The Cavalry then of both Regiments being thus provided with quarters on each ſide of the Main Paſſage, will direct us how to diſpoſe of our Infantry, as I ſhall ſhew you in the next place.

You have obſerved how I have quartered the three hundred horſe belonging to each Regiment, and their officers, in thirty-two lodgments on each ſide of the Main Paſſage, beginning from the croſs-way; and that I have left a void ſpace, ſixty feet in breadth, betwixt the ſixteenth and ſeventeenth lodgment for a traverſe-way. In order then to quarter the twenty Battalions, of which the two Regiments conſiſt, I would appoint lodgments for two Battalions behind the Cavalry on both ſides of the main paſſage; each of which ſhould be thirty feet in length and ſixty in breadth, like the others, and ſo cloſe to thoſe of the horſe that they ſhould join together. In every firſt lodgment, beginning from the Croſs-way, I would quarter the Lieutenant Colonel of the Battalion; who would then be in a line with the Commander of the Gens d'Armes: and this lodgment only ſhould be forty feet in breadth, and twenty in depth. In the next fifteen lodgments reaching to the traverſe-way, I would quarter a Battalion of foot on each ſide of the Main Paſſage; the number of which amounting to four hundred and fifty, there would be thirty in every lodgment. The other fifteen lodgments I would place contiguous to the light horſe on each ſide of the Main Paſſage, and on the eaſt of the traverſe-way, allowing them the ſame dimenſions with thoſe on the weſt: and in each range of theſe I would quarter one Battalion, aſſigning the ſixteenth, which ſhould be twenty feet in length, and forty in breadth, for the Lieutenant Colonel of the two Battalions; who would then be cloſe a-breaſt with the Commanders of the light horſe. The two firſt ranges of lodgments being thus occupied, would conſiſt partly of Cavalry, and partly of Infantry: but as the Cavalry ſhould always be clean and ready for action, and the horſemen have no Servants allowed to aſſiſt them in dreſſing and taking care of their horſes, the foot of the two Battalions that are quartered next to them ſhould be obliged to wait upon them for that purpoſe: in conſideration of which, they ſhould be excuſed from all other duty in the camp, according to the practice of the Romans.

Leaving a void ſpace then of ſixty feet wide, on the back of the lodgments on each ſide of the Main Paſſage, one of which may be called the *firſt way on the right*, the other, *the firſt way on the left*, I would mark out another range of thirty-two lodgments parallel

to the others, and with the back parts of them close together; allowing the same dimensions, with an interval likewise betwixt the fixteenth and seventeenth for the traverse-way: and in each of these I would quarter four Battalions, with their Commanders in the first and last of them. In the next place, I would leave another space of sixty feet wide on the back of these two lodgments, for a way which should be called the *second way on the right*, on one side the main passage; and the *second way on the left*, on the other: close to which, I would have another range of double lodgments on each side of the main passage, in every respect like the other two; in which I would quarter the four remaining Battalions, and their Lieutenant Colonels: so that all the Cavalry and Infantry of our own two Regiments would be disposed of in six ranges, or lines of double lodgments, with the main passage betwixt them.——As to the two auxiliary Battalions (supposing them to consist of the same number and sort of forces) I would place them on each side of our own, in the like order and number of double lodgments: the two first lines of which should be partly horse, and partly foot, and at the distance of sixty feet from the two third lines of our own on each side the main passage, to make room for a way betwixt them, which should be called on one side, *the third way on the right*; and on the other, *the third way on the left*. After this, I would mark out two other lines of lodgments, parallel to the first on each side of the main passage, and divided like those of our own Battalions, with spaces of sixty feet betwixt them for other ways, which should be numbered and denominated from their situation and distance from the main passage: and then all this part of the army would be quartered in twelve ranges or lines of double lodgments, with thirteen ways or passages betwixt the several divisions of it, including the Main Passage, Traverse, and Cross-ways.——Besides this, I would have a void space left of two hundred feet in width, betwixt the lodgments and the fosse which should encompass them: so that computing the whole distance from the center of the General's quarters to the eastern gate, you will find that it amounts to thirteen hundred and sixty feet.——There are still remaining two vacant intervals, one from the General's quarters to the South, and the other from thence to the North gate of the Camp; each of which (reckoning from the center) is twelve hundred and fifty feet in length. Deducting then from each of these spaces an hundred feet, which are taken up by the General's quarters on each side, and ninety feet on each side for an Area or Piazza, and sixty for a way to divide the two abovementioned spaces in the middle, and two hundred more for the interval betwixt the lodgments and the fosse, there will be a space left of eight hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred in depth,

for

for a line of lodgments on each ſide; the depth being the ſame with that of the General's quarters. Theſe ſpaces being properly divided, will make forty lodgments on both ſides of the General's quarters, each of which will be an hundred feet long, and forty broad: and in theſe I would quarter the Colonels of the ſeveral Regiments, the Paymaſters, the Quartermaſter-General, and in ſhort, all thoſe that had any particular charge or buſineſs in the army; leaving ſome of them vacant for the reception of ſtrangers or volunteers, and attendants upon the General. On the backſide of the General's quarters I would make a paſſage from north to ſouth ſixty-two feet wide, and call it the HEAD-WAY, which ſhould run along the weſt ſide of the eighty lodgments juſt mentioned: and then thoſe lodgments, and the General's quarters, would be included betwixt that paſſage and the croſs-way. From the head-way I would draw another paſſage directly from the General's quarters to the weſtern gate of the camp, which ſhould be ſixty feet wide, and of the ſame length with the main paſſage; and this ſhould be called the *Market-way*. Theſe two paſſages being drawn, I would make a market-place, or ſquare, at the beginning of the market-way, over againſt the General's quarters, and joining to the head-way, which ſhould be two hundred and forty feet on every ſide. On the right and left of the market-place I would have a row of quarters, each of which ſhould contain eight double lodgments, which ſhould be thirty feet in depth, and ſixty in breadth; that is, ſixteen on each hand of the market-place. In theſe I would lodge the ſupernumerary horſe belonging to the auxiliary Regiments: and if there ſhould not be room enough for all of them there, I would quarter thoſe that were excluded in ſome of the eighty lodgments next to the General's quarters, but chiefly in thoſe that lie neareſt the foſſe.

It now remains that we ſhould quarter our Pikemen and Velites extraordinary; for you know there are a thouſand of the former, and five hundred of the latter in every Regiment: ſo that our own two Regiments having two thouſand Pikemen, and one thouſand Velites extraordinary, and thoſe of the Auxiliaris as many more, we have ſtill ſix thouſand foot to diſpoſe of; all of whom I would quarter on the three ſides of the foſſe, in the weſtern part of the camp. For this purpoſe, I would have a row of five double lodgments, an hundred and fifty feet long, and an hundred and twenty wide, on the weſt ſide of the north end of the head-way, leaving a vacant ſpace of two hundred feet betwixt them and the foſſe: which row conſiſting of ten ſingle lodgments, and every lodgment being thirty feet deep, and ſixty wide, would countain three hundred foot; that is, thirty in every one of them. Next to theſe (but with an interval of ſixty-two feet betwixt them)

them) I would place another row of five double lodgments of the ſame dimenſions; and after that, another; and ſo on till there were five rows of five double lodgments of the ſame ſize, and with the ſame intervals betwixt them, all in a right line one with another, at the diſtance of two hundred feet from the foſſe on the weſt of the Head-way, and on the north ſide of the camp: ſo that there would be fifty lodgments in all, which would contain fifteen hundred men. Turning then from the left towards the weſtern gate, I would mark out five other rows of double lodgments in the ſpace betwixt the laſt of the other five and that gate, of the ſame contents and proportion, but with intervals of only thirty feet betwixt one row and the other; in which I would likewiſe quarter fifteen hundred men: and in this manner, all the Pikemen and Velites extraordinary belonging to our own two Regiments would be diſpoſed of in ten rows of double lodgments, that is, an hundred ſigle ones, (reckoning ten in a row) along the range of the foſſe from the north to the weſt gate. In the like manner I would provide for the Pikemen and Velites extraordinary belonging to the auxiliary Regiments; quartering them all in ten rows of double lodgments of the ſame dimenſions, and with the ſame intervals betwixt them, along the range of the foſſe, from the weſt to the ſouth gate; allowing their Colonels and other officers to take up ſuch quarters there as ſhould be moſt convenient for them.

My Artillery I would plant all along the banks on the inſide of the foſſe: and in the vacant ſpace, which would be ſtill left on the weſt ſide of the Head-way, I would lodge all the unarmed people, and impediments belonging to the camp. Now you muſt know by the word *impediments*, the Ancients meant all the baggage, and people, and ſtores that are neceſſary in an army, except the ſoldiers; as Carpenters, Joiners, Smiths, Stone-cutters, Maſons, Engineers, Cannoneers (though indeed theſe laſt may properly be reckoned Soldiers) Herdſmen, Oxen and Sheep for the ſuſtenance of the army, Cooks, Butchers; in ſhort, all manner of Artificers and implements, together with proper vehicles and beaſts of burden to carry the ammunition, proviſions, and other requiſites. However, I would not aſſign ſeparate and diſtinct lodgments for all theſe things; but content myſelf with ordering that ſome paſſages ſhould be left entirely clear and unoccupied by them. Of the four void ſpaces which would be left betwixt theſe paſſages, I would appropriate one to the Herdſmen and their cattle; another to the Artificers of every kind; another to make room for the carriages that contain the proviſions: and the laſt to receive thoſe that are loaded with arms and ammunition. The paſſages which I would have left quite open,

ſhould

ſhould be the market-way, the head-way, and another called the *middle-way*, to be drawn acroſs the camp from north to ſouth, which ſhould cut the market-way at right angles, and anſwer the ſame purpoſes on the weſtern ſide of the camp, as the traverſe-way does in the eaſtern. Beſides this, I would have ſtill another paſſage drawn behind the lodgments of the Pikemen and the Velites extraordinary, which are ranged on three ſides of the foſſe; and every one of theſe paſſages ſhould be ſixty feet wide.

BATTISTA. I confeſs my ignorance in theſe matters, and think I have no reaſon to be aſhamed of it, as the Art of War is not my profeſſion. The diſpoſition however, which you have made, pleaſes me very much; and I have but two queſtions to aſk relating to it, which I beg the favour of you to reſolve: the firſt is, why you make the ways and paſſages about the lodgments ſo broad? The ſecond (which perplexes me the moſt) is, in what manner the ſpaces you allow for the lodgments are to be occupied?

FABRIZIO. The reaſon why I make all the paſſages ſixty feet wide, is that a whole Battalion at a time, drawn up in order of battle, may paſs through them: for I told you before, if you remember, that every Battalion takes up a ſpace of fifty or ſixty feet in width. It is neceſſary alſo, that the interval betwixt the lodgments and the foſſe ſhould be two hundred feet wide, in order to draw up the Battalions there in a proper manner upon occaſion, to manage the Artillery, to make room for booty or priſoners taken from the enemy, and for throwing up new banks and ditches if it ſhould be requiſite. It is likewiſe proper to have the lodgments at a good diſtance from the foſſe, that they may be more out of the reach of fireworks, and other offenſive things, which an enemy might otherwiſe throw in amongſt them:——In anſwer to your ſecond queſtion, I muſt tell you, it is not my intention that every ſpace which I have laid out for lodgments ſhould be wholly covered by one great tent only, but that it ſhould be divided and occupied in ſuch a manner as may beſt ſuit the convenience of thoſe for whoſe uſe it is deſigned, and have more or fewer tents in it as they pleaſe, provided they did not exceed the limits preſcribed them.

But in order to lay out theſe lodgments, there ſhould always be able and experienced Engineers, Quarter-maſters, and Builders, ready to mark out a camp, and diſtinguiſh the ſeveral paſſages and diviſions of it with ſtakes and cordage, as ſoon as the General has fixed upon a proper ſituation for it: and to prevent confuſion, the front of the camp ſhould always look the ſame way; that ſo every man may know near what paſſage, and in which quarter, he may find his tent.

tent. This rule being conſtantly obſerved, the Camp will be a ſort of a moving Town, which carries the ſame ſtreets, the ſame houſes, and the ſame aſpect with it wherever it goes; a convenience which thoſe muſt not expect, who make choice of ſuch ſituations only as are naturally ſtrong and advantageous; becauſe they muſt always change the form of their camp according to the nature of the ground. The Romans (as I ſaid before) made their Camps ſtrong in any ſituation, by throwing up a ditch and rampart about them, and leaving a vacant ſpace betwixt their lodgments and the ditch, which was generally twelve feet wide, and ſix deep; though they ſometimes made it both wider and deeper, eſpecially if they either deſigned to continue long in the ſame place, or expected to be attacked. For my own part, I would not fortify a Camp with a Palliſade, except I intended to winter in it; but content myſelf with a rampart and a ditch, not of leſs width or depth than what has been juſt now mentioned, but greater if occaſion required: beſides which, I would have an half moon at every angle of the Camp, with ſome pieces of artillery in it to take the enemy in flank, if the trenches ſhould be attacked. In this exerciſe of encamping and decamping, the army ſhould frequently be employed, in order to make the ſeveral officers ready and expert in laying out the diſtinct lodgments in a proper manner, and to teach the ſoldiers to know their reſpective quarters: nor is there any great difficulty in it, as I ſhall ſhew elſewhere; for I will now proceed to ſay ſomething concerning the guards that are neceſſary in a Camp, becauſe if that point is not duly attended to, all the reſt of our labour and care will be to no purpoſe.

BATTISTA. Before you do that, I wiſh you would inform me what is to be done when you would encamp near an enemy; for ſurely there cannot be time enough, upon ſuch an occaſion, to diſpoſe things in this regular order, without expoſing yourſelf to great danger.

FABRIZIO. No General will ever encamp very near an enemy, except he is in a condition to give them battle whenever they pleaſe: and if the enemy be likewiſe diſpoſed to engage, the danger cannot be more than ordinary; becauſe he may draw out two thirds of his army, and leave the other to form his Camp. The Romans, in ſuch caſes, committed the care of throwing up entrenchments, and laying out their Camp, to the Triarii, and cauſed the Principes and Haſtati only to ſtand to their arms: for as the Triarii were the laſt line of their army that was to engage, they might leave their work if the enemy advanced, and draw up under arms in their proper ſtation. So that if you would imitate the Romans in the like caſe, you ſhould leave the care of laying out and fortifying your Camp to

the

the Battalions in the rear of your army, which reſemble the Triarii in thoſe of the Romans.

But to return to what I was going to ſay concerning the Guards of a Camp. I do not remember to have read that the Ancients uſed to keep any Guards or Centinels on the outſide of their entrenchments in the night-time, as we do at preſent. The reaſon of which I take to be, that they thought their armies were expoſed to much danger by making uſe of them; as perhaps they might either betray or deſert them of their own accord, or be ſurpriſed or corrupted by the enemy: and therefore they did not think fit to put any confidence in them. Upon theſe conſiderations, they truſted wholly to the Guards and Centinels that were ſtationed within their entrenchments; which were kept with ſuch order and exactneſs, that the leaſt failure in that duty was puniſhed with death. I ſhall not trouble you however, with a long and circumſtantial detail of the order and method which they obſerved in this matter, becauſe you very likely have read it in their hiſtories, or if you have not, you may meet with it there whenever you pleaſe. For the ſake of brevity then, I will only tell you what I would do myſelf upon ſuch occaſions. I would cauſe one third of my army to continue under arms every night: and one fourth of this to be upon guard along the entrenchments and other proper places of the camp, allowing a double guard at every angle of it; one part of which ſhould conſtantly remain there, and the other be patrolling all night from that angle to the next, and back again: and this method ſhould be obſerved in the day-time alſo, if the enemy lay near me. As for giving out a *Parole*, or *Watch-word*, and changing it every night, and other ſuch circumſtances belonging to Guards and Centinels, I ſhall ſay nothing of them, becauſe they are known by every one. But there is one thing of the utmoſt importance, the practice of which will be attended with much advantage, and the neglect of it with great prejudice; and that is, to obſerve ſtrictly who lies out of the Camp at night, and what ſtrangers come into it: which is a very eaſy matter to be done by ſuch as obſerve the manner and order of encamping I have recommended; becauſe every lodgment having a certain number of men belonging to it, you may preſently ſee if there be more or fewer in it than there ſhould be: if any are abſent without leave, they ſhould be puniſhed as deſerters; and if there are more than there ought to be, you ſhould diligently enquire who they are? what buſineſs they have there? and of other circumſtances relating to them. This precaution will make it very difficult, if not impoſſible, for the enemy to hold any ſecret correſpondence with your Officers, or to penetrate into your deſigns: and if the Romans had not carefully attended to this point, Claudius Nero

could not have left his camp in Lucania, and gone privately into the territories of Picenum, and returned from thence to his former quarters, whilſt Hannibal knew nothing of the matter all the while, though the two Camps lay very near each other [c].

But it is not ſufficient barely to give out good and wholſome orders for this purpoſe, if the obſervance of them is not enforced with the utmoſt ſeverity: for there is no caſe whatſoever in which the moſt exact and implicit obedience is ſo neceſſary as in the government of an army: and therefore the laws that are eſtabliſhed for the maintenance of it ought to be rigorous and ſevere, and the General a man of inflexible reſolution in ſupporting them. The Romans puniſhed with death, not only thoſe that failed in their duty when they were upon guard, but all ſuch as either abandoned their poſt in time of battle, or carried any thing by ſtealth out of the Camp, or pretended they had performed ſome exploit in action which they had not done, or engaged without the orders of their General, or threw away their arms out of fear: and when it happened that a Cohort or a whole Legion had behaved ill, they made them caſt lots, and put every tenth man to death, which was called *Decimation:* this was done to avoid ſhedding too much blood, and that though they did not all ſuffer, every man might be under an apprehenſion that the lot might fall upon him. But where there are ſevere puniſhments, there ſhould likewiſe be proportionable rewards, to excite men to behave themſelves well by motives both of hope and fear; and therefore they always rewarded thoſe that had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by any meritorious action; eſpecially ſuch as had either ſaved the life of a fellow-citizen in battle, or been the firſt in ſcaling the walls of an enemy's town, or ſtorming their Camp, or had wounded, or killed, or diſmounted an enemy. In this manner every man's deſert was properly taken notice of, and recompenſed by the Conſuls, and publicly honoured: and thoſe that obtained any reward for ſervices of this kind (beſides the reputation and glory which they acquired amongſt their brother Soldiers) were received by their friends and relations with all manner of rejoicings and congratulations, when they returned from the wars.——It is no wonder then that a people, who were ſo exact in rewarding merit, and puniſhing offenders, ſhould extend their Empire to ſuch a degree as they did: and certainly they are highly worthy of imitation in theſe reſpects. Give me leave therefore to be a little more explicit in deſcribing one of their puniſhments. ——When a delinquent ſtood convicted before his General, the latter gave him a ſlight ſtroke with a rod; after which, he might run away

[d] See *the Prince*, Chap. xiv. and *Pol. Diſc.* Book III. Chap. xxxix.

if

if he could: but as every Soldier in the army had liberty to kill him, he no ſooner began to run but they all fell upon him with their ſwords, or darts, or other weapons; ſo that he ſeldom eſcaped: and if he did, he was not allowed to return home, except under heavy penalties, and ſuch a load of infamy, that it would have been much better for him to have died. This cuſtom is in ſome meaſure ſtill kept up by the Swiſs in their armies, who always cauſe a convicted offender to be killed by the reſt of the Soldiers: and I think it is a very good one; for in order to prevent others from ſupporting or protecting an offender, it is certainly the beſt way to leave the puniſhment of him to themſelves; becauſe they will always look upon him with a different eye in that caſe, from what they would if he is to be puniſhed by any body elſe. This rule will alſo hold good in popular Governments, as we may learn from the example of Manlius Capitolinus, who being accuſed by the Senate, was ſtrenuouſly defended by the People, till they were left to judge him themſelves: after which, they preſently condemned him to die. This then is a good method of puniſhing delinquents, and of cauſing juſtice to be executed upon them in ſecuriry, without fear of exciting mutiny or ſedition. But as neither the fear of laws, nor reverence to man alone, are ſufficient to bridle an armed multitude, the Ancients uſed to call in the aid of Religion, and made their Soldiers take a very ſtrict oath to pay due obedience to military diſcipline with many awful ceremonies and great ſolemnity: beſides which, they uſed all other methods to inſpire them with a fear of the Gods; that ſo if they violated their oaths, they might have not only the aſperity of human laws, but the vengeance of Heaven to apprehend.

BATTISTA. Did the Romans ever ſuffer women or gaming in their Camp, as we do at preſent?

FABRIZIO. They prohibited both: nor was the reſtraint very grievous; for their Soldiers were ſo conſtantly employed either in one ſort of duty or other, that they had no time to think either of women or gaming, or any other of thoſe vile avocations which commonly make Soldiers idle and ſeditious.

BATTISTA. They were in the right of it.——But pray tell me what order they obſerved when they were going to decamp.

FABRIZIO. The General's trumpet was ſounded three times: at the firſt ſounding, they ſtruck their tents and packed them up; at the ſecond, they loaded their carriages; and at the third, they began their march in the order I have deſcribed before, with their Legions in the middle of the army, and their baggage in the rear of every particular corps. For which purpoſe, it is neceſſary that one of the Auxiliary Regiments ſhould move firſt with its own baggage, and a fourth part of the public impediments in its rear, which was placed in one or other of

the four diviſions in the weſtern part of the camp that I ſpoke of not long ago: and therefore every Legion ſhould have its particular diviſion aſſigned to its charge; that ſo when they are about to march, every one of them may know where to take its place.

BATTISTA. Did the Romans uſe to make any other proviſions in laying out their Camps beſides thoſe which you have already mentioned?

FABRIZIO. I muſt tell you again that they always kept to the ſame form in their encampments, which was their firſt and principal conſideration. Beſides this, they had two other great points in view: the firſt of which was a wholeſome ſituation; and the next, to encamp where the enemy could neither ſurround, nor cut them off from water or proviſions. To prevent ſickneſs in their army therefore, they always avoided marſhy grounds, and ſuch as were expoſed to noxious winds: of which they formed their judgment not ſo much from the quality of the place, as from the conſtitution and appearance of the people who lived thereabout: for if they either had ſickly complexions, or were ſubject to aſthmas, or dropſies, or any other endemic diſorder, they would not encamp there. As to the other point of not being liable to be ſurrounded by an enemy, they conſidered where their friends and where their enemy lay, and judged from thence of the probability or poſſibility of their being ſurrounded or not: upon which account, it is neceſſary that a General ſhould be very well acquainted with the nature and ſituation of the country he is in, and that he ſhould have others about him who are as knowing in theſe reſpects as himſelf. There are other precautions alſo to be uſed in order to prevent diſtempers and famine in an army; ſuch as reſtraining all manner of exceſs and intemperance amongſt the Soldiers, by taking care that they ſleep under cover, that your Camp may be near trees that will afford them ſhade in the day-time, and wood enough for fuel to dreſs their victuals, and that they do not march when the heat of the Sun is too intenſe. For this reaſon, they ſhould decamp before day-light in the Summer, and take care not to march through ice and ſnow in the winter, except they have frequent opportunities of making good fires, and warm cloathing to guard them againſt the inclemency of the weather. It is neceſſary likewiſe to prevent them from drinking ſtagnated and fetid water: and if any of them happen to fall ill, you ſhould give ſtrict orders to the Phyſicians and Surgeons of the army to take great care of them: for bad indeed is the condition of a General, when he has a ſickneſs amongſt his men and an enemy to contend with at the ſame time. But nothing conduces ſo much to keep an army in good health and Spirits as Exerciſe: and therefore the Ancients uſed to exerciſe their troops every day. Due exerciſe then is ſurely of great importance, as it preſerves your health in the Camp, and ſecures you victory in the field.

As

As to guarding againſt famine, it is not only neceſſary to take timely care that the enemy may not be able to cut you off from proviſions, but to conſider from whence you may be conveniently ſupplied with them, and to ſee that thoſe which you have are properly huſbanded and preſerved. You ſhould therefore always have a month's proviſions at leaſt beforehand, and afterwards oblige your neighbouring friends and allies to furniſh you daily with a certain quantity: you ought likewiſe to eſtabliſh Magazines and Storehouſes in ſtrong places, and above all to diſtribute your proviſions duly and frugally amongſt your men, giving them a reaſonable proportion every day, and attending ſo ſtrictly to this point that you may not by any means exhauſt your ſtores, and run yourſelf a-ground: for though all other calamities in an army may be remedied in time, famine alone grows more and more grievous the longer it continues, and is ſure to deſtroy you at laſt; nor will any enemy ever come to an engagement with you when he is ſure to conquer you in ſuch circumſtances without it: for though a victory obtained in this manner may not be ſo honourable as one that is gained by dint of arms, it is certain however, and not attended with any riſque. An army then cannot poſſibly eſcape famine which wantonly and extravagantly waſtes its proviſions without foreſight, or regard to rule or meaſure, or the circumſtances of the times: for want of timely care will prevent its having ſupplies, and profuſion conſumes what it already has to no purpoſe: upon which conſideration, the Ancients took care their Soldiers ſhould eat no more than a daily and reaſonable allowance, and that too only at ſtated times; for they never were ſuffered either to breakfaſt, or dine, or ſup, but when their General did the ſame. How well theſe excellent rules are obſerved in our armies at preſent, I need not tell you; for every one knows that our Soldiers, inſtead of imitating the regularity and ſobirety of the Ancients, are a parcel of intemperate, licentious, and drunken fellows.

BATTISTA. When our converſation firſt turned upon Encampments, you ſaid you would not confine yourſelf to two Regiments only, but take four, the better to ſhew how a complete army ſhould be encamped. But I ſhould be glad to know in the firſt place, how you would quarter your army if it conſiſted of a greater or ſmaller number of men than that? and in the next, what number you would think ſufficient to engage any enemy?

FABRIZIO. To your firſt queſtion, I anſwer, that if your army has five or ſix thouſand, more or leſs than that number, in it, you have nothing to do but either to add to or to diminiſh your rows of lodgments accordingly: and this you may do in what proportion you pleaſe. The Romans however had two different camps when they joined two Conſular armies together, the rear quarters of which (where the impedi-

and unarmed people were) faced each other. As to your ſecond queſtion, the common armies which the Romans brought into the field uſually conſiſted of about twenty-four thouſand men, and upon the moſt preſſing occaſions they never exceeded fifty thouſand. With this number they made head againſt two hundred thouſand Gauls who invaded them after the concluſion of the firſt Carthaginian war: with the ſame number they oppoſed Hannibal: indeed, both the Romans and Greeks, depending chiefly upon their diſcipline and good conduct, always carried on their wars with ſmall armies; whereas both the eaſtern and weſtern nations had vaſt and almoſt innumerable hoſts: the latter truſting wholly to their natural ferocity, and the former availing themſelves of the implicit ſubmiſſion which their ſubjects ſhew to their Princes. But neither the Greeks nor Romans being remarkable either for natural ferocity, or implicit ſubmiſſion to their Princes, were obliged to have recourſe to good diſcipline; the power and efficacy of which were ſo great, that one of their ſmall armies often defeated a prodigious multitude of the fierceſt and moſt obſtinate people. In imitation then of the Greeks and Romans, I would not have above fifty thouſand men in an army, but fewer if I might chuſe: for more are apt to create diſcord and confuſion, and not only become ungovernable themſelves, but corrupt others that have been well-diſciplined: King Pyrrhus therefore uſed to ſay, that *with an army of fifteen thouſand good Soldiers he would fight the whole world* [d].

But let us now proceed to other matters. You have ſeen our army gain a battle, and the accidents which may occur in the time of action: you have likewiſe ſeen it upon a march, and been acquainted with the dangers and embarraſſments it is ſubject to in thoſe circumſtances: and laſtly, you have ſeen it regularly quartered in camp, where it ought to ſtay awhile, not only to enjoy a little reſt after its fatigues, but to concert proper meaſures for bringing the Campaign to a happy

[d] "At the Siege of Alexia, the Gauls having drawn all their powers together to fight Cæſar, after they had made a general muſter of their forces, reſolved in a council of war to diſmiſs a good part of that great multitude, that they might not fall into confuſion. And indeed it ſtands to reaſon that the body of an Army ſhould conſiſt of a moderate number, and reſtrained to certain bounds, both in regard to the difficulty of providing for them, and the difficulty of governing and keeping them in order: at leaſt it is very eaſy to make it appear by example, that armies ſo monſtrous in number have ſeldom done any thing to the purpoſe. According to the ſaying of Cyrus in Xenophon, "it is not the number of men, but the number of good men, that gives the advantage;" the remainder ſerving rather to embarraſs than aſſiſt: and Bajazet principally grounded his reſolution of giving Tamerlane battle, contrary to the opinion of all his Captains, upon this, that the numberleſs hoſt his enemy had brought into the field, gave him aſſured hope of their falling into confuſion. Scanderberg, a good and expert judge in theſe matters, uſed to ſay, "that ten or twelve thouſand faithful fighting men were ſufficient for a good Leader to ſecure his reputation on all military occaſions." *See Montaigne*, Book II. Chap. xxxiv.

concluſion:

concluſion: for many things are to be conſidered and digeſted in camp, eſpecially if either the enemy ſtill keeps the field, or there are any towns belonging to them not yet reduced, or any in poſſeſſion of people whoſe fidelity and affection you have reaſon to ſuſpect: becauſe in thoſe caſes you muſt make yourſelf maſter of one, and ſecure the attachment of the other. It is neceſſary therefore to ſhew in what manner, and by what means, theſe difficulties are to be ſurmounted with the ſame reputation which we have hitherto carried on the war.——To deſcend to particulars then, I ſay, that if ſeveral different men, or different States, ſhould think of doing any particular thing which may tend to your advantage and their own prejudice, ſuch as diſmantling ſome of their towns, or baniſhing a great number of their inhabitants, you ſhould abet them in it in ſuch a manner that none of them may think you have any ſelf-intereſted view of your own in ſo doing; by which you may amuſe them ſo effectually, that inſtead of confederating together for their own ſafety, they will not think of giving each other the leaſt aſſiſtance, and then you may ſuppreſs them all without any material oppoſition. But if this method will not take, you muſt order every one of them to do what you would have done on the ſame day; that ſo each State imagining that no other has any orders of the ſame kind beſide itſelf, may be obliged to obey, becauſe it has no ſupport from its neighbours to depend upon; and thus you may ſucceed in your deſigns without any reſiſtance or combination formed againſt you.——If you ſhould ſuſpect the fidelity of any people, and would ſecure yourſelf againſt them by taking them unawares, in order to diſguiſe your intentions the more effectually, it is the beſt way to pretend a perfect confidence in them, to conſult them in ſome deſign which you ſeem to have upon other people, and to deſire their aſſiſtance in it, as if you had not the leaſt doubt of their ſincerity, or thought of moleſting them; which will put them off their guard, and give you an opportunity of dealing with them as you pleaſe.——If you ſuſpect any body in your army of giving the enemy intelligence of your deſigns, you cannot do better than avail yourſelf of his treachery, by ſeeming to truſt him with ſome ſecret reſolution which you intend to execute, whilſt you carefully conceal your real deſign: by which, perhaps, you may diſcover the traitor, and lead the enemy into an error that may poſſibly end in their deſtruction.——If you would leſſen your army, in order to relieve ſome friend, ſo privately that the enemy may not be aware of it (as Claudius Nero did) you ſhould not leſſen the number of your lodgments, but leave the vacant tents ſtanding, and the colours flying, making the ſame fires and keeping the ſame guards that you did before. In like manner, if you receive freſh ſupplies, and would not have the enemy know that you have been reinforced, you muſt not increaſe the

number of your tents; for nothing is of greater importance than to keep theſe and other ſuch things as ſecret as poſſible. When Metellus commanded the Roman armies in Spain, a certain perſon took the liberty of aſking him what he intended to do the next day; upon which, he told him that *if he thought the Shirt upon his back knew that, he would immediately take it off and burn it.* Marcus Craſſus being likewiſe importuned by one of his Officers to let him know when he deſigned to decamp, aſked him *if he thought he ſhould be the only one in the camp that would not hear the ſound of the trumpets.*——In order to penetrate into the ſecret deſigns, and diſcover the condition of an enemy, ſome have ſent Ambaſſadors to them with ſkilful and experienced officers in their train, dreſſed like the reſt of their attendants; who have taken an opportunity of viewing their army, and obſerving their ſtrength and weakneſs in ſo minute a manner that it has been of much ſervice. Others have pretended to quarrel with and baniſh ſome particular Confidant, who has gone over to the enemy, and afterwards informed them of their deſigns. The intentions of an enemy are likewiſe ſometimes diſcovered by the examination of the Priſoners you take.——When Martius commanded in the war againſt the Cimbrians, and wanted to try the fidelity of the Gauls, who at that time inhabited Lombardy, and were in confederacy with the Romans, he wrote ſome Letters to them which were left open, and others that were ſealed; in the former of which, he deſired they would not open thoſe that were ſealed till a certain day; but before that time he ſent for them again, and finding they had been opened, he perceived there was no confidence to be put in that people.——Some Princes have not immediately ſent an army to oppoſe the enemy when their territories have been invaded, but made an incurſion into their country, and thereby obliged them to return to defend themſelves; a method which has often ſucceeded: for in ſuch caſes, your Soldiers being elated with victory, and loaded with plunder, fight with Spirit and confidence; whilſt thoſe of the enemy are dejected at the thoughts of being beaten inſtead of conquering: ſo that a diverſion of this kind has frequenly been attended with good conſequences. But this you muſt not attempt, except your country is better fortified than that of the enemy: for if you do, you will certainly be ruined.——If a General is blocked up in his camp by an enemy, he ſhould endeavour to ſet a treaty of accommodation on foot with them, and to obtain a truce for a few days; during which, they are apt to be ſo careleſs and remiſs that he may poſſibly find an opportunity of ſlipping out of their hands. By theſe means, Sylla twice eluded the enemy; and in this manner Aſdrubal got clear of Claudius Nero when he had ſurrounded him in Spain. Beſides theſe expedients, there are other methods likewiſe of extricating yourſelf from an enemy; as either

either by attacking them with one part of your forces only, that ſo while their attention is wholly turned upon that ſide, the reſt of your army may find means to ſave themſelves; or by ſome uncommon Stratagem, the novelty of which may fill them with terror and aſtoniſhment at the ſame time, in ſuch a manner that they cannot reſolve how to act, or whether to act at all; as Hannibal did, when he was ſurrounded by Fabius Maximus: for having a great number of oxen in his camp, he faſtened lighted torches to their horns in the night-time and let them looſe to run about the country; at the ſtrangeneſs of which ſpectacle Fabius was ſo perplexed that he could not help letting them eſcape. ——But above all things, a General ought to endeavour to divide the enemy's ſtrength, either by making him ſuſpicious of his Counſellors and Confidants, or obliging him to employ his forces in different places and detachments at once, which conſequently muſt very much weaken his main army. The firſt may be done by ſparing the poſſeſſions of ſome particular men in whom he moſt confides, and not ſuffering their houſes or eſtates to be damaged in a time of general plunder and devaſtation; or by returning their children and other relations when they are taken priſoners, without any ranſom. Thus when Hannibal had ravaged and burnt all the towns and country round about Rome, he ſpared the eſtate of Fabius Maximus alone: Coriolanus likewiſe, returning at the head of an army to Rome, carefully preſerved the poſſeſſions of the Nobility, and burnt thoſe of the Plebeians. When Metellus commanded the Roman army againſt Jugurtha, he tampered with the Ambaſſadors who were ſent to him by that Prince, to deliver up their maſter priſoner to him, and kept up a correſpondence with them for the ſame purpoſe after they had left him, till Jugurtha diſcovered it, and grew ſo jealous of his Counſellors, that he put them all to death upon one pretence or other: and after Hannibal had taken refuge with Antiochus, the Roman Ambaſſadors managed ſo artfully that Antiochus became ſuſpicious of him, and would neither take his advice, nor truſt him again in any matter whatſoever.——As to dividing the enemy's ſtrength, there can be no better way of doing it than by making incurſions into their country, for that will oblige them to abandon all other enterprizes, and return home to defend their own. This was the method which Fabius took when he had not only the Gauls, but the Tuſcans, the Umbrians, and the Samnites to deal with at the ſame time. Titus Didius having but a ſmall army in compariſon of the enemy, and expecting to be reinforced by another Legion from Rome, was apprized that the enemy had formed a deſign to cut it off upon its march: to prevent which, he not only cauſed a report to be ſpread through his camp that he would engage the enemy the next day, but ſuffered ſome priſoners he had taken to eſcape, who informed their

General of the Conſul's intentions; which had ſuch an effect, that he did not think fit to diminiſh his own forces by detaching any part of them to oppoſe the march of that Legion; ſo that it joined the Conſul in ſafety: and though this Stratagem indeed did not divide the enemy's army, yet it proved the means of reinforcing his own.——Some, in order to diminiſh the ſtrength of an invader, have ſuffered him to enter their country, and take ſeveral towns: that ſo when he has weakened his main army by putting garriſons into them, they might fall upon him with a greater probability of ſucceſs. Others, who have had a deſign upon one Province, have made a feint of invading another: after which, turning their forces ſuddenly upon that where they were not at all expected, they have made themſelves maſters of it before the enemy could ſend any relief: for in ſuch caſes, the enemy, being uncertain whether you may not return to attack the Province firſt threatened, is obliged to maintain his poſt, and not to leave one place to ſuccour another: ſo that (as it often happens) he is not able to ſecure them both.——It is of great importance to prevent the ſpreading of mutiny or diſcord in an army: for which purpoſe, you ſhould puniſh the Ringleaders in an exemplary manner, but with ſuch addreſs that it may be done before they imagine you intend any ſuch thing. If they are at a diſtance from you, it is the beſt way to call both the innocent and the guilty together, leſt (if you ſummon the offenders alone) they ſhould ſuſpect your deſign, and either become contumacious, or take ſome other method to elude the puniſhment that is due to them: but if they are within your reach, you may avail yourſelf of thoſe that are innocent, and puniſh the others by their aſſiſtance. As to private diſcords amongſt your Soldiers, the only remedy is to expoſe them all to ſome ſort of danger; for in ſuch caſes fear generally unites them: but what moſt commonly keeps an army united is the reputation of the General; that is, of his courage and good conduct; for without theſe, neither high birth nor any ſort of authority are ſufficient. Now the chief thing incumbent upon a General, in order to maintain his reputation, is to pay well, and puniſh ſoundly: for if he does not pay his men duly, he cannot for ſhame puniſh them properly when they deſerve it. Suppoſing, for inſtance, a Soldier ſhould be guilty of a robbery; how can you puniſh him for that when you give him no pay? And how can he help robbing when he has no other means of ſubſiſtence? But if you pay them well, and do not puniſh them ſeverely when they offend, they will ſoon grow inſolent and licentious: for then you will become deſpiſed, and loſe your authority; after which, tumults and diſcords will naturally enſue in your army, which probably will end in the ruin of it.

The

The Commanders of armies in former times had one difficulty to ſtruggle with, from which our Generals at preſent are in a great meaſure exempt; and that was the interpreting bad omens and auguries in ſuch a manner, that inſtead of ſeeming adverſe, they might appear to be favourable and propitious. For if a Storm of thunder and lightning [e] fell upon the camp; or either the Sun or Moon was eclipſed, or there was an Earthquake, or the General happened to get a fall in mounting or diſmounting his horſe, the Soldiers looked upon it as an unhappy preſage, and were ſo diſmayed, that they made but a faint reſiſtance againſt any Enemy that attacked them. Upon any accident of that kind therefore, they either endeavoured to account for it from natural cauſes, or interpreted it to their own purpoſe and advantage. When Julius Cæſar landed in Africa, he happened to get a fall as ſoon as he ſet his foot on Shore, upon which, he immediately cried out, *Tenco te, O Africa*, i. e. *Africa, I take poſſeſſion of thee.* Others have explained the reaſons of Earthquakes and Eclipſes to their Soldiers. But ſuch events have little or no effect in theſe times: for men are not ſo much given to Superſtition ſince the Chriſtian Religion has enlightened their minds, and diſpelled theſe vain fears: but if they ſhould ever happen to return, we muſt imitate the example of the Ancients upon ſuch occaſions.

If famine or any other kind of diſtreſs has reduced an enemy to deſpair, and they advance furiouſly to engage, you ſhould keep cloſe in your entrenchments, and avoid a battle if poſſible; as the Lacedæmonians did when they were provoked to fight by the Meſſenians, and Julius Cæſar by Afranius and Petreius.——When Fulvius the Conſul commanded the Roman army againſt the Cimbrians, he cauſed his Cavalry to attack the enemy ſeveral days ſucceſſively, and obſerving that they always quitted their camp to purſue his troops when they retreated, he at laſt placed a body of men in ambuſh behind their camp, who ruſhed into it, and made themſelves maſters of it the next time they ſallied out to purſue his Cavalry.——Some Princes, when their dominions have been invaded, and their army has lain near that of the enemy, have ſent out parties under the enemy's colours to plunder and lay waſte their own territories: upon which, the enemy imagining them to be friends who were coming to their aſſiſtance, have gone out to join them; but upon diſcovering their miſtake, have fallen into confuſion, and given their adverſary an opportunity of beating them. This Stratagem was practiſed by Alexander of Epirus againſt the Illyrians, and Leptenes the Syracuſan againſt the Carthaginians, and they both

[e] The words of the Author are, "perche ſe cadeva una *ſaetta* in uno eſercito." Now the word *ſaetta* muſt here mean a ſtroke of lightning, moſt probably, or what the country people call a *thunder-bolt*. The old Tranſlation renders it thus: *For if an arrow fell down in an army, &c.* which I confeſs I do not underſtand.

found their account in it.——Many have gained an advantage by pretending to run away in great fear, and leaving their camp full of wine and proviſions, with which the enemy have gorged themſelves, the others have returned and fallen upon them whilſt they were drunk or aſleep. In this manner Cyrus was ſerved by Tomyris, and the Spaniards by Tiberius Gracchus. Others have mixed poiſon with the meat and drink they left behind them.——I told you a little while ago that I did not remember to have read that the Ancients placed any Centinels on the outſide of the ditch that ſurrounded their camp in the night; and that I ſuppoſed it was to prevent the miſchiefs they might occaſion: for it has often happened that Centinels, who have been ſtationed at out-poſts, even in the day-time, to obſerve the motions of an enemy, have been the ruin of an army; as they have ſometimes been ſurprized and forced to make the ſignals for their friends to advance, who have thereby been drawn into a ſnare, and either killed or taken priſoners.——In order to deceive an enemy, it may not be amiſs either to vary or omit ſome particular cuſtom or ſignal that you have conſtantly made uſe of before, as a certain great General did of old; who having cauſed ſome of his advanced parties always to give him notice of the enemy's approach by fires in the night, and ſmoke in the day-time, thought proper to vary that cuſtom at laſt, and ordered thoſe parties to keep conſtant fires all the night long, and to make a ſmoke every day, but to extinguiſh them when they perceived the enemy in motion: upon which, the enemy advancing again, and not ſeeing the uſual ſignals made to give notice of their approach, imagined they were not diſcovered, and puſhed on with ſuch precipitation to the attack, that they fell into diſorder, and were routed by their adverſary, who was prepared to receive them.——Memnon the Rhodian, in order to draw the enemy out of a ſtrong and advantageous ſituation of which they had poſſeſſed themſelves, got one of his own men to paſs over to them as a deſerter, with intelligence that his army was in a mutiny, and that the greater part of it was going to leave him: to confirm which, he cauſed a great uproar and commotion to be counterfeited every now and then in his camp; by which the enemy were ſo impoſed upon that they quitted their entrenchments to attack him, and were entirely defeated.——Great care is likewiſe to be taken not to reduce an enemy to utter deſpair. Julius Cæſar was always very attentive to this point in his wars with the Germans, and uſed to open them a way to eſcape, after he began to perceive that when they were hard preſſed, and could not run away, they would fight moſt deſperately; thinking it better to purſue them when they fled, than to run the riſque of not beating them whilſt they defended themſelves with ſuch obſtinacy.——Lucullus obſerving that a body of Macedonian horſe, which

which he had in his army, were going over to the enemy; cauſed a Charge to be ſounded immediately, and ordered all the reſt of his army to advance: upon which, the enemy ſuppoſing he deſigned to attack them, preſently fell upon the Macedonians with ſuch fury, that they were obliged to defend themſelves, and fought bravely, inſtead of deſerting him as they deſigned.

It is of great importance alſo to ſecure a town, when you ſuſpect its loyalty, either before or after a victory.——Pompey ſuſpecting the fidelity of the Catinenſes, deſired them to let him ſend the ſick men whom he had in his army into their town, to be taken care of till they were well again: but inſtead of ſick men, he ſent a parcel of the ſtouteſt and moſt reſolute fellows he had in his army in diſguiſe, who made themſelves maſters of the town and kept it for him.——Publius Valerius having been offended by the Epidaurians, and miſtruſting their ſincerity, cauſed a pardon to be proclaimed for all ſuch as would come to accept of it at a certain Temple without the gates of their town: upon which, all the inhabitants repairing thither for that purpoſe, he ſhut the doors of the Temple upon them, and ſuffered none to return to the town but ſuch as he could confide in.——Alexander the Great, in order to ſecure Thrace when he was upon his march into Aſia, took all the Nobility and leading men of that Province along with him, and allowing them penſions, left the common people to be governed by men of their own condition: by which, the Nobility being content with their appointments, and the common people having no leading men to oppreſs, or inſtigate them to rebel, the whole Province continued quiet. But of all the methods that can be taken to gain the hearts of a people, none contribute ſo much as remarkable examples of continence and juſtice; like that of Scipio in Spain, when he returned a moſt beautiful young Lady, ſafe and untouched, to her huſband and relations; a circumſtance which conduced more to the reduction of Spain, than any force of arms could ever have done.——Julius Cæſar acquired ſuch reputation for his juſtice in paying for the wood which he cut down to make paliſades for his camps in Gaul, that it very much facilitated the conqueſt of that Province. But I think I have now nothing more to add to theſe particular documents, or upon the Subject in general; except it be to ſay ſomething concerning the nature of attacking and defending towns; which I will do as briefly and clearly as I can, if I have not already treſpaſſed too much upon your patience.

BATTISTA. You are ſo very complaiſant and obliging, Sir, that we ſhall deſire you to indulge our curioſity in theſe points, without any apprehenſion of being thought troubleſome to you; ſince you are ſo good to make a free offer of what we ſhould otherwiſe have been aſhamed to aſk. We ſhall eſteem it a ve[illegible] favou[illegible]refore, as well

well as a pleaſure, if you will be ſo kind to go on with the Subject. But before you proceed to what you was ſpeaking of, let us entreat you to inform us whether it is better to continue a war all the winter (according to the cuſtom of theſe times) or to keep the field in the ſummer only, and put your troops into quarters before the winter comes on, as the Ancients uſed to do.

FABRIZIO. Indeed, Sir, if you had not aſked this timely and pertinent queſtion, I believe I ſhould have forgot to have ſaid any thing of a matter which yet deſerves much conſideration and attention.——I muſt therefore beg leave to tell you again, that the Ancients were wiſer, and conducted their affairs with more prudence, than we do at preſent; but eſpecially their wars: for though we are guilty of great errors indeed in many other reſpects, we certainly are guilty of more and greater in that. Nothing can be more dangerous or indiſcreet in a General than to carry on a war in winter-time: for in that caſe, the aggreſſor is ſure to run a greater riſque of being ruined than thoſe who act upon the defenſive. For as the main end and deſign of all the care and pains that are beſtowed in keeping up good order and diſcipline, is to fit and prepare an army to engage an enemy in a proper manner, a General ought always to have that point in view; becauſe a complete victory commonly puts an end to a war. He therefore, who has an orderly and well-diſciplined army under his command, will certainly have an advantage over another General who has not, and be more likely to come off with victory. Now it muſt be conſidered, that nothing is a greater impediment to good order and diſcipline than rough ſituations, and wet or cold weather: for in a bad ſituation you cannot range your forces according to your uſual order, and hard weather will oblige you to divide them: in which caſe you cannot act with your whole force againſt an enemy, as they are cantoned in villages and towns, and fortreſſes, at a diſtance from each other, without any order or regularity, and in ſuch a manner as neceſſity preſcribes: ſo that all the pains you have taken to diſcipline your men, and make them obſerve good order, will ſignify nothing in ſuch a ſeaſon. But it is not much to be wondered at that the Generals of our times carry on their wars in the winter: for as they are ſtrangers to all ſort of diſcipline and military knowledge, they are neither ſenſible of the loſſes and inconveniencies which muſt neceſſarily reſult from dividing their forces, nor do they trouble their heads in endeavouring to eſtabliſh that diſcipline and good order amongſt their men, which they never learnt themſelves.——They ought to reflect, however, upon the numberleſs hardſhips and loſſes occaſioned by a winter-campaign, and to remember that the defeat of the French near the Garigliano, in the year MDIII. was owing, not ſo much to the bravery of the Spaniards as to the rigour of the ſeaſon. For as I told you before, thoſe

that

that reſolve to carry on a war in an enemy's country during the winter, muſt of neceſſity have the worſt of it; becauſe, if they keep their men all together in a camp, they muſt ſuffer much from rain and cold; and if they divide them into different cantonments, they muſt greatly weaken their army. Whereas, thoſe that wait for them at home may preſently unite their forces, and not only chuſe their time and place of attack, but keep their men ſafe and freſh under cover, till they have an opportunity of falling upon ſome of the enemy's quarters, who being divided and diſperſed as it were, cannot be ſuppoſed to make any great reſiſtance. In this manner we may account for the defeat of the French, which I juſt now mentioned; and in this manner thoſe will always be ſerved who invade an enemy in the winter, that has any conduct or knowledge of military affairs. If any General therefore would plunge himſelf into ſuch circumſtances, that neither the number, nor diſcipline, nor good order, nor bravery of his troops, can be of any ſervice to him, let him carry on a field war in the winter. The Romans, however, in order to make the moſt of thoſe qualifications which they took ſo much pains to acquire, always avoided winter-campaigns with as much care as they did rough and confined and inconvenient ſituations, or any other impediment that might prevent them from availing themſelves of their valour and good diſcipline. This is all that I have to ſay at preſent in anſwer to your laſt queſtion. Let us now proceed, if you pleaſe, to the method of attacking and defending towns, and the manner of building and fortifying them.

The END of the SIXTH BOOK.

THE

THE ART OF WAR.

BOOK VII.

THE CONTENTS.

In what manner Towns and Fortreſſes are to be built and fortified. Rules to be obſerved by thoſe that are to defend a Town that is threatened with a Siege. Advice to ſuch as are in want of proviſions, when they are beſieged; and to the beſiegers. That appearances are not to be truſted to. How to draw a Garriſon out of a town that is beſieged. That ſome towns may be corrupted, and others taken by ſurprize. That good guards ſhould be kept at all times and places by the beſieged. Different methods by which they may convey private intelligence to their friends. How to repair a breach, and defend it. Of Mines. That the beſieged ſhould take care to divide their forces as little as poſſible. That when a Town or Camp is ſurrounded on every ſide, it is ſometimes neceſſary to expoſe it to an aſſault on one ſide. General rules to be obſerved in military diſcipline. The method of raiſing plenty of horſes in any country. That a General ought ſometimes to ſtrike out new artifices and inventions of his own. The Concluſion.

FABRIZIO. TOWNS and Fortreſſes, you muſt know, may be ſtrong either by nature or art. Thoſe are ſtrong by nature that are either ſurrounded by rivers or moraſſes, or ſituated upon a rock or ſteep hill, like Monaco and Sanleo: for ſuch as are ſituated upon hills that are not difficult of aſcent, are looked upon

as weak ſince the invention of mines and artillery: upon which account, thoſe that build fortreſſes in theſe times often chuſe a flat ſituation, and make it ſtrong by art. For this purpoſe, their firſt care is to fortify their walls with angles, baſtions, caſemates, half moons, and ravelines; that ſo no enemy can approach them without being taken both in front and flank. If the walls are built very high, they will be too much expoſed to artillery, if very low, they may eaſily be ſcaled: if you throw up a ditch on the outſide of them to make a ſcalade more difficult, and the enemy ſhould fill it up, (which may eaſily be done by a numerous army) they will preſently become maſters of them. In my opinion therefore, (with ſubmiſſion to better judges however) the beſt way to prevent that would be to build the walls pretty high, and to throw up a ditch rather on the inſide than on the outſide of them. This is the ſtrongeſt method of fortifying a town: for it not only covers the beſieged from the fire of the artillery, but makes it a very difficult matter for the beſiegers either to ſcale the walls or fill up the ditch. Your walls then ſhould be of a due height, and two yards thick at leaſt, to ſtand the fire of the enemy's batteries: there ſhould likewiſe be towers all along them, at the diſtance of four hundred feet from each other. The ditch on the inſide ought to be no leſs than ſixty feet wide and twenty-four deep, and all the earth that is dug out of it ſhould be thrown up on that ſide which is next the town, and ſupported by a wall built in the ditch, and carried up the height of a man above the ground, which will make the ditch ſo much the deeper. In the bottom of the ditch I would have caſemates [*f*] about four hundred feet from each other, to rake thoſe that might get down into it. The heavy artillery that is made uſe of for the defence of the town ſhould be planted on the inſide of the wall that ſupports the ditch: for as the other wall is to be a high one, you cannot make uſe of very large pieces there without much difficulty and inconvenience. If the enemy attempts a ſcalade, the height of the firſt wall ſecures you: if they batter you with artillery, they muſt beat down that wall in the firſt place; and when it is beat down (as a wall always falls towards that ſide from whence it is battered) the ruins of it having no ditch to bury them in, the outſide muſt naturally add to the depth of the ditch behind them: ſo that the enemy cannot well advance any further, being ſtopped there not only by thoſe ruins, but the ditch on the inſide of them, and the artillery planted on the other ſide of that ditch. The only expedient they have left upon ſuch occaſions, is to fill up the ditch, which is a very

[*f*] Vaults of maſon's work in the flank of a Baſtion next the Curtain, to fire upon the enemy.

difficult

difficult matter on account of its greas width and depth, the danger of approaching it from the baſtions and other fortifications with which it is flanked, and the labour of climbing over the ruins with burdens of faſcines upon their backs: ſo that I think a town fortified in this manner may be looked upon as impregnable [g].

BATTISTA. Would not the town be ſtronger do you think if there was another ditch on the outſide of the wall?

FABRIZIO. Moſt certainly. But I meant that if there was to be one ditch only, it would be the beſt way to have it on the inſide.

BATTISTA. Would you chuſe to have water in the ditches, or would you rather have them dry?

FABRIZIO. People differ in their opinions of that matter: becauſe ditches with water in them ſecure you againſt mines, and thoſe that have none are harder to be filled up. But upon the whole, I ſhould rather prefer dry ditches, becauſe they are a better ſecurity than the other: for ditches with water in them have ſometimes been frozen over in ſuch a manner in winter-time, that the towns they were deſigned to ſecure, have been taken without much difficulty; as it happened to Mirandola, when Pope Julius laid ſiege to it. But to guard againſt Mines, I would make my ditches ſo deep, that if any one ſhould attempt to work under them, they muſt be prevented by water. I would likewiſe build a Caſtle, or any kind of fortreſs, with the ſame ſort of walls and ditches; which would make them very difficult, if not impoſſible to be taken.

In the next place, I would adviſe thoſe that have the charge of defending a town that is going to be beſieged, by no means to ſuffer any baſtions or other works to be thrown up on the outſide of the walls, or at a little diſtance from the town: and I would alſo adviſe thoſe that build fortreſſes, not to make any place of retreat in them, whither the beſieged may retire when the walls are either beat down or in poſſeſſion of the enemy. The reaſon of my firſt caution is, that the Governor of a town that is beſieged, ought not to do a thing which will certainly leſſen his reputation at the very beginning of the ſiege: for the diminution of that will make all his orders but little regarded, and diſcourage the Garriſon. But this will always be the caſe, if you build little forts out of the town you are to defend: becauſe they are ſure to fall into the enemy's hand, it being impoſſible in theſe times to maintain ſuch inconſiderable places againſt a train of artillery: ſo that the loſs of them will be the loſs of your reputation, and therefore moſt probably of the town itſelf. When the Genoeſe rebelled againſt Lewis XII. King of France, they built ſome trifling redoubts upon the hills that lie round about Genoa, which being preſently taken by the

[g] Not ſince the invention of bombs.

French, occaſioned the loſs of that City. As to the ſecond piece of advice in relation to fortreſſes, I ſay, that nothing can expoſe a fortreſs to greater danger, than to have places of retreat into which the garriſon may retire when they are hard preſſed: for if it was not for the hopes of finding ſafety in one poſt, after they have abandoned another, they would exert themſelves with more obſtinacy and reſolution in defending the firſt; and when that is deſerted, all the reſt will ſoon fall into the enemy's hand. Of this we have a recent and memorable inſtance in the loſs of the Citadel at Forli, when the Counteſs Catharine was beſieged there by Cæſar Borgia, ſon to Pope Alexander VI. at the head of a French army. That fortreſs was ſo full of ſuch places of retreat, that a Garriſon might retire out of one into another, and out of that into many more ſucceſſively upon occaſion: for in the firſt place, there was the Citadel; and in the next, a Caſtle, ſeparated from it by a ditch, with a draw-bridge upon it, over which you might paſs out of one into the other; and in this Caſtle there were three diviſions ſeparated from one another by ditches full of water, with draw-bridges over them. The Duke therefore having made a breach in the wall of one of theſe diviſions with his artillery, Giovanni da Caſale, who was the Governor, inſtead of defending the breach, retreated into another diviſion: upon which, the Duke's forces immediately entered that diviſion without oppoſition, and having got poſſeſſion of the draw-bridges, ſoon made themſelves maſters of all the reſt. The loſs of that fortreſs then, which was thought inexpugnable, was owing to two great errors; the firſt in making ſo many conveniencies of retreating from one place to another; and the ſecond, in that none of thoſe places could command their bridges: ſo that the ill contrivance of the fortreſs, and the want of conduct in the garriſon, defeated the magnanimous reſolution of the Counteſs, who had the courage to wait for an army there, which neither the King of Naples nor the Duke of Milan durſt face: however, though her efforts did not ſucceed, ſhe gained much reputation by ſo generous a ſtand, as appears from many copies of verſes made in her praiſe upon that occaſion.——If I was to build a fortreſs then, I would make the walls of it very ſtrong, and fortify it with ſuch ditches as I have juſt now deſcribed: but I would have no retreating places, nor any thing elſe on the inſide of it, but dwelling houſes; and thoſe too ſo low, that the Governor ſeeing every part of the walls at one glance of the eye from the middle of it, might know where to ſend relief immediately upon occaſion, and the garriſon be convinced that when the walls and ditch were loſt, they had no other refuge left: but if I ſhould by any means happen to be prevailed upon to make places of retreat, I would contrive them in ſuch a manner, that every one of them ſhould be able to command its own draw-bridge, which I would

build

build upon piles in the middle of the ditches that ſeparated them from each other.

BATTISTA. You ſay that ſmall forts are not defenſible in theſe times: but, if I miſtake not, I have heard others aſſert that the leſs any fort was, the better it might be defended.

FABRIZIO. Their aſſertion is ill-grounded then: becauſe no place can be called ſtrong at preſent where the beſieged have not room to ſecure themſelves by throwing up other ditches and ramparts when the enemy has got poſſeſſion of the firſt: for ſuch is the force of artillery, that whoever depends upon one wall and one ditch only will have reaſon to lament his error.

And ſince forts and baſtions (provided they do not exceed the common dimenſions, for then they may be deemed caſtles and fortreſſes) have no room for raiſing new works in them, they muſt preſently be taken when they are aſſaulted. It is therefore the beſt way not to build any ſuch forts at a diſtance from a town, but to fortify the entrance into it, and cover the gates with ravelines in ſuch a manner that no body can either come in or go out of them in a right line; beſides which, there ſhould be a ditch betwixt the raveline and the gate, with a draw-bridge upon it. It is a good way to have a Portcullis likewiſe at every gate to let in your men again after they have made a ſally, and to hinder the enemy from entering with them if they ſhould be purſued. This is the uſe of Portculliſes: (which the ancients called *Cataractæ*) for upon ſuch occaſions you could not receive any benefit either from the draw-bridge or the gate itſelf, both of them being crowded with men.

BATTISTA. I have ſeen Portculliſes in Germany made of wooden bars in the form of an iron grate; but thoſe that are uſed in Italy, are all made of whole planks: pray what is the reaſon of this difference? and which of them are moſt ſerviceable?

FABRIZIO. I muſt tell you again, that the ancient military cuſtoms and inſtitutions are almoſt aboliſhed in every part of the world; but in Italy they ſeem to be totally extinct; and if we have any good thing to boaſt of, it is entirely borrowed from the Ultramontanes. You muſt have heard, and perhaps ſome of the company may remember, in how feeble and ſlight a manner we uſed to fortify our towns and caſtles before the coming of Charles VIII. King of France, into Italy in the year MDXCIV. The merlons or ſpaces in the walls betwixt the embraſures were not above a foot thick; the embraſures themſelves were made very narrow on the outſide, and wide within, with many other defects which it would be too tedious to enumerate: for when the merlons are made ſo ſlight they are ſoon beat down, and embraſures of that conſtruction are preſently laid open. But now we have learnt from the French to make our merlons ſtrong and ſubſtantial: and though our embraſures

are

are ſtill wide within, and grow narrower and narrower to the middle of the wall, after which they begin to open again and grow wider and wider to the outſide, the artillery cannot be ſo eaſily diſmounted, nor the men driven from the parapets. The French have likewiſe many other improvements and inventions which our Soldiers have never ſeen, and therefore cannot imitate: amongſt theſe I might mention the portculliſſes you juſt now ſpoke of, made in the form of an iron grate, which are much better than ours: for if you make uſe of one that is made of whole planks for the defence of a gate, when it is let down you ſhut yourſelf cloſe up, and cannot annoy the enemy through it; ſo that they may either hew it down with axes, or ſet fire to it without any danger: but if it is made like a grate you may eaſily defend it againſt them, either with ſpikes or firing ſhot through the interſtices of the bars.

BATTISTA. I have obſerved another Ultramontane invention which has been imitated of late in Italy, which is, to make the ſpokes of the wheels of our artillery-carriages incline obliquely from the fellies to the nave. Now I ſhould be very glad to know the reaſon of this, becauſe I always thought ſtraight ſpokes had been ſtronger than any others,

FABRIZIO. You muſt not look upon this deviation from common cuſtom as either the effect of whim or caprice, or for the ſake of ornament: for where ſtrength is abſolutely neceſſary but little account ought to be made of beauty. The true reaſon then of what you have obſerved, is that ſuch wheels are ſafer and ſtronger than our own: for when the carriage is loaded it either goes even or inclines to one ſide; when it goes even, each wheel ſuſtains an equal ſhare of the weight and is not too much oppreſſed by it: but when it inclines to either ſide, the weight lies wholly upon one of the wheels. If the ſpokes therefore are ſtraight they are ſoon broken in that caſe; becauſe if the wheel inclines, the ſpokes muſt incline alſo, and cannot ſupport the weight that preſſes upon them. So that the French judge rightly in ſetting the ſpokes of their wheels obliquely to the nave: for when the carriage inclines to one ſide, and the weight bears directly upon them, inſtead of oblique they will then become ſtraight in a line with it, and conſequentle better able to ſupport the whole than they were to bear one half of the load when the carriage went even. But to return to our towns and fortreſſes.

The French have likewiſe another method of ſecuring the gates of their towns, and of letting their men in and out of them with more eaſe and convenience when they are beſieged, which I have not yet ſeen practiſed in Italy. They erect two perpendicular piles or pillars at the end of the draw-bridge on the outſide of the ditch; upon each of which they balance a beam in ſuch a manner that one half of it hangs

hangs over the bridge, and the other on the outſide of it. Thoſe parts of them which hang on the outſide are joined together with croſs bars like a grate, and at that end of each beam which hangs over the bridge they fix a chain and faſten it to the bridge: ſo that when they have a mind to ſhut up that end of the bridge they looſe the chains and let the grate fall; and when they would open it they draw home the chains and hoiſt the grate up again: by theſe means they can raiſe it up to ſuch a height that either foot only, or horſe, if it is neceſſary, may paſs under, or may ſhut the paſſage up ſo cloſe that no body at all can get through; as the grate is raiſed and lowered like the port of an embraſure. This I take to be a better contrivance than the Portcullis; becauſe the grate does not fall perpendicularly like a Portcullis; and therefore is not ſo liable to be obſtructed by an enemy.——Thoſe then that would fortify a town in a proper manner, ſhould obſerve theſe directions: beſides which, they ſhould not ſuffer any lands to be tilled nor buildings to be erected within a mile at leaſt of it: the whole country round it ſhould be quite clear and open, free from all thickets, or banks, or plantations, or houſes, which may hinder the proſpect of the beſieged, and afford ſhelter to an enemy in his approaches.——Remember likewiſe that a town, where the banks of its outſide ditch are higher than the common ſurface of the earth, may be accounted very weak: for inſtead of doing you any good, they only ſerve to cover the enemy, and maſk their batteries, which they may eaſily open upon you from thence.——But let us now proceed to ſhew what is to be done within a fortified town for its greater ſecurity againſt an enemy.

I will not treſpaſs ſo much upon your time and patience as to tell you that beſides the directions already given, it is abſolutely neceſſary to be well furniſhed with ammunition and proviſions for the garriſon; becauſe every body muſt know this, and that without ſuch ſtores all other precautions and preparations are to no purpoſe. I ſhall only ſay in general, that there are two rules which ſhould never be forgotten upon ſuch occaſions: the firſt is, to provide yourſelf with every thing that you think you may want; and the next, to prevent the enemy from availing themſelves of any thing that may be of ſervice to them in the country round about you: for which purpoſe, if there be any forage, or cattle, or any thing elſe, that you cannot carry off into the town, you ought by all means to deſtroy it. You ought likewiſe to take care that nothing be done in a tumultuous or diſorderly manner, and that every man may know his ſtation, and what part he is to act upon any occaſion. It is neceſſary therefore to give ſtrict orders that all the old men, women, children, and ſick people, ſhould keep cloſe in their houſes, in order to leave every paſſage clear and open for thoſe that are young and fit for action; ſome of whom ſhould always be under

arms

arms at the walls, others at the gates, and others at the principal paſſes in the town, to be ready upon any ſudden emergency: there ſhould be particular parties alſo which ſhould not be confined to any certain ſtation, but appointed to ſuccour any quarter where there ſhould be occaſion for it: ſo that when ſuch a diſpoſition is made, it is hardly poſſible that any tumult ſhould happen which may throw you into confuſion.——There is another thing to be remembered both in beſieging and defending a town; which is, that nothing encourages an enemy ſo much as their knowing that it has not been uſed to ſieges: for it often happens that a town is loſt through fear alone, without waiting for an aſſault. The beſiegers therefore ſhould endeavour by all means to appear as powerful and formidable as they can, and take every opportunity of making the moſt oſtentatious diſplay of their ſtrength: the beſieged, on the other hand, ought to poſt the ſtouteſt of their men in places where they are attacked with the greateſt fury, and ſuch as are neither to be impoſed upon by appearances, nor driven from their poſts by any thing but downright force of arms: for if the enemy fails in the firſt attempt, the beſieged will take courage; and the enemy perceiving they are not to be diſmayed by ſhew alone, muſt be obliged to have recourſe to other methods.——The engines which the Ancients made uſe of in the defence of a town were many; the chief of which were ſuch as threw darts and huge ſtones to a great diſtance, and with aſtoniſhing force: they made uſe of ſeveral likewiſe in beſieging towns, as the battering ram, the tortoiſe, and many others [*b*]: inſtead of which, great guns are now uſed both by beſiegers and thoſe that are beſieged. But to return.

A Governor of a town then muſt take care neither to be ſurprized by famine, nor forced by aſſault: as to famine, I told you before that he ought to lay in a plentiful ſtock of proviſions and ammunition before the ſiege begins: but if the ſiege ſhould prove a very long one, and they ſhould fail at laſt, he muſt then deviſe ſome extraordinary method of procuring ſupplies from his friends and allies, eſpecially if a river runs through the town, as the inhabitants of Caſilinum did from the Romans: for when that place was ſo cloſely inveſted by Hannibal that they could ſend them no other ſorts of victuals, they threw great quantities of nuts into a river that ran through the middle of their town, which being carried down by the ſtream eſcaped the enemy's notice, and ſupplied the beſieged with food for a conſiderable time. The inhabitants of ſome towns which have been beſieged, in order to make the enemy deſpair of reducing them by famine, have either thrown a great quantity of bread over their walls, or gorged an ox

[*b*] The Reader may ſee an account and deſcription of them all in Danet's Dictionary, under the word *arma*.

with

with corn, and then turned it out to fall into the enemy's hand; that ſo when they killed it, and found its ſtomach ſo full of corn, they might imagine they had abundance in the town.——On the other hand, ſome great Generals have uſed as many artifices and expedients to diſtreſs a town. Fabius Maximus ſuffered the Campanians to ſow their fields before he inveſted their city, in order to diminiſh their Stores. When Dionyſius lay before Rhegium, he offered the people terms of accommodation, and during the treaty prevailed upon them to furniſh him with a large quantity of proviſions: but when he had thus leſſened their ſtock and increaſed his own, he immediately blocked up the town ſo ſtraitly on every ſide that he ſoon obliged them to give it up. Alexander the Great having a deſign upon Leucadia, firſt made himſelf maſter of the neighbouring towns, and turned all the inhabitants into that place; which at laſt filled it ſo full of people, that he preſently reduced it by famine.——As to aſſaults, I told you before that it is of the utmoſt importance to repel the firſt attack: for the Romans took many towns by ſuddenly aſſaulting them on every ſide, (which they called *aggredi urbem coronâ*) as Scipio did when he made himſelf maſter of New Carthage in Spain. If ſuch an aſſault therefore can be ſuſtained, the enemy will find it a difficult matter to ſucceed afterwards: for though they ſhould get into a town, the inhabitants may find ſome remedy, if they are not wanting to themſelves; and it has often happened even in that caſe, that the aſſailants have either been all knocked on the head, or driven out again; eſpecially when the inhabitants have got into garret windows, or upon the tops of houſes and turrets, and fought them from thence. To prevent this, the aſſailants commonly either ſet open the gates to make way for the others to eſcape with ſafety, or gave orders loud enough to be heard by every one, not to hurt any body but ſuch as were in arms, and to ſpare all thoſe that would lay them down: and this has frequently been of great ſervice upon ſuch occaſions.——It is an eaſy matter likewiſe to make yourſelf maſter of a town if you come ſuddenly and unexpectedly upon it; that is, if you are at ſuch a diſtance from it with your army, that the inhabitants do not ſuſpect you of any deſign of that kind, or imagine they ſhall have ſufficient notice of your approach: ſo that if you can make a long and haſty march or two, and fall unawares upon it, you are almoſt ſure to ſucceed.——I would willingly paſs over ſome tranſactions in ſilence that have happened in our own times, as it would be diſagreeable to talk of myſelf and my own exploits; and what to ſay of others I cannot well tell. Nevertheleſs, I cannot help propoſing the example of Cæſar Borgia (commonly called Duke Valentine) in this reſpect, as worthy of imitation: for when he lay with his army at Nocera, and pretended a deſign upon Camerino, he ſuddenly invaded the

Duchy of Urbino, and made himſelf maſter of a ſtate in one day without any difficulty, which another man could not have reduced without beſtowing much time and expence upon it, if at all. It behoves thoſe that are beſieged likewiſe to beware of tricks and ſtratagems in the enemy, and therefore they ought not to truſt to any appearance, though ever ſo uſual and familiar to them, but to ſuſpect there is ſome miſchief lurking under it. Domitius Calvinus laying ſiege to a town, uſed to march round it every day with a good part of his army: ſo that the beſieged, imagining at laſt he did it only for exerciſe, began to grow remiſs in their guards; which Domitius perceiving, made an aſſault upon the town, and carried it. Some Generals who have had intelligence of troops that were upon their march to relieve a place they had inveſted, have dreſſed a body of their own Soldiers in the enemy's livery, and furniſhed them with the ſame colours, who being admitted into the town have preſently made themſelves maſters of it. Cimon, the Athenian, ſet fire to a Temple one night that ſtood without the gates of a town he deſigned to ſurprize: upon which, all the people running out of it to extinguiſh the flames, left the town to the mercy of the enemy. Others, having met with a party of forragers who were ſent out of a fortreſs, have put them all to the ſword, and diſguiſed ſome of their own men in their cloaths, who have afterwards given up the place to them.——Beſides theſe artifices, the Ancients uſed ſome others to draw the garriſon out of a town they had a deſign upon. When Scipio commanded the Roman armies in Africa, he was very deſirous to make himſelf maſter of ſome ſtrong places which were well garriſoned by the Carthaginians: for which purpoſe, he made a feint of aſſaulting them, but ſoon deſiſted from the attempt, and marched away again to a great diſtance, as if he was afraid of the enemy. Hannibal therefore being deceived by appearances, immediately drew all the garriſons out of them in order to purſue him with greater force, in hopes of entirely cruſhing him: but Scipio being informed of this, ſent Maſſiniſſa with a ſufficient number of men by another route, who preſently got poſſeſſion of them. Pyrrhus laying ſiege to the Capital of Illyria (now Sclavonia) where there was a very ſtrong garriſon, pretended at laſt to deſpair of reducing it, and turning his arms againſt other towns which were not ſo well defended, obliged the enemy to draw the greater part of the garriſon out of the Capital to relieve them: after which, he ſuddenly returned thither with his army, and took it without any difficulty. Many have poiſoned wells and ſprings, and diverted the courſe of rivers, to make themſelves maſters of a town; but have not always ſucceeded in that: others have endeavoured to diſmay the inhabitants, by cauſing a report to be ſpread that they have lately gained ſome conſiderable advantage, and daily expect a powerful reinforcement.

reinforcement. Some Generals have made themſelves maſters of towns by holding a private correſpondence with, and corrupting one party of the inhabitants; for which purpoſe they have made uſe of ſeveral different methods: others have ſent one of their chief Conſidants amongſt them, who, under the pretence of deſertion, has gained great credit in the town, and afterwards betrayed it, either by giving intelligence to his friend in what manner the guards were poſted, or by preventing a gate from being ſhut again (when it had been opened upon any occaſion) by the breaking down of a carriage in it, or by ſome other means to facilitate the entrance of the enemy. Hannibal prevailed upon an officer to betray a garriſon to him belonging to the Romans, which was effected in this manner: the officer got leave to go a hunting in the night under a pretence that he durſt not do it in the day-time, leſt he ſhould be taken by the enemy; and returning before morning, contrived matters ſo well that he got ſeveral of Hannibal's men admitted with him in diſguiſe, who immediately killed the guards, and delivered up one of the gates to Hannibal. Some towns have been taken by ſuffering their garriſon to make a ſally upon the enemy, and then to purſue them to too great a diſtance when they pretended to fly before them: by which they have been drawn into an ambuſh and cut off. Many Generals (and Hannibal among the reſt) have let a beſieged enemy get poſſeſſion of their camp, in order to throw themſelves betwixt them and the town, and ſo prevent their retreat. Others have impoſed upon them by pretending to raiſe the ſiege, as Phormio the Athenian did: for after he had lain ſome time before the city of Calcedon, and ravaged all the country round about it, the inhabitants ſent ambaſſadors to him, whom he received with much courteſy, and made them ſo many fair promiſes that having lulled them into ſecurity, he decamped and marched away to a diſtance from the city: but whilſt they were weak enough to imagine they had got entirely quit of him, and had laid aſide all care of their defence upon the ſtrength of his promiſes, he ſuddenly returned, and falling upon them when they did not expect ſuch a viſit, preſently took the city. The inhabitants of a beſieged town ought likewiſe to ſecure themſelves by all means againſt any of their own townſmen whoſe fidelity they have reaſon to ſuſpect: but they may ſometimes work upon them more effectually by kindneſſes than ſeverity and harſh treatment. Marcellus knew that Lucius Bancius of Nola was inclined to favour Hannibal; yet he behaved to him with ſo much generoſity, that inſtead of an enemy he became his firm friend. They ſhould alſo be at leaſt as much upon their guard when the enemy is at ſome diſtance as when he is near at hand; and to be particularly careful in guarding thoſe places which they think are leaſt expoſed to danger: for many towns have been loſt by being aſſaulted in a part which has been thought

deep that an enemy cannot work under it without coming to water, which is the beſt defence againſt mines. But if you are in a town which ſtands upon a rock or hill, the only remedy is to dig ſeveral deep wells along the foot of the wall on the inſide, which may ſerve to give vent to the powder when a mine is ſprung. There is indeed another expedient, and a very good one too, which is to countermine the enemy, provided you can diſcover their mines; but that is a very difficult matter, if they take proper care to conceal them.

The Governor of a town that is beſieged ought likewiſe to take great care that he be not ſurprized whilſt the garriſon are either refreſhing or repoſing themſelves; as after an aſſault, or when the guards are relieved, (which is generally at the break of day in the morning, and by twilight in the evening) but eſpecially whilſt they are at their meals: for at thoſe times many towns have been ſurprized, and many ſallies made which have proved fatal to the beſiegers: upon which account, it is highly neceſſary to keep a ſtrict guard always in every quarter, and the greater part of the garriſon under arms. Another thing I muſt not forget to tell you, which is, that the chief difficulty in defending either a town or a camp is occaſioned by your being obliged to divide your men: for as the enemy may aſſault you at any time, or any place he thinks proper, with all his forces at once, you muſt keep a conſtant guard at every place: ſo that when he attacks you with his whole ſtrength, you can only defend yourſelf with part of your own [*i*]. ——The beſieged are likewiſe often in danger of being totally ruined at one ſtroke; whereas the beſiegers have nothing to fear but a repulſe: upon which conſideration, ſome who have been blocked up either in a town or in a camp, have made a ſudden ſally with all their forces, though they were inferior to the enemy, and utterly diſperſed them; as Marcellus did at Nola, and Julius Cæſar in Gaul; the latter of whom being attacked in his camp by a very powerful army, and finding he was neither able to defend himſelf there, nor fall upon the enemy with his whole ſtrength, becauſe he was forced to divide it to ſecure every part of his camp, threw open the entrenchments on one ſide, and facing about that way with all his men, exerted himſelf with ſuch vigour and courage that he totally defeated the enemy. The conſtancy and reſolution of the beſieged likewiſe often diſmay and weary out the beſiegers. In the wars betwixt Pompey and Cæſar, their two armies lying near each other, and Cæſar's being in great want of proviſions, a piece of the bread which his men were forced to eat was brought to Pompey; who finding that it was made of herbs, gave ſtrict orders that none of his own Soldiers ſhould ſee it, leſt they ſhould be daunted

[*i*] See Pol. Diſc. Book II. Chap. xxxii.

when

when they perceived what a ſort of an enemy they had to deal with. Nothing did the Romans ſo much honour in their wars with Hannibal as their unſhaken firmneſs and conſtancy: for they never ſued for peace, nor ſhewed the leaſt ſigns of fear even in the loweſt ebb of their fortune: on the contrary, when Hannibal was almoſt at their gates, they ſold the ground upon which he was encamped at a much greater price than they would have aſked for it at any other time; and were ſo inflexible in the proſecution of the enterprizes they had in hand, that they would not raiſe the Siege of Capua to defend Rome itſelf at a time when it was daily threatened with a ſiege.

I am ſenſible, after all, that I have told you many things which you muſt have known before, and perhaps may have conſidered as well as myſelf: but this I did (as I told you I ſhould do) that you might perfectly comprehend the nature of true military diſcipline and the Art of War, and for the inſtruction of others who may not have had the ſame opportunities of learning them that you have.—1—And now, Gentlemen, I think I have but little more to add to what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, except it be to lay down ſome general rules in military diſcipline, which yet you probably may think very obvious and common.

1 You muſt know then, that whatſoever is of ſervice to the enemy, muſt be prejudicial to you; and contrarywiſe.—2—He that is moſt careful to obſerve the motions and deſigns of the enemy, and takes moſt pains in exerciſing and diſciplining his army, will be leaſt expoſed to danger, and has moſt reaſon to expect ſucceſs in his undertakings.—3—Never come to an engagement till you have inſpired your men with courage, and ſee them in good order and eager to fight; nor hazard a battle till they ſeem confident of victory.—4—It is better, if you can, to ſubdue an enemy by famine than the ſword: for in battle, Fortune has often a much greater ſhare than either prudence or valour.—5—No enterprize is more likely to ſucceed than one which is concealed from the enemy till it is ripe for execution.—7—Nothing is of greater importance in time of war than to know how to make the beſt uſe of a fair opportunity when it is offered.—8—Few men are brave by nature: but good diſcipline and experience make many ſo.—9—Good order and diſcipline in an army are more to be depended upon than courage alone.—10—If any of the enemy's troops deſert them, and come over to you, it is a great acquiſition, provided they prove faithful: for the loſs of them will be more felt than that of thoſe who are killed in battle; though deſerters indeed will always be ſuſpected by their new friends, and odious to their old ones.—11—In drawing up an army in order of battle, it is better to keep a ſufficient reſerve to ſupport your front line upon occaſion, than to extend it in ſuch a manner as to make but one rank as it were of your army.—12—If a General perfectly knows his own ſtrength

and

and that of the enemy, he can hardly miſcarry. 13 The goodneſs of your ſoldiers is of more conſequence than the number of them: and ſometimes the ſituation of the place is of greater advantage and ſecurity than the goodneſs of your Soldiers. 14 Sudden and unexpected accidents often throw an army into confuſion; but things that are familiar, and have come on by ſlow degrees, are little regarded: it is the beſt way therefore when you have a new enemy to deal with, to accuſtom your men to the ſight of them as often as you can by ſlight ſkirmiſhes before you come to a general engagement with them. 15 He whoſe troops are in diſorder themſelves whilſt they are purſuing a routed enemy, will moſt probably loſe the advantage he had gained before, and be routed in his turn. 16 Whoever has not taken proper care to furniſh himſelf with a ſufficient ſtock of proviſions and ammunition, bids fair to be vanquiſhed without ſtriking a ſtroke. 17 He that is either ſtronger in Infantry than Cavalry, or in Cavalry than Infantry, muſt chuſe his ground accordingly. 18 If you would know whether you have any Spies in your camp in the day-time, you have nothing more to do than to order every man to his tent. 19 When you are aware that the enemy is acquainted with your deſigns, you muſt change them. 20 After you have conſulted many about what you ought to do, confer with very few concerning what you are actually reſolved to do. 21 Whilſt your men are in quarters, you muſt keep them in good order by fear and puniſhment; but when they are in the field, by hopes and rewards. 22 Wiſe Generals never come to an engagement but when they are either compelled by downright neceſſity, or can do it with great advantage. 23 Take great care that the enemy may not be apprized of the order in which you deſign to draw up your army for battle: and above all things, make ſuch a diſpoſition that your firſt line may fall back with eaſe and convenience into the ſecond, and both of them into the third upon occaſion. 24 In time of action be ſure not to call off any of your Battalions to a different ſervice from what they were deſtined to at firſt, leſt you ſhould occaſion diſorder and confuſion in your army. 25 Unexpected accidents cannot well be prevented; but thoſe that are foreſeen may eaſily be obviated or remedied. 26 Men, arms, money, and proviſions, are the ſinews of war; but of theſe four, the two firſt are moſt neceſſary: for men and arms will always find money and proviſions; but money and proviſions cannot always raiſe men and arms. 27 A rich man without arms, muſt be a prey to a poor Soldier well armed. 28 Accuſtom your men to abhor a ſoft and effeminate way of life, and to deſpiſe all manner of luxury, extravagance, and delicacy, either in their diet or dreſs.

Let theſe general rules ſuffice at preſent as altogether neceſſary to be remembered: though indeed I am ſenſible I might have introduced

ſeveral

ſeveral other topics in the courſe of this converſation, which would have fallen in properly enough with our ſubject; for inſtance, I might have ſhewn in how many different diſpoſitions the Ancients drew up their armies, in what manner they cloathed their Soldiers, and how they employed them at different times; with ſeveral other particulars, which I thought might be omitted, not only becauſe you may have various other means of informing yourſelves of theſe things, but becauſe I did not propoſe to myſelf at firſt to enter into a minute detail of ancient military diſcipline, but only to point out the methods by which much better order and diſcipline might be eſtabliſhed in our armies than there is any where to be found at preſent: upon which account, I thought I had no occaſion to make any further mention of ancient rules and inſtitutions than what was abſolutely neceſſary for the introduction of ſuch an eſtabliſhment. I know very well that I might likewiſe have taken an opportunity of enlarging more copiouſly upon the method of exerciſing and diſciplining Cavalry, and of diſcourſing upon the nature of Sea-ſervice: for thoſe who write upon the Art of War tell us, there is a Sea-army, and a Land-army, an army of Infantry, and an army of Cavalry. Of naval affairs, however, I ſhall ſay nothing, becauſe I do not pretend to have any knowledge of them, but leave that to the Genoeſe and Venetians, who have done ſuch wonderful things by their experience in thoſe matters: nor ſhall I ſay any more of Cavalry, becauſe (as I told you before) that part of our Soldiery is the leaſt corrupted: for if your Infantry (in which the ſtrength of an army chiefly conſiſts) be well-diſciplined, your Cavalry muſt of neceſſity be ſo too. I would adviſe any one, however, who is deſirous to raiſe and keep up a good body of Cavalry, in the firſt place, to fill his country with Stallions of the beſt breed that can be procured, and to encourage the farmers to rear foals and colts, as your countrymen do calves and young mules; and in the next, (in order to promote the ſale of them) to make every one that keeps a mule keep a horſe alſo; and to oblige him that would keep but one beaſt only to make uſe of a horſe: beſides which, he ſhould oblige all thoſe that wear garments made of fine cloth to keep one horſe at leaſt. This method was taken by a certain Prince in our own memory, and in a very little time he ſaw his country abound with excellent horſes. As to any thing elſe relating to Cavalry, I muſt refer you to what I have ſaid before upon that Subject, and the preſent eſtabliſhed diſcipline.

But you may deſire perhaps to know, before we part, what qualifications a General ought to be poſſeſſed of, and I will ſatisfy you in a few words; for I cannot make choice of a more proper man than ſuch a one as is maſter of the qualifications I have already particularized and

recommended: and [k] yet even thoſe are not ſufficient, except he has abilities to ſtrike out ſomething new of his own upon occaſion: for no man ever excelled in his profeſſion that could not do that; and if a ready and quick invention is neceſſary and honourable in any profeſſion, certainly it muſt be ſo in the Art of War above all others. Thus we ſee how any invention or new expedient, how trifling ſoever it may be, is celebrated by Hiſtorians: Alexander was admired only for cauſing a cap to be held up at the point of a lance as a ſignal for decamping (inſtead of ſounding a trumpet as uſual) in order to decamp in ſilence and unobſerved. The ſame Prince is likewiſe commended for ordering his men to kneel down on the left knee to receive the enemy upon a certain occaſion, that ſo they might be able to ſuſtain the attack with greater firmneſs: by which means, he not only gained a victory, but ſuch a degree of reputation that Statues were erected to him in that attitude. But as it is now high time to put an end to this converſation, I will conclude it with returning to the point from whence we ſet off; leſt I ſhould expoſe myſelf to the ridicule which is uſually and juſtly beſtowed upon ſuch as make long digreſſions, and wander from their ſubject till they are loſt.——If you remember, Coſimo, you ſeemed to wonder that I who profeſſed to hold the Ancients in ſuch admiration, and ſo liberally beſtowed my cenſure upon others for not imitating them in matters of the greateſt conſequence, have not copied their example myſelf in the Art of War, which is my profeſſion, and in which I have ſpent ſo much of my time and ſtudies. In anſwer to

[k] The Ancients, in reckoning up the qualities of a good General, gave Fortune a place by itſelf, and diſtinguiſhed it from Knowledge in the Art of War. *Ego ſic exiſtimo*, ſays Tully, *in ſummo Imperatore quatuor has res ineſſe oportere, ſcientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem.* He ſhews afterwards that theſe four qualities met eminently in Pompey. *Reliquum eſt ut de felicitate quam præſtare de ſeipſo nemo poteſt, meminiſſe, & commemorare de altero poſſumus; ſicut æquum homini de poteſtate Deorum timide & pauca dicamus. Ego enim ſic exiſtimo: Maximo, Marcello, Scipioni, Mario, & cæteris magnis Imperatoribus, non ſolum propter virtutem, ſed etiam propter fortunam, ſæpius imperia mandata, atque exercitus eſſe commiſſos. Fuit enim profecto quibuſdam ſummis viris quædam ad amplitudinem, & gloriam, & ad res magnas bene gerendas divinitus adjuncta fortuna. Pro lege Manil.* Cap. x. xvi.——One might add another qualification that is requiſite in a General, and a very neceſſary one too, viz. that he ſhould be perfect in his bodily ſenſes, ſuch as ſeeing, hearing, &c. The great and deciſive battle of Yvry in France was loſt by the ſhort-ſightedneſs of one of the Generals. The Viſcount Tavannes being extremely ſhort-ſighted, had placed the ſeveral diviſions of horſe ſo cloſe to one another, that there was not only no ſpace left through which the Reiters might retire to rally in the rear of the army, after they had wheeled according to their orders: but even the very diviſions themſelves had no intervals, by means of which they might extend themſelves when they moved. So that if they ſtirred ever ſo little, they joſtled and crowded each other. An error, which not being obſerved by any body, and therefore left without remedy, very much diſtreſſed the army of the League, and put it into great confuſion.——Nay indeed, it entirely occaſioned the loſs of the battle. *See Davila's Hiſt. of the Civil Wars of France*, Book XI.

this,

this, I told you that men who have any great deſign in view, ought in the firſt place to make due preparations, and qualify themſelves in a proper manner to carry it into execution when they have a fair opportunity of ſo doing. Now I muſt leave you to judge from the long converſation we have had to-day, whether I am maſter of ſufficient abilities to reduce our preſent military diſcipline to the ſtandard of the Ancients, or not; and how often I muſt have revolved this matter in my mind: from whence you will be able to form a pretty good conjecture how much I have it at heart, and whether I would not actually have attempted to execute my deſign, if ever I had been favoured with a proper opportunity. For your further ſatisfaction, and my own juſtification however, and to diſcharge my promiſe in ſome meaſure, I will ſhew you how difficult a matter it is in ſome reſpects, and how eaſy a one in others, to copy the Ancients in this point at preſent.

I ſay then that nothing in the world can be more eaſily effected, than to reduce military diſcipline to the ſtandard of the Ancients, if a Prince or State be able to raiſe an army of fifteen or twenty thouſand young men in his own dominions: on the other hand, nothing can be more difficult, if this power be wanting. Now to explain myſelf more fully, you muſt know that ſome Generals have done great things, and gained much reputation, with armies ready formed and well-diſciplined to their hands, as we might inſtance in ſeveral of the Roman Citizens, and others who have commanded armies which they found ready diſciplined, and therefore had nothing more to do but to keep them ſo, and to conduct them like able Commanders. Others, who have been no leſs renowned for their exploits, have not only been obliged to diſcipline their armies, but even to raiſe them out of the earth as it were, before they could face an enemy: and theſe certainly deſerve a much greater degree of applauſe than thoſe who had the command of veteran and well-diſciplined armies. Amongſt ſuch, we may reckon Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Tullus Hoſtilius, Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, Cyrus King of Perſia, and Gracchus the Roman, who all had their armies to raiſe and diſcipline before they could lead them into the field: and yet they were enabled to effect theſe things by their own great parts, and having ſubjects of ſuch a diſpoſition, that they could diſcipline and train them up as they pleaſed. But it would have been utterly impoſſible that any one of them, how great ſoever his merit and qualifications might have been, ſhould ever have performed any thing memorable in a foreign country, the inhabitants of which were corrupt and averſe to all good order and neceſſary obedience. It is not ſufficient therefore in Italy to know how to command an army already raiſed and diſciplined; a General muſt firſt raiſe and diſcipline it himſelf, before he puts himſelf at the head of it: but no body can do

that except a Prince who is poſſeſſed of large territories, and has a great number of ſubjects, which I am not; nor did I ever yet, or ever can command any but foreign armies, compoſed of Soldiers who owed me no natural obedience: and whether it is poſſible to eſtabliſh ſuch diſcipline as I have been recommending amongſt troops of that kind, I ſubmit to your conſideration. Do you think I could ever make theſe men carry heavier arms than they uſed to do; and not only arms but proviſions for two or three days, and a ſpade or mattock into the bargain? Could I ever make them dig, or keep them whole days together at their exerciſe, in order to fit them for the field? Could I keep them from gaming, drinking, whoring, ſwearing, and thoſe other vices which are got to ſuch a head amongſt the Soldiery of theſe times? How long muſt it be before I could eſtabliſh ſuch order, diſcipline, and obedience amongſt them, that if there ſhould happen to be a tree full of ripe fruit in the middle of the camp, not one of them ſhould dare to touch it; of which ſort we meet with ſeveral inſtances amongſt the Ancients? What rewards could I promiſe them of ſufficient weight to make them love me? or what threats could I uſe to make them fear me, when they know that when the war is over I ſhall have nothing more to do with them? How could I ever make thoſe aſhamed of any thing, who have no ſhame in them? How can they reſpect me, when they hardly know my face? By what God or what Saint muſt they ſwear? by him whom they worſhip, or thoſe whom they blaſpheme? What God they worſhip I know not; nor do I know what Saint they do not blaſpheme. How could I hope they would ever obſerve any promiſe, when I ſaw they did not pay the leaſt regard to their word, or imagine they would reverence man, when they ſhew ſo much diſhonour to God? What good impreſſion then could I ſtamp upon ſo rotten and corrupted a maſs?——If you object that the Swiſs and Spaniards are good Soldiers, I freely confeſs that I think them much better than the Italians; but if you have attended to what I have been ſaying, and conſider the diſcipline of both thoſe nations, you will find they fall very far ſhort of the Ancients in many reſpects. The ſuperiority of the Swiſs is owing to their ancient inſtitutions, and the want of Cavalry, as I told you before; and that of the Spaniards, to neceſſity: for as they generally carry on their wars in foreign parts, they cannot hope to eſcape if they loſe a battle, and therefore muſt either conquer or die. This it is that makes them reſolute Soldiers; but they are very deficient however in ſeveral other reſpects: for their chief, if not their only excellence, conſiſts in ſtanding firm to receive a charge from the puſh of a pike, or the point of a Sword: and ſhould any man attempt to inſtruct them in what they are ſtill wanting, eſpecially if he be a foreigner, he would find all his endeavours to no purpoſe.——As to the Italians, their Princes

have

have been ſo weak and puſillanimous for a long time, that they were not able to introduce any good military inſtitution: and not being reduced to it by neceſſity like the Spaniards, they could not do it of themſelves: ſo that they are now become the ſcorn and deriſion of the world. The people indeed are not to be blamed for this, but their Princes, who have been juſtly puniſhed for it, and loſt their dominions without being able to ſtrike a ſtroke in their defence. To confirm what I have ſaid, let me deſire you to recollect how many wars there have been in Italy ſince it was invaded by Charles VIII. of France: and though wars generally make men good Soldiers, yet the longer theſe wars laſted, the worſe were our officers and private men. This was owing to the nature of their military diſcipline and inſtitutions, which have long been very bad, and ſtill continue ſo; and what is ſtill worſe, there is no body that is able to reform them. It is in vain therefore to think of ever retrieving the reputation of the Italian arms by any other method than what I have preſcribed, and by the co-operation of ſome powerful Princes in Italy: for then the ancient diſcipline might be introduced again amongſt raw honeſt men who are their own Subjects; though it never can amongſt a parcel of corrupted debauched raſcals and foreigners; as no Sculptor, how ſkilful ſoever in his art, can hope to make a good Statue out of a block of marble that has been mangled and ſpoiled before by ſome bungler: whereas he will be ſure to ſucceed if he has a freſh block to work upon.

Before our Italian Princes had been ſcourged by the Ultramontanes, they thought it ſufficient for a Prince to write a handſome letter, or return a civil anſwer to one; to excel in drollery and repartee; to undermine and deceive one another; and to ſet themſelves off with jewels and lace; to eat and ſleep in greater magnificence and luxury than their neighbours; to ſpend their time in wanton dalliance and laſcivious pleaſures; to keep up a haughty kind of State, and grind the faces of their Subjects; to indulge themſelves in indolence and inactivity; to diſpoſe of their military honours and preferments to Pimps and Paraſites; to neglect and deſpiſe merit of every kind; to browbeat thoſe that endeavoured to point out any thing that was ſalutary or praiſe-worthy; to have their words and ſayings looked upon as oracles; not foreſeeing, (weak and infatuated as they were) that by ſuch a conduct they were making a rod for their own backs, and expoſing themſelves to the mercy of the firſt invader. To this were owing the dreadful alarms, the diſgraceful defeats, and the aſtoniſhing loſſes they ſuſtained in the year one thouſand four hundred and ninety-four; and hence it came to paſs that three of the moſt powerful States in Italy were ſo often ravaged and laid waſte in thoſe times. But [illegible] more deplorable to ſee that thoſe Princes, who are yet left in [illegible] of [illegible] dominions, are

are ſo far from taking warning from the downfal of others, that they purſue the ſame courſe, and live in the ſame ſort of miſrule and fatal ſecurity; not conſidering that Princes in former times, who were deſirous either to acquire new dominion, or at leaſt to preſerve their own, ſtrictly obſerved all thoſe rules which I have laid down and recommended in the courſe of this converſation, and that their chief endeavours were to inure their bodies to all manner of hardſhip and fatigue, and to fortify their minds againſt danger and the fear of death. Thus Julius Cæſar, Alexander of Macedon, and many other great men and heroic Princes whom I have mentioned before, always fought at the head of their own armies, always marched with them on foot, and carried their own arms; and if any of them ever loſt their power, they loſt their life with it at the ſame time, and died with the ſame reputation and glory which they had always maintained whilſt they lived. So that, how much ſoever we condemn the inordinate thirſt of dominion in ſome of them, we cannot reproach any of them with ſoftneſs and effeminacy, or accuſe them of having lived in ſo delicate or indolent a manner, as to enervate and make them unfit to reign over mankind. If then our Princes would read and duly conſider the lives and fortunes of theſe great men, one would think it impoſſible they ſhould not alter their conduct, or that their dominions ſhould long continue in the feeble and languiſhing condition they are in at preſent.

But as you complained of your Militia in the beginning of this converſation, I muſt beg leave to tell you, that if you had formed it upon the model, and exerciſed it in the manner I have recommended, and it had not anſwered your expectation, you would then indeed have juſt reaſon for your complaint: but as you have neither formed nor diſciplined it in that manner, you yourſelf are more properly to be blamed, if it has proved an abortion inſtead of a perfect birth. The Venetians, and the Duke of Ferrara alſo, made a good beginning, but they did not perſevere: ſo that if they likewiſe miſcarried, it is to be imputed to their own miſmanagement, and not the defects of their men: for I will venture to affirm, that the firſt State in Italy that ſhall take up this method, and purſue it, will ſoon become maſter of the whole Province, and ſucceed as Philip of Macedon did; who having learnt from Epaminondas the Theban the right method of forming and diſciplining an army, grew ſo powerful, whilſt the other States of Greece were buried in indolence and luxury, and wholly taken up in plays and banquets, that he conquered them all in a few years, and left his Son ſuch a foundation to build upon, that he was able to ſubdue the whole world. Whoever therefore deſpiſes this advice (whether he be a Prince or Governor of a Commonwealth) has but little regard for himſelf or his country: and for my own part, I cannot help complaining of Fortune, which

ſhould

ſhould either not have ſuffered me to have known theſe things, or given me power to put them in execution; which is a thing I cannot hope for now I am ſo far advanced in years. For which reaſon, I have freely communicated my thoughts to you of this matter, as young men and well qualified not only to inſtil ſuch advice into the ears of your Princes, if you approve of it, but to aſſiſt them in carrying it into execution whenever a proper opportunity ſhall offer: and let me conjure you not to deſpair of ſucceſs, ſince this Province ſeems deſtined to revive Arts and Sciences which have ſeemed long ſince dead; as we ſee it has already raiſed Poetry, Painting, and Sculpture as it were from the grave. As to myſelf indeed, I cannot expect to ſee ſo happy a change at my time of life: but if fortune had indulged me ſome years ago with a territory fit for ſuch an undertaking, I think I ſhould ſoon have convinced the world of the excellency of the ancient military diſcipline; for I would either have encreaſed my own dominions with glory, or at leaſt not have loſt them with infamy and diſgrace [*l*].

[*l*] "After all, (ſays Dr. Leland in a Note upon his Life of Philip of Macedon) a ſcrupulous regard to ſyſtematical rules, and pedantically reducing war to a Science, ſometimes proves a fatal enemy to that enthuſiaſtic ardour, ſome ſpark of which muſt neceſſarily have a ſhare in greatneſs of all kinds, and particularly in military greatneſs. Where the lively ſenſe of honour, and the true patriot Spirit which ſhould animate a ſoldier, are wanting, it may ſerve to extinguiſh the ſenſe of ſhame, and the fear of diſgrace, by affording a fair pretence for juſtifying an inſtance of inactive conduct, or the declining an hazardous and dangerous enterprize. But when an exact knowledge of the military art is united with more elevated qualities, then it becomes really valuable. Of this, the preſent age hath an illuſtrious inſtance in a Prince, who muſt be acknowledged to bear a ſtrong and ſtriking reſemblance to the Macedonian, in all the bright and glorious parts of his Character; to poſſeſs the ſame exalted genius, the ſame penetration, the ſame indefatigable vigour, the ſame firmneſs and greatneſs of mind, the ſame boldneſs in enterprize, the ſame taſte for the polite arts, and the ſame regard to Learning and its Profeſſors. Like Philip, in his moſt diſtreſſed condition, his abilities have been employed in bearing up with an unconquered ſpirit againſt the united power of many different enemies ſurrounding him with their formidable numbers. But as his difficulties have been infinitely greater; ſo his abilities in triumphing over them, have hitherto appeared unparalleled: the preſent age beholds them with aſtoniſhment; poſterity muſt ſpeak of them with delight and admiration." Such is the magnanimous Prince whom we may juſtly call the greateſt Hero (in the true ſenſe of the word) that this or any other age has ever produced. As a Soldier, a Politician, a Legiſlator, a Philoſopher, a Poet, he leaves Julius Cæſar, Alexander, Charles XII. of Sweden, &c. at a long interval behind him.

The END of the SEVENTH and laſt BOOK of the ART of WAR.

THE

THE

MARRIAGE of BELPHEGOR.

A NOVEL.

The ARGUMENT.

Belphegor, an Arch-devil, is ſent into this World by Pluto, and obliged to marry. He takes a wife, but not being able to ſupport her inſolence and extravagance, chuſes rather to return to Hell than to live any longer with her.

IT is recorded in the old hiſtories of Florence, that a certain devout perſon, who was held in great veneration there for the ſanctity of his life, being one day at prayers in his cloſet, had a viſion, in which he ſaw numbers of Souls deſcending into hell; the much greater part of which complained it was owing to their wives that they were ſent thither: at which, Minos, Æacus, Rhadamanthus, and the reſt of the infernal Judges were not a little aſtoniſhed. But though they looked upon it for ſome time only as a malicious ſlander raiſed upon married women; yet as the complaint grew more and more frequent every day, they at laſt acquainted Pluto with it: upon which, he reſolved to have the matter thoroughly diſcuſſed in his privy Council, and, after mature deliberation, to take ſuch meaſures as ſhould ſeem moſt expedient, to diſcover whether there was any truth in the complaint, or whether it was a mere calumny. The Council therefore being aſſembled, Pluto harangued them in this manner.

" Although, right truſty and well-beloved, we hold our dominions by the decree of Heaven and irrevocable deſtiny; and therefore are accountable to no other power for our actions: nevertheleſs, as it is a

point of wiſdom even in the greateſt potentates to rule according to law, and to take the opinion of able Counſellors, eſpecially in matters of high concern; we are determined to be adviſed by you in what manner we ought to conduct ourſelves in an affair, which otherwiſe perhaps may bring infamy and reproach upon ourſelves and our Government. For though indeed the Souls of almoſt all married men which deſcend into theſe realms complain that it is owing to their wives; yet are we unwilling to be too haſty in giving credit to ſo ſtrange a report, leſt we ſhould expoſe ourſelves to cenſure, as either too merciful and indulgent in ſparing offenders who juſtly deſerve puniſhment, or too rigid and ſevere in condemning the innocent. For as one extreme argues weakneſs, and the other injuſtice, and we are equally deſirous to avoid the ſcandal that may reſult from either of them; (if we could hit upon any proper expedient) we have called you together to demand your advice and aſſiſtance in making due proviſion that our Government, which hitherto has been renowned throughout all ages for the juſtice and impartiality of its decrees, may for ever enjoy the ſame unſpotted reputation."

The matter ſeemed of the utmoſt importance to the whole Council, and worthy of the matureſt deliberation: but though they all agreed that it was abſolutely neceſſary to ſift out the truth, yet they differed in the means which ought to be taken for that purpoſe: ſome thought it would be the beſt way to ſend one Devil in human ſhape into this world, to inform himſelf perſonally of the truth or falſity of ſo common a report; others ſaid it would be better, in their opinion, to ſend more than one, that ſo they might form a true judgment from their ſeveral accounts; a third party were of opinion they might ſpare themſelves the trouble of ſending any one at all, by torturing the Souls of married men till they told the whole truth: the majority however agreeing in the firſt opinion, the reſt acquieſced in it, and it was reſolved accordingly to ſend ſome one particular Devil upon that errand: but as none of them appeared to be very fond of ſuch an expedition themſelves, nor offered their Service as volunteers, it was determined that matter ſhould be decided by lot; and the lot fell upon Belphegor, one of the Arch-devils, but once an Arch-angel and ſpirit of light before his fall from Heaven. Belphegor however did not much reliſh the employmy that had fallen to his lot: but as it was the unanimous decree of Pluto and the whole Council, he ſubmitted to the commands they laid upon him, and to take up with ſuch appointments as they ſhould think proper: which were, that he ſhould have an hundred thouſand ducats paid him down in ready money as ſoon as he entered upon his Commiſſion, to introduce him into this world with a handſome equipage in the form of a man, and to enable him to marry ſuch a wife as he

pleaſed,

pleaſed, with whom he was to live ten years: at the expiration of which term he was to return to Hell, to give Pluto a true account from his own experience of the happineſs or unhappineſs of a matrimonial life. It was likewiſe another condition annexed to his commiſſion, that he ſhould be ſubject, as long as he was a ſojourner upon earth, to all the miſery, and diſtreſs, and affliction, and paſſions that are the lot and inheritance of mortal men; ſuch as ſickneſs, and pain, and poverty, and exile, and impriſonment, and ſorrow of all ſorts, except he could find means to elude them by any artifice or eſcape.

Belphegor then having received the money and engaged to ſubmit to theſe conditions, ſet out for the upper world with a train of devils in the diſguiſe of Servants, and ſoon after his arrival upon earth made a magnificent entry into Florence (a city which he choſe to live in above all others for the ſake of improving his fortune) where he aſſumed the name of Don Roderigo of Caſtile, and took a very fine houſe in the ſuburbs of All Saints. But to conceal his real quality, he gave out that he left Spain when he was but a boy to make a voyage into the Levant, and having reſided at Aleppo ever ſince, had acquired a conſiderable fortune there; but that he had now retired from buſineſs with a deſign to marry and ſettle in Italy, as a country which he had heard much celebrated for the humanity and politeneſs of the people, and thought he ſhould like it better than any other in the world. Now Roderigo ſeemed a very handſome man about thirty years of age, and as he lived in great ſplendour and magnificence, the Florentines were ſoon convinced he muſt be exceeding rich: upon which account, ſeveral of the nobility, who had many daughters and but ſmall eſtates, courted his alliance. After ſome time therefore he made choice of a moſt beautiful young lady, whoſe name was Honeſta, the daughter of Amerigo Donati, who alſo had three other daughters and three ſons all grown up: but notwithſtanding the Donati were one of the nobleſt and moſt honoured families in Florence, yet Amerigo having ſo many children, beſides the dignity of his rank to ſupport in a proper manner, was poor and could give his daughter little or no fortune. Roderigo however married the young Lady, and celebrated his nuptials in the moſt ſplendid and oſtentatious manner, being ſubject to vanity and all other human paſſions by the conditions he had ſubmitted to before he left the infernal regions. Soon after his wedding, he likewiſe entered into all the pleaſures and follies of the age, and ſpent vaſt ſums of money to make himſelf popular and much talked of: beſides which, he grew ſo paſſionately fond of his wife, that he was almoſt diſtracted whenever ſhe happened to be either indiſpoſed or diſpleaſed at any thing. But Madam Honeſta, beſides the reſt of her fortune, which conſiſted chiefly, if not altogether, in her beauty and the nobility of her blood, brou[illegible] like[illegible]

likewiſe ſuch a portion of pride and inſolence with her, that Roderigo, who was a competent judge (as he was well acquainted with both parties) thought ſhe excelled Lucifer himſelf in thoſe amiable qualities: for when ſhe found he was ſo enamoured of her that ſhe could make him jump over a ſtraw if ſhe pleaſed, ſhe laid aſide all manner of affection and regard, and would call him the moſt opprobrious and provoking names ſhe could think of whenever he denied her any thing, how unreaſonable ſoever it was to aſk it; which kind of treatment at laſt made poor Roderigo almoſt weary of his life: nevertheleſs, the reſpect he had for her father, her brothers, and the reſt of her relations, the conſideration of his marriage vow, and above all, the tenderneſs he ſtill had for her, made him reſolve to bear all with patience, and to keep her in temper if poſſible. For this purpoſe, he not only ſpent immenſe ſums to gratify her vanity with the richeſt cloaths that could be got for money, and to indulge her in every new faſhion that came up in a city where faſhions change as often as the wind; but gave handſome marriage-portions to all her Siſters, ſent one of her brothers with a cargo of fine cloth into the Levant, another with Silks into France and Spain, and ſet up the third in a Goldſmith's Shop at Florence. Beſides this, in the time of Carnival, and at the Feſtival of St. John, when all the nobility and rich Citizens made great feaſts and entertainments for their friends, Madam Honeſta took ſpecial care to ſee that her huſband ſhould exceed all others in luxury and profuſion. Yet all theſe expences, heavy as they were, he bore with patience to keep peace at home; nor would he ever have repined at them, if he could but have lived quietly in his own houſe, till all was ſpent. But vain were his endeavours: for ſuch was her extravagance and inſolent behaviour to every one, that it brought him into many diſtreſſes and inconveniencies, and was ſo inſupportable to others, that neither man-ſervant nor maid-ſervant could bear to ſtay in the houſe above two or three days at moſt: ſo that Roderigo was almoſt at his wits end, when he ſaw that not only his hired ſervants, but even the very devils themſelves whom he had brought with him into this world in the ſhape of men, deſerted him, and choſe rather to return to hell, and endure any ſort of torment there, than to live upon earth under the hatches of ſuch a vixen.

In theſe comfortleſs circumſtances, Roderigo having at laſt got almoſt to the bottom of his purſe by the aſſiſtance of his good wife, began to feed himſelf with the hopes of having ſome returns from the cargoes he had ſent into France, Spain, and the Levant: but as his credit was ſtill good, he reſolved to keep up to his rank and uſual manner of living. For this purpoſe, he borrowed money of the merchants and bankers, and gave them notes and bonds for it: but as many of them

them were circulating round the city, they began after a while to ſmell a rat: and to complete his ruin, when his credit was thus ſunk, he received news on the ſame day that his wife's brother, whom he had ſent into the Levant, having ſold his cargo, had loſt all the money at play; that the Ship in which the other brother was returning with a cargo of merchandize he had received in exchange for his own, had foundered at Sea, without having been inſured; and that his brother-in-law himſelf was drowned. As ſoon therefore as this came to be publicly known, Roderigo's creditors met privately together; but not daring to arreſt him before his notes became payable, though they looked upon him as utterly ruined, determined to have him narrowly watched leſt he ſhould ſhew them a light pair of heels. Roderigo, on the other hand, ſeeing his affairs in ſo deſperate a ſituation that there was no remedy left, and remembering there was a loop-hole left in his commiſſion, reſolved to run away at all events; and mounting his horſe early one morning, immediately fled out of the city: but as ſoon as ever his creditors heard he was gone off, they took the alarm, and having obtained leave from the Magiſtrates to ſeize him wherever he ſhould be found, they not only ſent bailiffs to purſue him, but rode after him themſelves as faſt as their horſes could go.

Roderigo had not got above a mile from the city when he was aware they were coming full cry after him, and ſeeing himſelf in great danger, reſolved to leave the high road, and traverſe the country to ſeek his fortune, if he ſhould be happy enough to make his eſcape. But when he got into the fields, he found himſelf ſo entangled amongſt the ditches and encloſures, that he was forced to quit his horſe and take to his heels; and ſkulking about from one field to another, under the cover of the vines and reeds with which that country abounds, he at laſt arrived at the houſe of one Giovanni Matteo del Bricca, a farmer and tenant to Meſſer Giovanni del Bene, whom he found in the yard giving fodder to his cattle; and recommending himſelf to his protection, promiſed him a great reward, and that he would make him a rich man, if he would conceal him from his creditors, who were purſuing him in order to throw him into jail, where he might lie rotting all the days of his life if they ſhould catch him: to gain credit to which promiſes he aſſured him he would give him ſuch proof of his ability to perform them, that if he was not ſufficiently convinced of it before they parted, he would freely give him leave to deliver him up into the hands of his enemies.——Now this Matteo, though a peaſant, was a ſharp, ſenſible fellow; and as he thought he ſhould be wanting to himſelf and his family, if he loſt ſo fa[illegible]portuni[illegible] of making his fortune, and could come to no harm if [illegible]ucce[illegible] in charitably endeavouring to ſhelter a man in diſtre[illegible]

told Roderigo he would afford him protection: for which purpoſe he covered him up cloſe in a heap of Straw that lay before the barn door, and threw a parcel of bruſhwood and reeds over it, which he had brought out of the fields for fuel. But Roderigo had hardly got into his neſt when his creditors arrived: and though they made a very ſtrict enquiry after him, they could get nothing more out of Matteo than that he had neither ſeen nor heard of any ſuch perſon: ſo that they ſoon went way; and having ſearched for him all over the country for the ſpace of two or three days to no purpoſe, they at laſt returned to Florence. Matteo then, as ſoon as the ſtorm was blown over, took his gueſt out of the ſtraw and demanded the performance of his promiſe: upon which, Roderigo ſaid he was truly ſenſible of the great obligations he lay under to him, and would certainly be as good as his word; and to convince him of his ſincerity, he told him who he was, upon what errand he came into this world, and what ſort of a wife he had been bleſſed with: adding that (as he deſigned to make him a rich man) whenever he heard of any woman in the neighbourhood that was poſſeſſed with a Devil, he might be aſſured that he was the Devil that poſſeſſed her, and would never quit her till his friend Matteo came to drive him away; which would give him an opportunity of making his own terms with her relations: after which promiſe, he immediately took his leave and went about his buſineſs.

Not many days after it happened that the daughter of Ambrogio Amadei, and wife of Buonaiuto Tebalducci, citizens of Florence, was poſſeſſed with a Devil: upon which, her huſband and parents had recourſe to all the remedies that are generally made uſe of upon ſuch ſad occaſions: and amongſt the reſt, they not applied St. Zanobi's ſkull to her head, but wrapped her up in St. Gaulbert's cloke: at all which Roderigo laughed moſt heartily in his ſleeve. Every body, however, was fully convinced that the woman was really poſſeſſed with a Devil, and that her diſtemper was not owing to vapours, or any ſham-ſham of that ſort: for ſhe talked Latin, diſputed in Philoſophy, and diſcovered the private frailties and infirmities of ſeveral godly people: particularly thoſe of a righteous Monk, who, amongſt the reſt of his peccadilloes, had kept a handſome girl above four years in his cell, under the diſguiſe of a young lay-brother: all which things afforded matter of great ſurprize to every body that heard her. In the mean time her father Amadei was in great affliction, and having tried all remedies to no purpoſe, began to deſpair of a cure, when Matteo, luckily hearing of her caſe, came to wait upon him, and aſſured him he would diſpoſſeſs his daughter if he would give him five hundred florins to buy a little bit of land at Perettola. Theſe terms being readily accepted by her father, Matteo having in the firſt place cauſed two or three Maſſes to

be

be ſung, and gone through certain other devout ceremonies to give a good colour to the matter, put his mouth cloſe to the Lady's ear and ſaid in a low voice, "Roderigo, I am come to deſire you will perform the promiſe you made me:" "that I will do moſt willingly, anſwered Roderigo; but this job will not be ſufficient to make you ſo rich as I would have you; and therefore as ſoon as I go out of this woman I will enter into King Charles's daughter of Naples, and never leave her till you come to beat up my quarters: for this ſervice you may make your own conditions, and when you have done your buſineſs there, pray give me no further trouble:" after which, he immediately quitted the Lady, to the great joy and aſtoniſhment of the whole city. Not long after, the abovementioned Princeſs was in the ſame condition; and though the King her father had recourſe not only to all manner of phyſical remedies, but the aſſiſtance of the moſt pious and able Divines, it ſignified nothing: but hearing what feats Matteo had done, he ſent for him to Naples. Matteo now thinking his fortune made, joyfully obeyed the ſummons, and arriving in that city, ſoon drove the Devil entirely out of the Princeſs; for which the King made him a preſent of fifty thouſand ducats: but before he took his leave of Matteo, he told him, that as he had honeſtly fulfilled his promiſe, he no longer thought himſelf under any obligation to him; and therefore hoped for his own ſake he would trouble him no more: for if he did, he would be a greater enemy to him than ever he had been a friend. Matteo then returned to Florence, and flattered himſelf with the hopes of enjoying his riches in peace all the reſt of his life, without any thoughts of ever offending his friend Roderigo. But it ſeems he reckoned without his hoſt: for ſoon after, a daughter of Lewis VII. King of France was likewiſe poſſeſſed with a Devil; the news of which greatly diſturbed Matteo, when he conſidered the King's authority on one hand, the threats of Roderigo on the other, and took it for granted that he ſhould be applied to upon the reputation of his late ſucceſs. The King of France then finding all other means were of no ſervice to his daughter, and being informed of Matteo's abilities in matters of exorciſm, firſt diſpatched one of his Meſſengers to deſire he would repair to his Court: but Matteo pretending to be dangerouſly ill and not able to travel ſo far by any means whatſoever, his Majeſty ſent to requeſt the Signiory of Florence would force him to come. Being thus obliged to ſet out for Paris much againſt the grain, he repreſented to his Majeſty upon his arrival at Court, that though indeed he had met with ſome ſucceſs in ejecting Devils out of ſuch as were poſſeſſed, he could not anſwer for doing the ſame in all caſes, as ſome of them were ſo ſtubborn and contumacious that they neither [illegible] threats

nor charms, nor any kind of religious means: but that ſince it was his Majeſty's pleaſure, he would uſe his beſt endeavours to ſerve him; and hoped if he failed he would impute it to nothing but abſolute inability. The King, however, in anſwer to this ſpeech, told him in plain terms that ſince he had cured others, he was ſure he could cure his daughter; and if he did not, he ſhould certainly be hanged: at which Matteo fell into a fit of trembling, and was ready to ſink into the earth. But collecting his ſpirits at laſt, he deſired he might be introduced to the Princeſs; and approaching gently to her ear, recommended himſelf to Roderigo's mercy in the moſt humble terms, conjuring him to remember the ſervices he had formerly done him, and conſider how ungrateful it would be in him to abandon his old friend in ſuch diſtreſs. You covetous raſcal, ſaid Roderigo, how dare you come near me any more after the caution I gave you when we parted laſt? Have you not been already well paid for the ſervices you upbraid me with? Am I to help you out of every ſcrape you get into? Indeed, Sir, I ſhall convince you that I can be an enemy as well as a friend; for I will take care you ſhall be decently tucked up before I leave this place. Poor Matteo therefore ſeeing himſelf thus left in the lurch, reſolved to try ſome other method; and having deſired the Princeſs might withdraw, told the King there were ſome Spirits, as he ſaid before, of ſo obſtinate and refractory a turn that there was no way of dealing with them, and that this was one of them: that however he had one expedient left, and if it ſucceeded, he hoped he ſhould be entitled to his Majeſty's favour; if not, he was at his mercy, and humbly implored him to ſpare a man who had been guilty of no crime: after which, he deſired the King would be pleaſed to cauſe a very large Stage to be erected in the Church of Nôtre Dame, capable of holding all the Nobility and Clergy in the City, and to have it covered with cloth of gold: that he would likewiſe order an Altar to be ſet up in the middle of it, and condeſcend to come thither himſelf with all his Clergy and Nobles richly habited, and in royal proceſſion on the next Sunday morning: and laſtly, that after a Solemn Maſs had been celebrated, he would graciouſly be pleaſed to ſend for the Princeſs thither. He alſo deſired there might be twenty perſons at leaſt placed on one ſide of the Church-yard with trumpets, drums, horns, hautboys, and all ſorts of muſical inſtruments, ready to ſtrike up and advance towards the Stage when he threw up his hat into the air; all which, with ſome other ſecret remedies he was in poſſeſſion of, he hoped would not fail to ſend the Devil a packing. Every thing then being in readineſs on Sunday morning (as he had requeſted) the Stage full of the Clergy and Nobility, the Church-yard of common people,

and

and Maſs ſung, the Princeſs was conducted thither by two Biſhops and a magnificent train of Nobles. But when Roderigo ſaw ſuch a multitude got together, and all the reſt of the apparatus, he began to wonder what was the matter, and muttered to himſelf, What the plague is this Scoundrel about? Does he think to fright me with a Mob and a parade of Biſhops? Surely he muſt know I have ſeen all the pomp of Heaven, and the confuſion of Hell, and am not to be ſcared out of my wits in this manner. But I will ſwinge the rogue for it. Matteo however drawing up to the Princeſs's ear, humbly beſought him to quit her. Quit her, ſaid Roderigo, this is a pleaſant conceit indeed! Pray what is all this apparatus for? Doſt think to drive the country of me with theſe gim-cracks? But I will ſurely have thee hanged, ungrateful wretch as thou art.——After repeated ſupplications on one ſide, and variety of hard names on the other, Matteo finding there was no more time to be loſt, threw up his hat into the air: upon which, the Muſicians immediately ſtruck up, the drums beat, the trumpets ſounded, the mob ſhouted, and advanced all together towards the Stage, to the great aſtoniſhment of Roderigo, who began to tremble like an aſpin leaf, and ſoftly ſaid to Matteo, what is up now? Alas, anſwered Matteo, ſeemingly much frighted, your wife is coming!——No ſooner did Roderigo hear the name of *wife* but he loſt all preſence of mind, and without ſtaying to reflect that what Matteo ſaid could not poſſibly be true, he quitted the Princeſs in a moment and ran away as faſt as his legs could carry him; chuſing rather to go back again to Hell for eaſe, than to return to the thraldom of Matrimony, in which he had experienced ſuch torment and ſo many heart-breaking ſorrows.——In this manner Belphegor having luckily eſcaped from his wife, made what haſte he could to the infernal Regions, to inform Pluto of what he had both ſeen and felt himſelf; and to aſſure him he might depend upon the truth of what he had ſo often heard from the Souls of married men, but could not believe: and Matteo for his part, having thus outwitted the Devil, joyfully returned to his houſe at Perettola.

POSTHUMOUS WORKS

OF

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL

CONTAINING

I. A Diſcourſe concerning the proper ways and means of reforming the Government of Florence, written by the command of Pope Leo X.

II. Letters written by him in the name of that Republic, upon different occaſions, whilſt he was Secretary of State to it.

ADVERTISEMENT to the READER.

THAT nothing might be omitted which could in any wiſe contribute to make this work uſeful and agreeable to the Public, the Editor has added a Tranſlation of ſome Poſthumous writings before-mentioned in *the Life of Machiavel*, and publiſhed in Italian at London in 1760, under the title of *Opere Inedite di Niccolò Machiavelli*; of which the Reader will meet with a more particular account in the following preface to the original.

THE

PREFACE.

ABOUT ten years ago an Engliſh Gentleman travelling through Tuſcany, had the good fortune to meet with the following valuable pieces in manuſcript, which had never been publiſhed, though long and earneſtly ſought for, and deſired by the curious and learned. Phillippo Nerli had ſeen and read the *Diſcourſe concerning the ways and means of reforming the Government of Florence* whilſt he lived, as appears from a paſſage in the ſeventh book of his Commentaries, p. 137. Jacopo Nardi mentions it in the ſeventh book of his Hiſtory, p. 382 of the Florence Edition: it is taken notice of likewiſe by Jacopo Gaddi in his book *de Scriptoribus non Eccleſiaſticis*, par. II. p. 9; and indeed almoſt all thoſe that have ſpoken of the Life and writings of Machiavel, have ſaid ſomething of it. The Manuſcript however lay hid in a private corner of the famous Gaddian Library above two hundred and forty years, and till very lately eluded the moſt diligent ſearches of the *Literati*, who juſtly ſet the higheſt value upon the productions of ſo great a genius.——The Reader will here alſo find thirty-nine Letters, written by Machiavel, in the name of the Republic of Florence, whilſt he was Secretary of State there: but theſe are only a part of a large volume in his own hand-writing, ſtill preſerved in the Chancery of that City, as appears from an authentic Document which I have ſubjoined to the end of them.

How the Engliſh Gentleman above-mentioned came at theſe Manuſcripts, I know not, becauſe he is dead: but this I know, that the Spirit and Genius of the A[illegible] be diſtinguiſhed both in the Diſcourſe and in the Letter[illegible]er, we diſcover the honeſt

neſt boldneſs of a free Republican; in the latter, all the marks of juſtice, prudence, humanity, and mercy; and in both, that ſagacity and penetration which manifeſtly ſhew him to have been a man of the moſt conſummate knowledge and abilities in Civil Government. Had Machiavel never written the *Prince*, or if that piece had had the good fortune either to have been interpreted with more judgment, or not been fallen upon by the moſt virulent adverſaries, he would have eſcaped that infamy and reproach which are now thrown upon him by the greater part of mankind: for theſe writings evidently demonſtrate that he was not only a moſt ſtrenuous defender and aſſerter of the liberties of his country, but a lover of juſtice and humanity, and eminently endowed with all other ſocial virtues. But could ſuch a man as he was, a man born, educated, and advanced to great and honourable preferments in a free State, who was afterwards reduced to extreme poverty and diſtreſs by the machinations of the Medici and their party, who was engaged in one conſpiracy with Aghoſtino Capponi and Pietro Paolo Boſcoli againſt Guiliano and Lorenzo de Medici, and in another with Luigi Alamanni and Zanobi Buondelmonte againſt Cardinal Giulio; could ſuch a man ever think of writing a book with a deſign to enſlave his country, when it had heaped honours and preferments upon him without end or meaſure, and that only to make Lorenzo de Medici, Duke of Urbino, Sovereign Lord over it, againſt whom he had entered into a Conſpiracy not long before? Could a man who uſed to frequent the celebrated Aſſemblies in Coſimo Rucellai's Gardens, who conſtantly aſſociated with young men of great and generous minds, who made it his only ſtudy to maintain the liberties of his country, who in his Diſcourſes upon the firſt Decad of Livy has painted Tyranny in the moſt odious colours, and taught his fellow citizens how to live and die like true Republicans, who was continually extolling the generoſity and magnanimity of Brutus and Caſſius; could ſuch a man ever be thought in earneſt to have taught Lorenzo de Medici the way to oppreſs his country, and reduce it to the moſt abject and infamous ſtate of Slavery? "*Itaque Tyranno non favet*; (ſays Albericus Gentilis to this purpoſe, de Legationibus, Lib. III. Cap. ix.) *ſui propoſiti non eſt Tyrannum inſtruere, ſed arcanis ejus palam factis ipſum miſeris populis nudum ac conſpicuum exhibere.*"——"*Conatus ſcriptoris eſt* (adds Caſpar Scioppius Pæd. Politic.) *certum aliquem Tyrannum patriæ infeſtum deſcribere, eoque pacto partim populare odium in eum commovere, partim artes ejus detegere.*——But the limits of a bare Preface are too narrow for ſuch an apology as ſo great a man deſerves.

As to the *Diſcourſe*, it was written ſoon after the death of Lorenzo de Medici, Duke of Urbino, and Nephew to Leo X. who died the fourth of May 1519, and left no legitimate Children, but Catherine, afterwards

afterwards Queen of France, a Princeſs of rare abilities and more than maſculine courage, who will ever be renowned in Hiſtory for having maintained her Sons in the poſſeſſion of that Kingdom as long as ſhe lived, in the moſt troubleſome and dangerous times. Philippo Nerli and Jacopo Nardi indeed have fixed the date of this Diſcourſe ſomething later: but the Reader will eaſily perceive it muſt have been written about the time I mention.

Upon the death of the Duke of Urbino then, there aroſe great diſſenſions in Florence; ſome who were friends to liberty being deſirous to extend the plan of their Government, and fix it upon a bottom as remote from Monarchy as they could; whilſt the party of the Medici uſed their utmoſt endeavours to throw the Sovereign power into the hands of that family. But Cardinal Giulio de Medici, (natural Son to Giuliano, and Couſin to the Pope) who had come to Florence two days before the death of Lorenzo, endeavoured to prevent any tumult or commotion amongſt the people there, by giving out that his Holineſs deſigned to reform the State to the ſatisfaction of every one, and to reſtore their liberties: after which, having compoſed all differences, for the preſent at leaſt, he ſet out for Rome in September 1519, leaving Silvio Paſſerini, Cardinal of Cortona, at Florence, a man of great prudence and addreſs, to keep the citizens in good temper if poſſible. It was at that time therefore, according to all appearances, that Leo X. being informed of the diſcords that were ready to break out in the City of Florence, laid his commands upon Machiavel to draw him up a Plan for the Reformation of that State: a Commiſſion which gave birth to the following Diſcourſe, wherein he has ſufficiently diſplayed the greatneſs of his abilities, as well as the exquiſite adroitneſs and ſubtlety of his genius: for under the appearance of eſtabliſhing and ſecuring the Sovereign power in the Houſe of Medici, he has given a model of a moſt perfect Commonwealth; in which the attentive Reader will perceive that the Sovereign Power is lodged both of right, and in fact, in the Citizens themſelves, and that the power of the Medici, though apparently very great, is in reality nothing more than a ſhadow.

The Reader will likewiſe be ſurprized perhaps to ſee all the eſſential qualities, as well as the principles and fundamentals of the ſeveral different forms of Government, ſketched out and comprized in ſo narrow a compaſs; and cannot well help feeling himſelf ſenſibly affected by the love and regard which this illuſtrious Republican expreſſes towards his Country.

The *Letters* were written before the *Diſcourſe*, and are dated in the years 1510 and 1511, before the [illegible] Leo X. to the Pontificate, which did not happen till [illegible] proper to leave them in the order in which [illegible] Manuſcript, as

as a ſupplement to the *Diſcourſe*, which is the principal part of it. Theſe may ſerve to mark out the true character of Machiavel, and ſhew the goodneſs of his heart: ſince it is evident from them, that he muſt have been a man of extreme good nature, humanity, and juſtice. Natural equity and clemency, in preference to rigid juſtice, are the Virtues which diſtinguiſh themſelves throughout the greater part of theſe Letters, and which he there conſtantly recommends to the different States and perſons to whom they were written. The impartiality he inculcates in compoſing private animoſities and civil diſſentions in a ſummary manner; his lenity and compaſſion to poor people, even in collecting the public Taxes; his regard for decency and modeſty; his reverence for the Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction; and his extreme care for the honour of Almighty God, will, at laſt, ſurely undeceive the malevolent and unwary, who upon the bare word of others have been perſuaded to think of Machiavel as a wicked and violent man both in his principles and practice. It might be added, by way of concluſion to this Preface, that particular notice ought to be taken of the inviolable regard to Public Faith which he never fails to preſcribe, as well as of ſeveral other Maxims full of juſtice and political prudence; but above all, of his manner of writing, which carries with it an air of Majeſty, and commands reſpect.

A DIS-

A

DISCOURSE

UPON THE

Proper ways and means of reforming the Government of Florence.

Writtten by NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL, at the Command of Pope Leo X.

THE reaſon why Florence hath ſo often changed its form of government, is becauſe there never was yet either any Republic or Principality eſtabliſhed there which had the qualities it ought to have had: for that Principality cannot be called perfect and ſtable where things, which ſhould be tranſacted according to the will of one perſon only, are ſubmitted to the determination of many: nor can that be ſaid to be a true and durable Commonwealth where certain humours and inclinations are not gratified, which otherwiſe muſt naturally end in its ruin. To evince the truth of which, let us examine the ſeveral forms of Government which Florence has been ſubject to from the year 1393 till this time.

If we begin then with the Reformation conducted at that time by Maſo degli Albizi [a], we ſhall ſee that he moulded the Republic into a ſort of Ariſtocracy; in which there were ſo many defects that it did not continue above forty years: and indeed it would not have laſted ſo long, had it not been for the wars with the Viſconti, Dukes of Milan,

[a] See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book III.

lan, which happened in that period, and kept it united. The chief defect was, that the power was continued too long in the ſame perſons, and that the Elections were ſubject to fraud and underhand practices, which might throw the Government into the hands of bad men: beſides which, as mankind are liable to be corrupted, and good men too often become bad by a long continuance of power, it might happen that though the Election was a fair one at firſt, and upright men had been made choice of, it might prove a bad one in the end by the change of their manners. There was likewiſe no check upon the Grandees to deter them from forming Parties and Factions, which generally are the deſtruction of a State: and it might be added, that the Signiory had but little reputation, whilſt they had too much authority; for they had a power of taking away the life and property of any Citizen without appeal, and of calling the People together to a conference whenever they pleaſed: ſo that inſtead of being a defence and protection to the State, they were rather an inſtrument of its ruin, when they were under the influence of any popular and ambitious man. On the other hand, they had but little reputation, as I ſaid before; for as it often happened that raw young men, of little experience, and abject condition (and therefore incapable of ſupporting their dignity in a proper manner) were introduced into the Signiory, it was not poſſible they ſhould have any conſiderable degree of reputation. There was ſtill another imperfection in this form of Government of no ſmall conſequence, namely, that certain private men were admitted into the public Councils, which gave great reputation to thoſe men, whilſt it diminiſhed that of the Councils, and took away from the authority of the Magiſtrates; a circumſtance contrary to all civil good order. But what was of the laſt importance, was, that the People had no ſhare at all in the Government: all which defects joined together occaſioned infinite diſorder and confuſion; and if the wars abovementioned had not happened to have kept the State under in thoſe times, it muſt have been diſſolved long before it was.

This Adminiſtration was ſucceeded by that of Coſimo de Medici, which inclined more to a Principality than a Republican form: and if it was of longer duration than the laſt, it was owing in the firſt place to the favour of the people, by whoſe conſent and approbation it was eſtabliſhed; and in the next, to the uncommon prudence of two ſuch men as Coſimo and his grandſon Lorenzo, who were at the head of it. Nevertheleſs, it was ſo weakened by their being obliged to ſubmit their meaſures to the deliberation of many, that it was often in great danger; which occaſioned many Balia's and the frequent Baniſhments which happened under that Government, and at laſt its utter diſſolution when Charles VIII. of France invaded Italy. After this, the City endeavoured

voured to reſume the form of a Republic; but the meaſures which were taken for that purpoſe made it of ſhort duration, becauſe they were neither calculated to gratify the humours of all the Citizens, nor had ſufficient force to correct them: and it was ſo far from being a true and perfect Commonwealth, that a Gonfalonier for life, if he had been an able and bad man, might eaſily have made himſelf abſolute Lord over it; but if he had been a weak and good man, he might ſoon have been pulled from his ſeat, and that eſtabliſhment entirely overturned. But as it would be endleſs to adduce reaſons for the confirmation of this aſſertion, I ſhall only mention one, which is, that there was not ſtrength enough in that Government to ſupport the Gonfalonier if he was a good man, nor to check and controul him if he was a bad one: to which let me add likewiſe, that the reaſon why all theſe Governments were deficient, was, that the Reforms which were made were not with any view to the Public Good, but to ſtrengthen and ſupport different factions in their turns; which ends however were not accompliſhed, becauſe there was always a diſcontented Party, which proved a very powerful inſtrument in the hands of thoſe that were deſirous to effect any change or innovation in the State.

It now remains that I ſhould ſay ſomething of the Adminiſtration of the *Twelve* from its firſt eſtabliſhment to this time, and to point out its ſtrength and imperfections: but as theſe things are already well known, and freſh in every one's memory, I ſhall here omit all mention of them. It is certain however, that now things are circumſtanced as they are ſince the Death of the Duke of Urbino, it is neceſſary to think of ſome new form of Government: and I hope I ſhall be excuſed if, in obedience to the commands of your Holineſs, I venture to deliver my opinion upon the matter. But firſt I beg leave to lay that of others before you, according to what I have collected in converſation, and then to ſubjoin my own: in which, if I ſhould err from the mark, I truſt your Holineſs will pardon a man who has ſhewn his zeal to your perſon, though he may have failed in his judgment and abilities.

I ſay then that ſome think a better kind of Government cannot be deviſed than that which was eſtabliſhed in the times of Coſimo and Lorenzo de Medici: others wiſh for one that may be ſettled upon a broader bottom. The former alledge that things eaſily return into their old channel; and that the Florentines having been uſed to honour your family, to ſhelter themſelves under its favour and protection, to delight in whatſoever was moſt agreeable to it, and indeed habituated to theſe things for the ſpace of ſixty years, it muſt naturally happen that when they ſee the ſame plan of Government reſtored, the ſame degree of affection and reſpect muſt alſo revive in [illegible]. They affirm likewiſe

likewiſe that very few would be averſe to it; and that thoſe few might eaſily be brought over by different methods. To all which, they add the evident neceſſity of the matter, and ſay that as the State of Florence cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt without a head, it is much better to chuſe one out of that family which uſed to be ſo much beloved and revered there, than either to live in confuſion and diſorder for want of ſuch a head, or to take one out of ſome undiſtinguiſhed family; which would of courſe excite the diſguſt and indignation of the whole City.

In anſwer to this, it is aſſerted by others, that ſuch an Adminiſtration muſt be dangerous, becauſe it would be weak: for if that Coſimo was feeble and infirm from the cauſes already aſſigned, one of the ſame ſtamp muſt be doubly ſo at preſent; when not only the form of Government, but the temper of the Citizens, and the circumſtances of the times, are totally different from what they were in thoſe days. So that it would be utterly impoſſible to contrive any eſtabliſhment in Florence which ſhould reſemble that of the Medici, and be of long duration. In the firſt place (ſay they) that form of Government was then univerſally approved; but now it would be as much diſliked by the people: the Citizens of thoſe times thought they could not have one founded upon a better bottom; but the preſent Generation imagine there has been ſince found out one that is more compatible with liberty, and gives no leſs ſatisfaction than the other. There was then (continue they) no army, nor any power in Italy, which the Florentines were not able to cope with, and that too without the leaſt aſſiſtance: but now France and Spain have got footing in it, there is a neceſſity for joining one of them; and if the ſide which the Florentines join ſhould happen to be overpowered by the other, they can afterwards expect nothing but to be ſwallowed up by the Conqueror; which was not the caſe in thoſe times. The Citizens had likewiſe been long accuſtomed, under that Government, to ſubmit to the burden of heavy taxes and impoſitions: but now they have been freed from it, either from their inability to pay them, or long diſuſe, it muſt be an odious as well as dangerous attempt to revive them. The Medici too, who then governed Florence, having been born and educated amongſt their fellow-citizens, afterwards kept up a ſort of familiarity with them, which wonderfully conciliated their affections to that family: but now it is grown ſo great, all that familiarity is dropped, and conſequently the edge of their affections taken off: ſo that conſidering the diſſimilitude of the times and men, any one muſt be fatally deceived who expects to make the ſame impreſſion upon ſo different a maſs: and if the Medici were every now and then in danger of loſing their power in thoſe days (as I ſaid above) they would now be certainly undone. It is ridiculous therefore to imagine that men under ſuch circumſtances will

eaſily

eaſily return to their former manner of living: for though indeed this may be brought about when they are more inclined of themſelves to that than to any new form of Government; yet when it happens otherwiſe, they will conform to it no longer than they are forced: and whenever that force ceaſes, their conformity will vaniſh into the air. Beſides, though it may be true that the State of Florence cannot ſubſiſt without ſome head; and that if the Citizens were diſpoſed to chuſe one out of ſome particular family, they would ſooner take one out of the family of the Medici than any other: yet if it ſhould be propoſed to veſt the ſupreme power in ſeveral perſons of any condition whatſoever, they would prefer ſuch a head to a ſingle one.

Some are of opinion that ſuch a Government could not be ſhaken without ſome external force; and that there would always be time enough to accommodate matters with thoſe that ſhould make any attempt upon it. But in this they are much miſtaken: for it often happens that you muſt be obliged to patch up a Treaty of friendſhip, not with thoſe that are actually your moſt formidable enemies, but with thoſe that either have it moſt in their power at that juncture to annoy, or are more agreeable to you than any others: and it may come to paſs that both you and ſuch an ally may not only be overpowered by the enemy, and left at his diſcretion, but that he will not liſten to any terms of accommodation; either becauſe you did not court his friendſhip in time, or out of the diſguſt he may have conceived againſt you for entering into an alliance with his enemies. Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan, would gladly have made his peace with Lewis XII. of France, if he could have found means: Frederic King of Naples would have done ſo likewiſe with the ſame Prince; but they were both diſappointed in their endeavours: for a thouſand accidents may happen to prevent and fruſtrate ſuch deſigns. So that, all theſe things being duly weighed, it ſeems as if ſuch an eſtabliſhment could be neither ſecure nor permanent, when it has ſo many ſeeds of weakneſs in it; and therefore that it cannot be wiſhed for either by your Holineſs or your friends.

As for thoſe that would have the Government ſettled upon a broader bottom, I ſay, that if it is not modelled in ſuch a manner as to become a regular and well-ordered Commonwealth, the breadth of its bottom will only ſerve to accelerate its ruin: if they would be particular, however, in telling me into what form they would have it moulded, I would alſo deſcend to particulars in anſwering them; but as they deal altogether in generals, I can only anſwer them in the ſame manner. Let this ſuffice with regard to them: and in order to evince the weakneſs of Coſimo's eſtabliſhment the more fully, in as few words as poſſible, it is only neceſſary to add, that no form of Government can be deviſed that will be firm and laſting, which is not either a tru[illegible]

cipality, or a true Commonwealth; and that all intermediate forms betwixt theſe two extremes, (if I may ſo call them) will be defective. The reaſon is plain: for a Principality can only be ruined one way; and that is, by deſcending into a Commonwealth. The ſame may be ſaid of a Commonwealth alſo: for the only way by which it can be ruined, is by aſcending to a Principality. Whereas all intermediate forms may be ruined two ways, i. e. either by aſcending to a Principality, or deſcending into a Commonwealth; and this is the cauſe of their inſtability.

If then your Holineſs would eſtabliſh ſuch a Government at Florence as will be firm and durable, and redound to your own glory, as well as the ſecurity of your friends, it muſt be either a true Principality, or a Commonwealth which has all its due qualities: for all other forms will be tottering and ſhort-lived. As to a Principality, I ſhall ſay but little in this place, both on account of the great difficulty of eſtabliſhing one in our City, and becauſe the moſt proper inſtrument for effecting it is now no more: for your Holineſs muſt underſtand, that in all States where there is a great equality amongſt the Citizens, it is very difficult, if not impoſſible, to erect a Principality. If any one ſhould go about to found a Commonwealth at Milan, where there is a great inequality amongſt the Citizens, he muſt firſt reduce all the Nobility, who are there very numerous, to a level with others: for they are ſo powerful that they trample upon the laws, and nothing but Royal authority can bridle and controul them. On the contrary, whoſoever would eſtabliſh a Principality at Florence, where there is a remarkable equality amongſt the Citizens, muſt in the firſt place deſtroy that equality, by creating many Noblemen and building them Caſtles, and Villa's, and ſtrong-holds, who, in conjunction with the Prince, may ſerve to keep not only the City, but whole Provinces in Subjection by the terror of their arms and dependants [*b*]: for a Prince alone, and unſupported by Nobility, cannot ſuſtain the weight of Royalty; and therefore it is neceſſary there ſhould be ſome middle State betwixt him and the Commonalty to aid and aſſiſt him. This is obſerveable in all Principalities; eſpecially in France, where the Gentry lord it over the People, the Nobles over the Gentry, and the King over the Nobles. But ſince it is ſo difficult a matter to found a Principality where a Commonwealth might eaſily be eſtabliſhed, and *vice verſâ*; and as the difficulty muſt lay the undertaker under the neceſſity of committing great violence, and doing many things unworthy of a good and virtuous man, I will ſay no more of a Principality, but proceed to lay the plan of a Commonwealth; becauſe your Holineſs is known to be more

[*b*]. See the Political Diſcourſes upon Livy, Book I. Chap. lv.

inclined

inclined to that form of Government, and has only deferred the eſtabliſhment of it at Florence, till ſuch a model could be thought of as might at the ſame time ſecure your own authority there, and contribute moſt to the peace and welfare of your friends. And now I am vain enough to conceive that I have hit upon ſuch a one, I humbly ſubmit it to your conſummate wiſdom; that ſo if there ſhould happen to be any thing worth your notice in it, it may be carried into execution; if not, that your Holineſs may at leaſt be convinced of my perfect devotion and obedience to your commands. But I am not altogether without hopes, I confeſs, that you will find that by this plan your own authority is not only firmly ſupported, but increaſed, that your friends will ſtill enjoy their honours in ſecurity, and that the reſt of the Citizens will have the higheſt reaſon not barely to be ſatisfied, but to be pleaſed and delighted with it. Let me entreat your Holineſs, however, neither to approve, nor condemn this Diſcourſe till you have read it quite through, nor yet to be ſurprized at ſome alterations that are propoſed to be made in the Magiſtracy: for where a Government was not well regulated before, the leſs there is retained of the old form, the better it muſt naturally be ſuppoſed to be afterwards.

I ſay then, that thoſe who model a Commonwealth, muſt make ſuch proviſions as may gratify three ſorts of men, of which all States are compoſed; that is, the high, the middle ſort, and the low: and though there is a great equality amongſt the Citizens of Florence, as hath been ſaid before; yet there are ſome there who think ſo highly of themſelves that they would expect to have the precedence of others: and theſe people muſt be gratified in regulating the Commonwealth; for it was owing to the want of this that the laſt adminiſtration was ruined. Theſe people then will never be ſatisfied if they have not the firſt rank and honours in the Commonwealth; which dignity they ought to ſupport by their own perſonal weight and importance. But it is impoſſible to entail this dignity upon the firſt order in the Commonwealth, whilſt the Signiory and Councils continue upon the ſame footing they have been of late: for as it muſt happen from the manner in which the members of them have been elected, that men of weight and reputation will ſeldom be made choice of, there is no other remedy but to lodge that dignity either in the next rank, or in the loweſt of all; which is contrary to all civil good order and polity. It is abſolutely neceſſary therefore to alter the manner of elections, and at the ſame time to gratify the ambition of all the three ſeveral ſorts of people; which may be done by diſſolving the Signiory, th[illegible] and the twelve *Buonhomini*; and by electing Sixty-f[illegible] leſs than forty-five years of age (in order to give [illegible] fifty-three out of the higheſt Claſs, and t[illegible]

ſhould continue in the Adminiſtration for life, ſubject to the following reſtrictions. In the firſt place, one of them ſhould be appointed *Gonfalonier of Juſtice* for a term of two or three years, if it is not thought proper to appoint one for life; and in the next, the other Sixty-four Citizens already elected ſhould be divided into two diſtinct bodies, each conſiſting of thirty-two; one of which moities, in conjunction with the Gonfalonier, ſhould govern the firſt year, and the other the next: ſo that they would be changed alternately every year, and altogether ſhould be called *the Signiory*.

After this, let the *thirty-two* be divided into four parts, eight in each; every one of which ſhould reſide three months in its turn with the Gonfalonier in the Palace, and not only aſſume the Magiſtracy with the uſual forms and ceremonies, but tranſact all the buſineſs which before paſſed through the hands of the Signiory, the Council of Eight, and the other Councils; all which ſhould be diſſolved, as I ſaid before: This ſhould be the firſt member, or rather the Head of the State; and by this proviſion, when it is well conſidered, your Holineſs will ſee the Dignity of the Signiory will be reſtored: for as none but men of gravity and authority will ever ſit there, it will be no longer neceſſary to employ private men in the affairs of State, (which, as I obſerved before, is always of prejudice to any Republic) ſince the thirty-two who are not in office that year may be adviſed with upon occaſion, ſent upon Embaſſies, and made uſeful in other functions. And this firſt Signiory your Holineſs may eaſily find means to fill with your moſt intimate friends and confidants, as I ſhall ſhew preſently; but in the mean time let us come to the ſecond order in the State.

Since there are three ſorts of men in every State, as I ſaid before, there ſhould alſo be three ranks or degrees of quality in a Republic, and no more; upon which account, it is neceſſary to prevent the confuſion occaſioned of late by the Multiplicity of Councils in our City; which have been eſtabliſhed, not becauſe they were conducive to good civil order, but merely to create friends and dependants, and to gratify the humour and ambition of numbers in a point which yet was of no ſervice to liberty or the public; becauſe they might all be corrupted and biaſed by party. In order therefore to reduce the Commonwealth to ſuch a form, the Council of Seventy, that of an hundred, and that of the People and Commonalty, ſhould all be aboliſhed; and in the room of them I would appoint a Council of two hundred, every member of which ſhould be not leſs than forty years of age; an hundred and Sixty of them to be taken out of the middle claſs, and the other forty out of the loweſt, but not one out of the *Sixty-five*. They ſhould likewiſe continue for life, and be called the *Council Elect*: which Council, in conjunction with the *Sixty-five*, ſhould tranſact all the affairs that uſed

to be tranſacted by the abovementioned Councils, (now ſuppoſed to be aboliſhed) and be veſted with the ſame degree of authority, and all the members of it appointed by your Holineſs. For which purpoſe, as well as to maintain and regulate theſe proviſions, and others that I ſhall mention hereafter, and for the further ſecurity of your power and friends, it is neceſſary that a degree of authority, equal to that of the whole collective body of the people of Florence, ſhould be veſted by a Balia in your Holineſs, and the moſt Reverend Cardinal de Medici, during the lives of both: and that the Magiſtracy of the *Eight di Guardia*, as well as the Balia [*c*], ſhould be appointed from time to time by your Holineſs. It is likewiſe expedient, for the ſupport of your authority and your friends, that your Holineſs ſhould divide the Militia into two diſtinct Corps, over which you may appoint two Commiſſaries, one for each.

By theſe proviſions your Holineſs will ſee that two out of the three claſſes may be thoroughly ſatisfied, and that both your own authority, and that of your friends, will be effectually confirmed and corroborated; as you will have the Militia and Courts of Juſtice in your hands, the laws in your own breaſt, and the Heads of the State entirely at your devotion.

It remains now to ſatisfy the third and loweſt rank of the Citizens, which conſiſts of the generality or greater part of the People. But theſe will never be ſatisfied, (and whoever thinks otherwiſe will find himſelf miſtaken) except their authority is either actually reſtored, or they are made eaſy by a promiſe that it ſhall be. And ſince it might endanger your authority as well as that of your friends to reſtore it all at once, it would be better for your Holineſs to reſtore part of it only at firſt, and give them ſuch aſſurances of reſtoring the reſt in due time as they may fully confide in: for which purpoſe, I conceive it will be neceſſary alſo to revive the *Council of a thouſand*, or at leaſt one of Six hundred Citizens, who ſhould nominate all the Magiſtrates and officers in the ſame manner they uſed to do formerly, except the abovementioned *Sixty-five*, the *Council of two hundred*, *the Eight di Guardia*, and *the Balia*, who ſhould be appointed by your Holineſs and the Cardinal, during the lives of you both.

And that your friends when going to be ballotted for in the Council, may be cetain of being imborſed [*d*]; your holineſs ought to depute eight

[*c*] Theſe Magiſtrates, Officers, &c. as well as ſeveral other things which occur in theſe pieces, have been ſo often mentioned in the Hiſtory of Florence, that it would be needleſs here [illegible] to what has been already ſaid of them, by way of explaining the [illegible] and functions.

[*d*] It appeared [illegible] through the method of electing the Florentine magiſtrates by [illegible] names of the candidates into purſes, was plauſible,

eight aſſeſſors, who being in the ſecret, may make the election fall upon whom they pleaſe, without power of wronging any of them; and that the generality may believe that the candidates names have been imborſed, the Council, for their ſecurity, may ſend two Citizens, put into a joint Commiſſion by itſelf, to be witneſſes of the imborſation.

Without ſatisfying the generality, no Republic ever yet ſtood upon a ſtable foundation: and it is certain the generality of Florence will never be ſatisfied, except the *Hall of a thouſand* be opened again, and the diſtribution of offices reſtored to it. Your Holineſs ſhould likewiſe be further informed, that whoever meditates any revolution in the State will certainly endeavour above all things, in the firſt place, to open that Hall again: and therefore it muſt ſurely be the beſt way to do it yourſelf in ſuch a manner as may leave no opportunity for any one to make an attempt which muſt end in the downfal of your authority, and the ruin of your friends.

The State being thus modelled, no other proviſions would be wanting for its ſecurity, if your Holineſs and the moſt Reverend Cardinal were to live for ever: but as you are ſubject to mortality, it is neceſſary (if you would have the Republic continue firm and ſtrongly ſupported on every ſide, in ſuch a manner that every one may ſee himſelf perfectly ſecure, when the generality are ſatisfied by reſtoring part of their authority, and an aſſurance of the reſt) that there ſhould alſo be Sixteen Gonfaloniers appointed over the Companies of the Citizens, in the ſame manner and for the ſame time that they have been hitherto appointed; which may be done either by your own authority, or by leaving the appointment of them to the great Council, as your Holineſs ſhall think moſt proper; remembering only to increaſe the number of the *Divieri* [e]; that ſo they may be more ſpread over the City; and that none of the Gonfaloniers ſhould be of the *ſixty-five*. After their appointment, four Prevôts ſhould be drawn out of them by lot, and continue in office one month; ſo that at the end of four months they will all have been Prevôts. Out of theſe four, one ſhould be drawn to reſide for a week only with the eight Signiors and the Gonfalonier in the Palace; by which rotation all the four will have kept their reſidence there at

ſible, yet it might be defeated; becauſe it was in the power of the returning officers, whom Machiavel here calls Accoppiatori, or aſſeſſors, to make the election fall upon whom they pleaſed, by pretending that their friends had the majority. The methods of imborſations in Florence differed as the ariſtocratical or democratical powers prevailed. That which is here recommended by Machiavel, was practiſed under the Medici family, who did no violence to the forms of the democratical conſtitution, but aboliſhed its ſpirit, by always having the returning officers in their intereſt; ſo that in fact, they, inſtead of the people, named the magiſtrates and ſervants of the public, or had it in their power to do ſo.

[e] The *Divieri* were aſſiſtants to the Gonfalier, and commanded detachments of the people under him.

the

the end of the month. Without the preſence of this Officer, the ſaid reſident Signiory ſhould not be allowed to paſs any act, nor ſhould he himſelf have any vote there, but only be a witneſs and inſpector of their proceedings; to which he may be ſuffered to put a ſtop till he has aſked the opinion of all the *thirty-two*, together, and had the matter fully diſcuſſed by them. But even the *thirty-two*, when all together, ſhould not have power to reſolve upon any thing, except two of the ſaid Prevôts were preſent, who ſhould have no further authority than to put a ſtop to their reſolutions for that time, and report them to the *Council elect*: nor ſhould that Council have a power of reſolving upon any thing, except ſix at leaſt of the ſixteen Gonfaloniers, and two Prevôts, were there, who ſhould only have the liberty of taking the matter out of the hands of that Council, and referring it to the great Council, provided that any three of them ſhould think it neceſſary ſo to do: and as to the great Council, it ſhould not be allowed to meet, unleſs three of the Prevôts at leaſt were there, who might give their votes in it like the other Citizens.

This order ſhould be obſerved after the death of your Holineſs and the moſt Reverend Cardinal, for two reaſons: in the firſt place, that if the Signiory or other Council ſhould either diſagree in their reſolutions, or attempt any thing againſt the public good, there might be ſomebody veſted with a power to take the matter out of their hands, and refer it to the people: for it would be a great defect in the Conſtitution, that any one ſet of Magiſtrates, or ſingle Council, ſhould have a power to paſs a law by its own authority alone; and that too without any remedy or appeal: upon which account, it is highly neceſſary that the Citizens ſhould have ſome proper officers, not only to inſpect their proceedings, but even to put a ſtop to them, if they ſeem to be of pernicious tendency. The other reaſon is, that when the preſent Signiory is diſſolved, and the privilege of being admitted into the new one is taken away from the generality, it will be expedient to give them ſome degree of rank and authority, which may in ſome meaſure reſemble that of which they have been deprived: now that which I have recommended will be ſtill greater, more ſerviceable, and more honourable than what they have loſt. The Gonfaloniers therefore ſhould be appointed as ſoon as poſſible, to reduce the City into the aforementioned claſſes and degrees: but they ſhould not be ſuffered to exerciſe any other functions of their Office without a Licence from your Holineſs, of which you may avail yourſelf, (in cauſing them to report the proceedings of theſe ſeveral orders to you) to ſupport your dignity, with ſo much the more ſtate and authority.

Beſides this, in order to give ſuch a degree of ſtability and perfection to the Commonwealth, that no part of it may ſhrink or fail after

the decease of your Holiness and the most Reverend Cardinal, it is necessary that a Court should be erected upon occasion, consisting of the *eight guardia*, and a Balia of thirty Citizens, to be chosen by lot out of the *Council of two hundred* and that of *Six hundred* together; which Court should have a power, in criminal cases, of summoning the Accuser and the Accused to appear face to face before it in a certain time: but it should never be suffered to assemble during the lives of your Holiness and the Cardinal, without your special decree. Such a Court is of great use in a Commonwealth: for a few Citizens are afraid to call great and powerful delinquents to account, and therefore it is necessary that many should confer for that purpose: that so when their judgments are concealed, (as they may be by balloting) every man may give his opinion freely and in security. It may serve also, during your lives, as a check upon *the Eight*, and make them more careful in administering justice, as well as more diligent in expediting public affairs, lest they should be called before this Court. But that it may not be obliged to assemble upon every little frivolous occasion, it may be ordained that it shall not take cognizance of any matter of fraud not amounting to the sum of fifty Ducats; nor of any act of violence where there is no effusion of blood, or maiming, or bone broken, or where the loss sustained is under the value of fifty Ducats.

This model of a Commonwealth being duly considered, I think nothing will be wanting in it even when your authority shall cease, as I have shewn before at large: but if it be considered during your life and that of the Cardinal, it appears to be a Monarchy; for you have the command of the Militia, the appointment of the Judges, and the Laws in your own breast: so that I cannot see what further power any one can desire in a State; nor can I conceive what any of your friends, who are good and peaceable men, have to fear whilst the authority of your Holiness is so great, and they themselves fill the first employments in the Government; nor yet do I see any reason why the gentrality should not be very well satisfied, when they find the distribution of Offices in part already restored to them, and the rest falling by degrees into their hands. For your Holiness may now and then suffer the *Council of two hundred* to nominate one of the *Sixty-five* when there is a vacancy, and sometimes the *great Council* to appoint one of the *two hundred*, and sometimes you may create them yourself, according to the circumstances of the times; and I am very certain that by the interposition of your Holiness's authority, every thing may be conducted in such a manner, that the second of these orders may at last be consumed into the first, and the third into the second, &c. and that the whole body may be governed in peace, with perpetual glory to your Holiness, since you

power may very easily at all times remedy any inconveniency that shall happen.

For my own part, I am of opinion that the highest honour that can be attained to by any man is that which is voluntarily conferred on him by his Countrymen, and that the greatest good he can do, as well as the most acceptable to God, is that which he does to his Country. Next to that, I think none are to be compared with those who have reformed Kingdoms and Commonwealths by wholesome Laws and Constitutions. These men have always held the next rank to those that have been deified for their great actions; but as there have been but few that have had an opportunity, and still fewer that knew how to do this, the number of those is very small that have done it. This kind of glory has always been so much coveted by such as made glory the sole end of their labours, that when they have not had power themselves either to found, or reform a State in such, they have left models and plans in writing, to be executed by others that should have in future times, as Plato, Aristotle, and many others, who have shewn the world that if they did not found free States themselves, like Solon and Lycurgus, it was not owing either to ignorance or want of good will to mankind, but to want of power.

Heaven then cannot bestow a nobler gift upon any man, nor point out a fairer road to true glory; and amongst all the Blessings which God has been pleased to shower down upon your Holiness and your August family, the most considerable is that he has given you both power and opportunity of immortalizing your name, and of far surpassing all your Ancestors in the splendor of your actions. Let me entreat your Holiness therefore, to consider in the first place, that if you intend to let the Government of Florence continue upon the same bottom it is at present, many accidents must inevitably happen which will be attended with great danger; and that before they happen, you will be teazed and tutored in such a manner as would seem intolerable to any man, as you will be more particularly informed by the most Reverend Cardinal, who has resided for some months past at Florence. This is partly owing to the importunity of several Citizens, who indeed are much too presumptuous in their demands; and partly to the fears of others, who think they do not live in security under the present establishment: so that they are continually crying out for a reformation, one desiring the Government may be settled upon a broader bottom, and another upon a narrower, whilst nobody pretends to point out the particular measures by which it may either be contracted or extended with safety; for being puzzled and confused themselves, and at the same time terrified at the prospect of impending danger, they neither know how to prevent it themselves, nor will put any confidence

in

in thoſe that do: from whence it comes to paſs that amidſt ſuch difference of opinions and variety of advice, the wiſeſt and moſt able man in the world muſt live in continual doubt and diſtraction amongſt them.

To remedy theſe inconveniencies then, there are but two methods, viz. either to deny them audience and give them no opportunity of mentioning theſe matters at any time whatſoever, except their opinion is aſked, (as the late Duke of illuſtrious memory uſed to do) or to ſettle the Government at once upon ſuch a footing that it may adminiſter itſelf, and that now and then a little of your Holineſs's inſpection may ſuffice to keep it in good order: by the latter of theſe methods you may be freed from all danger and trouble; by the former, from trouble and impertinence only. But to ſay ſomething further of the dangers that muſt enſue if things continue as they are, I will venture to propheſy, that whenever any commotion or inſurrection ſhall happen, either one or other of the following events, if not both, muſt certainly be the conſequence; i. e. either ſome Head will be appointed in a ſudden and tumultuary manner, who will reſcue the ſtate by violence and force of arms; or one part of the Citizens will immediately open the *Council of a thouſand* again, and ſacrifice the other without mercy. In caſe either of theſe events ſhould happen, (which God avert) your Holineſs will be pleaſed to conſider how many executions, how many baniſhments, and how many confiſcations muſt of neceſſity enſue: a reflection which ſurely muſt ſhock the moſt hard-hearted man alive, much more a man of that remarkable humanity and tenderneſs which have always diſtinguiſhed your Holineſs. The only way then to prevent theſe evils, is to eſtabliſh the ſeveral claſſes and ordinances of the Commonwealth in ſuch a manner, that they may ſupport themſelves: and that they will always be able to do, when each rank has its due ſhare in the adminiſtration, when every one knows his proper ſphere of action, and whom he can confide in; and laſtly, when no one has any occaſion to wiſh for a change of Government, either becauſe his ambition is not thoroughly gratified, or that he does not think himſelf ſufficiently ſecure under ſuch an Adminiſtration.

LET-

LETTERS written to ſeveral States and Perſons, in the name of the Republic of Florence.

By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State there in the years 1510 and 1511.

LETTER I.

To the Reverend Marco Priori, Vicar [*f*] to the Biſhop of Luca [*g*], at Lower Caſtro Franco.

WE are informed that a certain prieſt, named Antonio, the Son of Simone da S. Pietro, has forcibly ſeized upon ſome goods and chattels in the Vicariate of Lari, which had been made over ſome months ago to Maria Tedda, widow to the late Pietro, Son of Simone da S. Pietro, according to the laws of Piſa: at which we are much diſpleaſed; becauſe we would not have the leaſt violence uſed in our territories by any perſon whatſoever, much leſs by a *religious*: but if

[*f*] The perſons by whom the ſtates of Italy uſed to govern ſmall territories and dependencies were often ſtiled *Vicars*, but they were Laymen: beſides whom there were alſo Spiritual Vicars to inſpect the manners of Eccleſiaſtics; and if an Eccleſiaſtic was guilty of any crime or miſdemeanor which was cognizable by the Secular Magiſtrate, yet that Magiſtrate durſt not cite, much leſs lay hands upon, the offender till he had obtained Licence for ſo doing from the Spiritual Vicar, under whoſe juriſdiction he was, leſt he ſhould incur the Pope's diſpleaſure, as appears from this and other inſtances in the courſe [illegible] which has introduced that Soleciſm in Politics, *Imperium in Imperio*.

[*g*] [illegible] (pelt) a little territory in Tuſcany.

he

he has any pretenſions to thoſe goods, or any part of them, let him have recourſe to the laws, as every honeſt man ought to have. We therefore deſire your reverence to ſend for the ſaid Antonio, who is under your juriſdiction, and order him not only to deſiſt from all further violence, but to give ſufficient ſecurity to the widow and her tenants that he will not perſonally moleſt or annoy either her or any of them, upon this account: becauſe, we hear, he goes continually armed for that purpoſe; which is very unbecoming in a *Religious*. This you may do under ſuch penalties as you think moſt proper, and it will be acting in a manner that will be very agreeable to our moſt Serene Republic, and worthy of your Reverence. But if he is contumacious, and refuſes to appear before you, be pleaſed to grant your Licence to our Vicar at Lari (where the premiſes lie) to take him into cuſtody, and we will ſend him orders to do it; that ſo he may be compelled to ſubmit to your Reverence. Farewell, 13 July, 1510.

LETTER II.

To the Conſuls of the Marine.

ONE M. Chriſtofano da Marchio, a Portugueſe Gentleman, and Student in the Canon Law, has been before us, and complains that as he was going to the Univerſity at Piſa, he was ſtopped at the gates of that city, and had not only all the cloaths and houſhold furniture he brought with him, but likewiſe all his money, taken from him, and was obliged to pay twelve Ducats in Gold, as Duty for the ſaid money. Now, as he is no Trader, (according to his own report of the matter) but a Lawyer and a Gentleman in his own country, and carries ſuch furniture and ſums of money with him for his convenience and ſupport, wherever he goes to ſtudy, he thinks he ought to be exempt from any ſuch duty. We are of opinion, therefore, that the ſaid twelve Ducats ſhould be refunded to him; that ſo he may have no reaſon to complain of having ſuffered any violence in our Dominions, and that our Subjects may not be uſed in the ſame manner in Portugal. For in truth, if the money he had with him was only to ſupport him in his Studies like a Gentleman, you ought to proceed with great caution and diſcretion in this matter, as we truſt you will do. Farewell, 23 July, 1510.

To

LETTER III.

To Alamanno de Petrucci, chief Magiſtrate of Campiglia.

WE make no doubt but you muſt have heard that our Corn-harveſt has not proved ſo plentiful a one as was expected: and that our people may not have any cauſe to fear a dearth, we will and command you, to take all poſſible care that no ſort of corn or grain of any kind which grows in your neighbourhood, or elſewhere, upon the coaſt of Campiglia, may be conveyed out of thoſe parts upon any account whatſoever. For which purpoſe, you are to puniſh all thoſe that preſume to diſobey your orders in this reſpect, by ſeizing upon the grain only for the firſt offence; and for the ſecond, by taking away their horſes, or other beaſts of burden, and carriages alſo. But all this muſt be done with as little noiſe as poſſible: for as we have in general a tolerable ſufficiency of all neceſſaries, we would not willingly occaſion any diſturbance, or have the people alarmed. You are a prudent man, and underſtand our meaning: act accordingly, as you are wont to do; and if you hear of any ſort of grain that is upon the road to our City, don't ſtop it. Farewell, 14 Auguſt, 1510.

LETTER IV.

To the Vicar of Piſa and St. Miniato; and alſo to the Magiſtrates of Buggiani and Fucecchio.

WE are informed that great quantities of Corn have been conveyed out of our Dominions from your Diſtrict, and are much offended at it; for the harveſt in theſe parts has not been ſo abundant as we hoped: and as we ought not to ſuffer our own ſubjects to be reduced to the want of bread, by letting it be tranſported out of our own territories into thoſe of others, we will and command you to make it known either by Proclamation, or in ſome other public manner, that if any perſon, of what rank, eſtate, or condition ſoever he may be, ſhall be found tranſporting any ſort of grain out of our territories, he ſhall be puniſhed with the loſs of his carriages, horſes, and loading, without remedy or appeal. After this warning is publiſhed, you are to cauſe a ſtrict watch to be kept night and day at all paſſes; and to take care that all ſuch as ſhall offend may be puniſhed

in the manner above preſcribed. You are men of underſtanding, and now you know our pleaſure, let it be your principal concern that it may be duly executed. Farewell, 23 Auguſt, 1510.

LETTER V.

To Buonaccorſo de Serragli, chief Magiſtrate of Palaia.

TOMASO, the Son of Antonio di Pagno, hath been before us, and humbly beſought our pardon for his late offences. Wherefore, in purſuance of a Law made in favour of ſuch inhabitants of that City as ſhould return thither, we have granted him a free pardon: and it is our further pleaſure that all the eſtates and goods he was poſſeſſed of before the year 1494, and ſince that time, which, he ſays, lie about Marti, and conſiſt of houſes, olive-yards and vineyards, ſhould be immediately reſtored to him. We therefore hereby will and command, as he is now returned to live peaceably and quietly at Piſa, that you not only cauſe all the ſaid goods and eſtates to be reſtored to him, by ejecting the preſent occupiers of them; but that you likewiſe henceforth treat him in a friendly and amicable manner, as one who hath ſubmitted to our Government in conſequence of the aforeſaid Law. Hereof you are not to fail. Farewell, 26 Auguſt, 1510.

LETTER VI.

To Franciſco de Bramanti, Chief Magiſtrate of Caſcina, in the territory of Piſa.

WE ſuppoſe you can be no ſtranger to the loſſes which the inhabitants of the country on this ſide Piſa ſuſtained by the frequent depredations, murders, and other ſorts of violence that were committed upon them during the war betwixt us and that City, before we became poſſeſſed of it, and muſt know that the greater part of them were thereby reduced to extreme poverty. We are informed, however, that the inhabitants of Caſcina, in particular, are ſued and diſtreſſed in ſuch a manner at this time by the officers of your Courts, for debts which they had contracted before the year 1494, that if theſe proceedings are not dropped, they muſt either fly their Country, or lie in priſon all the days of their life; which would give great uneaſineſs

and

and offence to our moſt Serene Republic, as we would willingly keep theſe poor people at home, and in poſſeſſion of their liberty. It is our pleaſure, therefore, that whenever any of their creditors apply to your Courts to enforce the payment of ſuch debts as were contracted before the year 1494, you enquire ſtrictly into the nature and circumſtances of thoſe debts, and ſhew as much favour as you can conſiſtently with common equity, to the Debtors, out of compaſſion to their ſufferings, and to keep them if poſſible in their own country. Now you know our pleaſure, let it be your endeavour to aſſiſt theſe miſerable people according to their neceſſities, and with as much addreſs as you can. Farewell, 27 Auguſt, 1510.

LETTER VII.

To Certaldo Raphaele de Antinori.

CONSIDERING the circumſtances of the times, though indeed there is no appearance of open war at preſent, yet for our own ſatisfaction, we have put a garriſon into Poggio Imperiale. But there is ſtill ſomething further wanting to ſecure that fortreſs; and what we deſigned to have done in the ſpace of a month or two for that purpoſe, we could now wiſh might be completed in five or ſix days, if poſſible. We therefore command you to repair immediately to Poggio, but without noiſe or buſtle, under a pretence that you only came thither for a ride and a little recreation. But when you are there, you are not only to ſurvey the walls as privately as you can, but to obſerve whether any Foſſes are neceſſary for its preſent defence, whoſe houſes muſt be pulled down, and what places levelled, in order to ſecure it againſt any force. If you ſhall have reaſon to think, however, that the inhabitants of that Vicariate, and eſpecially thoſe that live neareſt to Caſtello Fiorentino, will readily concur with you in the matter, you are to uſe your utmoſt endeavours to put the town in a proper poſture of defence in five or ſix days. For which purpoſe, it is neceſſary that you ſhould leave ſome perſon there to inſpect the works in your abſence, and that you yourſelf ſhould go thither once in two days till the whole is finiſhed: but if you ſuſpect there will be any great difficulty in the matter, and that the people will be much averſe to it, ſay nothing of it, but acquaint us with your proceedings, and what obſervations you have made there. Farewell, 29 Auguſt, 1510.

LET-

LETTER VIII.

To the Commiſſioners and other Officers for inſpecting the Ditches and Banks in the Diſtrict of Piſa.

THERE are now two Deputies with us, one from the Pariſh of S. Caſſiano, and another from S. Lorenzo; the latter of whom has alſo applied to the Courts at Caſcina. They complain that you have ordered thoſe Diſtricts to ſend labourers to work at the Ditches and Banks in the territory of Piſa, and have laid ſeveral fines upon them for not ſending any, though they are expreſsly exempted from ſuch labour by certain privileges granted them by this moſt Serene Republic, as you may ſee from the tenor of an inſtrument in writing drawn up for that purpoſe, and ſtill in their poſſeſſion: upon which account, they demand that a due regard ſhould be paid to the contents of that inſtrument. Now as you know that the public faith given to Subjects ought always to be moſt religiouſly obſerved, it is our pleaſure that you have recourſe to the ſaid inſtrument, and that if you find they are actually exempted from ſuch duty by virtue of it, you ſhould not only obſerve the purport of it inviolably yourſelf, but cauſe all others under your Juriſdiction to do the ſame, and remit the fines that have been laid upon them, as illegal and contrary to the tenor of the aforeſaid inſtrument. You are to ſee that all this be duly executed without fail. Farewell, 29 Auguſt, 1510.

LETTER IX.

To Bernardino da Colle, Vicar of Monte Caſtello.

THERE have been two Deputies before us from the Community of S. Almazio, who have repreſented to us, that the river Pagone, running betwixt their Diſtrict and that of Monte Caſtello, when the inhabitants of S. Almazio take their Cattle to water there, they are ſued by the Cowkeepers of Monte Caſtello for damages, though the River is no more in one Liberty than another, and the Cattle never ſtray over it. On the contrary, the people of S. Almazio ſue thoſe of Monte Caſtello for the ſame ſort of treſpaſs. Now theſe frivolous and vexatious ſuits are daily multiplied by each ſide in ſuch a manner, that both are miſerably impoveriſhed and almoſt ruined by them; though

though there does not appear any great reaſon for it on either: for certainly all men are at liberty to water their Cattle at any river, provided they do not injure another perſon by it; which does not ſeem to have been the caſe in this matter. It is our will and command therefore, that upon the receipt of this, you immediately ſummon both parties to appear before you; and that when you have thoroughly examined the nature of their grievances, you uſe your utmoſt endeavours to compoſe all differences betwixt them; not by any violent or compulſive means, but in an amicable manner, as far as it can be done without prejudice to common honeſty and juſtice; which will be a piece of ſervice that will merit our commendation. But if you ſhould fail in theſe laudable endeavours, after you have tried all fair means, you are to refer the two parties to us, with an account of their ſeveral pretenſions, and an exact draught of the water-courſe; and after we have heard what each has to ſay for itſelf, we will take care that ſtrict juſtice ſhall be done to both. Be ſure then not only to give us ſpeedy advice of your proceedings in this affair for your own reputation, but at what time you heard the cauſe, and what you think of the matter yourſelf. Farewell, 2 September, 1510.

LETTER X.

To the Conſuls of the Marine.

THOUGH we could wiſh all the ditches and water-courſes in the country might be ſcoured and cleanſed with all poſſible expedition, as well for the plenty and improvement it would occaſion, as for the health of the inhabitants: nevertheleſs, conſidering that many townſhips are exempted from labouring at ſuch work by expreſs articles; and that others, who have no ſuch exemption to plead, are reduced to ſuch miſery and poverty by the late devaſtations in the territories of Piſa, and the failure of their harveſt this year, in which they had placed their laſt hope, that they ſay they are not able to give us the leaſt aſſiſtance; it is our will and pleaſure (to prevent their being driven to deſpair, and forced to fly their Country) that with regard to thoſe who have ſuch exemptions to ſhew, you ſhould both ſtrictly obſerve the tenor of thoſe articles yourſelves, and take care that all others do the ſame; becauſe we would not have the faith that has been given by this moſt Serene Republic in the leaſt violated upon any account whatſoever. As to others, who have no exemptions to plead in their behalf, and therefore are liable to this work, we would have you act with diſcretion [illegible] mentioned; and

and not be too hasty in punishing them if they do not appear; but to treat them in so mild and tender a manner, as may induce them tocome voluntarily and without compulsion of any kind: for if the matter cannot be conveniently dispatched this year, it must be deferred till the next; because you must be sensible how much greater regard we have, and ought to have, to the circumstances of these poor people, than to expediting the present undertaking. Now you know our pleasure, we make no doubt but you will act with your usual prudence upon this occasion, and favour them as much as you can, lest they should be reduced to despair. Farewell, 5 September, 1510.

LETTER XI.

To Philippo de Arigucci, Chief Magistrate of Terracolle.

ALESSANDRO di Mariano of your town has been committed to prison here by the worshipful *Eight of the Guard*, and the Balia of this City, for abusing a Servant Girl of no more than eleven years of age, in such a manner that he has ruined her. Now the wife of Christofano Messo of your town, as well as the wife of one Lazzero a Blacksmith, and another woman called Parvola, who afterwards met her at a well out of the Porta Passerina, where she was washing her cloaths, are fully acquainted it seems with all the circumstances of this affair. And as we are determined to take strict cognizance of the whole ourselves, we hereby enjoin you to send for the said three women and the Girl herself before you, and to cause them to be examined closely and separately upon oath by your Chief Justice, in the presence of a Public Notary, but with all due regard to Decency and Modesty; that so we may have full information of the matter. After they have been so examined, you are to send us a copy of their Depositions inclosed in a Letter, sealed with your own Seal, by the hands of a faithful Messenger. At the same time you are also to send the Girl herself hither, with a proper attendance to secure her person, and as speedily as possible for your own credit; giving us likewise a circumstantial account of all that is come to your knowledge in this business, by the person who brings us the Depositions, and who is to come himself with the Girl. Farewell, 11 September, 1510.

LET-

LETTER XII.

To Tomaſo Franciſco de Caponſacchi, Chamberlain of St. John's.

A Deputy from the Community of Lannolina has been with us, and repreſented to us, that all their corn, grapes, and cheſnuts have been deſtroyed this Seaſon by a dreadful ſtorm, in ſuch a manner that they cannot tell how to ſupport themſelves the reſt of the year: upon which account they have humbly beſought us to have pity on them; for if they are ſent to priſon for the tenths and other taxes ariſing from thoſe fruits, they muſt inevitably periſh there with hunger. And as it is our duty to have compaſſion upon the poor and miſerable, you are hereby required to enquire into the matter, and if you find they have actually ſuſtained theſe loſſes, you are to favour them in ſuch a manner in remitting the aforeſaid duties, as your diſcretion ſhall think neceſſary in ſo grievous a calamity. You are a prudent man, and now you know our diſpoſition in this reſpect, you will behave yourſelf, we make no queſtion, ſo as to deſerve our approbation. Farewell, 5 October, 1510.

LETTER XIII.

To Giovanni Battiſta de Bartolini, Commiſſary and Chief Magiſtrate of Piſa.

WE find by your laſt Letters to the *Council of Ten*, that a certain Portugueſe Phyſician, and ſome others of that nation are come to Piſa, under a ſafe-conduct from the late Council of Ten, but that they are thought to be either Heretics or Infidels; upon which account, you ſay, you are reſolved to ſend them elſewhere about their buſineſs. But for many reaſons, and particularly becauſe they came to Piſa under the ſanction of the Public Faith, (though indeed that protection is now at an end) as well as becauſe it is a very difficult matter to form a true judgment of men in points of Religious Faith, and that we are deſirous to have your City as well filled with inhabitants as poſſible, it is our pleaſure that you ſuffer the ſaid Phyſician and his countrymen to ſtay amongſt you for three or four months; during which time, by keeping a good watch upon their actions and behaviour, you

able to gueſs pretty truly at their Principles: and if you find, at the end of that term, that their further ſtay will be of prejudice to the Community, you may then diſmiſs them. Farewel, 22 December, 1510.

LETTER XIV.

To the Same.

BY your laſt of the 24th inſtant, in anſwer to our commands concerning the reputed Heretics you mentioned in your former Letter, we were informed of what you had then obſerved with regard to their conduct and actions; and we commend you for your early and neceſſary advice. The intention of this therefore is to recommend to you that you ſtill continue to keep a watchful eye upon thoſe people, that you may be enabled to diſtinguiſh the good from the bad amongſt them; and that you tolerate thoſe that behave themſelves well and like Chriſtians, ſince they may be of ſervice to the Community: but to diſmiſs ſuch as ſhall demean themſelves otherwiſe, and therefore cannot poſſibly do any good there, but much harm, and may excite the indignation of the people. Theſe matters you will be able to judge better of upon the Spot, than we can poſſibly do here; and therefore you muſt act accordingly. As to bringing any diſtemper amongſt you, you muſt diligently enquire into that; and if you have ſufficient proof that they came lately from an infected place, let them be immediately ſent away, leſt they ſhould ſpread the Contagion in a City which at preſent is free from any thing of that kind. Farewel, 26 December, 1510.

LETTER XV.

To Giovanni de Serragli, Chief Magiſtrate of Peccioli.

YOU will find that, by virtue of a Law very ſeaſonably made by the Legiſlature of our Republic in the month of Auguſt 1492, whoever ſhall afterwards come with their families to live in the territory of Piſa, ſhall be entirely exempt from all manner of taxes, both ordinary and extraordinary, for twenty years to come, as well in the territory of Florence as in that of Piſa; excepting that they ſhall be obliged to contribute to the expence of repairing and keeping in good order the ditches, highways, and bridges in the reſpective diſtricts where they live, in the ſame manner with the other inhabitants of thoſe places,

places, as you may ſee more fully by having recourſe to the ſaid Law. Now ſome people from the Community of Fabricia have been with us to complain in their own names, and thoſe of ſeveral other ſtrangers, who have come with their families to ſettle there, that you have laid ſome duties upon cloaths and other goods which they have, at the inſtance of that Community, in order to make them contribute to the expence of ſupporting Soldiers and other extraordinary charges; from all which they plead an exemption in conſequence of the aforeſaid Law, and indeed demand it: for they ſolemnly declare they ſhould never have gone to live there, but for the privileges granted by it. It is our pleaſure therefore that, immediately upon the receipt of this, you ſummon the Repreſentatives of Fabricia, as well as the ſtrangers who have been ſo aggrieved, to appear before you; and that when you have read the ſaid Law in their preſence, you cauſe due regard to be paid to it, by reſtoring to them, and every one of them, the ſeveral ſums that have been levied upon their goods in contempt of it, without putting them to any further expence. For we are determined it ſhall be inviolably obſerved for the ſpace of twenty years, with regard to all ſuch as have come to ſettle within the territories of Piſa for the ſake of enjoying the privileges and immunities granted by it; in order to repeople that country as well, and as ſoon as we can. Take care then that theſe orders be duly put in execution, and Farewel, 18 February, 1510.

LETTER XVI.

To the Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of the City of Piſa, and their Succeſſors; and likewiſe to the Vicar of Lari, the Vicar of Vico Piſano, the Chief Magiſtrate of Campiglia, and their reſpective Succeſſors.

WE are informed that great quantities of Myrtle, and other materials made uſe of in tanning and dreſſing Leather, have been tranſported out of our Dominions from your ſide: by which we are likely to ſuffer much inconvenience; as we ſhall not have a ſufficient quantity of ſuch materials left in our parts for the uſe of our own Tanners and Leather-dreſſers. In order therefore to repair this loſs, and to prevent foreigners being ſupplied with theſe things to our own prejudice, we command you, upon the receipt of this, to cauſe Proclamation to be made in all the public places of your ſeveral juriſdictions, that if any perſon, of what rank or condition ſoever he may be, ſhall henceforth preſume either himſelf, or by the aſſiſtance of others,

or under any pretence whatſoever, to tranſport or cauſe to be tranſported out of our Dominions, either by land or water, any ſuch materials, he ſhall forfeit not only the loading, but the carriages and beaſts that draw them, or the veſſel in which they are freighted, if conveyed by water. After you have cauſed this Proclamation to be printed, and ſtuck up in the moſt frequented places of your reſpective Juriſdictions, that ſo nobody may pretend ignorance, you are likewiſe to exert your utmoſt activity and diligence in puniſhing all offenders in the aforeſaid manner, as ſoon as they ſhall be convicted: for you muſt be very ſenſible yourſelves how much we ſhould ſuffer by a continuance of ſuch practices. Let it be your principal endeavour therefore to prevent them. Farewel, 25 February, 1510.

LETTER XVII.

A Patent.

THE Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to the Chief Magiſtrate, Commiſſary, and Conſuls of the City of Piſa, greeting. You are no ſtrangers, we ſuppoſe, to the great pains that have been taken for a long time paſt by this Republic, and particularly by the officers of the Mint, to put a ſtop to the currency of all baſe and clipped coin in our Dominions; in which indeed they have in a great meaſure ſucceeded according to our wiſhes. But we have been lately informed that ſuch ſort of money has been again introduced into your City, and is commonly paſſed off from one to another without any fear or reſerve; at which we cannot help being very much offended and concerned: for you muſt be thoroughly ſenſible, we are aſſured, how prejudicial ſuch a thing muſt be both to the Public and every Individual; eſpecially as we have taken great care to circulate good and genuine coin of all denominations throughout almoſt every part of our Dominions, according to the uſual cuſtom and inſtitutions of this Republic. As we are very deſirous therefore to eradicate this evil, which is of the moſt pernicious tendency, we command you to aſſemble altogether upon the receipt of this, and to make ſuch proviſions as ſhall ſeem moſt proper and expedient, not only to prevent the currency of all bad money, but to clear our Dominions entirely of it, if poſſible. You are men of ſenſe, and muſt know how detrimental the ſufferance of it will be to every ſort of people in the end. Let it be your buſineſs to take all neceſſary meaſures to remedy ſo great an evil. Farewel, 15 March, 1510.

LET-

LETTER XVIII.

To Galeotto de Leoni, Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of Burgi.

AN information hath been laid before us that Jacopo Venuto, Doctor of Law in your town, about four years ago married Madonna Giacopa, daughter of the late Chriſtofano Picchi there, a woman of good reputation and family. But that he keeps another woman in the houſe, by whom he has ſeveral children, under the very eyes of his wife, whom he has abuſed in ſuch a manner that ſhe has been forced to quit the houſe, and return to her relations, for want of bread and other neceſſaries of life, whilſt he and his Concubine are ſpending her fortune and inheritance. Now this being a matter of very bad example, and not only highly culpable, but likely to be attended with dangerous conſequences, we have been humbly petitioned to take cognizance of it: upon which account, it is our pleaſure, that on the receipt of this, you preſently cite the ſaid Jacopo Venuto to appear before you, together with his wife, or ſome of her neareſt relations, that you may know the truth of the matter: and if you ſhall find it to be as it hath been repreſented to us, you are to reprimand the ſaid Jacopo in a proper manner for his cruel behaviour to his wife, giving him to underſtand that ſuch a conduct very ill becomes a perſon of his profeſſion, and that if he perſiſts in it, the Signiory of this Republic will take ſuch a courſe with him as ſhall not fail to reclaim him, and make him ſenſible of his error. In the mean time, however, you are to take care that he provide her with a proper table, cloaths, and other conveniencies ſuitable to her rank, and that he return her fortune immediately. Theſe are our poſitive orders; act with your uſual prudence in the execution of them, and endeavour to reduce the man to reaſon for your own reputation: but if you find him obſtinate and incorrigible, let us have a particular account of his behaviour; for we are determined to redreſs the poor woman's grievances in a proper manner. Farewel, 15 March, 1510.

LETTER XIX.

To Bartolomeo de Mancini, Vicar of Piſcia.

WE are informed that the Community of Monte Catini are deſirous to have a reform made in their Magiſtracy, now the time of chuſing new Officers is at hand. For which purpoſe ſome private perſons have been with us from that place in their own names, and thoſe of many others, who wiſh to have the Government altered for the better, and complain that their Community, which conſiſts of about five hundred inhabitants, is entirely governed by thirty or forty perſons, who never go out of office but they are ſucceeded either by their ſons, or brothers, or ſome near relations; ſo that they are always in the Adminiſtration, and throw the power into whatſoever hands they pleaſe, without any regard to juſtice or merit. In this manner, they ſay, a few perſons ſhare all the honours amongſt them, as well as the revenues of the Public, which annually amount to four thouſand Ducats; and that though the expences of the Community never exceed two thouſand, yet they conſtantly make up accounts at the end of the year, by which they bring the reſt of their fellow townſmen in their debt; for which reaſons they complain, as we ſaid before, of being ill governed by a little circle of Officers, who chuſe another by turns for that purpoſe in ſuch a manner, that when one of them goes out of power, another of them is ſure to come in: a courſe of adminiſtration ſo iniquitous, that they think they cannot fall into worſe hands upon any change whatſoever. It is our will, therefore, that either you yourſelf, or your Chief Juſtice, ſhould repair directly to Monte Catini, and not only inform yourſelf of the manner in which this Reform is to be conducted, but to take care that the chief Magiſtrates and Council, who are to nominate the Reformers, may not appoint any relation of their own, even in the fourth degree, according to the tenor of their Laws; and that none of the old Circle (that is, of thoſe who have been ſo long in office) may be elected; that ſo other people may have their turn in the Adminiſtration, and the Reform proceed with equity and impartiality, by diſtributing the honours and employments amongſt thoſe who have always behaved themſelves well, and formerly uſed to have their ſhare in them; as well as by excluding others who have forfeited all pretenſions to them, either by having been outlawed, or otherwiſe rendered infamous by their actions. In ſhort, if you cannot attend there yourſelf, you are to lay a ſtrict injunction upon your Chief Juſtice, that he take particular care this Reform may be made with all

due regard to juſtice and peace, and, if poſſible, with general ſatisfaction, by acting without paſſion or prejudice, and by conſidering the merits of every one, as their Laws expreſsly require. But if the Repreſentatives of the Community ſhall think themſelves in any wiſe aggrieved by the manner of proceeding we preſcribe, they are at liberty to apply to our moſt Auguſt Signiory. Farewel, 26 March, 1511.

LETTER XX.

To Giovanni de Popoleſchi, Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of the City of Piſtoia.

SOME people from Piſtoia (of both the Parties which divide that City) who came hither not long ago in your name, have been with us again, about the three Fellowſhips which are likely to be ſoon vacant in your College; the Panciatichi [*b*] complaining they have but few Graduates of their Party in the College, and much leſs intereſt there than they ought to have. Upon which account, having heard all that both Parties had to ſay for themſelves upon this occaſion at ſeveral times; and laſtly, having cauſed the Reverend Cardinal of Trano's will to be read to them, which preſcribes the order that is to be followed in ſuch Elections, we are of opinion that we cannot deviate from the ſaid will, without incurring much ſcandal and cenſure. For this reaſon, we will and command that the order preſcribed by it be punctually obſerved at the next Election: and if the Panciatichi have not ſo many Graduates as the other Party, you muſt exhort them to patience this time; that ſo the Election may be conducted as it ſhould be, and thoſe only choſen who have the beſt right to be ſo according to the tenor of that will, without regard to any other conſideration whatſoever; becauſe it is our pleaſure that it ſhould be duly obſerved in every reſpect. On the other hand, you muſt give both Parties to underſtand that we expect they ſhould come to ſome compromiſe in theſe matters for the future, and that a proviſion be made that the Panciatichi may not be totally excluded by degrees; as it was not the Cardinal's intention that either Party ſhould have a larger ſhare in his Donation than the other. This you are to ſee executed with the utmoſt impartiality, taking great care that every ſtep may be avoided which may occaſion any ſcandal or diſturbance, and exhorting the Electors to behave themſelves in ſuch a manner upon this occaſion, as may recom-

[*b*] The name of one of the Parties.

mend them to the notice and favour of our Auguſt Signiory. Farewel, 18 April, 1511.

LETTER XXI.

To Franciſco de Pitti, Vicar and Commiſſary of St. Miniato.

WE are informed that on Sunday next, the eleventh of this month, the Chapter of the Minor Friars for the Province of Tuſcany are to aſſemble at St. Miniato for the choice of a new Rector of their order, and that the Sieneſe Friars are determined to elect ſomebody of their own City into that office. Now as our City is the Head of Tuſcany, we think it will be more honourable that ſome Friar of our own territories ſhould be elected; and if they can be perſuaded to think well that Franciſco de Ghinucci da Monte Varchi, a man of learning and good conduct, and their preſent Rector, ſhould continue in his office, (which we underſtand would be very agreeable to their General) it would alſo be very pleaſing to us, on account of his excellent character. We therefore will and command you hereby to give all manner of aſſiſtance (as far as is conſiſtent with juſtice and decency) to our immediate Subject, the preſent Rector; taking all poſſible care to prevent any ſcandal or diſturbance that may ariſe upon this occaſion. You know our pleaſure; endeavour to ſee it executed in a proper manner, without making it public, or violating your own Conſcience. Farewel, 30 May, 1511.

LETTER XXII.

To the Moſt Reverend Father Hieroniмo de Pandolfini, Biſhop of Piſtoia.

SEVERAL perſons belonging to the Church of S. Pietro Maggiore in Piſtoia have been before our Auguſt Signiory, and aſſert that the Chapter of the ſaid Church, by virtue of a Bull granted by Pope Eugenius in the year 1433, are Patrons of it, and all the beneficed Altars in it: and that your Reverence being deſirous to ſee the Bull and ſome other writings relating to the Patronage of that Church, they were freely entruſted in your hands; but that you now refuſe to return them; at which we cannot help being much concerned, as well as offended;

offended; because (not to mention the violence committed upon other people's rights) it seems to be a step, if their allegations are true, every way unworthy of your Reverence. Upon which accounts, we advise you to restore the said Bull and other writings, and to behave yourself with such modesty and justice in this affair, as may prevent all occasion of scandal in the City: and indeed we make no doubt but your Reverence will be much more ready to compose all disturbances than to excite and enflame them; as you must certainly know that when men are injured in their rights, they will take some means to shew their resentment. Your Reverence then, being a Prelate of great prudence and moderation, will suffer things, we dare say, to proceed in their usual course, and without encroaching upon the just claims of any; which will be very agreeable to us, and put an end to all further uneasiness in others. Farewel, 7 June, 1511.

LETTER XXIII.

To Matteo de Niccolini, Vicar of St. John's.

THE Church of S. Pietro at Presciano being now vacant by the death of the last Rector; and our August Signiory having the Patronage thereof, they have conferred that Benefice upon Francisco Fagiuoli, one of their own Citizens, and a very worthy Ecclesiastic: in consequence of which, they lately sent Dommoro di Domenico, their Bailiff, to enter and take possession of the premises for the said Francisco. But our Bailiff informs us by Letter, that some people there not only shut the doors upon him, and bid him go about his business (as they intended to keep possession of it themselves) but presented loaded Cross-bows, which they threatened to discharge at him. Upon which, in order to avoid raising any scandal or disturbance, he presently left the place, and retired to Castello di Presciano, to wait there for our further orders. Now as the honour of our August Signiory is concerned in the affair, we send one of our own officers express with this; upon the receipt of which, we command you immediately to dispatch your Sheriff and his whole *Posse*, well armed, to the said Church, having first given notice thereof to our Bailiff at Castello di Presciano, that he may repair directly to him: after which, you are to use all means to put the said Bailiff in possession of it, which he is to keep in the name of our Signiory.

You are likewise to drive out all secular persons who have shut themselves up there, taking down [illegible] and places of abode in writing, and to give us a particul[illegible] the whole: but if you happen

happen to find any Prieſts, or other Eccleſiaſtics of any kind, amongſt them, you are to let them alone, and neither to ſay nor do any thing to them; for we have no buſineſs to put our ſickle into other people's corn [i]. In the next place, you are to cite the father of Ser Chriſtofano of S. Leolino, a Prieſt in Valdambra (if he has one) together with his brothers, nephews, and ſome others of his neareſt relations, to appear perſonally before us within two days after they receive the citation, on pain of having a fine of two hundred Ducats laid upon every one of them that does not appear at that time: after which, you are to give us immediate advice of what you have done, whom you have ſummoned, and upon what day. In all theſe ſeveral proceedings you are to act with all poſſible vigour and expedition; ſince, as we ſaid before, the honour of our Auguſt Signiory is highly intereſted in this matter. Farewel, 25 June, 1511.

LETTER XXIV.

To the Same.

BY your diſpatches of yeſterday concerning the affair of the Church at Preſciano, we are informed of the perſons who forcibly kept poſſeſſion of it, and the contempt they have ſhewn of our authority in their behaviour to our Bailiff and your Sheriff. Now as the honour of this Serene Republic is at ſtake, we will and command you, upon the receipt of this, to ſend your Sheriff with his *Poſſe*, and as many other armed men as you can ſuddenly raiſe in your Vicariate, to burn down and level to the ground the houſe of Matteo di Simone, commonly called the Finocchino [k] of the ſaid Church; as alſo that of Fruoſino da S. Leolino in your Vicariate, both whom you make mention of in your laſt. After which, you are to order the ſaid Matteo and Fruoſino to appear perſonally before us on the twenty-ninth of this month without fail, on pain of being proclaimed Rebels, and having all their goods confiſcated in caſe of diſobedience to our commands. You are further to make diligent enquiry after all the reſt who violently took poſſeſſion of the ſaid Church, and to take down their names in writing, as we inſtructed you in our former Letter: of which you muſt give us an immediate account. We ſend this by an expreſs, becauſe we are determined not to trifle any longer. Fail not therefore to execute theſe commands with vigour and diſpatch. Farewel, 27 June, 1511.

[i] See Note [f] Letter I.
[k] An officer ſomewhat of the nature of a collector or treaſurer of the taxes.

LET-

LETTER XXV.

To the Commiſſary and Chief Magiſtrates of Piſtoia.

WE have been informed, to our great diſpleaſure, that on the ſecond of this month, people could not have bread for their money from the bakers in your City; at which we cannot help being very much ſurprized, ſince there has been ſo fine a harveſt this year, that there can be no want of corn ſufficient to occaſion ſuch an inconvenience: and we are ſtill more ſurprized that you have not acquainted us with this matter before now, that ſo we might immediately have provided you with a proper ſupply. It is our pleaſure therefore that, after due conſultation together, you cauſe a ſpeedy and diligent ſearch to be made whether there be really a ſufficient quantity of corn in and about the City; and if you find there is, that you force thoſe that have it, to bring it to market, and ſell it at a fair and reaſonable price, as we ſhould think they would naturally be inclined to do for their own intereſt, after ſo plentiful a harveſt. But if you find there is a real ſcarcity, you are to let us know directly, and we ſhall provide accordingly: for it is a ſhameful thing that people cannot have bread for their money in ſuch a City, after ſo plentiful a harveſt (as we ſaid before) and that you ſhould have ſuffered it to be ſold at the rate of forty Soldi per Buſhel [*k*], ſince it will not take that price, or any thing like it, either in our City, or any other part of our Dominions. See that theſe orders be executed without fail, and Farewel, 8 July, 1511.

LETTER XXVI.

To Leonardo de Rodulfi, Chief Magiſtrate of Piſtoia.

THE Reverend Father Aghoſtino Filippo, ſon of Antonio our fellow-citizen, and Provincial Vicar of the order of Servites in our City, hath been before us, and ſays they have a Convent of the ſame order at Piſtoia, in which there are ſome diſſolute brethren, who

[*k*] The original ſays *a Soldi* 40 *lo ſtaio*. An Italian *Soldo* is of the ſame value with a French *Sau*, twenty of which make a *Livre*: ſo that forty *Soldi* make about 1s. 10d. Sterling. This would be thought a very inconſiderable price for a Buſhel of wheat at preſent, though it was looked upon as ſo exorbitant in Machiavel's time. But whoever conſiders how ſcarce money was in Europe about two hundred and fifty [illegible] compariſon of what it is now, will eaſily account for this difference in the [illegible]

refuſe to pay due obedience to him and the eſtabliſhed rules of the Society, with whoſe names he will acquaint you. And though he is deſirous to reduce them to reaſon and obedience, as the duty of his office, and the diſcipline of the Convent, require, he has not ſufficient power to effect it, and correct them in a proper manner: upon which account he has petitioned the aſſiſtance of the ſecular Magiſtrate. It is our pleaſure therefore, that when the ſaid Provincial Vicar, or his Deputy, ſhall ſhew you ſufficient licence and authority from their Superior to correct thoſe Monks, and reduce them to obedience, and that he is thereby duly empowered to ſollicit the interpoſition of the ſecular Magiſtrate, you ſhall give him all manner of proper aſſiſtance, as often as he ſhall require it, for the abovementioned purpoſes; taking great care however, to prevent all frays and tumults, and ſcandal, that may ariſe upon this occaſion. You are a diſcreet man, and know how we would have you behave in the affair: act therefore in ſuch a manner as may deſerve our commendation, by reducing the ſaid brethren to their duty; conſidering, above all things, that the honour of Almighty God is here immediately concerned. Farewel, 20 July, 1511.

LETTER XXVII.

A Patent.

The Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to all our Governors and Magiſtrates, as well preſent as to come, and to every one of them in particular, to whom theſe our Letters Patent ſhall come, greeting.

WE herewith ſend you a Proclamation to be publiſhed, in order to notify the treaty of peace, friendſhip, and confederacy, concluded on the ſecond of this month betwixt this Auguſt Republic and the Magnificent Community of Siena, which contains a mutual pardon and oblivion of all injuries and damages that have ever been committed by one upon the other, with ſeveral other ſuch pacts and ſtipulations as are uſually made in the like Conventions. We therefore will and command you all, and every one of you reſpectively, to cauſe the ſaid Proclamation to be publiſhed throughout your ſeveral juriſdictions; that ſo from henceforth the citizens and ſubjects of both Republics may freely and ſecurely paſs out of the Dominions of one into thoſe of the other, to traffick, negotiate, and tranſact all other ſuch affairs as good friends and neighbours are wont to do together. Farewel, 9 Auguſt, 1511.

LET-

LETTER XXVIII.

To the Conſuls of the Marine.

WE underſtand that this Auguſt Republic having ſome years ago taken a reſolution to divert the ſtream of the river Arno in ſuch a manner as to overflow the territories of Piſa, in order to reduce that State to its duty to our City; the work was actually begun, and ſeveral ditches cut for that purpoſe. So that ever ſince the river began to take a new courſe, it appears that all the lands belonging to the Community of Fagiana, have been ſo flooded and covered with mud, that no ſigns of any former boundaries or land-marks are now to be diſcovered; but all the meadows are diſguiſed with roots of trees, mire and ſand to ſuch a degree, that it is impoſſible for any man to diſtinguiſh his own from that of his neighbour. Now the owners of the ſaid Lands being deſirous to recover them (as it is natural to ſuppoſe they ſhould be) and to make them turn to ſome account again when every man knows his own, (which cannot poſſibly be effected till that is aſcertained by due authority) ſome of the moſt conſiderable of them have been before us, and petitioned that you may take all neceſſary and proper meaſures to have thoſe lands ſurveyed in ſuch a manner, that every man may have his own property reſtored to him with certainty, and reap the profits of it in due time. Now as this expectation is but juſt and reaſonable, we command you to take the matter in hand immediately, and not only to ſend for the ſeveral owners of the ſaid lands, but to ſearch narrowly into the nature of every man's claim, and then to aſſign them ſuch a portion of ground as they had there before; taking care at the ſame time to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral pieces by proper names, boundaries, and land-marks, and to have them ſpecified and recorded in a writing, which any one may have recourſe to hereafter for ſatisfaction upon occaſion. Notwithſtanding this diviſion, however, it is our pleaſure, that if any one of the proprietors ſhall think himſelf aggrieved by it, he ſhall have free appeal at all times to our Auguſt Signiory: for we would not upon any account deprive one perſon of his right, and give it to another that has none. Now you know our pleaſure, take care to act with prudence and juſtice in it. Farewell, 19 Auguſt, 1511.

LETTER XXIX.

To Giovanni de Barducci, Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of Fiviziani.

IT hath been repreſented to our Auguſt Signiory, that the Marquis Giovanni Lorenzo da Treſpie, not only behaves with great rudeneſs and inſolence to the Marquis of Morello, his near relation, but actually diſturbs him by force and violence in the poſſeſſion of his eſtate; which certainly is acting in a manner that little becomes a man of quality and a near relation. We command you therefore to go in perſon to the ſaid Marquis Giovanni Lorenzo (taking care at the ſame time to keep up your dignity in a proper manner) and give him to underſtand, that it is the pleaſure of this Auguſt Signiory he ſhould deſiſt from all further violence and rudeneſs to his kinſman: for that if he perſiſts in it, we ſhall take the Marquis of Morello under our immediate protection, and afford him all convenient aſſiſtance for his ſecurity, as he hath been well recommended to our care. For this purpoſe, you are to make uſe of ſuch arguments and perſuaſions as ſhall ſeem good to your prudence: and if you find he is inclinable to peace, let him ſue for juſtice in the ordinary way, in caſe he thinks he has been in any wiſe injured; that ſo the Marquis of Morello may likewiſe have an opportunity of juſtifying himſelf in a legal manner: for no private man ought to be permitted to right himſelf when he thinks he has ſuffered wrong. Farewel, 18 September, 1511.

LETTER XXX.

To the Conſuls of the Marine.

BARTOLOMEO, the Son of Franciſco Graſſolino, a citizen of Piſa, hath been before our Auguſt Signiory, and ſays, that about ten months ago he returned to live at Piſa after an abode of fifteen years at Rome; and that as his houſhold goods and furniture were coming from Rome to Piſa by water ſome days ago (having been packed up and ſent away by a particular friend at Rome) it ſeems about fifteen pounds of Salt had been inadvertently put amongſt other kitchen neceſſaries by the care of his friend's wife, who had been very exact in ſending every thing that might be of the leaſt uſe in houſekeeping, but

but without any ill deſign, or thoughts of offending againſt the Laws relating to the tranſportation of Salt. Now when the box where the Salt was came to be opened by the Cuſtomhouſe Officers, to ſee whether there were any contraband goods in it, they found it there amongſt other things, and condemned the whole freight, according to the tenor of the Laws made for that purpoſe. The ſaid Bartolomeo therefore hath humbly beſought us to afford him ſome redreſs in this affair, as, he ſays, he had no intention of tranſgreſſing the Law, nor indeed knew any thing of the matter: ſo that, if what he ſays is true, it is a caſe that deſerves commiſeration. Upon which account, if you find things to be as he hath repreſented to us, it is our pleaſure that you treat him with ſuch clemency as ought to be ſhewn in ſo ſingular and unexpected a caſe. For though the Laws relating to Salt are very ſtrict and ſevere, yet, upon ſuch an occaſion as this, they ſhould be mitigated according to the circumſtances of it. Proceed therefore with your uſual prudence and lenity, now you know our pleaſure, and farewel, 28 September, 1511.

LETTER XXXI.

To Pietro de Compagni, Vicar of Piſa.

WE ſuppoſe you, and all the people in your Vicariate, have heard of the Interdict which his Holineſs the Pope [*l*] hath thundered out againſt us; though both we ourſelves, and almoſt all the City, look upon it as vain and inſignificant for many reaſons; eſpecially becauſe his Holineſs having been cited to appear before a General Council, could not publiſh ſuch an Interdict according to the Canons of the Church, without leaving us at liberty to appeal to the ſaid Council, or any other Tribunal where our cauſe could be formally and judicially heard: for ſuch an appeal is to be conſidered as ſelf-defence, and that being allowed by the Laws of nature, cannot be refuſed or objected as a crime to any man. We might add, that this Interdict has been publiſhed by his Holineſs without ever citing us to appear before him; whereas a citation ſhould always precede condemnation and puniſhment. God himſelf has given us an example of it in the caſe of Adam, by citing him after he had ſinned, and ſaying, *Adam, Adam, ubi es? Adam, Adam, where art thou* [*m*]? before he drove him out of Paradiſe. Many other reaſons might be alledged, but to avoid

[*l*] Julius II.
[*m*] Gen. iii. 9.

prolixity

prolixity we ſhall not ſpecify them here. That we may live like Chriſtians therefore, and have Maſs and other Divine Service duly celebrated, we oblige ſuch Conventuals of our city to officiate, as always uſed to perform thoſe Duties at our Palace, viz. the Servites, the order of S. Maria Novella, of Santa Croce, of Santo Spirito, the Carmelites, and the order of All Saints. As to the other Orders and the Seculars, eſpecially thoſe of our Principal Church, we have given them leave to obſerve the Interdict if they pleaſe, leſt they ſhould be deprived of their benefices and revenues. This is all that we think neceſſary to ſay at preſent relating to the Interdict, and the manner in which we conduct ourſelves upon this occaſion; and it is our pleaſure that you communicate it to all our faithful ſubjects under your juriſdiction. Farewel, 1 October, 1511.

LETTER XXXII.

To the ſame.

THERE is no occaſion for any further anſwer to yours of the 30th, than that you are to underſtand we do not look upon the preſent Interdict (as it is called) to be valid, for ſeveral reaſons. In the firſt place, becauſe the Pope has been cited ſome months ago to appear before a General Council: in the ſecond, becauſe we have appealed to that Council ourſelves: thirdly, becauſe we have had no citation from his Holineſs, as is always uſual upon ſuch occaſions: and for many other reaſons which are not neceſſary to be mentioned at preſent. We therefore have cauſed the Conventuals who have no Benefices to loſe, and have always been accuſtomed to celebrate Maſs and other Divine Service in our Palace, to perform the ſame duties as uſual, for the ſatisfaction and conſolation of our city. But for the reſt of our Clergy who are beneficed, we would not expoſe them to any inconvenience; becauſe the Conventuals at preſent are ſufficient to perform all the neceſſary duties, and we hope in God the matter will blow over in a few days. Now you know how we act here upon this occaſion, we would have you conduct yourſelf accordingly, and with diſcretion. Farewel, 1 October, 1511.

LET-

LETTER XXXIII.

A Patent.

The Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to all and every one to whom theſe preſents ſhall come, greeting.

WE hereby notify to you, that we, together with the Reſpectable *Council of Eight for the maintenance of Liberty and Peace*, the *Council of Eighty*, and the other Colleges of our city, according to the Ordinances thereof, have elected and appointed our truſty and well-beloved fellow-citizen Giovanni de Rodolfi to be Governor over all the Province of Romagna, with full and ample power to provide for the ſecurity, good government, and welfare of the ſaid Province. Wherefore, we will and command you all that you obey him in every thing in the ſame manner as if our Auguſt Signiory were actually preſent amongſt you, and to behave yourſelves towards him with ſuch dutiful reſpect and ſubmiſſion, that you may merit our approbation for it. Farewel, 3 November, 1514.

LETTER XXXIV.

To the Reverend Donato de Chianni, Vicar to the Biſhop of Arezzo.

WE have had information of an affair which cannot but give us great offence and diſpleaſure, as the honour and dignity of our Governors (who are members of our Auguſt Signiory) is much impaired by it. It ſeems, one Gaſpari, the Son of Meo di Cecco, and chaplain to the Church of Faltona, ſuffered himſelf to be ſo tranſported with choler, that on St. Simon's day laſt, he not only abuſed and vilified our truſty and well-beloved fellow-citizen Carlo Macigni, Governor of Caſtello Focagnano, in the moſt opprobrious and contumelious terms, but actually came with arms in his hands to aſſault him; and how becoming that was in a *Religious*, we leave your Reverence (as you are a very prudent [illegible] judge yourſelf. Now as ſo grievous an indignity ought to [illegible] in the moſt exemplary manner,

manner, we earneſtly exhort your Reverence to examine into the circumſtances of the matter, and cauſe the offender to be chaſtiſed in ſuch a manner, as may not only deter others from the like outrages for the future, but make ſufficient reſtitution to the honour of our Republic, which has been ſo grievouſly inſulted upon this occaſion. But if your Reverence is backward in doing this, we ſhall be forced to take the affair into our own hands; and then we ſhall make him ſenſible whom he has offended, and ſee due ſatisfaction rendered to our Republic. Confiding therefore in your prudence and juſtice, we make no doubt but you will cauſe the offender to be puniſhed to our ſatisfaction for this, and ſeveral other crimes and delinquencies he has been guilty of. Farewel, 8 November, 1511.

LETTER XXXV.

To Giovanni de Barducci, Commiſſary and Chief Magiſtrate of Fiviziani.

MERCATO, the ſon of Giacopo da Botignano, a little town and court in the juriſdiction of Fiviziani, about twelve years ago, as we are informed, obtained a ſafe-conduct from the Signiory of Lucca to drive a herd of Cattle through their territories towards the ſea-coaſt and back again. But as he was returning from thence, and had got almoſt to the gates of Lucca with his Cattle, they were taken from him, it ſeems, by the Luccheſe, to the value of three hundred Ducats and upwards. Seeing, therefore, they had violated their faith in this manner, and robbed him almoſt cloſe to the gates of their city, he made complaint of it to our Auguſt Signiory; who, taking the matter into conſideration, came to a reſolution that their ſubject ſhould have proper ſatisfaction made him for his loſs. For which purpoſe, they wrote a letter to their Commiſſary for the time being to ſeize upon ſome inhabitants in that part of the juriſdiction of Lucca which lies neareſt the territory of Fiviziani, and to fine them in ſuch a manner as might indemnify our ſaid ſubject Mercato: which being executed in ſome meaſure, he recovered about one hundred Ducats. But the Signiory of Lucca being informed of this, immediately cauſed three of the principal men that belonged to the territory of Fiviziani, and lived in their juriſdiction, to be outlawed, viz. Pietro del Maeſtro, Pietro Agnolo Berni, and Lazzerotto di Chriſtofano, of whom the ſaid Lazzerotto only is now alive, but ſtill outlawed, and in daily apprehenſion of being ſeized, as they watch continually for him; which he thinks

is a very hard caſe, being in no fault at all himſelf. Having humbly beſought us therefore to commiſerate his condition, and to afford him ſome relief, we command you, upon the receipt of this, immediately to acquaint four of the principal inhabitants belonging to the Vicariate of Minuzzano, in the Juriſdiction of Lucca, (of whoſe names Lazzerotto will inform you) that if within twenty days after that notice, they do not effectually prevail upon the Signiory of Lucca (or whomſoever elſe it may belong to) to revoke and utterly cancel the outlawry againſt the ſaid Lazzerotto, you will cauſe them to be ſerved in the ſame manner that he has been. This is our pleaſure: take care to execute it with your uſual prudence and regard to juſtice; that ſo Lazzerotto may at laſt be freed from all further danger and apprehenſion. Farewel, 27 November, 1511.

LETTER XXXVI.

To Bernardo de Vittorii, Vicar and Commiſſary of Peſcia.

FATHER Ludovico degli Oneſti, Deputy from the Community of Pietra Buona, hath been before us; and ſays, that in September laſt ſome flocks of goats belonging to the Luccheſe peaſants having committed great treſpaſs in the lands of the ſaid Community, the tenants ſeized upon and delivered them into the hands of their reſpective landlords, that ſo thoſe to whom they belonged might be obliged to make proper ſatisfaction for the the damage they had done before they had them again: and further, that Pietro di Cante, your predeceſſor, had the ſeveral parties before him, and compoſed all differences betwixt them, as appears by a written inſtrument drawn up on that occaſion. But we are informed that the Luccheſe peaſants having ſince repreſented the matter in a manner very different from truth to the Chief Magiſtrate of Lucca, in order to throw all the blame upon our Subjects the inhabitants of Pietra Buona, he has not only confiſcated the goods of ſix of the moſt ſubſtantial people in the Luccheſe territories who belong to that Community, but threatens to hang them, and has ſet a price upon their heads, promiſing a reward of fifty Ducats to any one who ſhall deliver them up to him either dead or alive: at all which proceedings we cannot help being greatly ſurprized, as thoſe men have not been guilty of the leaſt crime to merit ſuch ſeverity. As it ought to be reſented therefore in a proper manner for the honour of our Auguſt Republic, we will and command you, upon the receipt of this, to ſerve twelve of the moſt ſubſtantial men and heads of the family of the Giuſti at Caſtello di Medicini, who belong to the juriſ[illegible]

in the ſame manner that our ſubjects of Pietra Buona have been ſerved by the Magiſtracy of that City; that ſo by returning like for like, they may be made ſenſible of their error. Fail not execute theſe commands with vigour and expedition. Farewel, 16 December, 1511.

LETTER XXXVII.

To Lorenzo de Acciaiuoli, Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of Caſtro Caro.

WE underſtand by your Letter to his Excellency the Gonfalonier, that there is a quarrel of a dangerous nature in your town, betwixt the families of Caſa Nuova and the Fabri on one ſide, and that of the Taſſinari on the other, but that there is at preſent a ſort of a tacit truce betwixt them. Now as theſe families are very numerous, and have many relations and dependants in the ſeveral ſtreets where they live, we could wiſh, in order to prevent all further diſturbances, the ſeveral families would come to ſome amicable accommodation amongſt themſelves, eſpecially as there has been yet no-body killed on either ſide, and only ſome few people ſlightly wounded. For this purpoſe, we command you, upon the receipt of this, to ſend for the Heads of both parties to appear before you, and, with your uſual prudence, to adviſe them in a friendly and gentle manner to be ſincerely reconciled to each other for their mutual honour, ſatisfaction, and welfare. If you perceive them diſpoſed to this, you are to commend their prudence and good nature, ſetting forth the ſweets and advantages of good neighbourhood, as well as the many evils and inconveniencies that always reſult from quarrels. But if you find that all fair and perſuaſive means are in vain; and there is no poſſibility of bringing about an accommodation betwixt them without ſome ſort of compulſion, you are to order the Heads of that party which is moſt obſtinate in rejecting all terms, to appear perſonally before us within four days at the furtheſt after ſuch ſhort notice, without fail, and on pain of our diſpleaſure; giving the Heads of the other party notice likewiſe to appear at the ſame time, that we may ſettle all differences betwixt them, and make a proper diſtinction betwixt thoſe that are refractory, and thoſe that are deſirous to live in peace. In this caſe you are to let us have immediate advice, and to acquaint us upon what day you gave them ſuch orders, taking all poſſible care to prevent them from quarrelling upon the road as they come hither. Farewel, 11 February, 1511.

LET-

LETTER XXXVIII.

To Filippo de Lorini, Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of Fiviziani.

THERE has been a diſpute, it ſeems, for ſome time, which may at laſt very probably be attended with bad conſequences, betwixt the Community of Vinca in your juriſdiction on one ſide, and the people of Fornole, who are ſubject to the Marquis of Maſſa, on the other, on account of Mount Rutaia; concerning which our Signiory has written many Letters, and laſtly one to your predeceſſor Giovanni de Barducci, dated the nineteenth of January laſt, which perhaps may be regiſtered in your Chancery. This diſpute is not yet ſettled, which has not been owing to our ſubjects, we hear, but to the ſaid Marquis, who has always prevaricated, and put off the matter without any ſeeming deſire to come to an accommodation, whilſt in the mean time his ſubjects of Fornole have come every day, and ſtill do, to aſſert their right to the ſaid Mount, by committing all ſorts of violence upon the people of Vinca, ſuch as beating them, entering their lands by force, and keeping poſſeſſion of them by ſuch means as ſeem neither juſt nor warrantable, nor becoming people that would be good neighbours. It is our duty, therefore, to afford theſe our ſubjects all manner of neceſſary aſſiſtance in the maintenance of their rights and properties; eſpecially as they have been at all times, and ſtill are, remarkably loyal and faithful to our Auguſt Republic. But as it is our deſire to proceed by fair and amicable means in compromiſing this matter, we hereby order you to acquaint the ſaid Marquis as ſoon as poſſible, that you have a Commiſſion from us to treat and confer with him in behalf of our ſubjects at Vinca, on the ſpot, concerning the lands in diſpute, and after an oculiar ſurvey, and hearing the claims on both ſides, to determine it in a ſummary way, taking good care at the ſame time, however, to ſupport the juſt rights of our ſubjects in a proper manner. But if he ſtill perſiſts in ſhuffling and evading a fair accommodation, as uſual, and will come to no reaſonable compoſition in favour of his people, but ſuffers them to uſe force and violence, as they have hitherto been accuſtomed to do, you are then (ſince it is lawful to repel force by force) to ſend for Gianneſino, Captain of the battalion di Caſtiglione, and employ the forces under his command to prevent our ſubjects at Vinca from having any further violence committed upon them contrary to all juſtice and equity, taking heed to act rather upon the defenſive than the offen-

ſive, and to ſupport our people inſtead of attacking others. We would have you nevertheleſs, in the firſt place, to make uſe of all gentle and perſuaſive arguments, according to your uſual prudence, in order to bring about a fair and amicable adjuſtment of this matter. Farewel, 7 March, 1511.

LETTER XXXIX.

A Patent.

The Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to Giuliano de Orlandini, Chief Magiſtrate of Prato; Pelegrino de Lovini, Commiſſary of Piſtoia; and Bernardo de Vittorii, Vicar and Commiſſary of Peſcia, greeting.

WE have ſent Pietro Paolo, the bearer of this, and an officer belonging to our Auguſt Signiory, with all expedition, to prepare magnificent lodgings at Prato for his Eminency, the moſt Reverend Legate from his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty to our Auguſt Signiory, who is returning according to his commiſſion into France. It is our pleaſure therefore, that his Eminency, together with all his train and attendants, be honourably received and entertained by you and every one of you, as well as by your principal citizens; and that you provide him with magnificent lodgings, and ſuch as are fitting for the Ambaſſador of ſo great a Prince. And if his Eminency has a mind to ſee the environs of Prato, you, the Chief Magiſtrate of the ſaid town, are to take care that he be attended in a proper manner, and that all manner of honour and reſpect be ſhewn him, as he juſtly deſerves, according to the inſtructions we have given to the bearer of this, which he will communicate more fully to you by word of mouth. Farewel, 18 March, 1511.

We would not willingly deprive the Public of the following Letter, written by Machiavel, and tranſmitted to us by a perſon of learning in Italy, though it is upon a Subject very different from the reſt.

LET-

LETTER XL.

Nicholas Machiavel to his excellent Friend Alamanno Salviato, greeting.

YOU may here read, ſince you deſired it, my dear Alamanno, the ſufferings of Italy during the courſe of ten years, and the fruits of my labours for fifteen days: but I know very well you will have no pleaſure either in one or the other; ſince you muſt be moved with compaſſion at the misfortunes of your Country, and entertain ſome pity for me who have attempted a recital of ſo many great events in ſo narrow a compaſs. Yet I am aſſured you will bear with both, as the former were owing to fatal neceſſity, and the latter to the ſhortneſs of the few intervals of leiſure that fall to my ſhare: and as you nobly ſupport one of the chief members of your Country in its liberties, I hope you will alſo kindly vouchſafe your aſſiſtance to the reciter of its troubles, by poliſhing my verſes in ſuch a manner as may make them worthy of your acceptance, and the greatneſs of the ſubject. Farewel, ix November, M.D.IIII. [*n*]

[*n*] The original of this letter is in the Medicean Library at Florence, Cod. xlii. Membr. in 8o, Pl. xliv. It was written by Machiavel to Salviati, when he ſent him his two Poems, called *i Decennali*; the former of which begins in this manner,

Io canterò l'Italiche fatiche
Seguite gia ne' duo paſſati luſtri,
Sotto le Stelle al ſuo bene inimiche, &c.

The latter thus:

Gli accidenti e caſi furioſi
Che in dieci anni ſeguenti ſono ſtati,
Poiche tacendo la penna repoſi;
Le mutation de Regni, Imperii e Stat
Seguiti pur per l'Italico ſito,
Dal conſiglio divin predeſtinati,
Canterò io, &c.

The END of the LETTERS.

A Copy of what is prefixed to the Regiſter, in which all the Letters that were written by the Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence are preſerved in the Chancery of that City [o].

In Dei nomine Amen. Anno Domini noſtri Jeſu Chriſti ab ejus ſalutiferâ incarnatione milleſimo quingenteſimo undecimo, Indictione quarta decimâ [p], diebus vero & menſibus infra ſcriptis.

In hoc ſequenti chartarum numero præſentis Regiſtri, ſcribentur omnes & ſingulæ Deliberationes pertinentes & expectantes ad officium ſecundæ Cancelleriæ Magnificorum Dominorum D. Priorum libertatis & Vexilliferi juſtitiæ perpetui Populi Florentini rogatæ & publicatæ per me Nicolaum Domini Bernardi de Maclavellis unum ex Cancellariis præfatæ Dominationis exiſtentibus de dictis Dominis.

Johanne Franciſco Bartolomei Franciſci de Bramantibus Cino Hieronymi Cini Lucæ Cini	Pro Quart,rio S. Spiritus.
Bernardo Hieronymi Matthæi de Morellis Angelo Andreoli alterius Andreoli de Sacchettis	Pro Quart,rio S. Crucis.
Alberto Cantis Johannis de Compagnis Pieradovardo Hieronymi Adovardi de Giacchinottis	Pro Quart,tio S. M. Nouvellæ.
Lactantio Franciſci Papi de Thedaldis Johanne Philippi Johannis de Cappellis	Pro Quart,rio S. Johannis.

Petro Domini Tommaſii Laurentii de Soderinis Vexillifero juſtitiæ perpetuo Populi Florentini.

Here the following note is inſerted in the Margin.

Filius juſtitiæ ſub cujus umbrâ totum Imperium Florentinum feliciſſimum recubat.——

Exiſtente eorum Notario Ser Juliano Johannis Antonji de Valle—— Cancell.——

[o] We cannot ſay much here in praiſe either of the elegance or intelligibility of Machiavel's Latin.

[p] The word *Indictio* ſignifies a period of fifteen years; a way of computing time introduced by Conſtantine the Great.

Die

Die primâ Novembris M.D.XI.

Præfati excelſi Domini in ſufficienti numero congregati, per eorum ſolemne partitum miſſum inter eos ad fabas nigras & albas, & eo quidem obtento ſecundum ordinamenta Civitatis Florentiæ, deliberaverunt per præfatum eorum Cancellarium, ſolutis in primis debitis taxis Communi Florentiæ, poſſint & debeant tradi Litteræ civibus Florentinis euntibus in Capitaneos, Vicarios, Poteſtates, & Caſtellanos; & pari modo Litteræ noſtræ notificatoriæ, Revocationum Bullectinorum, ut moris eſt. Laus Deo.

It appears from the ſame Regiſter, that the Priori and Notary were changed every two months; and that no Public officer was conſtantly employed in the Service of the Republic when theſe Letters were written, except Pietro Soderini, the Gonfalonier, and Niccolò Machiavelli, the Secretary of State.

FINIS.

THE following letter having been printed in all the Editions of the old Tranſlation, it is here given to the reader, though it certainly was not written by Machaivel; it bears date 1537, and his death is placed by all the beſt Hiſtorians in 1530.—There are beſides in it many internal marks, which to the judicious will clearly prove it to be the work of ſome other writer, vainly endeavouring at the ſtile and manner of our excellent author. The letter is indeed a ſpirited and judicious defence of Machiavel and his writings, but it is written in a ſtile too inflated, and is utterly void of that elegance and preciſion which ſo much dinguiſh the works of the Florentine Secretary.

THE

PUBLISHER to the READER,

CONCERNING

The following LETTER.

COURTEOUS READER,

IT hath been uſual with moſt of thoſe who have tranſlated this Author into any Language, to ſpend much of their time and paper in taxing his impieties, and confuting his errors and falſe principles, as they are pleaſed to call them. If, upon peruſal of his Writings, I had found him guilty of any thing that could deceive the ſimple, or prejudice the reſt of mankind, I ſhould not have put thee to the hazard of reading him in thy own Language; but rather have ſuffered him ſtill to ſleep in the obſcurity of his own, than endanger the world; but being very well aſſured of the contrary, and that the Age will rather receive advantage than damage by this Publication, I did yet think that it was fit to ſay ſomething in a Preface to vindicate our Author from thoſe Slanders, which Prieſts and other biaſed Pens have laid upon him; but ſtill I thought, that it might prove a bold and preſumptuous undertaking, and might excite laughter, for a perſon of my ſmall parts

and abilities to Apologize for one of the greateſt Wits and profoundeſt Judgments that ever lived amongſt the Moderns: In this perplexity, I had the good fortune to meet with this Letter of his own writing; which hath delivered me from thoſe ſcruples, and furniſhed me with an opportunity of juſtifying this great perſon by his own pen. Receive then this choice Piece with benignity; it hath never before been publiſhed in any Language, but lurked for above 80 *years*, in the private Cabinets of his own Kindred, and the Deſcendants of his own admirers in Florence, till in the beginning of the Pontificat of Urban VIII. it was procured by the Jeſuits and other buſy-bodies, and brought to Rome with an intention to divert that wiſe Pope from his deſign of making one of *Nicholas Machiavel*'s Name and Family Cardinal, as (notwithſtanding all their oppoſition) he did, not long after. When it was gotten into that City, it wanted not thoſe who had the judgment and curioſity to copy it, and ſo at length came to enjoy that privilege which all rare Pieces (even the ſharpeſt Libels and Paſquils) challenge in that Court, which is to be ſold to Strangers, one of which being a Gentleman of this Country, brought it over with him at his return from thence in the year 1645, and having tranſlated it into Engliſh, did communicate it to divers of his friends, and by means of ſome of them, it hath been my good fortune to be capable of making thee a preſent of it; and let it ſerve as an Apology for our Author and his Writings, if thou thinkeſt he need any. I muſt confeſs I believe his Works require little, but rather praiſe and admiration; yet I wiſh I could as well juſtify one undertaking of his not long after the writing of this Letter; for we find in the Story of thoſe times, that in the Month of Auguſt following, in the ſame year 1537, this *Nicolo Machiavelli* (except there were another of that name) was committed Priſoner to the Bargello, amongſt thoſe who were taken in Arms againſt Coſimo at the Caſtle of Montemurli, notwithſtanding all his Compliments in this Letter to that Prince, and profeſſed Obligations to him. If this be ſo, we muſt impute it to his too great zeal to concur with the deſires of the univerſality at that time, in reſtoring the liberty of their Country, which hath ſo far dazzled the judgments even of great and wiſe men, that thou ſeeſt many grave Authors amongſt the Ancients have even commended and deified the ingratitude and Treachery of Brutus and Caſſius. But certainly this crime of his would have been much more unpardonable, if he had lived to ſee his own Propheſy fulfilled in the Perſons and Deſcendants of this great Coſimo, for there was never any ſucceſſion of Princes ſince the world began, in which all the Royal virtues and other qualities neceſſary to thoſe who rule over men, were more eminently perſpicuous than in every individual

individual of this line; ſo that thoſe people have as little cauſe as ever any had to lament the change of their Government; their great Dukes having been truly Fathers of their Country, and treated their Subjects like Children, though their power be above all limitation, above all fundamental Laws; but they, having no Law, are a Law to themſelves. I cannot chuſe but inſtance in ſome few of their Benefits to their people; firſt, the making the River Arno Navigable from Piſa to Florence in a year of Dearth, that ſo the Poor might be ſet on work and have Bread, and the Traffick of both Cities infinitely facilitated; their making at their own charge a Canal from Livorne to Piſa; their erecting at Piſa a famous Univerſity, paying the Profeſſors, who are eminent for Learning, and diſcharging all other incidencies out of their own Revenue, beſides the raiſing ſtately Buildings for Schools and Libraries; their founding a renowned Order of Knighthood, and keeping the Chapter in the ſame City, and ordering a conſiderable number of Knights conſtantly to reſide there, both which were intended and performed by them, to encreaſe the concourſe, and reſtore the wealth to the once opulent Inhabitants of that place; their new building, fortifying and enfranchizing Livorne, that, even by the aboliſhing their own Cuſtoms, they might enrich their Subjects, and make that Port (as it now is) the Magazine of all the Levant Trade; and laſtly, their not having in 140 years ever levied any new Tax upon their people, excepting in the year 1642, to defend the Liberties of Italy againſt the Barbarini. Theſe things would merit a Panegyric, if either my parts, or this ſhort Advertiſement, would admit it. I ſhall conclude then, after I have borne a juſt and dutiful teſtimony to the merits of the Prince who now governs that State, in whom (if all the Princely virtues and endowments ſhould be loſt) they might be found and reſtored again to the world; as ſome ingenious Artiſts in the laſt Age retrieved the Art of Sculpture by certain *bas relievos* remaining on ſome Pillars and Walls at Rome; the Prudence, Magnanimity, Charity, Liberality, and above all, the Humanity, Courteſy, and Affability of this Prince, though they exceed my expreſſions, yet they are ſufficiently known, not only to his own Subjects (the conſtant objects of his care and goodneſs) but even to all Strangers, more particularly to our Nation, he having undertaken a troubleſome Journey to viſit this Kingdom, and to make it a witneſs and partaker of his tranſcendent generoſity and bounty, which he hath continued ever ſince, as can be teſtified by all who have had the honour to wait upon him in his own Country, or the good fortune but to ſee him in ours. I myſelf, who have been ſo happy to be admitted into his preſence, and have been honoured ſince in having his Highneſs my cuſtomer for many choice Books, to encreaſe (not his knowledge,

for that is beyond receiving any addition by Books) but his curiosity, and his Library, do think myself bound in Duty to take this poor opportunity of testifying my gratitude and devotion to this excellent Prince. As to this Letter, I have nothing more to say, but that thou mayest see how right this Author was set in Principles of Religion, before he could have the information, which we have had since from the Pens of most learned and rational Controversists in those points, and therefore thou mayest admire the sagacity of his Judgment. Read him then, and serve God, thy King, and thy Country, with the knowledge he will teach thee. Farewel.

NICHO-

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL's

LETTER

TO

ZANOBIUS BUONDELMONTIUS

IN

VINDICATION of himſelf and his WRITINGS.

THE Diſcourſe we had lately (dear Zenobio) in the delightful Gardens of our old deceaſed Friend Coſimo Rucellai, and the preſſing importunity of Guilio Salviati, that I would uſe ſome means to wipe off the many aſperſions caſt upon my Writings, gives you the preſent trouble of reading this Letter, and me the pleaſure of writing it; which laſt would be infinitely greater, if I were not at this day too old, and too inconſiderable, and by the change of our Government wholly incapable, of performing, either with my brain or my hand, any further ſervice to my Country; for it hath ever been my opinion,

opinion, that whoſoever goes about to make men publicly acquainted with his actions, or apologize to the world for imputations laid upon him, cannot be excuſed from vanity and impertinence, except his parts and opportunities be ſuch, as may enable him to be inſtrumental for the good of others, and that he cannot atchieve that excellent end, without juſtifying himſelf from having any indirect and baſe ones, and procuring truſt from men, by clearing the repute of his juſtice and integrity to them. But although this be far from my caſe; yet I have yielded (you ſee) to the entreaty of Guilio and the reſt of that Company, not only becauſe I am ſufficiently (both by the reſtraint of our Preſs, and the diſcretion of the perſon I write to) aſſured that this Letter will never be made public; but for that I eſteem it a Duty to clear that excellent Society from the Scandal of having ſo dangerous and pernicious a perſon to be a member of their converſation; for by reaſon of my Age, and ſince the Loſs of our Liberty, and my ſufferings under that Monſter of luſt and cruelty Alexander de Medici, ſet over us by the Divine vengeance for our ſins, I can be capable of no other deſign or enjoyment, than to delight, and be delighted, in the company of ſo many choice and virtuous perſons, who now aſſemble themſelves with all ſecurity, under the happy and hopeful Reign of our new Prince, Coſimo, and we may ſay, that though our Commonwealth be not reſtored, our ſlavery is at an end, and that he coming in by our own choice, may prove (if I have as good Skill in Propheſying as I have had formerly) Anceſtor to many renowned Princes, who will govern this State in great quietneſs, and with great clemency; ſo that our Poſterity is like to enjoy eaſe and ſecurity, though not that greatneſs, wealth, and glory, by which our City hath for ſome years paſt (even in the moſt factious and tumultuous times of our Democracy) given Law to Italy, and bridled the ambition of foreign Princes. But, that I may avoid the Loquacity incident to old men, I will come to the buſineſs. If I remember well, the exceptions that are taken to theſe poor things I have publiſhed, are reducible to three.

Firſt, *That in all my Writings, I inſinuate my great affection to the Democratical Government, even ſo much as to undervalue that of Monarchy in reſpect of it, which laſt I do, not obſcurely, in many paſſages teach, and as it were, perſuade the People to throw off.*

Next, *That in ſome places I vent very great impieties, ſlighting and vilifying the Church, as Author of all the miſgovernment in the world, and by ſuch contempt make way for Atheiſm and Prophaneneſs.*

And

And Laſtly, *That in my Book of* the Prince *I teach Monarchs all the execrable Villainies that can be invented, and inſtruct them how to break faith, and to oppreſs and enſlave their Subjects,*

I ſhall anſwer ſomething to every one of theſe; and that I may obſerve a right method, will begin with the firſt.

Having lived in an Age when our poor Country and Government have ſuffered more changes and revolutions, than ever did perhaps befal any people in ſo ſhort a time, and having had, till the taking of Florence, my ſhare in the managing of affairs, during almoſt all theſe alterations, ſometimes in the quality of Secretary of our City, and ſometimes employed in Embaſſages abroad, I ſet myſelf to read the Hiſtories of Ancient and Modern times, that I might by that means find out whether there had not been in all Ages the like viciſſitudes and accidents in State affairs, and to ſearch out the cauſes of them, and having in ſome ſort ſatisfied myſelf therein, I could not abſtain from ſcribbling ſomething of the two chief kinds of Government, Monarchy and Democracy, of which all other forms are but mixtures; and ſince neither my Parts nor Learning could arrive to follow the ſteps of the Ancients, by writing according to Method and Art, as Plato, Ariſtotle, and many others have done upon this Subject, I did content myſelf to make ſlight obſervations upon both; by giving a bare Character of a Prince, as to the Monarchical frame; and as to the popular, chuſing the perfecteſt and moſt ſucceſsful of all Governments of that kind upon earth, and in my Diſcourſes upon it, following the order of my Author, without ever taking upon me to argue problematically, much leſs to decide which of theſe two Governments is the beſt. If from my way of handling matters in my diſcourſes upon Livy, and from thoſe incomparable virtues and great actions we read of in that Hiſtory, and from the obſervations I make, men will conclude (which is, I muſt confeſs my opinion) that the excellency of thoſe Counſels and Atchievements, and the improvements which Mankind, and, if I may ſo ſay, human nature itſelf obtained amongſt the Romans, did proceed naturally from their Government, and was but a plain effect and conſequence of the perfection of their Commonwealth; I ſay, if Readers will thus judge, how can I in reaſon be accuſed for that? It would become thoſe who lay this blame upon me to undeceive them whom my Papers have miſſed, and to ſhew the world to what other cauſes we may impute thoſe admirable effects, thoſe Heroic qualities and performances, that integrity and purity of manners, that ſcorning of riches and life itſelf, when the public was concerned: If they pleaſe to do this, they will ob[illegible]

my Readers, who will owe to ſuch the rectifying their judgments, and not at all offend me, who have reaſoned this matter impartially and without paſſion, nor have poſitively affirmed any thing. But what if this part of my accuſation had been true? Why ſhould I be condemned of Hereſy or indiſcretion for preferring a Commonwealth before a Monarchy? Was I not born, bred, and employed in a City, which being at the time I writ, under that form of Government, did owe all wealth and greatneſs, and all proſperity to it? If I had not very deſignedly avoided all dogmaticalneſs in my obſervations (being not willing to imitate young Scholars in their Declamations) I might eaſily have concluded from the premiſes I lay down, that a Democracy, founded upon good order, is the beſt and moſt excellent Government, and this without the leaſt fear of confutation; for I firmly believe, that there are none but Flatterers and Sophiſters would oppoſe me, ſuch as will wreſt Ariſtotle, and even Plato himſelf, to make them write for Monarchy, by miſapplying ſome looſe paſſages in thoſe great Authors: nay, they will tell their Readers, that what is moſt like the Government of the world by God is the beſt, which wholly depends upon his abſolute power. To make this compariſon run with four feet, theſe Sycophants muſt give the poor Prince they intend to deify, a better and ſuperior Nature to humanity, muſt create a neceſſary dependance of all Creatures upon him, muſt endow him with infinite wiſdom and goodneſs, and even with omnipotency itſelf. It will be hard for any man to be miſled in this Argument by proofs wreſted from Theology, ſince whoſoever reads attentively the Hiſtorical part of the Old Teſtament, ſhall find that God himſelf never made but one Government for men; that this Government was a Commonwealth (wherein the Sanhadrim or Senate, and the Congregation or popular Aſſembly, had their ſhare) and that he manifeſted his high diſpleaſure when the rebellious people would turn it into a Monarchy; but that I may not ſtrike upon the rock I profeſs to ſhun, I ſhall paſs to that which is indeed fit to be wiped off, and which if it were true, would not only juſtly expoſe me to the hatred and vengeance of God, and all good men, but even deſtroy the deſign and purpoſe of all my Writings, which is to treat in ſome ſort (as well as one of my ſmall parts can hope to do) of the politics; and how can any man pretend to write concerning Policy, who deſtroys the moſt eſſential part of it, which is obedience to all Governments? It will be very eaſy then for Guilio Salviati, or any other member of our Society, to believe the Proteſtation I make, that the animating of private men either directly or indirectly to diſobey, much leſs to ſhake off, any Government, how deſpotical ſoever, was never in my Thoughts or Writings; thoſe who are unwilling to give credit to this, may take the pains to aſſign in any of my Books, the paſſages they imagine to tend

that

that way, (for I can think of none myſelf) that ſo I may give ſuch perſon more particular ſatisfaction. I muſt confeſs I have a diſcourſe in one of my Books, to encourage the Italian Nation to aſſume their ancient valour, and to expel the Barbarians, meaning (as the ancient Romans uſed the word) all Strangers from amongſt us; but that was before the Kings of Spain had quiet poſſeſſion of the Kingdom of Naples, or the Emperor of the Dutchy of Milan; ſo that I could not be interpreted to mean that the people of thoſe two Dominions ſhould be ſtirred up to ſhake off their Princes, becauſe they were Foreigners, ſince at that time Lodovic Sforza was in poſſeſſion of the one, and K. Frederic reſtored to the other, both Natives of Italy; but my deſign was to exhort our Countrymen not to ſuffer this Province to be the Scene of the Arms and ambition of Charles the VIII. or K. Lewis his Succeſſor, who when they had a mind to renew the old Title of the Houſe of Anjou to the Kingdom of Naples, came with ſuch force into Italy, that not only our Goods were plundered, and our Lands waſted, but even the liberty of our Cities and Governments endangered, but to unite and oppoſe them, and to keep this Province in the hands of Princes of our own Nation: this my intention is ſo viſible in the Chapter itſelf, that I need but refer you to it. Yet that I may not anſwer this imputation barely by denying, I ſhall aſſert in this place what my principles are in that which the world calls Rebellion, which I believe to be not only riſing in Arms againſt any Government we live under, but to acknowledge that word to extend to all clandeſtine Conſpiracies too, by which the peace and quiet of any Country may be interrupted, and by conſequence the Lives and Eſtates of innocent perſons endangered. Rebellion then, ſo deſcribed, I hold to be the greateſt crime that can be committed amongſt men, both againſt Policy, Morality, and *in foro Conſcientiæ*; but notwithſtanding all this, it is an offence which will be committed whilſt the world laſts, as often as Princes tyrannize, and by enſlaving and oppreſſing their Subjects, make Magiſtracy, which was intended for the benefit of Mankind, prove a Plague and Deſtruction to it; for let the terror and the guilt be ever ſo great, it is impoſſible that human Nature, which conſiſts of paſſion as well as virtue, can ſupport with patience and ſubmiſſion the greateſt cruelty and injuſtice, whenever either the weakneſs of their Princes, the unanimity of the people, or any other favourable accident, ſhall give them reaſonable hopes to mend their condition, and provide better for their own intereſt by inſurrection. So that Princes and States ought, in the Conduct of their Affairs, not only to conſider what their people are bound to ſubmit to, if they were inſpired from Heaven, or were all Moral Philoſophers, but to weigh likewiſe what is probable, *de facto*, to fall out in this corrupt age of the world, and to reflect upon thoſe dangerous Tumults

which have happened frequently not only upon oppreſſion, but even by reaſon of Malverſation, and how ſome Monarchies have been wholly ſubverted and changed into Democracies by the Tyranny of their Princes, as we ſee (to ſay nothing of Rome) the powerful Cantons of Swiſſerland brought by that means, a little before the laſt age, to a conſiderable Commonwealth, courted and ſought to by all the Potentates in Chriſtendom. If Princes will ſeriouſly conſider this matter, I make no queſtion but they will Rule with Clemency and Moderation, and return to that excellent Maxim of the Ancients (almoſt exploded in this Age) that the intereſt of Kings and of their people is the ſame, which truth it hath been the whole deſign of my Writings to convince them of.

I am charged then, in the ſecond place, with impiety, in villifying the Church, and ſo to make way for Atheiſm. I do not deny but that I have very frequently, in my Writings, laid the blame upon the Church of Rome, not only for all the miſgovernment of Chriſtendom, but even for the depravation and almoſt total deſtruction of the Chriſtian Religion itſelf in this Province; but that this Diſcourſe of mine doth, or can tend to teach men impiety, or to make way for Atheiſm, I peremptorily deny: and although for proof of my innocence herein, I need but refer you and all others to my Papers themſelves, as they are now publiſhed (where you will find all my reaſons drawn from experience, and frequent examples cited, which is ever my way of arguing) yet ſince I am put upon it, I ſhall in a few lines make that matter poſſibly a little clearer; and ſhall firſt make proteſtation, that as I do undoubtedly hope, by the merits of Chriſt, and by Faith in him, to attain eternal Salvation; ſo I do firmly believe the Chriſtian profeſſion to be the only true Religion now in the world: next, I am fully perſuaded, that all Divine verities which God then deſigned to teach the world, are contained in the Books of Holy Scripture, as they are now extant and received amongſt us. From them I underſtand that God created man in purity and innocence, and that the firſt of that Species, by their frailty, loſt at once their integrity and their Paradiſe, and intailed ſin and miſery upon their poſterity; that Almighty God, to repair this loſs, did out of his infinite mercy, and with unparalelled grace and goodneſs, ſend his only begotten Son into the world, to teach us new truths, to be a perfect example of virtue, goodneſs, and obedience, to reſtore true Religion, degenerated amongſt the Jews into Superſtition, Formality, and Hypocriſy, to die for the ſalvation of Mankind, and in fine, to give to us the Holy Spirit, to regenerate our Hearts, ſupport our Faith, and lead us unto all Truth. Now if it ſhall appear, that as the luſts of our firſt Parents did at that time diſappoint the good intention of God, in making a pure world, and brought in by their diſobedience

dience the corruptions that are now in it; ſo that ſince likewiſe the Biſhops of Rome, by their inſatiable ambition and avarice, have deſignedly, as much as in them lies, fruſtrated the merciful purpoſe he had, in the happy reſtoration he intended the world by his Son, and in the renewing and reforming of human Nature, and have wholly defaced and ſpoiled Chriſtian Religion, and made it a worldly and a Heatheniſh thing; and altogether uncapable, as it is practiſed amongſt them, either of directing the ways of its Profeſſors to virtue and good life, or of ſaving their Souls hereafter. If, I ſay, this do appear, I know no reaſon why I, for detecting thus much, and for giving warning to the world to take heed of their ways, ſhould be accuſed of Impiety or Atheiſm, or why his Holineſs ſhould be ſo inraged againſt the poor Inhabitants of the Vallies in Savoy, and againſt the Albigeſi, for calling him Antichriſt; but to find that this is an undoubted truth, I mean that the Popes have corrupted the Chriſtian Religion, we need but read the New Teſtament (acknowledged by themſelves to be of infallible truth) and there we ſhall ſee, that the Faith and Religion preached by Chriſt, and ſettled afterwards by his Apoſtles, and cultivated by their Sacred Epiſtles, is ſo different a thing from the Chriſtianity that is now profeſſed and taught at Rome, that we ſhould be convinced, that if thoſe Holy men ſhould be ſent by God again into the world, they would take more pains to confute this Gallimaufry, than ever they did to preach down the Tradition of the Phariſees, or the Fables and Idolatry of the Gentiles; and would in all probability ſuffer a new Martyrdom in that City under the Vicar of Chriſt, for the ſame Doctrine which once animated the Heathen Tyrants againſt them. Nay, we have ſomething more to ſay againſt theſe Sacrilegious pretenders to God's power; for whereas all other falſe worſhips have been ſet up by ſome politic Legiſlators, for the ſupport and preſervation of Government, this falſe, this ſpurious Religion brought in upon the ruins of Chriſtianity by the Popes, hath deformed the face of Government in Europe, deſtroying all the good principles and Morality left us by the Heathens themſelves, and introduced inſtead thereof, Sordid, Cowardly, and impolitic Notions, whereby they have ſubjected Mankind, and even great Princes and States, to their own Empire, and never ſuffered any Orders or Maxims to take place where they have power, that might make a Nation Wiſe, Honeſt, Great or Wealthy. This I have ſet down ſo plainly in thoſe paſſages of my Book which are complained of, that I ſhall ſay nothing at all for the proof of it in this place, but refer you thither, and come to ſpeak a little more particularly of my firſt aſſertion, that the Pope and his Clergy have depraved the Chriſtian Religion. Upon this ſubject I could infinitely wiſh, now Letters begin to revive again, that ſome learned pen would employ itſelf, and that ſome perſon verſed in

the Chronology of the Church (as they call it) would deduce out of the Eccleſiaſtical Writers, the time and manner how theſe abuſes crept in, and by what arts and Steps this Babel that reaches at Heaven, was built by theſe Sons of the Earth; but this matter, as unſuitable to the brevity of a Letter, and indeed more to my ſmall parts and Learning, I ſhall not pretend to, being one who never hitherto ſtudied or writ of Theology, further than it did naturally concern the Politics: therefore I ſhall only deal by the New Teſtament as I have done formerly by Titus Livius; that is, make obſervations or reflections upon it, and leave you and Mr. Guilio, and the reſt of our Society to make the judgment, not citing like Preachers, the Chapter or Verſe; becauſe the reading of Holy Scripture is little uſed, and indeed hardly permitted amongſt us. To begin at the top, I would have any reaſonable man tell me, whence this unmeaſurable power, long claimed, and now poſſeſſed by the Biſhop of Rome, is derived, firſt of being Chriſt's Vicar, and by that (as I may ſo ſay) pretending to a Monopoly of the Holy Spirit (which was promiſed and given to the whole Church; that is, to the Elect or Saints) as is plain by a Clauſe in St. Peter's Sermon, made the very ſame time that the miraculous gifts of the Spirit of God were firſt given to the Apoſtles, who ſays to the Jews and Gentiles; *Repent and be baptizedevery one of you in the name of Jeſus Chriſt for the remiſſion of Sins, and you ſhall receive the gift of the Holy Ghoſt, for this promiſe is to you and to your Children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God ſhall call.* Next, to judge infallibly of Divine Truth, and to forgive Sins as Chriſt did. Then to be the Head of all Eccleſiaſtical perſons and cauſes in the world; to be ſo far above Kings and Princes, as to Judge, Depoſe, and deprive them, and to have an abſolute juriſdiction over all the Affairs in Chriſtendom, *in Ordine ad Spiritualia:* yet all this the Canoniſts allow him, and he makes no ſcruple to aſſume, whilſt it is plain that in the whole New Teſtament there is no deſcription made of ſuch an Officer to be at any time in the Church, except it be in the Prophecy of the Apocalyps, or in one of St. Paul's Epiſtles, where he ſays, *who is it that ſhall ſit in the Temple of God, ſhewing himſelf that he is God.* Chriſt tells us his Kingdom is not of this world; and if any will be the greateſt amongſt his Diſciples, that he muſt be ſervant to the reſt, which ſhews that his followers were to be great in ſanctity and humility, and not in worldly power.

The Apoſtle Paul, writing to the Chriſtians of thoſe times, almoſt in every Epiſtle commands them to be obedient to the higher Powers, or Magiſtrates ſet over them, and St. Peter himſelf (from whom this extravagant Empire is pretended to be derived) in his firſt Epiſtle, bids us ſubmit ourſelves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's ſake, whether

ther it be to the King, or, &c. and this is enjoined, although it is plain, that they who governed the world in thoſe days, were both Heathens, Tyrants, and Uſurpers; and in this ſubmiſſion there is no exception or proviſo for Eccleſiaſtical immunity. The practice as well as Precepts of theſe Holy men ſhew plainly that they had no intention to leave Succeſſors, who ſhould deprive Hereditary Princes from their right of Reigning for differing in Religion, who without all doubt are, by the appointment of the Apoſtle, and by the principles of Chriſtianity, to be obeyed and ſubmitted to (in things wherein the fundamental Laws of the Government give them power) though they were Jews or Gentiles. If I ſhould tell you by what Texts in Scripture the Popes claim the Powers beforementioned, it would ſtir up your laughter, and prove too light for ſo ſerious a matter; yet becauſe poſſibly you may never have heard ſo much of this Subject before, I ſhall inſtance in a few: they tell you therefore that the Juriſdiction they pretend over the Church, and the power of pardoning Sins, comes from Chriſt to St. Peter, and from him to them. *Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church. I will give thee the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; whatſoever thou ſhalt bind on Earth ſhall be bound in Heaven, and whatſoever thou ſhalt looſe on Earth,* &c. From theſe two Texts ridiculouſly applied, comes this great Tree which hath with its Branches overſpread the whole Earth, and killed all the good and wholſome Plants growing upon it; the firſt text will never by any man of ſenſe be underſtood to ſay more, than that the Preaching, Suffering, and Miniſtry of Peter, were like to be a great foundation and Pillar of the Doctrine of Chriſt; the other Text (as alſo another ſpoken by our Saviour to all his Apoſtles, *whoſe ſins ye remit they are remitted, and whoſe ſins ye retain they are retained)* are by all the Primitive fathers interpreted in this manner; whereſoever you ſhall effectually preach the Goſpel, you ſhall carry with you Grace and Remiſſion of Sins to them which ſhall follow your inſtructions; but the people who ſhall not have theſe joyful Tidings communicated by you to them, ſhall remain in darkneſs, and in their Sins. But if any will conteſt, that by ſome of theſe laſt Texts, that Evangelical Excommunication, which was afterwards brought into the Church by the Apoſtles, was here preſignified by our great Maſter, how unlike were thoſe cenſures to thoſe now thundered out (as he calls it) by the Pope? Theſe were for edification, and not deſtruction, to afflict the fleſh for the ſalvation of the Soul; that Apoſtolical ordinance was pronounced for ſome notorious Scandal or Apoſtacy from the Faith, and firſt decreed by the Church; that is, the whole Congregation preſent, and then denounced by the Paſtor, and reached only to debar ſuch perſon from partaking of the Communion or fellowſhip of that Church, till repentance ſhould re-admit him;

followed by no other proſecution or chaſtiſement, as is now practiſed. But ſuppoſe all theſe Texts had been as they would have them, how does this make for the Succeſſors of St. Peter or the reſt? or how can this prove the Biſhops of Rome to have right to ſuch ſucceſſion? But I make haſte from this ſubject, and ſhall urge but one Text more; which is, *The ſpiritual man judgeth all men, but is himſelf judged of none*; from whence is inferred by the Canoniſts, that firſt the Pope is the Spiritual man; and then, that he is to be Judge of all the world; and laſt, that he is never to be liable to any judgment himſelf; whereas it is obvious to the meaneſt underſtanding, St. Paul in this Text means to diſtinguiſh between a perſon inſpired with the Spirit of God, and one remaining in the ſtate of Nature, which latter, he ſays, cannot judge of thoſe Heavenly gifts and graces, as he explains himſelf when he ſays, *The Natural man cannot diſcern the things of the Spirit, becauſe they are fooliſhneſs unto him.* To take my leave of this matter, wholly out of the way of my Studies, I ſhall beg of you Zenobio and of Guilio, and the reſt of our Society, to read over carefully the new Teſtament, and then to ſee what ground there is for Purgatory (by which all the wealth and greatneſs hath accrued to theſe men) what colour for the Idolatrous worſhip of Saints, and their Images, and particularly for ſpeaking in their hymns and prayers to a piece of wood (the Croſs I mean) *Salve Lignum, &c.* and then *fac nos dignos beneficiorum Chriſti*, as you may read in that Office; what colour, or rather what excuſe for that horrid, unchriſtian, and barbarous Engine called the Inquiſition, brought in by the command and authority of the Pope, the Inventor of which, Peter a Dominican Friar having been ſlain amongſt the Albigeſi, as he well deſerved, is now canonized for a Saint, and ſtiled San Pietro Martine. In the dreadful priſons of this Inquiſition, many faithful and pious Chriſtians (to ſay nothing of honeſt Moral Moors or Mahometans) are tormented and famiſhed, or if they outlive their ſufferings, burnt publicly to death, and that only for differing in Religion from the Pope, without having any crime, or the leaſt miſdemeanor proved or alledged againſt them; and this is inflicted upon theſe poor Creatures by thoſe who profeſs to believe the Scripture, which tells us, that *faith is the gift of God*, without whoſe ſpecial illumination no man can obtain it, and therefore is not in reaſon or humanity to be puniſhed for wanting it: and Chriſt himſelf hath ſo clearly decided that point in bidding us let the tares and the wheat grow together till the Harveſt, that I ſhall never make any difficulty to call him Antichriſt, who ſhall uſe the leaſt perſecution whatſoever againſt any differing in matters of faith from himſelf, whether the perſon ſo diſſenting be Heretic, Jew, Gentile, or Mahometan: next, I beſeech you to obſerve in reading that Holy Book (though Chriſtian faſts are doubtleſs of Divine right) what ground there

is for enjoining fiſh to be eaten (at leaſt fleſh to be abſtained from) for one third part of the year, by which they put the poor to great hardſhip, who not having purſes to buy wholſome fiſh, are ſubjected to all the miſeries and diſeaſes incident to a bad and unhealthful diet, whilſt the rich, and chiefly themſelves and their Cardinals, exceed Lucullus in their Luxury, of Oyſters, Turbats, tender Crabs, and Carpioni brought ſome hundreds of miles to feed their gluttony upon theſe penitential days of abſtinence from Beef and Pork. It may be it will lie in the way of thoſe who obſerve this, to enquire what St. Paul means, when he ſays, *That in the latter days ſome ſhall depart from the faith, forbidding to marry, and commanding to abſtain from meats which God hath created to be received with thankſgiving*; but all theſe things, and many other abuſes brought in by theſe Perverters of Chriſtianity, will I hope ere long be enquired into by ſome of the Diſciples of that bold Friar, who the very ſame year in which I propheſied that the ſcourge of the Church was not far off, began to thunder againſt their Indulgencies, and ſince hath queſtioned many tenets long received and impoſed upon the world. I ſhall conclude this diſcourſe, after I have ſaid a word of the moſt Helliſh of all the innovations brought in by the Popes, which is the Clergy; theſe are a ſort of men under pretence of miniſtring to the people in holy things, ſet apart and ſeparated from the reſt of mankind (from whom they have a very diſtinct, and a very oppoſite intereſt) by a human Ceremony called by a divine name, viz. Ordination. Theſe, whereever they are found (with the whole body of the Monks and Friars, who are called the regular Clergy) make a Band which may be called the Janizaries of the Papacy; theſe have been the cauſers of all the Soleciſms and immoralities in Government, and of all the impieties and abominations in Religion, and by conſequence of all the diſorder, villainy, and corruption we ſuffer under in this deteſtable Age; theſe men, by the Biſhop of Rome's help, have crept into all the Governments in Chriſtendom, where there is any mixture of Monarchy, and made themſelves a third eſtate; that is, have by their temporalities (which are almoſt a third part of all the Lands in Europe given them by the blind zeal, or rather folly, of the Northern people, who over-ran this part of the world) ſtept into the throne, and what they cannot perform by theſe ſecular helps, and by the dependancy their vaſſals have upon them, they fail not to claim and to uſurp by the power they pretend to have from God and his Vicegerent at Rome. They exempt themſelves, their Lands and goods, from all ſecular juriſdiction; that is, from all Courts of Juſtice and Magiſtracy, and will be Judges in their own Cauſes, as in matters of tythe, &c. and not content with this, will appoint Courts of their own to decide Sovereignly in teſtamentary matters, and many other cauſes, and take upon them to be ſole Puniſhers of many great Crimes, as Witchcraft, Sorcery, Adultery, and all uncleanneſs,

cleanneſs; to ſay nothing of the forementioned judicatory of the Inquiſition: in theſe laſt caſes they turn the offenders over to be puniſhed (when they have given Sentence) by the ſecular arm, ſo they call the Magiſtrate, who is blindly to execute their decrees under pain of Hell fire; as if Chriſtian Princes and Governors were appointed only by God to be their Bravoes or Hangmen. They give Protection and Sanctuary to all execrable offenders, even to Murderers themſelves (whom God commanded to be indiſpenſably puniſhed with death) if they come within their Churches, Cloyſters, or any other place, which they will pleaſe to call Holy ground; and if the ordinary juſtice, nay, the Sovereign power, do proceed againſt ſuch offender, they thunder out their Excommunication; that is, cut off from the body of Chriſt, not the Prince only, but the whole Nation and People, ſhutting the Church doors, and commanding divine offices to ceaſe, and ſometimes even authorizing the people to riſe up in Arms, and conſtrain their Governors to a ſubmiſſion, as happened to this poor City in the time of our Anceſtors, when for but forbidding the ſervant of a poor Carmelite Friar (who had vowed poverty, and ſhould have kept none) to go armed, and puniſhing his diſobedience with impriſonment, our whole Senate with their Gonfalonier were conſtrained to go to Avignon for abſolution, and in caſe of refuſal, had been maſſacred by the people. It would almoſt aſtoniſh a wiſe man to imagine how theſe folks ſhould acquire an Empire ſo deſtructive to the Chriſtian Religion, and ſo pernicious to the intereſts of men, but it will not ſeem ſo miraculous to them who ſhall ſeriouſly conſider, that the Clergy hath been for more than this thouſand years upon the catch, and a formed united corporation againſt the purity of Religion, and the intereſt of mankind, and have not only wreſted the Holy Scriptures to their own advantage (which they have kept from the laity in unknown languages, and by prohibiting the reading thereof) but made uſe likewiſe, firſt of the blind devotion and ignorance of the Goths, Vandals, Huns, &c. and ſince of the ambition and avarice of Chriſtian Princes, ſtirring them up one againſt another, and ſending them upon fooliſh errands to the Holy Land, to loſe their lives, and to leave their Dominions, in the mean time, expoſed to themſelves and their Complices. They have beſides kept Learning and Knowledge among themſelves, ſtifling the light of the Goſpel, crying down Moral virtues as ſplendid ſins, defacing human policy, deſtroying the purity of the Chriſtian faith and profeſſion, and all that was virtuous, prudent, regular and orderly upon earth; ſo that whoever would do good, and good men ſervice, get himſelf immortal honour in this life, and eternal glory in the next, would reſtore the good policy (I had almoſt ſaid, with my Author Livy, the ſanctity too) of the Heathens, with all their valour, and other glorious endowments; I

ſay,

ſay, whoever would do this, muſt make himſelf powerful enough to extirpate this curſed and apoſtate race out of the world, and that you may ſee this is lawful as well as neceſſary, I ſhall ſay but one word of their calling and original, and then leave this ſubject. The word Clergy is a term wholly unknown to the Scriptures, otherwiſe than in this ſenſe; a peculiar People or God's lot, uſed often for the whole Jewiſh Nation, who are likewiſe called a Kingdom of Prieſts in ſome places. In the New Teſtament, the word Cleros is taken for the true Believers, who are alſo called the Elect, and often the Church, which is the Aſſembly of the faithful met together, as is eaſily ſeen by reading the beginning of moſt of St. Paul's Epiſtles, where writing to the Church or Churches, he uſually explains himſelf, *To all the Saints in Chriſt*; ſometimes, *To all who have obtained like faith with us*; ſometimes, *To all who in all places call upon the Name of the Lord Jeſus, &c.* by which it appears, that neither the word Church or Clergy was in thoſe days ever appropriated to the Paſtors or Elders of the flock; but did ſignify indifferently all the people aſſembled together; which is likewiſe the literal conſtruction of the word Eccleſia, which is an aſſembly or meeting. In theſe Congregations or Churches was performed their Ordination, which properly ſignifies no more than a decree of ſuch Aſſembly; but is particularly uſed for an Election of any into the Miniſtry. The manner was this, ſometimes the Apoſtles themſelves in their Perigrinations, and ſometimes any other eminent Member of the Church, did propoſe to the Society (upon vacancy, or other neceſſity of a Paſtor, Elder, or Deacon) ſome good Holy man to be Elected, which perſon, if he had parts or gifts, ſuch as the Church could edify by, was choſen by the lifting up of hands, that is, by ſuffrage, and oftentimes hands were laid upon him, and Prayer made for him. Theſe men, ſo ſet apart, did not pretend to any conſecration, or ſacredneſs, more than they had before, much leſs to become a diſtinct thing from the reſt of mankind, as if they had been metamorphoſed, but did attend to perform the ſeveral functions of their calling, as propheſying; that is, Preaching the Goſpel, viſiting the ſick, &c. and never intermitted the ordinary buſineſs of their Trade or Profeſſion, unleſs their Church or Congregation was very numerous, in which caſe they were maintained by alms or contribution, which was laid aſide by every member, and collected the firſt day of the week by the Deacons. This was ſaid to be given to the Church, and was employed by ſuffrage of the whole Collective Body to the poor, and to other incidencies; ſo far was it from Sacrilege in thoſe days to employ Church goods to Lay uſes. From theſe words, Church, Clergy, Ordination, Paſtor, (which laſt hath been tranſlated of late years Biſhop) you ſee what concluſions theſe men have deduced, and how immenſe a ſtructure they have raiſed upon ſo little foundation,

and how eaſily it will fall to the ground, when God ſhall inſpire Chriſtian Princes and States to redeem his truths, and his poor enſlaved Members out of their Clutches, to bring back again into the world the true original Chriſtian faith, with the Apoſtolical Churches, Paſtors, and Ordination, ſo conſiſtent with moral virtue and integrity, ſo helpful and conducing to the beſt and moſt prudent Policy, ſo fitted for obedience to Magiſtracy and Government, all which the world hath for many years been deprived of, by the execrable and innate ill quality which is inſeparable from Prieſtcraft, and the conjuration or ſpell of their new invented ordination; by which they cry with the Poet,

Jam furor humanum noſtro de pectore ſenſum
Expulit & totum ſpirant præcordia Phœbum;

which makes them ſo Sacred and Holy, that they have nothing of integrity, or indeed of humanity, left in them. I hope I ſhall not be thought impious any longer upon this point; I mean, for vindicating Chriſtian Religion from the aſſaults of theſe men, who having the confidence to believe, or at leaſt profeſs themſelves the only inſtruments which God hath choſen, or can chooſe, to teach and reform the world (though they have neither Moral virtues, nor Natural parts equal to other men for the moſt part) have by this pretence prevailed ſo far upon the common ſort of people, and upon ſome too of a better quality, that they are perſuaded their ſalvation or eternal damnation depends upon believing or not believing what they ſay. I would not be underſtood to diſſuade any from honouring the true Apoſtolical Teachers, when they ſhall be re-ſtabliſhed amongſt us, or from allowing them (even of right, and not of alms or courteſy) ſuch emoluments as may enable them chearfully to perform the duties of their charge, to provide for their Children, and even to uſe hoſpitality as they are commanded by St. Paul. But this I will propheſy before I conclude, that if Princes ſhall perform this buſineſs by halves, and leave any root of this Clergy or Prieſtcraft, as it now is, in the ground; or if that famous reformer fled ſome years ſince out of Picardy to Geneva, who is of ſo great renown for learning and parts, and who promiſes us ſo perfect a reformation, ſhall not in his model wholly extirpate this ſort of men, then I ſay I muſt foretel, that as well the Magiſtrate as this Workman, will find themſelves deceived in their expectation, and that the leaſt fibra of this plant will over-run again the whole Vineyard of the Lord, and turn to a diffuſive Papacy in every Diocefe, perhaps in every Pariſh: So that God in his mercy inſpire them to cut out the core of the ulcer, and the bag of this impoſtume, that it may never ranckle or feſter any more, nor break out hereafter, to diffuſe new corruption

and

and putrefaction through the body of Chriſt, which is his Holy Church, nor to vitiate and infect the good order and true policy of Government.

I come now to the laſt branch of my charge, which is, that I teach Princes villainy, and how to enſlave and oppreſs their Subjects, in which accuſation I am dealt with as poor Agnollo Canini was, who, as they report, being a very learned Practiſer of the Laws, and left the only man of this profeſſion (one Autumn) in our City, the reſt of the Advocates being fled into the Country for fear of a contagious Diſeaſe which then reigned, was commanded by our Judges to aſſiſt with his Counſel both parties, and to draw Pleas as well for the Defendant as the Plaintiff, elſe the Courts of Juſtice muſt have been ſhut up. In the ſame manner my accuſers handle me, and make me firſt exhort and teach Subjects to throw off their Princes, and then to inſtruct Monarchs how to enſlave and oppreſs them; but I did not expect ſuch ingratitude from mine own Citizens, or to be ſerved as Moſes was, when he was upbraided for killing the Egyptian, by one of his own people, for whoſe ſake he had done it; whereas he believed they would have underſtood by that action, that he was the perſon whom God intended to make uſe of in delivering them from the horrid ſlavery they were then under. If any man will read over my Book of the Prince with impartiality and ordinary charity, he will eaſily perceive, that it is not my intention therein to recommend that Government, or thoſe men there deſcribed to the world; much leſs to teach them to trample upon good men, and all that is ſacred and venerable upon earth, Laws, Religion, Honeſty, and what not; if I have been a little too punctual in deſigning theſe Monſters, and drawn them to the life in all their lineaments and colours, I hope mankind will know them, the better to avoid them, my Treatiſe being both a Satire againſt them, and a true Character of them; I ſpeak nothing of great and honourable Princes, as the Kings of France, England, and others, who have the States and Orders of their Kingdoms with excellent Laws and Conſtitutions to found and maintain their Government, and who reign over the hearts as well as the perſons of their ſubjects; I treat only of thoſe vermin bred out of the corruption of our own ſmall Commonwealths and Cities, or engendered by the ill blaſts that come from Rome, Olivaretto da Fermo, Borgia, the Baglioni, the Bentivoglii, and a hundred others; who having had neither right nor honourable means to bring them to their power, uſe it with more violence, rapine, and cruelty upon the poor people, than thoſe other renowned Princes ſhew to the Boars, the Wolves, the Foxes, and other ſavage beaſts which are the objects of their chaſe and hunting. Whoſoever in his Empire over men is tied to no other rules than thoſe of his own will and luſt, muſt either be a Saint to moderate his paſ-

ſions, or elſe a very Devil incarnate; or if he be neither of theſe, both his life and reign are like to be very ſhort; for whoſoever takes upon him ſo execrable an employment as to rule men againſt the Laws of nature and of reaſon, muſt turn all topſy turvy, and never ſtick at any thing, for if once he halt, he will fall and never riſe again. I hope after this I need ſay little to juſtify myſelf from the calumny of adviſing theſe Monſters to break their faith, ſince to keep it is to loſe their Empire, faithfulneſs and ſincerity being their mortal enemies. Ugucceone della Faggivola to one who upbraided him, that he never employed honeſt men, anſwered, *Honeſt men will cut my throat, let the King uſe honeſt men*, meaning the King of Naples, who was eſtabliſhed in his Throne, and had right to it. But that I may have occaſion to juſtify myſelf againſt a little more than I am accuſed of, I will confeſs, that in a work where I deſired to be a little more ſerious than I was in this Book of the Prince, I did affirm, that in what way ſoever men defended their Country, whether by breaking or keeping their faith, it was ever well defended, not meaning in a ſtrict moral ſenſe, or point of honour, but explaining myſelf that *de facto* the infamy of the breach of word would quickly be forgotten and pardoned by the world, which is very true: nay, what if I had ſaid that good ſucceſs in any enterprize (a far leſs conſideration than Piety to our Country), would have cancelled the blame of ſuch perfidy as Cæſar (whom I compare to Cataline) uſed towards his fellow-citizen, not only not deteſted by poſterity, but even crowned with renown and immortal fame; inſomuch as Princes to this day (as I have obſerved elſewhere) think it an honour to be compared to him, and the higheſt pitch of veneration their flatterers can arrive at, is to call them by the name of one who violated his faith, and enſlaved his Country. I hope that in ſhewing as well theſe Tyrants as the poor people who are forced to live under them, their danger, that is, by laying before the former the helliſh and precipitous courſes they muſt uſe to maintain their power, by repreſenting to the latter what they muſt ſuffer, I may be inſtrumental, firſt, to deter private Citizens from attempting upon the liberties of their Country; or if they have done it, to make them lay down their ill gotten authority; and then to warn the reſt of the Nobility and people from theſe factions and malignancies in their ſeveral Commonwealths and Governments, which might give hope and opportunity to thoſe who are ambitious amongſt them, to aſpire to an Empire over them. However it prove, I hope I am no more to be blamed for my attempt, than that excellent Phyſician of our Nation is, who hath lately taken ſo much pains to compoſe an excellent Treatiſe, of that foul Diſeaſe which was, not long ſince, brought from the new world into theſe parts; wherein though he be forced to uſe ſuch expreſſions as are almoſt able to nauſeate his Readers,

and

and talk of ſuch Ulcers, Boils, Nodes, Blotches, Cankers, &c. that are ſcarce fit to be repeated, eſpecially when he handles the cauſes of thoſe effects, yet he did not intend to teach or exhort men to get this Diſeaſe; much leſs did he bring this lamentable infirmity into the world, but deſcribes it faithfully as it is, to the end men may be bettered, and avoid the being infected with it, and may diſcern and cure it, whenever their incontinence and folly ſhall procure it them. I ſhall ſay no more in this matter; but to conclude all make a proteſtation, that as well in this Book, as in all my other Writings, my only ſcope and deſign is to promote the intereſt and welfare of mankind, and the peace and quiet of the world, both which, I am ſo vain as to believe, would be better obtained and provided for, if the principles I lay down were followed and obſerved by Princes and People, than they are like to be by thoſe Maxims which are in this Age moſt in vogue. For myſelf, I ſhall only ſay (and call you all to witneſs for the truth of it) that as by my Birth I am a Gentleman, and of a Family which hath had many Gonfaloniers of Juſtice in it; ſo I have been uſed in many employments of great truſt, both in our City and abroad, and at this hour I am not in my Eſtate one penny the better for them all, nor ſhould I have been, although I had never ſuffered any loſſes by the ſeizure of my Eſtate in the year 1531. For my carriage, it hath ever been void of faction and contention; I never had any prejudice againſt the Houſe of Medici, but honoured the perſons of all thoſe of that Family whom I knew, and the memory of ſuch of them as lived before me, whom I acknowledge to have been excellent Patriots and Pillars of our City and Commonwealth. During the turbulent times of Piero, and after his expulſion out of Florence, though my employments were but Miniſterial, my advice was aſked in many grave matters, which I ever delivered with impartiality and indifference, not eſpouſing the heady opinions of any, much leſs their paſſions and animoſities; I never ſided with any Party further than that the Duty of my charge obliged me to ſerve the prevailing Party, when poſſeſſed of the Government of our City; this I ſpeak for thoſe changes which happened between the flight of the ſaid Piero de Medici, and the horrid Paricide committed by Clement VII. upon his indulgent Mother, joining with his greateſt enemies, and uniting himſelf with thoſe who had uſed the moſt tranſcendent inſolence to his own perſon, and the higheſt violence and fury the Sun ever ſaw to his poor Courtiers and Subjects, that ſo accompanied he might ſheath his Sword in the bowels of his own deſolate Country. At that time, and during that whole Siege, I muſt confeſs I did break the confines of my Neutrality, and not only acted as I was commanded barely, but rouzed myſelf, and ſtirred up others, haranguing (in the

Streets

Streets and places of the City) the People to defend with the laſt drop of their blood, the Walls of their Country, and the Liberty of their Government; taking very hazardous Journies to Feruccio, and then into the Mugello and other parts, to bring in Succours and Proviſions to our languiſhing City; and acting as a Soldier (which was a new profeſſion to me) at the age of above ſixty, when others are diſpenſed from it. For all which, I had ſo entire a ſatisfaction in my mind and conſcience, that I am perſuaded this cordial made me able to ſupport the ſufferings which befel me after our Cataſtrophe, and to rejoice in them ſo far, that all the malice and cruelty of our enemies could never draw one word from me unſuitable to the honour I thought I merited, and did in ſome ſort enjoy, for being inſtrumental to defend (as long as it was poſſible) our Altars and our Hearths. But all that I have undergone, hath been abundantly recompenced to me by the favour and courteſy of the moſt excellent Signior Coſimo, who hath been pleaſed to offer me all the preferments the greateſt ambition could aſpire to, which I did not refuſe out of any ſcruple to ſerve ſo incomparable a Prince, whoſe early years manifeſt ſo much Courage, Humanity, and Prudence, and ſo Fatherly a care of the public good, but becauſe I was very deſirous not to accept of a charge which I was not able to perform, my years and infirmities having now brought me to a condition in which I am fitter to live in a Cloyſter than a Palace, and made me good for nothing but to talk of paſt times, the common vice of old Age: So that I did not think it juſt or grateful to reward this excellent perſon ſo ill for his kindneſs, as to give him a uſeleſs Servant, and to fill up the place of a far better. This is all I think fit to ſay of this matter, I chuſe to addreſs it to you, Zenobio, for the conſtant friendſhip I have ever entertained with you, and formerly with your deceaſed Father, the companion of my Studies, and ornament of our City. And ſo I bid you farewel.

The firſt of April, 1537.

To this Vindication of Machiavel, it has been thought neceſſary to ſubjoin the following ſatisfactory account of its Writer (which we have received ſince the Impreſſion) extracted from a letter written by the right Reverend and moſt learned Biſhop of Glouceſter, and communicated by a Gentleman equally eminent for elegance and humanity.

THE anecdote you inquire after I preſume is this, and is at your Friend's ſervice.

There is at the end of the Engliſh tranſlation of Machiavel's works, printed in Folio, 1680, a tranſlation of a pretended Letter of Machiavel, to Zenobius Buondelmontius, in vindication of himſelf and his Writings. I believe it has been generally underſtood to be a feigned thing, and has by ſome been given to Nevil, he who wrote, if I be not miſtaken, the *Plato redivivus.* But, many years ago a number of the famous Marquis of Wharton's papers [the Father of the Duke] were put into my hands. Amongſt theſe was the preſs-copy (as appeared by the printer's marks, where every page of the printed Letter begun and ended) of this remarkable Letter, in the Marquis's hand-writing, as I took it to be, compared with other papers of his. The perſon who intruſted me with theſe papers, and who, I underſtood, had given them to me, called them back out of my hands.—This anecdote I communicated to the late Speaker: and at his deſire wrote down the ſubſtance of what I here tell you, in his Book of the above Edition.

I am, dear Sir,

With the trueſt regard and Affection,

Your moſt faithful, and

Aſſured Friend and humble Servant,

Prior Park,
May 17, 752.

W. GLOUCESTER.

The END of VOL. II.